SYRIA-IRAQ: IMPLICATIONS OF A RECONCILIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302570001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Syria-Iraq: Implications of a Reconciliation
NESA M# 86-20089
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
1 - Richard Murphy (State Department)
1 - George Harris (State Department)
1 - Richard L. Armitage (Pentagon)
1 - Morton I. Abramowitz (State Department)
1 - Peter Rodman (NSC)
1 - Sandra Charles (Pentagon)
1 - Robert H. Pelletreau (Pentagon)
1 - Dennis Ross (NSC)
1 - Marion Creekmore (State Department)
1 - Arnold Raphel (State Department)
1 - Roscoe Suddarth (State Department)
1 - David Tarbell (Pentagon)
1 - Peter Rurleigh (State Department)
1 - John Craig (State Department)
1 - James Kelly (Department of Commerce)
1 - Charles Boykin (Department of Energy)
1 - Roger Pajak (Treasury Department)
1 - Robert G. Lawrence (State Department)
1 - Walter P. Lang (Pentagon)
1 - DDI DATE (p 3 ) l(L6
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1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff DOC NO /1(C-SA Y'Co0oO ?
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6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/PES P&PD
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DDI/NESA/AI/D~ I12 June 1986
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 June 1986
SYRIA-IRAQ: Implications of a Reconciliation
Summary
Jordan's King Hussein has embarked on an
intensive, effort to bring about a reconciliation
between Syria and Iraq. The King's personal
diplomacy has sought to end the bitter feud
between the two Ba'thist regimes which emerged
from the collapse in 1979 of a previous effort at
unification. While we remain skeptical that the
King can negotiate a rapprochement between
Presidents Hafiz al-Assad and Saddam Husayn, who
share a deep mutual antipathy, a Syrian-Iraqi
rapprochement would have significant implications
for both countries and for the region. This
memorandum is based on the assumption that a
Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement occurs in the near
term. It examines in detail the pluses and minuses
for them and the possible impact on the region.
Benefits to Syria
We believe Syria's economic woes provide the immediate
context for Assad's flirtation with King Hussein's proposal.
Damascus has experienced a foreign payments crunch over the past
two years as Arab aid has tapered off and erratic oil shipments
from Iran have forced Syria to look to the spot market for oil
imports.
--Official transfers under the Baghdad Pact of 1978 have
fallen off significantly with the softening of the oil market
and general Arab dissatisfaction with Syrian policies.
Syria's foreign aid in 1980--virtually all from Arab
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis. Information as of 9 June 1986 was used in
its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to
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countries--was $1.95 billion. By 1985, we estimate aid to
have fallen to about $800 million. Only Saudi Arabia has
remained current in its Baghdad payments.
--In the past year, Syria's relationship with Tehran has
become troubled. We estimate Syria's oil debt to Iran is
between $1.5 and $2 billion, despite Tehran's write-off of
arrearages in 1984 and a high volume of free oil for the
Syrian military. Periodic disputes over unpaid bills have
reduced oil supplies to well below the contract amount.
Iranian shipments since last December are 6.3 million
barrels-- less than half of Syria's oil import requirement.
Syria would derive several economic benefits from a
reconciliation with Iraq. Assad could press Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the other Gulf shaykdoms, and Iraq to reward Syria with aid and a
more stable source for oil imports. It received such payoffs for
its rapprochement with Jordan last year. At a minimum, Damascus
would ask for prompt payment of pledges from the Baghdad Pact
signatories. In any event, reopening the idle Iraq-Syrian pipeline
would bring the benefits of transit fees charged Iraq and
prospects for a more stable oil supply relationship.
In strategic terms, Syrian cooperation with King Hussein's
reconciliation efforts would strengthen ties between Damascus and
Amman that Assad hopes to finesse into greater military
cooperation. With Egypt neutralized and Iraq bogged down in the
Gulf war, Jordan is Syria's only potential credible military
partner should war break out with Israel in the next few years.
Assad would like to station Syrian early warning radar and even
tactical air defense missiles in northern Jordan, and he may
believe that such an agreement could emerge as a trade-off for
reconciling differences with Iraq.
At a minimum, Damascus would expect its cooperation with King
Hussein to increase Syrian leverage over Jordan's relations with
the PLO and to influence the King's position on a negotiated
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite the current
falling-out between Hussein and PLO leader Arafat, Assad remains
wary of a renewed Jordanian-PLO initiative. Assad also is
determined to prevent the King from pursuing a West Bank
alternative to the PLO that, if successful, would severely reduce
Syrian influence over the course of the conflict.
Assad also may believe he can parlay reconciliation into
agreement by Arafat's backers--particularly Saudi Arabia--to
withdraw their support for his continued leadership of the PLO.
Assad envisions a reunified PLO under a leader who will take
direction from Damascus. Syrian domination of the PLO would
give Damascus another lever over future peace initiatives.
Assad's Soviet patrons favor a Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation.
The Soviets may have agreed in recent meetings with Syrian
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officials in Moscow to increase economic and military aid to
Damascus in exchange for a Syrian-Iraqi dialogue. Soviet
commitments, however, still appear to fall short of Syrian
expectations.
