JORDAN-US: KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302540001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 6, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: JORDAN-US: King Hussein's Visit
MESA M#86-20086
Distribution:
External
1 - LTC Fred Hof, OSD/ISA
Internal
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
3 - NESA/AI/I
F/E
DATE
DOC NO 0Je__
OCR
P&PD
6 Jun 86 25X1
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 June 1986
JORDAN-US: King Hussein's.Visit
Summary
During his meetings with US officials, King Hussein is likely to
focus on his current diplomatic efforts to mediate a Syrian-Iraqi
reconciliation, which he hopes will lead eventually to a coordinated
Arab strategy on the peace process. The King probably will not
explore in depth the possibility of future US arms sales to Jordan
because he is embittered over US Congressional opposition and believes
it rules out a major arms agreement for the forseeable future.
The end of the dialogue with PLO Chairman Arafat, Hussein's failure to
attract a loyal West Bank constituency, and the assassination of a leading
moderate West Bank mayor have convinced the King that the window has closed on
moving forward on the Palestinian issue in the near term. Hussein's failure to
attract an independent West Bank leadership willing to join him in peace talks,
after Arafat refused to accept UN resolutions 242 and 338 in February, was due
partly to Jordanian negligence in addressing West Bank political and economic
concerns. In an effort to cultivate greater support, Jordanian officials
recently have taken a "carrot-and-stick" approach in dealing with West
Bankers--harrassing pro-Arafat travellers seeking to cross the Jordan River, for
instance, while increasin financial support to some pro-Jordanian West Bank
institutions.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe 25X1
Israel-Jordan-PLO Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis. Information as of 5 June 1986 was used in its
preparation. Questions and comments should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli
Division,
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NESA M#86-20086
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The King's ability to repair his damaged image in the West Bank by pouring
in money, however, is severely limited by Jordan's economic problems stemming
from reduced Arab financial aid. In his discussions in Washington, he probably
will ask the US to encourage Israel to follow through on West Bank quality of
life programs and to funnel increased US assistance for the West Bank through
Hussein's Arab Strategy
The King recently has undertaken a longterm strategy designed to build a
moderate Arab consensus isolating Arafat. He hopes his efforts to broker a
Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation, during meetings with Presidents Assad and Saddam
Husayn in May, will pave the way for an early Arab summit. The King sorely
needs a foreign policy success and hopes some form of Syrian-Iraqi
reconciliation will boost his support among moderate Arabs, encourage Arab
financial aid to Jordan and spur a coordinated Arab strategy toward future talks
with Israel 25X1
Hussein apparently aims by facilitating a Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation to
strengthen his ties to President Assad and over time to work with him to rein in
Arafat, thereby giving the PLO only a secondary role in any future peace talks.
The King would prefer to work with the PLO to ensure credible Palestinian
backing for his efforts to negotiate with Israel, and he probably hopes that
closer ties with Assad will put additional pressure on Arafat to be more
flexible. For his part, Assad believes the rift between Jordan and the PLO
offers him the best opportunity yet to prevent a settlement of the Palestinian
issue that ignores Syrian interests.
Hussein's limited support for former chief of Fatah Military Intelligence
Abu Zaim may also be designed to lay the 25X1
groundwork or cultivating a new Palestinian leadership in conjunction with
Syria if Arafat remains recalcitrant. The King presumably doubts that Abu
Zaim's small, financially strapped dissident movement will successfully
challenge Arafat, but apparently hopes if necessary to undermine his leadership
and to encourage alternatives to the PLO. 25X1
The King apparently has not secured any commitments from Assad and Saddam,
but some progress is evident. US Embassy sources in Damascus say Syria has
dropped some demands and is willing to participate in secret contacts with Iraq
under Jordanian sponsorship. The King hopes to arrange a bilateral summit in
Amman between Assad and Saddam Husayn, but a preliminary meeting of senior
officials, as early as mid-June, is more likely.) 25X1
Assad probably hopes his cooperation with Hussein will encourage moderate
Arabs to continue economic aid to Syria. Damascus may also hope that Iranian
nervousness over Hussein's shuttle diplomacy will prompt Tehran to give Syria
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additional economic and political concessions. Syria's public accusation that
Iraq was behind the bombings throughout Syria in March and April illustrates
Assad's entrenched enmity for the Saddam regime and suggests that reconciliation
is unlikely soon. The absence of a Syrian accusation after a recent explosion
in Damascus, however, may indicate that Assad may be willing to give Hussein
some cooperation in his reconciliation efforts.
