AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302550001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 10, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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I I ~.
Directorate of
Intelligence
IMC/CB
1O -c`
Afghanistan Situation Report
DATE
DOC NO NE,S/3 /1 ko - &oob'7cX
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- onc:-1CK
OCR -7.91 (,
P&PD V
Top Secret
NESA M 86-20087CX
SOVA M 86-20054CX
10 June 1986
copy O 8 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302550001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302550001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302550001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302550001-5
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORTI 25X1
NEW AFGHAN-SOVIET ENERGY CONTRACT SIGNED
The Soviets signed a contract on 4 June with the
Afghan regime to build the Sarowbi-Il dam to
increase hydroelectric power for the Kabul area.
REFUGEE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTANIS STRAINED
Tensions between Afghan refugees and local
residents are evident in Pakistan's Kurram
Agency.
GROWING FISSURES IN THE PARTY
Babrak Karmal's removal as General Secretary of
the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
continues to generate friction in the Parchami
faction as his suporters clash with those of new
party chief Najibullah.
10 JUNE 1986
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IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
FORTRESS KABUL: SOVIET AND REGIME FORCES CONSOLIDATE
Soviet-Afghan forces have increased their control
over the Kabul area by establishing security zones
around the capital and making it difficult for the
insurgents to operate in the city.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
10 June 1986
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10 June 1986
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NEW AFGHAN-SOVIET ENERGY CONTRACT SIGNED
The Kabul regime signed a contract with the Soviet
Union on 4 June for the construction of the Sarowbi-II
dam, part of a project for hydroelectric power stations
along the Kabul River. Under the terms of the
agreement, the Soviet Union will provide specialists
and. equipment for the project and extend financial
assistance through its long-term credit agreement with
Afghanistan. The dam is scheduled to be completed in
1987-88.
COMMENT: To alleviate Afghanistan's chronic shortages
of electricity, a large portion of Soviet economic aid
has been allocated to the development of power
generating facilities. Sarowbi-II's output will be
hindered by periodic and severe water shortages. Such
shortages, as well as insurgent attacks on facilities,
have limited the effectiveness of Kabul's existing
hydroelectric plants.
10 June 1986
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Tensions between the predominantly Sunni Afghan
refugees and local Shia tribesmen continue in the
Kurram Agency,
The refugees now outnumber
the native Pakistanis, and a delegation of local
residents
wanted the refugees to go elsewhere. number o
Pakistanis resent the competition of Afghan refugees in
the transport and retail industries, and blame them for
the sharp rise in housing, food, and fuel prices.
COMMENT: The economic impact of the 2 million refugees
has been blunted somewhat by foreign aid, but the
assistance does not compensate for damage to the
environment or the burden on the local social services
and the transportation network. Even though most
unskilled Afghan do not directly compete with
Pakistanis for jobs, and there is still room in the
transportation and retail industries for local
businessmen, Pakistani officials are concerned about
growing resentment toward the refugees. Assertions by
the Pakistani Government that it is working toward the
repatriation of refugees may continue to partially
appease NWFP residents, but Islamabad will remain
sensitive to the political ramifications of the
Afghans' presence.
The removal of Babrak Karmal as General Secretary of
the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is
continuing to foster unrest in the party's Parchami
faction.
forces loyal to the new party head, Najibullah,
arrested more than six hundred Babrak supporters in the
party and the army in Oandahar city in mid-May.
Members of the pro-Babrak group reportedly tried to
defect to the resistance.
The US Embassy in Kabul reports that Najibullah is
traveling under heavy guard. An unconfirmed press
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report claimed he had been wounded by Babrak supporters
last week. Babrak Karmal made the annual speech at the
Eid celebration on 7 June. He appeared haggard and
worn.
COMMENT: The opposition to Babrak's removal may have
forced Moscow to keep him in his largely ceremonial
post and in the public view. Najibullah has moved
quickly to clamp down on dissent but plans to move
forward with Afghan parliamentary elections--presumably
to bolster the regime's claims to legitimacy prior to
resumption of the UN-sponsored peace talks on
30 July--might be delayed because of the infighting.
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construction at the
helicopter airfield at Bost in Helmand Province is
continuing. The new ammunition storage area is
completed, and pierced steel planking has been
placed on ten helicopter hardstands and the
taxiway. Eight additional hardstands were still
being graded. Prior to the renovation of the
airfield
Forces
The completion of the first stage of the Afghan
media project was recently announced at a press
conference sponsored by a German Bundestag
representative. According to the US Embassy in
Bonn, about 60 Afghans will undergo four weeks of
training in operations and maintenance of portable
video equipment. Squabbling among insurgents at
the conference undercut the public presentation of
the project.
A three-person medical team has left Switzerland
for Afghanistan, according to the US Embassy in
Bern. The team evidently plans to operate in areas
where medical assistance is now unavailable. It is
receiving funds from a political institute in
Bern. This is the first reported instance of~
private Swiss aid to the Afghan insurgents.
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TOP SECRET
PERSPECTIVE
FORTRESS KABUL: SOVIETS AND REGIME FORCES CONSOLIDATE CONTROL
Soviet and Afghan Forces have slowly increased their
control of the Kabul area over the past few years.
They have established security zones around the city
and nearby military areas, hampering insurgent efforts
at infiltration. Some 28,000 Soviet and 20,000 Afghan
military and paramilitary troops are stationed in the
capital itself, providing Kabul with the highest
concentration of military forces in the country.
Periodic combat sweeps have virtually depopulated areas
south of Kabul where insurgents had previously had a
major presence and hindered guerrilla operations
elsewhere near the city. Insurgent forces are still
active in the capital, but operations have become more
difficult because of the Soviet and Afghan regime
defensive measures.
