AFTER AL FAW: IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR IRAQ AND IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 March 1986
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After Al Faw: Implications and Options for Iraq and Iran
Summary
After Iran's military success at Al Faw, the situation
is more ominous for Baghdad than at any time in the
struggle. Iran's advance on the peninsula has been halted
and the shock of the attack has not led to the kind of
subsequent defeats or withdrawals of Iraqi forces that would
signal a critical decline in Iraq's war fortunes. The loss
of Al Faw does not, in and of itself, represent a watershed
in the five-and-a-half-year-old war. Nonetheless, a turning
point in the war would probably occur in the wake of
additional, small-scale Iranian battlefield victories, a
successful major Iranian offensive elsewhere, or continued
heavy Iraqi casualties. In any event, the initiative now
belongs to Iran, but Tehran must act soon, otherwise chances
for success will diminish as Baghdad recovers and builds new
Following a surprise attack in a poorly defended area of southern
Iraq on 9 February 1986, Iran captured the port city of Al Faw and over
200 square kilometers of the peninsula. Iraq contained the Iranian
advance by rushing in its strategic reserve, but a long delay in
launching a counterattack allowed Iran to consolidate its position. In
the last three weeks, Iraq has not made any significant gains despite
fierce fighting. At the same time, Iran has not yet capitalized on its
This paper was prepared byl ~ Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Persian Gulf Division. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,
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success at Al Faw, and the stalemate continues as both sides build up
defensive positions, rotate forces to the area, and consider their next
Iraqi Options and Constraints
Baghdad's options are limited by political and military risks.
Despite the importance given to the recapture of Al Faw by the leadership
in Baghdad, Iraq will proceed cautiously because it judges that a long,
bloody campaign would be needed to dislodge the Iranians. Iraq has
already suffered more casualties in its unsuccessful efforts to retake Al
Faw than in any other battle since 1983. Iraqi morale, which we believe
is at its lowest level since 1982, might crumble because of the high
casualties resulting from an attack to regain the lost territory.
Additionally, because Iraq's elite Republican Guard units have been
mauled and most of its other reserves are already committed, Baghdad
could not commit significantly greater forces without undermining
With the possibility of a major Iranian offensive still present in
the near term, Baghdad will try to prevent a breakout from Al Faw while
maintaining pressure on the Iranian position. Such a course will reduce
Iraqi casualties at Al Faw and will not draw troops from other areas.
The Iraqis probably will use artillery, airstrikes, and chemical weapons
to try to wear down Iranian defenders in the Al Faw pocket. Baghad may
consider limited raids along the border to recapture lost territory (such
as the northern Majnoon Island) to offset Iran's success at Al Faw or to
spoil Iranian preparation for other attacks.
At the same time, the Iraqi leadership will be reluctant to allow a
continued Iranian occupation of Al Faw because it threatens Umm Qasr and
the southern approach to Al Basrah and hinders Iraq's access to the
Persian Gulf through the Khawr Abdallah Channel. In April, good weather
will improve the Iraqi Air Force's chances for effective attacks on Al
Faw. Moreover, as the ground there dries out, Iraq will be able to use
its armored forces more effectively. Even so, Baghdad is cautious and
may judge that--even with these advantages--its forces could suffer heavy
losses and might not be able to retake Al Faw. Saddam Husayn would then
likely concede the area to Tehran while keeping military pressure on
Iranian Options and Constraints
Tehran is in a position to hold, possibly indefinitely, the Al Faw
salient and reap the political benefits from Baghdad's embarrassment and
the heightened fears of the Gulf Arabs. Iran would be able to remind the
region of its victory by occasional small-scale raids from Al Faw, veiled
threats to Kuwait's Bubiyan Island, or possibly the establishment of a
puppet "Iraqi Islamic Republic" in Al Faw. Even if Iran is pushed out of
Al Faw eventually, it could make this so costly in manpower and equipment
for Baghdad that the Iraqi Army would be seriously weakened.
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Iran may capitalize on its success while the Iraqis are still off
balance. A breakout from Al Faw is unlikely, but Iran may launch a
series of division-size or smaller attacks farther north along the
border. With such a plan, however, Iran would be taking risks because
the commitment of men and equipment to Al Faw could prevent Iranian
forces from succeeding in other areas. A major defeat along another
front would tarnish Iran's victory at Al Faw and improve Iraqi civilian
and military morale.