The Iraqis are eager to halt Syrian support for Iran and Iraqi dissidents
and almost certainly are willing to make significant concessions, possibly
including a reduction in their support for PLO Chief Arafat. Baghdad's doubts
over Assad's sincerity, however, will lead it to demand early evidence of a
change'in Syrian policy.
Hussein's Military Agenda
King Hussein was frustrated and angered by US Congressional opposition to
the Jordan arms package earlier this year and is unlikely to resurface the arms
issue for in-depth discussions during this trip. Instead, he probably will
raise mutual regional security concerns, particularly developments in the
Iran-Iraq war and the recent tension between Israel and Syria.
Hussein wants to preserve the US-Jordanian military relationship and
continues to value his strategic ties to Washington, but he sees no alternative
to finding other arms suppliers. After the arms package failed, Hussein said he
would look elsewhere for arms and is.proceeding to do so. Although Hussein has
proven his willingness to seek non-US suppliers, any large deal--particularly
for aircraft--requires financing from the Saudis, who have alternatively agreed
to and backed off on funding commitments.
Jordan's Air Force is examining the French Mirage 2000 and British Tornado
fighter aircraft as alternatives to the requested US F-16s and F-20s. 0 25X1
France and Britain are pressuring Jordan to decide which 25X1
aircraft it will purchase. Hussein, however, is likely to continue delaying a
commitment for either aircraft for the near term, since neither adequately
satisfies Jordan's air defense needs. Jordanian air force pilots prefer US
fighters, and Hussein may try to mollify them by biding his time, with the hope
that the climate in the US becomes more conducive next year to major Jordanian
arms purchases. 25X1
Jordan has turned to the Soviet Union to augment 1981 and 1984 purchases of
SA-8 and SA-13 surface-to-air missiles and ZSU-23 anti-aircraft guns. 25X1
Jordan signed a new deal with the Soviets last month for 25X1
additional air defense equipment, possibly modified SA-8s and SA-13s and
additional ZSUs. The new contract also may have included fifteen BMP-1
reconnaisance vehicles--the King's US request included 32 Bradley reconnaisance
vehicles. This new deal does not portend significantly expanded Jordanian/USSR
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military ties--in fact most senior Jordanian officers regret having to conclude
a third deal with Moscow--but does underscore the King's priority for force
modernization. Hussein deeply mistrusts Soviet intentions, and does not now
seem inclined to include major arms--such as the MIG-29--in contracts with
Moscow to avoid the development over a time of a major Soviet presence in
Jordan. 25X1
Other Issues
Regional Development Plan. King Hussein has expressed some interest in
Prime Minister Peres's idea of a regional development fund to provide financial
aid to'key Arab states and has asked to be kept informed on related
developments. He has cautioned, however, that hopes about prospects for the
fund should not be raised prematurely. In addition, Jordan's Prime Minister has
made clear the Jordanian desire that any funds destined for the West Bank be
channeled through Jordan. 25X1
"Gaza First." Hussein does not support Peres's offer of greater self-rule
for the Gaza Strip. He fears that progress toward a settlement in Gaza alone
would reduce Tel Aviv's incentive to reach a comprehensive peace accord that
would include the West Bank. 25X1
Prospects
Hussein's hopes for early progress in his Arab reconciliation efforts may
be unrealistic. Assad probably would not forgo an opportunity to assume a
leading role among his Arab colleagues, but does not appear ready to embrace
Saddam Husayn or to withdraw support for Iran. For his part, Saddam ap ears
skeptical of Syrian intentions, but probably will proceed nonetheless. 25X1
Even if the King succeeds in arranging an Arab summit, he is unlikely to
convince his Arab colleagues to withdraw their support for Arafat's leadership
of the PLO. Jordan's financial benefactors, particularly Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, continue to back Arafat and want Hussein to settle his differences with
the PLO leader. 25X1
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