OUTLOOK FOR A MAGHREB SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
SUBJECT: Outlook for a Maghreb Summit
NESA M#86-20054
DI S TPtI BUTI ON
EXTERNAL:
Howard Teicher, NSC
Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
Philip Ringdahl, NSC
Elaine Morton, NSC
Morton I. Abramowitz, State Department
Peter Rodman, State Department
R. Rand Beers, State Department
Patrick N. Theros, State Department
Howard K. Walker, State Department
David E. 2weifel, State Department
Martin Van Heuven, State Department
Sandra Charles, Pentagon
James L. Woods, Pentagon
DDI
NIO/NESA
NIO/AFR
CPAS/I MD/CB
D/NESA
DD/NESA
C/PPS/NESA
PPS/NESA (One Copy to Analyst to Source)
C/PES
NID Staff
PDB Staff
NESA/AI/D
NESA/PG/D
NESA/SO/D
NESA/IA /D
NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M/
~i/t
DATE ~ LI ~~ ~~~~
DpC NQ ~A~ 8L' ~~sy
OCR 3
P&PD ~
6 Apr 86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20SOS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 April 1986
Outlook for a Maghreb Summit
Summary
A possible meeting in May between Algerian President
Bendjedid and Moroccan King Hassan could be the forerunner
of a greater Maghreb summit in the coming months. Since
the beginning of the year, the five states of North Africa
-- Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya --
have talked increasingly about a "Greater Arab Maghreb"
and the necessity for a regional sumTttit to discuss the
concept. Leaders in these countries always have paid lip
service to Maghreb unity, but meetings between them of
late suggest that the prospects for such a forum are
better than usual. The impetus appears to be coming
primarily from President Bendjedid of Algeria who met with
Qadhafi in late January and reportedly plans to meet soon
with King Hassan.
Uncertainties about the stability of alliances in the
region are the driving force behind these contacts, rather
than pan-Arab or altruistic desires for cooperation.
Private agendas would dominate any summit. The Western
Sahara problem would be the principal focus of any meeting
attended by both Algeria and Morocco. The animosities
between the states preclude any comprehensive and lasting
political settlement.
is memoran um was prepared by
the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 18 April
1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments may be
addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
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The latest verbiage about Maghreb unity comes from Algiers.
President Bendjedid, in a major foreign policy address on 8 April,
stated that Algeria's intensive contacts with Libya, Tunisia, and
Mauritania in recent months involved consultations on regional
unity. He claimed such a goal must based on economic as well as
political factors. Bendjedid also hinted that a unity project may
be unveiled shortly, and that it would be subject to a public
referendum.
Libyan leader Qadhafi made similar pronouncements last February
following several meetings between Algerian and Libyan officials,
including his summit in late January with Bendjedid. These
initiatives have been complemented by calls for a Maghreb conference
by Tunisia and travel to all of the capitals in the region by
Mauritanian President Taya. The last effort to bring the states
together had been Tunisian President Bourguiba's attempt in early
1985, but Algeria refused to attend because the Polisario was not
given a seat at the conference.
High-level Algerian-Moroccan contacts appear to be the next
phase of the emerging initiative toward a summit. Bendjedid said in
his April speech that unity in the region could not be achieved
without a resolution of the Western Sahara dispute. King Hassan
said in a press interview in late March that he expected to meet
soon with Bendjedid.
Hassan may host a meeting wit a gerian rest en nex mon
US diplomats in Morrcco report that planning for the summit is well
What's the Game?
Algeria: Algiers appears to be the most preoccupied with the
idea of Maghreb unity. Its traditional hostility with Morocco has
been compounded by tension with Libya, despite a recent warming
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trend between the two countries. President Bendjedid's meeting with
Libyan leader Qadhafi, as well as his prospective meeting with King
Hassan, probably stems from Bendjedid's efforts to break the
Morocco-Libyan union and relieve military pressures on one or both
of Algeria's borders--Algeria is the only countr borderin all of
the other states--with these two adversaries. 25X1
Libyan threats against Tunisia and Morocco's fight with the
Polisario complement Algeria's concerns about its national security,
and thus are key motives for Algerian outreach to both countries.
