NORTH AFRICA: THE POWER EQUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201760001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP86T01017R000201760001-4
of
EXTERNAL:
1 - Howard Teicher, NSC
1 - Elaine Morton, NSC
1 - Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
1 - Lieutenant General, James A. Williams, Pentagon
1 - Lieutenant General, Dale A. Vesser, Pentagon
1 - James L. Woods, Pentagon
1 - Sandra Chrales, Pentagon
1 - Arnold Raphel, State Department
1 - R.Rand Beers,'State Department
1 - Patrick N. Theros, State Department
1 - David E. Zweifel, State Department
1 - Peter Rodman, State Department
1 - Morton I. Abramowitz, State Department
1 - Roger Merrick, State Department
INTERNAL:
1 - DDI
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NIO/AFR
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M
Jan 86 25X1
DATE
DOC NO I-1E:SA M Sic Z=
OCR 3
P&PD I
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 January 1986
North Africa: The Power Equation
Summary
The two major alliances of North Africa are undergoing
internal strains which could lead to a shift in the balance
of power in the Maghreb. Morocco's King Hassan and Libyan
leader Qadhafi are increasingly dissatisfied with-the
implementation of their union; longstanding differences
among Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania have prevented their
loose pact from taking root. We do not anticipate a
dissolution of the current groupings in the near term,
but friction, if unchecked, could lead the countries to
realign their foreign policies. Tentative signs are that
change in the alliances would involve rapprochement between...
Algeria and Libya and possibly expanded ties between Morocco
and Tunisia. We believe Algeria and Libya are the most
likely countries to benefit from any major changes, while
Morocco and Tunisia would be more isolated and vulnerable.
Overall, the balance of power in the Maghreb would not
change appreciably, unless in the unlikely event that Algeria
and Libya form some sort of an alliance. Such shifts in the
region would provide opportunities for Moscow to expand??i.ts
influence and produce mixed results for Washington.
Since late 1984, the two North African groupings -- the
Arab-African Union of Morocco and Libya and the loose coalition of
Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania--have sparred for advantages. Both
This memorandum was prepared by
the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of 25X1
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of
10 January 1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments
should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
25X1
NESA M,#8,6-20005
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alliances are built on the sand of profound differences and old
rivalries between partners. Historically, Morocco's King Hassan and
Tunisia's President Bourguiba have been strongly oriented toward the
West, Algeria has been among the foremost proponents of radical
socialism, and Qadhafi has peddled his Green Book and brazenly
meddled in other countries affairs. 25X1
Fissures in the Alliances
During recent months there have been indications of tensions
within these two alliances. Libyan leader Qadhafi is disappointed
with his union with Morocco, even though it is a gambit that so far
has entailed few costs for him. Qadhafi is particularly frustrated
with Morocco's reluctance to cooperate on defense as called for in
the treaty establishing the union, and by Rabat's refusal to provide
embargoed spare parts for Libya's inventory of US-manufactured
aircraft. He is also angered by Hassan's refusal to come to Tripoli
for a state visit and by the King's inability to use his influence
with Washington or Paris to lessen Western hostility toward Tripoli--,,,
Morocco, which has more to lose in the relationship, also is
dissatisfied with the union.'-Hassan realizes that the union has
damaged Morocco's ties with Washington and jeopardized the
acquisition of much-needed weapons. He also is concerned that the
union has accelerated the warming of ties between Algeria and z e ;S
and probably believes the Algerians will try to convince Washincton
to support the Polisario on the Western Sahara dispute. Morec?;e-,
Hassan almost certainly is aware that the union has resulted in a
sizable influx of Libyans into Morocco, which increases the
potential for Qadhafi to create trouble for Hassan, especially if
the union fails. 25X1
Libya's military threats against Tunisia during the pas'-,:.six
months have given impetus to cooperation between Algeria and
Tunisia. Even so, Tunisian leaders are uncomfortable with the
newfound relationship. They worry about becoming militarily
dependent on Algiers and have longstanding suspicions that Alciers
sees Tunisia as part of Algeria's sphere of influence, accordnc to
Embassy Tunis. Unlike the other countries, Algerian leaders have
less scruples about their alliances and the effects on the coun:rv's
overall foreign policy, but they fear that these commitments risk
war with Libya and Morocco. 25X1
Shifting Coalitions
The members of these alliances have begun to take steps to