The insurgency in Kabul is now restrained by comparison
with previous levels of activity. In 1983, improved
cooperation among guerrillas operating in Kabul enabled
them to launch coordinated attacks on the Bala Hissar
Fortress, the Microrayon housing complex, and even
Radio Afghanistan in the central city. Assassinations
and attacks on facilities occupied by regime and Soviet
officials were more common. Moreover, the number and
intensity of rocket and mortar attacks on the city were
greater and the frequency of the attacks more
regular.
Ring Around Kabul
Although the preponderance of Soviet and Afghan
military forces in Kabul has been a major factor
inhibiting guerrilla attacks in the-city, defensive
measures have been decisive in heloing to keep the
insurgents at bay.
a series of small
outposts now guard the southern approaches to the
capital. One of these, in the Monaray Ghar mountains
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overlooking the Masa'i Valley, can be reached only by
helicopter and is equipped with heavy mortars to harass
guerrilla forces in the area,
In conjunction with the lookout points, the Soviets
have created a virtual "no-man's land" to the south of
the city.
houses within 500 meters of key sections of the Kabul-
Gardeyz road have been destroyed and that most of the
villages have been bombed or shelled. As a
consequence, the southern Masa'i and the Sorkh Ab
Valleys are now almost completely depopulated.
patrol activity by
Afghan and Soviet forces creates de facto defensive
rings around the city. The inner ring comprises Soviet
troops patrolling in tanks and other armored vehicles;
the middle zone is auarded by Afghan forces; and the
outer area is covered by Soviet helicopter forces.
Besides measures to protect ground installations in the
Kabul area, the Soviets have also increased precautions
to protect air operations from insurgent air defense
missiles. Beginning in late 1984, aircraft using Kabul
International Airport started flying evasive maneuvers
on takeoffs and landings. The maneuvers included sharp
banking turns and steep ascents and descents over the
city to avoid low-altitude flights over the hills
around Kabul, from which insurvents have fired at
aircraft. Military aircraft using the airport have
employed flares to deflect heat-seeking missiles.
Additionally, the Soviets now use MI-24 Hind attack
helicopters to escort transport aircraft in and out of
the zone of greatest vulnerability near the airport.
The Insurgent Threat to Kabul
Insurgents from six of the seven member groups of the
insurgent alliance still conduct occasional operations
in and around Kabul. The Hizbi Islami (Gulhuddin)
probably is the most active and effective, followed
closely by the Jamiat-i-Islami and the Hizbi Islami
(KhaIis),
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Guerrillas in southern Kabul and the Masa'i Valley
areas seem to be adequately supplied with food and
weaponry, although there are some reports of shortages
of heavy weapons ammunition.
Guerrilla Activity Limited But Not Eliminated
The insurgents who target Kabul have had to modify some
of their tactics as a result of the improved defenses
in the capital area.
the guerrillas have been forced to relinquish their
permanent campsites in the mountains and canyons. They
have formed small, mobile "committees" that use
abandoned houses for shelter, cache heavy weapons until
needed, and frequently change location. Their base
camps are situated in the mountains at extended
distances from Kabul.
Insurgent forces remain able to attack targets in the
Kabul area, although the overall level of their
activity is reduced. Both the Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin)
and the Jamiat-i-Islami groups conduct sabotage and
assassination operations in Kabul. They engage in
night harassment attacks, using rockets and mortars
fired from long range.
small teams of insurgents infiltrated the capital's
defenses in early May 1986 to fire recoilless rifles,
machineguns, and light mortars at Kabul Airport and a
Soviet barracks near a communications site. The US
Embassy in Kabul reported in April 1986 that a spate of
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bomb explosions in the city prompted an increase in
patrols and manning of checkpoints in the city.
The guerrillas also are better able to inflict damage
on Soviet and regime forces on the periphery of the
capital's defense. the
insurgents are strong in the southern reaches of the
Masa'i Valley and that they lay mines and mount
ambushes against forces traveling on the main road
there. Because of the absence of outposts on the road
south of the Masa'i Valley, Soviet and Afghan forces
that travel the road employ heavy convoy security,
including armored vehicles flanking the route out to a
distance of three kilometers and attack helicopter
escorts.
Outlook
Soviet and Afghan regime forces will continue efforts
to curb insurgent activity in Kabul. Major outbreaks
of insurgent activity in the capital in the past have
embarrassed the regime, and the government would like
to have a pacified capital to hack uD its claims to
legitimacy.
At the same time, the insurgents can not he completely
prevented from operating in Kahul. The guerrillas have
demonstrated that they are skilled at taking advantage
of lapses in Soviet and regime security routines. For
example, there are some indications that the insurgents
have used knowledge of patrol schedules by Soviet
helicopters to determine the timing of their own
operations. Reports by the US Embassy in Kabul have
suggested that security precautions often slacken when
antiregime activities in Kabul decline, and the
relaxation of procedures can be productively exploited
by the guerrillas. The dropoff in patrol activity at
night by Soviet forces also permits insurgent
infiltration, in our view.
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But for the insurgents to maintain their current
overall level of activity in Kabul, they will have to
further refine their tactics and operations. In light
of intensified regime efforts to penetrate and disrupt
guerrilla organizations, improved security will be
essential to sustain successful operations. The
guerrillas probably will also have to continue to
improve training and increase discipline and
coordination among attack groups. Moreover, because of
the extended Soviet and regime perimeter around Kabul,
the insurgents probably will have to rely less on
rocket and artillery attacks to demonstrate that the
reg~ control of the capital is not yet complete.
10
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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