Developments in the Western Sahara dispute over the past few years
have worked against Algiers' interests. The Algerian-backed
Polisario guerrillas, although able to mount occasional attacks on
the berm, have lost the military initiative,
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
Algiers, faced with drastically
eclining petroleum revenues, no onger can afford to finance the
oug ere a
no signs that Ben ~e i is prepare to give in to Morocco's demand
for full sovereignty over the Western Sahara, he appears more
flexible on the terms of a settlement. Algiers probably would
support a degree of political autonomy that would reserve the
indentity of the local Sahrawi people.
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Morocco: King Hassan generally has been the spectator to
efforts to produce a summit. He would nevertheless be willing to
meet with other leaders; indeed, the King would want to join any
successful Algerian initiative to sponsor a Maghreb summit. As long
as he has the military advantage in the Western Sahara, Hassan
probably will be unwilling to relinquish the gains he has made.
Nonetheless, the the conflict is costly -- the majority of Moroccan
armed forces are deployed in the Western Sahara -- and there have
been indications of morale problems among the troops. Hassan also
is concerned about growing Algerian-Libyan ties. The King probably
hopes contacts with Bendjedid will help delay additional diplomatic
gains for Algeria and the Polisario in international fora, such as
the non-aligned movement and the UN.
Tunisia: Tunis' interest in a Maghreb summit probably stems
from its small size and political and military weakness. Prime 25X1
Minister Mzali's recent call for a summit probably stems in part
from Algerian pressure and fear that Algiers and Tri oli mi ht reach
an accord that would be detrimental to its security.
Mauritania: Nouakchott, like Tunis, would feel constrained to
attend a Maghreb summit. Mauritania currently is linked with
Algeria and Tunisia in a tripartite Treaty of Fraternity and Concord
signed in 1983, but the Taya regime has adopted a neutral position
toward Algeria and Morocco. Northwestern Mauritania gradually has
become a battle ground between Morocco and the Polisario, and the
prospect for additional berm construction in the Western Sahara by
Morocco would place greater pressure on the country's northern
borders.
Additional fi htin could undermine President Ta a's alread
n t bl r ime.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2
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Libya: Qadhafi's willingness to attend would depend on his
ability to consolidate his power at home in the wake of the US
airstrike. Because of Qadhafi's ideological commitment to unity and
Libya's interest in rallying Arab neighbors at a time of increased
pressure from the United States, under normal circumstances he would
favor such an idea. He would view a meeting as an opportunity to
enhance his own prestige in the region and the Arab world. Qadhafi
also would seek to bolster the flagging political union with
Morocco, demonstrate that differences with Tunisia were in the past,
and build solid relations with Algeria. However, Qadhafi will
resist any attempt by Algeria to openly support the Polisario -- as
it had done before the treaty with Morocco -- and to cave in to
Tunisia's demands for normal relations.
Prospects and Implications for the United States
In our view, a Maghreb summit involving all five countries is
dependent upon the success of the upcoming Bendjedid-Hassan meeting.
Algeria and Morocco long have been arch rivals, and any agreement
between them would remove the principal barrier. Even if a
successful Hassan-Bendjedid meeting paved the way for a five-nation
summit, we believe there is little likelihood that the countries
will solve the many problems that divide them. Except for broader
regional and Arab issues, in our view, the parties would be loathe
to make the compromises necessary to resolve s ecific Ma hreb
problems -- particularly the Western Sahara. 25X1
An unsuccessful meeting could draw Algeria closer to Libya and
encourage Bendjedid to hold a four-nation summit, with or without
the Polisario. Algiers probably would see such a move as a way of
demonstrating its predominance and a way of applying pressure on
Morocco. The effect of such a meeting would be negative for Rabat,
and potentially break the Libyan-Moroccan union. A push by Algeria
for such a meeting, and Libyan agreement to attend, would also put
Tunisia and Mauritania in a difficult position. Neither country can
afford to antagonize its powerful neighbors, but they also would not
want Algerian and Libyan cooperation to pro ress to the point that
they would control their foreign policy. 25X1
A five-nation summit and the promise of some lessening of
tension in the region would enhance US interests. A four-nation
summit dominated by Algeria and Libya would work against US
interests. Even if the conference precipitated the break-up of the
Libya-Morocco union, Libya would be less isolated, and Tripoli's
strengthened ties with Algeria would indirectly promote Soviet
interests. Morocco and Tunisia, the nations closest to the US in
the region, would find themselves with reduced influence, and they
would be ,more dependent on the US for military and diplomatic
support.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202220001-2