compensate for recent strains with their partners. Since November,
Libya has undertaken a diplomatic offensive to improve relations
with Algiers. Qadhafi has sent senior envoys to Algiers and used
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other intermediaries, such as the Iranian foreign minister, to
arrange a summit with President Benjedid. Qadhafi probably wants to
break up nascent Algerian-Egyptian military collaboration against
his regime and to lessen tension on his border with Algeria to
better allow him to meddle in Chad. We believe a report from a
reliable source of Embassy Algiers that Qadhafi may renew military
support to the Polisario is, if verified, a step to help repair
relations with Algeria. 25X1
Algeria is skeptical of Qadhafi's motives, but President
Bendjedid appears willing to meet with him. Algeria reportedly set
tough conditions for a meeting, however, including Libyan cessation
of subversion in Tunisia. We believe Algeria also will demand that
Libya cease its support for Algerian dissidents, and decrease its
involvement with Morocco. Reports from the US Embassy in Tunis that
Algeria is encouraging Tunis to adopt a less confrontational posture
toward Libya could indicate that Algiers is taking steps to placate
Libya. 25X1
Morocco generally has looked outside the Maghreb to.make up for
its isolation in North Africa. Hassan probably believes that he has
little choice as long as he continues his union with Qadhafi. The
King appears to view France as a counterweight to Algeria, and a
potential source-of-military and economic support. There also are
signs that Hassan is interested in expanding ties with Soviet bloc
countries. Over the long term, he probably wants to persuade Moscow
not to provide Algeria with new weapon systems. 25X1
Tunisia, more than the other countries, is :nilitarily
vulnerable. its primary concern has been stabli:y in the face of
Libvan blandishments and doubts about French and American
willingness to come to its defense. Even so, Tunisia remains wary
of Algeria, and has looked outside the region to Egypt and :raq for
military support. 25X1
Recional Prospects
Neither of the two North African alliances is in imminent dancer
of collapse, despite the strains. Both Hassan and Qadhafi _:e
Moroccan-Libyan union as a "marriage of convenience" that serves
useful purposes. Algeria and especially Tunisia will find
necessary to maintain their close ties, as long as the Raba-- ocli
alliance endures, and the threat exists of Libyan interference i:i
Tunisian succession politics. 25X1
Nevertheless, we believe the Maghreb countries will serio-,.s_?_,
consider. foreign policy realignments in the region if current
frictions intensify over the next year. It is also possible, but
less likely, that a rapprochement between Libya and Tunisia would
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Winners
Algeria and Libya would be the most likely countries in the
region to change partners and negotiate a practical compromise with
each other. They also would be the primary beneficiaries of any
shift in the existing alliances. Reconciliation would serve to
lessen the military threats each faces from abroad. Both countries
are surrounded by hostile neighbors, and each would be able to
reorient its forces toward its traditional enemies. Libya would be
able to strengthen its border with Egypt, while Algeria would be
able to reduce its new garrisons on the Libyan border and return
units and equipment to the Moroccan frontier. 25X1
In our judgment, any Libyan-Algerian rapprochement at the most 25X1
is likely to be no more advanced than a fairly loose association
because of competition for regional dominance.
by pro-Qadhafi radicals would allow a close relationship.
only his removal from power and a regime in Tripoli not controlled
Algerian distrust for Qadhafi is so intense that
Morocco and Tunisia would find themselves more vulnerable if the
current alliances were to shift,-especially because of their weaker
military position and economic problems. They would find themselves
without any partners in North Africa or thrown together in a weak.
coalition. Moreover, a collapse in the Moroccan-Libyan pact would
tarnish somewhat the image of King Hassan, since he placed his
prestige on the line in forming the union. He argued both at home
and in Washington that the union would enable him to tame Qadha~=i.
Morocco would be prone to Libyan subversion.
The loss of Algeria as a key ally would be a severe blow for
Tunisia, since the country's leaders have leaned on Algeria in the
wake of disillusionment over what they perceive as parsimonious
security assistance from France and the US. Both Tunisia and
Morocco almost certainly would be compelled to break ranks with
Libya if the Algerian-Libyan rapprochement showed promise. The
union might also split if Hassan became convinced that Qadha_"_ ad
resumed miitary aid to the Polisario or was engaged in subversive
activity in Morocco. In these circumstances, Hassan could turn to
Tunisia, even though he would know that his new partner would not be
able to render the strategic and economic assistance Morocco needs.