Benefits to Iraq
Reconciliation would bring important military and political
benefits to Iraq, although it probably would not significantly
enhance Baghdad's ability to wage war with Iran. Baghdad would
welcome the halt of Syrian arms sales to Iran--primarily small
arms, SA-7s, and possibly FROGs. The cut-off would be more
important for its symbolism than for its military value, but would
isolate Iran, leaving Libya as Iran's only important Arab backer.
Reconciliation would also lend credibility to Iraq's claim to be
defending the Arab cause. It also would substantially increase
Iraq's chances for obtaining a strong Arab League resolution
condemning Iranian occupation of Iraqi territory, calling on Iran
to end the war, and threatening economic sanctions.
A halt in the flow of Syrian arms to Iraqi Kurdish rebels and
an end to Syrian efforts to unite disparate Iraqi dissidents would
weaken guerrilla activity in northern Iraq. The Kurds control much
of the mountainous territory beyond the major cities and tie up
militia in manpower-short Iraq.
Iraq, like Syria, stands to gain on several economic counts.
Reopening the 450,000 b/d Iraq-Syrian oil pipeline would provide
Iraq with $1.6 billion a year in additional foreign exchange
earnings at current prices, easing Baghdad's fragile financial
position. When the line reached this capacity, in about two or
three months, it would boost Iraqi oil exports to about 1.9
million b/d. The additional revenues might improve Baghdad's
ability to meet overdue debt payments this year that have caused
lenders to restrict trade financing. Reopening the all-weather
land route from the Syrian seaport of Latakia would reduce Iraq's
dependence on its current land link to Western Europe, bypassing
mountainous terrain both in Turkey and areas of Iraq threatened by
Kurdish rebels.
These developments would provide a substantial boost to Iraqi
civilian and military morale that is suffering from increasing
austerity measures and a seemingly endless war. The psychological
lift probably would be short-lived, however, because
reconciliation with Syria is unlikely to force Iran to the
negotiating table or to reduce significantly the level of fighting
or Iraqi losses--the main causes of low morale.
Risks and Disadvantages for Both Sides
For both Damascus and Baghdad there are significant risks or
costs to signing on to King Hussein's mediation effort.
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Damascus must anticipate that Iran would react sharply to a
shift in Syrian policy and would seek to "get even" by promoting
anti-Syrian fundamentalist activities within Lebanon and Syria
itself.
/the
relationship established between the Iranian-backed radical Shia
Hizballah and pro-Arafat Palestinians in South Lebanon is already
threatening to undermine Syria's efforts to manage the
confrontation with Israel in the Lebanese security zone--and might
get worse after a rapprochement as both try to draw Syria into
confrontation with Israel.
From Saddam's perspective, Assad's increased influence with
the moderate Arab states would be at Iraqi expense. Baghdad
believes it is the rightful leader of the Arabs by virtue of its
oil resources, size, geographic position, and rich heritage. The
Iraqis regard Syria's present influence as a temporary development
stemming from Egypt's isolation, events in Lebanon, and Iraq's
preoccupation with the war. Moreover, the Iraqis would believe
that Assad would resume efforts to remove Saddam at the first
opportunity and would be wary of Syrian promises to the contrary.
The Ba'thist regime in Baghdad, particularly Saddam, harbors deep-
rooted animosity toward Syrian Ba'thists for ideological reasons,
for Assad's efforts to oust Saddam, and for Syrian support for
Iran in the war.
Implications
Improved Syrian-Iraqi ties probably would not significantly
enhance the near-term prospects for a negotiated settlement of the
Iran-Iraq war. The loss of Syrian support, however, might prompt
an increasingly isolated Tehran to undertake subversion or
terrorism not only against Syria but against the Arab states of
the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. Tehran might activate
its network of operatives in Gulf Shia communities to increase the
cost to Gulf Arabs of continued support to Baghdad. Iranian
subversion could aim to threaten the stability of smaller Gulf
states like Bahrain and the UAE, temporarily disrupt oil exports
from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, or result in terrorism against US
interests in the area.
Israel would view renewed Syrian-Iraqi ties and greater Arab
unity with alarm. Israeli officials have long been concerned about
the possible emergence of an "eastern front" bringing together
Syria, Iraq, and Jordan with strong Arab support. In addition, the
Israelis will be concerned that a shift of Syrian support to Iraq
in the Gulf war could give Baghdad enough of an edge to bring the
war to a conclusion.
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Renewed Syrian ties with the Arab moderates would not extend
to Egypt--Assad almost certainly will continue to demand that
Cairo renounce its treaty with Israel--and is likely to result in
more "radicalization" of Arab positions than "moderation" of
Syrian positions. With Assad emerging at an Arab summit as a key
player, Syrian influence on the Arab consensusus almost certainly
will grow. Assad probably would seek to extract support for Syrian
positions on the PLO, on Lebanon, and on the terms for an Arab-
Israeli settlement as the price of going along with the moderates'
efforts to reunify Arab ranks.
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