ISRAEL'S SEARCH FOR MORE CAPABLE SUBMARINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
fire .~...
SUR3ECT: Israel's Search for More Capable Shrines
NESA M# 86-20061
SW M# 86-20031
DISTRIBUTION:-
EXTERNAL:.
1 - David L. Anderson, Pentagon
DATE
DOC NO .~ ~' i /
OCR 3
P&PD
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 -- CPAS/1r1 /CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/MESA
2 - PPS/NESA (One Copy to Analyst to Source)
1 - C/PES
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - OSWR/NSD/UWB
1 - NESA/IA
1 - MESA/PG
1 - MESA/SO
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/I,
28 April 1986 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 April 1986
Israel's Search for More Capable Submarines
Summary
Israel wants to procure three Dolphin-class diesel
subamrines with the US Foreign Military sales funds to
replace the three Type 206 subamrines currently in its
inventory. The Israeli navy would like to take
delivery on the first submarine in 1992 to support its
ambitious plans for a "blue water" navy capable of
operating more widely and for extended periods in the
Central Mediterranean and Red Seas. In our judgment,
submarines of this particular design are not absolutely
essential'to the Israeli navy's ability to perform its
traditional missions. We do not believe that a two or
three year delay in the delivery of these vessels would
seriously degrade the navy's ability to defend
Israel.
The acquisition of three Dolphin-class diesel submarines by
the early 1990s is one of the Israeli navy's top procurement
priorities. In our judgment, boats of this particular design are
not absolutely essential to the Navy's ability to perform its.
traditional missions of coastal defense, maintenance of sea lines
of communication, and support of air and ground combat
operations. Without the Dolphins or submarines of similar
capabilities, however, the Israelis cannot realize their
ambitions to operate more widely and for extended periods in the
Central Mediterranean and Red Seas.
This memorandum was prepared by I Ithe Israel-
Jordan-PLO Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis, and
Office of Scientific and
Weapons Research, with a contribution by the
Subcontinent Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 25 April 1986 was
used in its preparation. Comments and questions should be
directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
NESA M# 86-20061
SW M# 86-20031
25X1
25X1
2bAi
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
Israel wants to continue to modernize its navy because of
the growth of Arab fleets--mainly those of Syria and Libya--in
recent years (see Annex). It has been particularly anxious to
develop a "blue water" submarine capability to assist in
monitoring Libyan naval activities, especially those supporting
terrorist missions. Israel also probably wants to be able to
insert and remove commando teams. In wartime, the Israelis would
prefer to destroy Libyan combatants--particularly Libya's five
operational diesel subamrines--well before they get within
striking range of Israel's shores or bottle them up by mining
harbors.
Capabilities of Dolphin-Class Submarines
Dolphin-class subamrines are not particularly well-suited
for some of these duties. Diesel submarines cannot move quickly
from one area to another without giving away their position, and
submarines in general are poor platforms for broad-sea
reconnaissance missions, such as monitoring terrorist activities,
unless they are acting on very detailed intelligence tip-offs.
Moreover, the vast majority of Arab surface combatants that could
threaten Israel are guided-missile patrol boats whose high speed
and small size make them difficult targets for a submarine to
engage. Other systems, particularly maritime patrol aircraft and
longer-range fast patrol boats, contribute more than submarines
in broad-area searchs and the long-range interception of surface
vessels and submarines.
Nevertheless, the Dolphin-class submarines are more capable
than the Type 206 boats currently in Israel's inventory. The
Dolphins' 4,500-nautical-mile range is nearly double that of the
Type 206s', and their endurance is 50 percent greater. Moreover,
the Dolphins carry 60 percent more torpedoes or antiship missiles
and require only four more crewmen to operate. They can also sow
mines--which Israel's Type 206s cannot--and transport a much
larger commando contingent.
The navy says it wants to replace its three Type 206 boats
with these new and better Dolphins combatants by 1992. when the
Tvne 206s will near the end of their service lives.
have aireauy
discovered cracks in the hulls of their Type 206s. These
structural problems and the experience that other navies have had
boats of similar design make the Israelis reluctant to keep their
Type 206s in service much past the early 1990s.