Nonetheless, in our judgment Iran still hopes to launch a large-
scale offensive aimed at capturing or isolating Al Basrah. Tehran may
believe that because of its economic woes it must try to inflict a
military defeat on Iraq that will topple the Baghdad regime in the next
12 months. Although Iraq still has strong defenses around the Hawizah
marsh and east of Al Basrah, the chances for an Iranian success there
have improved because Iraqi reserves have been seriously weakened and
Baghdad has pulled some units away from the marsh.
Outlook
In our view, the battle of Al Faw does not yet represent a new phase
in the war, but it may be the first of a series of military setbacks that
eventually lead to the collapse of the Iraqi army and the fall of the
regime. The initiative, however, lies with Tehran which must keep the
military pressure on Iraq and prevent Baghdad from recovering.
Iran faces a time factor in taking action. For maximum impact, a
major offensive by Tehran would need to be undertaken soon, before
Baghdad restores its reserves and before Iran's capability to carry out a
large-scale attack weakens because of bad weather and supply problems.
On the other hand, an Iranian decision to forego a major offensive in the
hope that the victory at Al Faw and a continuing war of attrition will
undermine the Baghdad regime probably has only a few months at best to
show results before war weariness begins to rise again in Iran.
In the past, Baghdad has rationalized defeat and realigned its
defenses to continue the war. But continued bloodletting, coupled with
the serious economic crunch that Baghdad is already beginning to feel,
could prevent the Iraqis from rallying as they have before. Trying to
force its way through to Al Faw regardless of casualties would have a
devastating impact on Iraqi morale, the regime's credibility with the
military (and vice versa), and its defense posture. This might be
sufficient to cause Saddam's ouster. Therefore, we believe Baghdad will
conclude that operations to recapture Al Faw or mount a large attack
elsewhere on the border will be counter-productive. Iraq will instead
concentrate on limiting the damage and threat from Iran by maintaining
its defensive strategy in the ground war.
Even though Baghdad is likely to continue its cautious tactics on
the ground, we believe that Iraq may increase its air attacks against
military and economic targets in Iran's interior and in the Persian Gulf,
and it may expand attacks on civilian targets in response to the Iranian
occupation of Al Faw. Fear of Iranian retaliation may have prevented an
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Iraqi renewal of bombings so far. But in the longer term Baghdad may see
airstrikes inside Iran as a way to raise the cost of Tehran's continued
hold on Iraqi territory. Air attacks on cities, power grids, or pumping
stations would likely lower Iranian morale, while targeting oil export
facilities in the Gulf would reduce Tehran's ability to pay for the
fighting.
Attacks on civilian and economic targets inside Iran, however, raise
the risks of Iranian retaliation against the Gulf Arab states' oil
exports and economic targets. Iran has already increased its attacks on
shipping in the Gulf and has threatened Kuwait because of its continued
support for Iraq. Recent declines in world oil prices have reduced
Iranian oil revenues, and the danger of Tehran lashing out in the Gulf
will grow if Iraqi attacks cause further reductions and perhaps lead to
civil unrest in Iran. We believe that Iran would attack Gulf oil
facilities only as a last resort because of fear that such raids might
lead to Western or US intervention in the Gulf. Nonetheless, the.
hardships resulting from the recent drop in oil prices may have caused
Tehran to believe that its back is closer to the wall.
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Current Offensive Losses, 9 February to 4 March 1986
Iraq Iran
Killed or wounded in action 10,000 to 15,000 b 21,000 to 30,000
Prisoners of war 1,000 to 3,000 b. 60 to 100 b
Aircraft 20 to 40b.a 20 to 25b.d
Tanks 150 to 200 c 10 to 25'
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1territo)y
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SUBJECT: After Al Faw: Implications and Options for Iraq and Iran
NESA M 86-20032
Distribution:
1 - Donald R. Fortier, NSC
1 - Jock Covey, NSC
1 - Ronald St. Martin, NSC
1 - Morton Abramowitz, State
1 - Richard W. Murphy, State
1 - Marion Creekmore, State
1 - George S. Harris, State
1 - Peter Burleigh, State
1 - Richard Armitage, ISA
1 - Robert H. Pelletreau, ISA
1 - Roger Pajak, Treasury
1 - D D I
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - C/PES
1 - C/CSG
1 - C/NID
1 - C/PDB
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/AI
6 - NESA/PG
DDI/NESA/PG/I (10 Mar 86)
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