Tunisia-might reciprocate a Moroccan overture, but its leaders, too,
would see limited advantages to such a relationship. A more likely
course for Morocco and Tunisia would be concerted efforts to obtain
assistance from France, wealthy Arab states, and the USSR if the US
was not receptive to their needs. 25X1
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The New Balance of Power
We believe that a realignment of states in North Africa would
not significantly alter the balance of power or stability in the
region. Morocco and Algeria will continue to be adversaries and
will remain at loggerheads over the Western Sahara. The position of
Libya vis-a-vis the other Maghreb states would be somewhat improved,
because Algiers is the only regime that can effectively challenge
Tripoli. Tunisia would remain a pawn between its larger neighbors.
Overall military stability, at least in the short term, would be
enhanced by an accommodation by Algeria and Libya, which have the
largest and most lethal inventories of weapons. Thus while the 25X1
prospects of military conflict in the Maghreb may recede with a
change in the alliances, heightened anxieties on the parts of
Morocco and Tunisia would continue to keep the region on edge.
The emergence of a formal political alliance between Algeria and
Libya would produce a significant change in the balance of power in
the Maghreb. Even cooperation short of a compact between them, such
as support for the Polisario and Moroccan dissidents, would result
in significantly heightened friction in the region. The war in the
Western Sahara would be prolonged and state-sponsored terrorism 25X1
would increase. Qadhafi,-for his part, would be careful not-to-
antagonize the Algerians with overt attacks on Tunisia, but ne
probably would adopt a more aggressive stance toward Egypt.
The Soviet Angle
Such shifts in the alliances probably would encourage Libya and
Algeria to look to the Soviet Union as a potential wedge against the
others. High level contacts between the Soviets and Algeria and
Tunisia, including a reported forthcoming visit to both capitals by
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, suggest that Moscow senses an
opportunity to increase its influence in the region. '.!oscow.fa?.7 ors
a rapprochement between Algeria and Libya, because of the Soviet's
traditional friendship with these two countries. Moscow also would
discourage an alignment against Morocco and Tunisia out of a concern
that such a move would increase opportunities for the inited Sta_es.
25X1
None of the Maghreb countries, except for Qadhafi's Libya, are
prepared to jeopardize their security links with Western Europe Or
the United States. Tunisia probably hopes its contacts with the
Soviets will prompt the US to increase its aid, and Algiers and
Rabat could do the same. These three countries also probably hope
to get-Moscow to curb Qadhafi's excesses. 25X1
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Imolications for the United States
These shifts in relations among the Maghreb states would have
mixed results for Washington, but, overall, it is conceivable that
the United States would lose influence in North Africa. Morocco and
Tunisia would move closer to Washington out of necessity. Both
countries would view Washington as the best source of military
assistance. Nevertheless, the United States would not necessarily
have greater leverage, because Rabat and Tunis would probably
conclude that Washington would be more dependent upon them. The
degree to which Rabat and Tunis turned to Washington probably would
depend on the nature of the Algerian-Libyan relationship. The
closer the ties between Algiers and Tripoli -- particularly any hint
of military cooperation -- the more willing Morocco and Tunisia
would be to cooperate with United States, perhaps even willing to
discuss military facilities.
25X1
I
Bilateral relations with Algeria probably would become more
ambivalent. Algeria presumably would want to continue to expand
ties with the United States in order to mcdernize its'ecc -y and
military. To the extent that Algiers felt compelled to placate
Qadhafi, however, it would have less incentive to cooperate with
Washington. Algeria may even decide to refrain from acting as a
political conduit to radical Arab regimes. Qadhafi, for his part,
would eliminate the military threat from Algeria and coopt a Key
ally of Washington in the US effort to undermine the Libyan recime.
25X1
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EXTERNAL:
1 - Howard Teicher, NSC
1 - Elaine Morton, NSC
1 - Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
1 - Lieutenant General, James A. Williams, Pentagon
1 - Lieutenant General, Dale A. Vesser, Pentagon
1 - James L. Woods, Pentagon
1 - Sandra Chrales, Pentagon
1 - Arnold Raphel, State Department
1 - R.Rand Beers, State Department
1 - Patrick N. Theros, State Department
1 - David E. Zweifel, State Department
1 - Peter Rodman, State Department
1 - Morton I. Abramowitz, State Department
1 - Roger Merrick, State Department
INTERNAL:
1 - DDI
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/AFR
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M~
C?
10 Jan 86 25X1
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