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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 25, 2011
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 17, 1986
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9.pdf488.51 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000302600001-9 e o q Directorate of -Top Svcmt-- DATE DOC NO OCR 0 "7 cab P&PD 6 25X1I Ai gnanistan situation Report 79-81 IMC/CB NESA M 86-20092JX SOYA M 86-20056JX 17 June 1986 copy 0 8 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 WIDESPREAD COMBAT OPERATIONS BEGIN 2 25X1 Soviet and Afghan troops from Konduz, Herat, Jalalabad, and the Kabul-Bagram areas initiated regiment-size operat ions last week, as military pressure on the insu rgents intensifi ed. 25X1 25X1 CONTINUING AFGHAN-INDIAN MILITARY RELATIO NSHIP 2 25X1 A recent meeting in Kabul of Indian, Soviet, and Afghan Air Force officers to discuss the shootdown of an Afghan SU-22 by Pakistani F-16s suggests military cooperation between India and the Afghan regime may be growing. UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAM FOR AFGHANISTANI 4 Donors to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are opposed to a new country program for Afghanistan for 1987-1991 but probably will be unable to block completely funding to Kabul. The Soviets again assumed most of the combat burden against the insurgents in May. They took steps to prevent the Afghan military from reacting to the changeover in leadership within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Insurgent activity was restrained somewhat by start of Ramadan on 7 May. 17 JUNE 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 THE LITTLE WAR IN GHOWR PROVINCE 10 25X1 Ghowr Province, a rugged area in west-central Afghanistan, is essentially controlled by the resistance. The Soviets do not consider it an important strategic region and probably will not attempt to drive out the insurgents. This document is prepared weekly by the office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 ?Qal'eh-ye r''Kelef"' - I Kheyrabad. Mazer-e Sheeberghanhanl Chaghcharan D yak Vyzsbad ?Tatogan Eshkashem j duz Khalm Ku ,PogeaKhomri Pahl Charikar Mahmud-e ?R Ramlan ? agi r13z Jdehtalam '1z'1.e~ sadebad _WM e f Tarin 0Kow1.... ~.. y.. odao ~,aJ Qalat Qanda'har Gereshk o Khasn tashkar Gahp Zgranj NIMPUL ~\mD '.... Da Yaye e Ge `mss Afghanistan I nternatio nal boundary Province boundary National capital Province capilal Railroad Road 0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers F T-LT 0 50 100 150 17 June 1986 25X1 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 WIDESPREAD COMBAT OPERATIONS BEGIN Several regiment-size Soviet and Afghan combat operations were under way last week in an effort to maintain pressure on the insurgents. major elements of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment at Konduz and a command post set up at Pol-e Khomri are involved in operations about 55 kilometers southeast of Konduz. 25X1 :ZbX1 25X1 01 sy sources report a recent Soviet-Afghan three-day operation in Wardak Province west of Kabul left 47 regime soldiers killed and 60 wounded. Several Soviet Afghan military groups continue sweeps in the hills west of Paghman. CONTINUING AFGHAN-INDIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP Indian Air Force officers met with Soviet and Afghan Air Force officers in Kabul in late May to discuss the 17 May dogfight between Afghan fighter-bombers and Pakistani F-16s, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. The Indians ostensibly were investigating Pakistani F-16 fighter tactics, capabilities, and crew proficiencies. The Indian officers were given an inaccurate account of the incident that claimed Pakistani pilots were not yet proficient on the F-16. COMMENT: The distorted version of the incident--in which an SU-22 was shot down--probably was, in part, an effort by the Soviets and Afghans to save face. Nevertheless, the exchange is another indication of a continuing Indo-Afghan military cooperation. Last 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 January, an Afghan Army general made an official visit to India, and there were unconfirmed reports that Indian Army officers observed operations in the Panjsher Valley. UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAM FOR AFGHANISTAN A meeting of donors to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was recently convened to discuss the Afghanistan country program for 1987-1991, according to the US Mission in Geneva. The UNDP representative in Kabul has tried to dissuade the Afghan regime from seeking a new country program because current project activity could be jeopardized if the governing council reacts adversely to a new proposal. The regime insists, however, that it will present a country program next June. Opposition from the "Group of 8" donor countries--the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the US--prevented adoption of country programs in COMMENT: The "Group of 8" probably will object to a new country program for the reasons it cited previously: unwillingness to legitimize the regime, the possible use of project aid for the regime's military and political efforts, and the uncertain security conditions in country. They probably will not totally cut off project funding, however, because of Soviet and East European pressure in the United Nations and a desire to avoid denying assistance to the Afghan people. Accordingly, they probably will agree to continue the current practice of funding a limited number of projects on a case-by-case basis. 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Bakhtiar Airlines maintenance personnel plan to strike if their demands for restored salary levels are not met by the end of June, Salaries were reduced by 50 percent after the recent nationalization of the airlines. It is unknown whether other Bakhtiar employees will join in the strike. The Kabul regime has asked Hazara and Turi leaders to form 5,000- and 2,000-man militia forces respectively for operations along the Afghan and Pakistani border, Plans for the creation of these Shia militias reflect Najibullah's interest in widening support for the regime among Afghan tribes and bolstering Kabul's severely understrength armed forces. But the regime almost certainly will fail to enlist as many men as it wants. 