-2-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
Budgetary Problems
The Israeli
budget cuts, and
stepchild of the
the interservice
military establishment is grappling with defense
the navy, which has traditionally been the
Israel Defense Forces, stands to lose heavily in
competition for procurement funds.
the Ministry of Defense is aware that
naval construction has been ignored for the last several years
and cannot be postponed any further.
The commander of the navy has argued that $13-23 million in
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) monies must be obligated in the next
few months for preliminary design and contract work and long-lead
procurement if the navy is to receive attack submarines by
1992. Nevertheless, Tel Aviv may ultimately be forced to help
adjust for cost overruns of the Lavi fighter aircraft program by
delaying the acquisition of the Dolphins. In our view, a two or
three year delay in delivery would not seriously degrade the
Israeli navy's ability to carry out its principal missions.
Tel Aviv wants to finance the submarine program, which US
defense officials say will cost about $450 million, with FMS
funds. US off-shore procurement policy, however, is proving
troublesome to the Israelis, who had hoped to convince Washington
to approve the off-shore expenditure of FMS funds to have the
Dolphin hulls built in West Germany by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche
Werft (HDW), a shipbuilding firm with extensive experience in
submarine construction.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
approval for this plan will
not be forthcoming, nor, according to press reports, will a US 25X1
shipyard construct the boats.
Israeli Shipbuilding
It appears that the only alternative will be for Israel
Shipyards, Ltd. to build the submarines at its yard in Haifa.
Although Israel Shipyards, Ltd. has built nearly 60 ships,
various heavy steel strucures for Israel's petrochemical
industry, and large storage tanks, it has never attempted the
complex task of submarine construction. Naval construction
experts consider the firm's personnel to be skilled and
resourceful, but the yard probably would still need substantial
technical assistance from West German design engineers and
construction specialists to assemble the boats nearly as
efficiently as HDW.
India's experience in assembling Type 209 submarines may be
instructive. The Mazagon Docks in Bombay also had had fairly
broad experience in ship construction, but had never built a
submarine. Its personnel had major problems in mastering the
welding techniques necessary to connect the pressure hull
sections properly, even though Indian shipwrights had directly
assisted in the construction of the first two hulls at the HDW
-3-
SECRET
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
yard in Kiel. Moreover, Indian machinists were not accustomed to
working to the close tolerances specificed for installation of
the submarines' propulsion systems. These problems resulted in
major delays.
-4-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5
Israeli military planners routinely produce worst-case
assessments. Their view of the Arab-Israeli naval balance is no
exception. They usually include Egyptian forces in their threat
assessments, even though Cairo has continued to adhere to the
1979 peace treaty with Israel. The bulk of Egypt's naval
inventory, moreover, is obsolete and in poor condition.
9-X1
25X1
25X1
Syria-Egypt-Libyal
R
atio
25X1
Destroye
rs
0
3
0:3
Frigates
0
8
0: 8
Missile
Patrol/Attack
24
58
1:24
Missile
Hydrofoils
2
0
2: 0
Patrol
50
59
1:1.2
Submarin
es
21
1:7
25X1
25X1
When Egypt is removed from the calculations, the ratios
change significantly, leaving Israel in a relatively comfortable
position.
Frigates
Missile Patrol/Attack
Missile Hydrofoils
Patrol
Submarines
0
24
2
50
Syria-Libyal Ratio
2 0:2
28 1:1.2
0 2: 0
3 16.7:1
7 1:2.3
25X1
25X1
Because the size and content of Syria's weapons inventory is
so heavily dependent on Soviet support levels and Libya's
forces currently are at great risk, it is difficult to estimate
of Arab naval force structure in the mid-1990s. We believe,
however, that the Syrian or Libyan naval inventories of 1995
probably will be as large or larger than they are now, unless
they destroyed in a general Arab-Israeli war.
1 This tabulation includes only those Libyan combatants with the
range and endurance to operate in or near Israeli waters. 25X1
-5-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202290001-5