(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201990001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 7, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT: USSR-Afghanistan: Implications of a Partial Soviet
Withdrawal
NESA M# 86-20028
1 - Morton Abramowitz (State)
1 - The Honorable Richard W. Murphy (State)
1 - Robert A. Peck (State)
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(7Mar86)
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Centml Intelligence Agency
7 March 1986
USSR-Afghanistan: Implications of a Partial Soviet Withdrawal
Summary
We believe the Soviets have more to lose than to
gain if they sign a Geneva-type peace agreement and
then abrogate it, claiming that the United States and
Pakistan had not lived up to their end of the bargain.
Moscow, however, may perceive the situation differently
and may proceed with one of several possible scenarios.
The political and military costs to Moscow would vary
marginally from one scenario to another but, in our
judgment, are fundamentally similar and risky under any
plausible scenario. International reaction, in
particular, would depend on how and when the Soviets
halted their troop withdrawal. In circumstances where
the Soviets renege, however, we would expect the
resistance forces to resume country-wide attacks as
soon as the Soviet withdrawal ended, and Pakistan to
resume support for the Afghans.
This typescript was prepared by the CIA's Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis,'in
conjunction with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State. All comments and queries should be directed
to Chief, South Asia Division, the Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis,
t
their seeming hints to the contrary are part of a political
effort aimed at dividing the countries and forces onnosina them..
* The Intelligence Community judged recently that the prospects
for a serious Soviet initiative on Afghanistan are slim and that
NESA M# 86-20028
-SEeRFMI
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The Scenarios
This memo examines the consequences for the United States,
Pakistan, and the Afghan resistance of a Soviets move in
Afghanistan to negotiate a settlement in which they agree to a
phased withdrawal of their military forces from the country over
a six month period, but then renege, citing isolated acts of
resistance as evidence that outside support is continuing. The
memo also assumes that the settlement is based more or less on
the existing four draft instruments from the Geneva talks; the
settlement would include a US guarantee on non-interference.
We also assume that the insurgents for the most part will
lie low during the first few months of the Soviet withdrawal.
Nevertheless, resistance disunity, disinterest in the peace
negotiations among some groups,
will almost certainly result in scattered
resistance attacks against Soviet forces even after an agreement
is signed.
Soviet reneging could take several forms:
--The Soviets might make only a token troop withdrawal of up
to 5,000 men;
--The Soviets could draw down their forces to a level of
about 80,000 men over three to four months before
terminating the withdrawal;
--The Soviets might not only terminate the withdrawal
process after drawing down their forces to 80,000 men, but
also reintroduce military units that had previously been
withdrawn, perhaps even increasing the total number of
troops.
How Would the Resistance Fare?
Under all the scenarios, we believe the insurgents would
quickly resume fighting once it became obvious that Moscow had
halted its withdrawal. In our view, insurgent groups would be
able to sustain the fighting at current levels without resupply
in many parts of the country--especially in the Panjsher Valley
and northern Afghanistan--for at least six months to a year using
weapons from stockpiles, captured weapons, and acquisitions
through the black market in Pakistan.
Afghan resistance groups are
establishing arms caches and training camps within Afghanistan,
both to defend themselves against prolonged Soviet-Afghan attacks
and to prepare for the possibility of a political settlement that
ends external material support for the insurgency.
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three of the seven parties in the
Peshawar-based resistance alliance have established separate
training camps inside Afghanistan, some replete with arms depots.
Based on limited data, the forces of Jamiat commander Ahmad
Shah Masood appear to be in the best shape with respect to
stocks. Masood decided
to decentralize his arms supply system in 1984 by making each of
his 30-man groups responsible for cacheing its own supplies. C
Masood stores a 12-month
supply of weapons in caves--which provide protection against
Soviet air attacks; Masood's Panjsher Valley
forces did not lose any supplies of concealed weapons to Soviet
forces in 1985. Elsewhere,
Hizbi Islami insurgents in Kabol Province store heavy
weapons in caches until needed for operations; in Nangarhar
Province, according to a fairly reliable source, insurgent
commanders have secreted stockpiles, including a 20-30 day supply
of ammunition.
The Soviets usually claim to have seized insurgent arms
caches after launching major operations. Although the Soviets
probably have had some major successes--they reportedly captured
a huge insurgent arms cache near Qandahar several months ago--we
believe many of their claims are exaggerated.
The insurgents, as in the past, will also be able to acquire'
captured weapons to supplement their stocks. During the
destruction of the Afghan garrison at Peshghowr last June, Masood
captured enough small arms to supply his forces for a year,
Even if major suppliers to the resistance cut off arms
deliveries, the resistance will still be able to smuggle arms
purchased illicitly through Pakistan's border areas into
Afghanistan. We believe it will be impossible for Pakistan or
the Soviets to seal the border because of the numerous trails and
passes, including new routes that have sprung up to support
resistance logistics since the war began. The resistance's mcst
significant problem, in our view, would be acquiring heavy
weapons, such as heavy machineguns, mortars, and air defense
weapons--the most difficult arms to purchase in Pakistan's
illegal arms market.
Sympathetic Arab countries, Iran, and China would probably
continue to supply the resistance through alternate routes along
the Iranian-Afghan border as well as, where possible, through
Pakistan. Tehran would almost certainly view a negotiated
agreement as a sellout of the resistance. Continued financial
support for the ~esistance=
is also likely.
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The Pakistan Factor
If the USSR reneges on its withdrawal agreement, Pakistan
would probably reestablish covert support for the Afghan
resistance. Indeed, we believe Pakistan would work out
contingency plans for such a scenario with the resistance
leadership before actually signing a political settlement.