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 In May, Soviet ground forces carried most of the load in counterinsurgency operations, reversing the trend in recent months when the Afghan Army bore the brunt in major offensives. During the changeover of leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in late April and early May, Soviet forces evidently took precautions to prevent the Afghan military from reacting forcefully to Babrak Karmal's replacement. Insurgent activity probably was constrained by the beginning of Ramadan--the holy month of fasting--which began on 7 May. Clipped Wings The Soviets tried to minimize the chances of violence over the replacement on 4 May of Babrak Karmal as Communist Party leader. All military movement by Afghan forces in and out of Kabul was prohibited starting as early as 28 April, and Afghan Army units in the capital were largely disarmed. he Embassy in Kabul commented that Soviet troops were out in force in the capital during the change in leadership. Some of the controls apparently continued into at least mid-month and were a source of Soviets Out Front The major Soviet and Afghan combat operation in May was centered in the 'Ali Kheyl area, where insurgents-- primarily from the National Islamic Front--had been harassing an Afghan Army garrison. Following several days of airstrikes, operations commenced on 14 May, with an unsuccessful reach Ali Kheyl. 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 ,Fv1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 The Battle in Qandahar Province To stem infiltration, the Soviets are building a security belt around Qandahar similar to the one around Kabul. it will comprise three concentric circles ot security posts. The outer ring will be manned by Soviet soldiers; the middle one by 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Afghan soldiers; and the innermost belt by militia. insurgent forces have found it increasingly difficult to move in and out of Qandahar city, although they manage to harass Soviet and Afghan positions nearly The Soviets and Afghans have established new security outposts along routes normally used by insurgents. The interdiction effort allegedly has nearly doubled the cost of transporting supplies in province. 25X1 25X1 some of the decisions taken by the insurgents have had unintended consequences. In particular, when the guerrillas tried to block sales of food and fuel by local merchants to regime forces, the regime confiscated the items. In addition, the guerrillas' suggestion to have civilians destroy draft exemption cards resulted in a major round-up of draft- eligible males by the regime. Because of the negative impact of the decisions on civilian morale in Qandahar city, some insurgents suspect the originator of the measures of being a government agent. Lull of Ramadan Insurgent-initiated attacks throughout Afghanistan probably were limited somewhat by the onset of Ramadan early in May. Rocket attacks on Kabul increased during the month, according to the US Embassy, although the frequency and intensity were lower than in past years. The airport and the Dar of Aman Palace areas appeared to have been the main targets of the insurgent rockets. Later in the month, 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 the insurgents ambushed a large Soviet military convoy near Kowt-e Ashrow. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, the insurgents destroyed nearly 18 vehicles during a six-hour attack. Outlook o ensive postponed will once the planning for another large-scale in the Nazian Valley in June--an attack from May--indicate that Soviet ground units more be the major participants. This suggests that the Soviets are not ready to give primary responsibility for all major actions against the guerrillas to the Afghan Army. The limited successes this year, in which Afghan infantry and armor units have been the primary ground forces component, almost certainly are the result of the massive firepower supplied by Soviet artillery and combat aircraft. 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 THE LITTLE WAR IN GHOWR PROVINCE Rugged Ghowr Province in west-central Afghanistan is largely controlled by the insurgents. Soviet and regime forces maintain only a token presence in the provincial capital of Chaghcharan. Given the relative unimportance of the area to the counterinsurgency effort, the Soviets are unlikely to push hard to extend their control of the region in the foreseeable future. Lines of communication in the province are highly vulnerable to interdiction by the guerrillas. The roads are few and of poor quality, and the terrain is mountainous. Access to Chaghcharan is limited to a few passes, which are patrolled by the insurgents. Holed Up in Chaghcharan 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Jamiat-i-Islami and Harakat-Inqilab-i-Islami insurgents based in the Farsi Valley frequently harass regime and Soviet convoys: -- In an attack in September 1983, at least 300 insurgents ambushed a 500-vehicle convoy. Nine vehicles were destroyed, five soldiers killed, and 11 wounded. Despite a helicopter escort and frequent air attacks, the Soviet convoy took three days to travel through the Farsi Valley to Chaghcharan. By early fall 1985, the insurgents controlled the countryside around Chaghcharan. They essentially confined the Soviet battalion to the city and nearby airfield. Soviet forces organized a reinforcement column in November. MI-24 gunships provided air cover 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Insurgent small arms and RPG-7 fire slowed the convoy, while guerrillas from several factions set an ambush near the city of Tulak. The lead armored personnel carrier hit a mine and was destroyed, halting movement on the road, and the insurgents opened fire on the stopped vehicles. Only the intervention of MI-24 helicopters prevented a major disaster for the force, Fighting continued through the night, and at about noon the following day, the column began a slow retreat, with helicopters covering the movement of the remaining vehicles back to Shindand. The insurgents claimed to have killed at least 43 Soviet and regime troops and destroyed or disabled some 20 vehicles. Objective: A Minimal Presence The Soviets now depend on aircraft from Shindand to resupply their garrison in Chaghcharan and to protect convoys. The Soviets probably will maintain their presence in Ghowr at current levels so long as it remains sufficient to retain control of Chaghcharan. They view the area as strategically insignificant and probably 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX 25X1 25X1 2.5X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 are unwilling to expend more resources trying to quell the insurgency there. For their part, the insurgents probably will remain unable to force the Soviets out of Chaghcharan. 17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9 Top Secret Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302600001-9