Factors underlying Pakistan's current Afghan policy--concern
about the Soviet threat to Pakistan's national security and
Pakistan's strong desire to have the refugees return to their
homeland--would help Zia revive support for the resistance.
Because most Afghan refugees would probably stay in Pakistan
until after a Soviet withdrawal was completed, Pakistan would
once more be under pressure from the refugees to resume support.
Assuming, as seems likely, that President Zia and Foreign
Minister Yaqub Khan will continue to be in control of vital
foreign policy issues for the foreseeable future, a resumption of
support could probably be achieved fairly expeditiously.
Nevertheless, with the transition to civilian rule, Zia can no
longer act as independently as he did in the past. He would have
to secure the consent of the army--which harbors some
highly-placed critics of the current Afghan policy--and of Prime
Minister Junejo, who is clearly sensitive to opposition by some
of Pakistan's political parties, including the dominant
opposition People's Party. To help gain public support for a
renewed program, moreover, Zia and Junejo would almost certainly
expect upgraded US financial and strategic assistance.
Risks for Moscow...
...Military. We believe Moscow has more to lose than to
gain by beginning and then cutting off a troop withdrawal. The
military risks under the first scenario would be slight, but a
significant Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan--to 80,000
men--would severely weaken Soviet capability to maintain their
lines of communications, sharply reduce offensive operations,
increase the risks to remaining units, and allow the insurgents
to strengthen their military and political structure in many
areas. The Soviet withdrawal, moreover, might precipitate the
collapse of the Kabul regime and the defection of many Afghan
Army personnel to the resistance, although it could also cause
stresses and perhaps some internecine struggle among the
resistance as well.
..and Political. The withdrawal agreement, followed by
removal of large numbers of troops would give Moscow some
significant foreign policy gains, but reneging would, in our
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view, more than negate them. Stopping the withdrawal and
breaking off the agreement would be interpreted in most
international quarters as proof of Soviet duplicity. Condemnation
would be especially strong if Moscow reintroduced troops. Our
assessment of political costs to the Soviets under all three
scenarios assumes that they not only halt troop withdrawals, but
also declare the entire agreement no longer valid. If Moscow
were to halt troop withdrawals and ask to reopen the negotiating
process to discuss the purported violations, international
reaction would, in our view, be relatively milder.
Soviet attempts to place the blame on the United States,
Pakistan, and the insurgents are unlikely to be very successful
unless Moscow could point to a major insurgent atrocity, such as
shooting down a civilian airliner. In our view, Moscow would
find it difficult to stage an incident of this magnitude, which
would have to result in large-scale casualties to be believable.
Pointing to captured insurgent weapons of US-manufacture could be
done fairly easily--Vietnam-vintage US M-16s have appeared in
Pakistan's tribal areas, but this would be viewed by most
international observers with great suspicion. The Soviets are
thus likely to be immediately condemned by China, the West
Europeans and Japanese, the nonaligned movement, Islamic
organizations, and at the UN. Virtually no foreign policy gains
would accrue from only a token troop withdrawal or a situation
that gave the Soviets a stronger military position than they now
have.
The Soviets would probably calculate that reneging--under
any of the scenarios--would risk progress on arms control, trade
and other areas with promise of real benefits to Moscow, as well
as a resumption of US and other support for the insurgency. Any
future Soviet attempts to negotiate a political solution to the
war would be viewed with even greater skepticism.
A Soviet Withdrawal Scenario
In order to execute a highly visible withdrawal while
minimizing security risks, the first Soviet units to be
withdrawn, in our view, would probably be airborne forces because
they could be reintroduced quickly if the Kabul government and
its security forces began to disintegrate.* The Soviets would
then probably try to reduce their forces by 'thinning out' units
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* Soviet air support might be augmented initially during the
withdrawal while selected units throughout the country moved back
to the Soviet Union. Some protection for the lines of
communications to remaining units would be necessary, although
for a limited period smaller units might be supplied primarily by
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in various parts of the country--by removing subunits from each
division--rather than abandoning whole sections of the country to
the insurgency. The withdrawing force might comprise about 40
combat maneuver battalions--about one third--of the already very
limited combat fighting force of 110 battalions.
The primary goal of the remaining forces would be to maintain
security in and around Kabul and and other major cities and
secure adequate lines of communications from the USSR. All
current Spetsnaz units would probably remain and some new
Spetsnaz units might be added; all Spetsnaz units would probably
be equipped with their own helicopters to improve their ability
to operate independently. Some isolated Soviet units would
probably be relocated to more secure garrison areas.
Implications for the United States
Because scenarios of the type outlined above would involve
significant political and military risks for Moscow, we do not
believe they are realistic. Nevertheless, should Moscow agree to
a Geneva-type accord and then back out, the United States would
face several immediate policy decisions:
--Because the circumstances of the collapse of the agreement
probably would be somewhat ambiguous, the United States,
Pakistan, and the resistance may find it difficult to
revive the current high level of international support for
the resistance cause. This would be particularly true if
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the Soviets could point to a resistance atrocity--the
shooting down of a civilian airliner or an attack on
civilians--as the reason for their ending the withdrawal.
--The Soviets would likely immediately blame the US and
Pakistan for the failure of the peace agreement. They
will argue in international fora and in the media that
their reintroduction of troops was forced by Washington's
and Islamabad's failure to implement guarantees of
non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.
--Islamabad most likely would expect a large US aid
commitment as a quid pro quo for reviving support for the
insurgents.
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