TERRORIST TRENDS AND LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302620001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Terrorist Trends and Leadership Challenges in the
Palestinian Movement
NESA M 86-20094
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DATE t,*
DOC NO NE M M&-9'/
OCR 3
P&PD
secure(23Jun86)
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Terrorist Trends and Leadership es
in the Palestinian Movement
Summary
We believe that the authority of the established
Palestinian leaders is being undermined gradually and
that this development is contributing to the
indiscriminate Palestinian terrorism of recent months.
The erosion of PLO Chairman Arafat's position and
challenges to leaders of other Palestinian groups will
encourage:
--The emergence of more aggressive, competitive
Palestinian leaders impatient with complex
political negotiations and more prone to seek
results with terrorism.
--More splits, offshoots, and shifts in loyalty
among Palestinian groups that will frustrate and
reduce the influence of moderate Palestinians.
--More manipulation of Palestinian terrorist
groups by state sponsors, which also may result
in some attacks by "freelance" Palestinians
attempting to gain notoriety or funding on their
own.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Issues 25X1
Branch, Issues and Applications Division, Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 23 June 1986 was 25X1
used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be
addressed to Chief, Issues and Applications Division,
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--More violent operations by Palestinians who
have grown up in Lebanon numbed by their
day-to-day experiences.
Israel will continue to be the primary target for
Palestinian terrorists, but moderate Arab
states--particularly Jordan--will still be vulnerable.
We believe the prospects will remain high that US
interests will continue to be the target of attacks by
Palestinian terrorists, encouraged by strong US ties to
Israel, anti-Americanism among younger Arabs, and
persistent pressure by radical Arab states.
Arafat's Eroding Influence
Several factors are contributing to the indiscriminate
Palestinian terrorism of recent months, but we believe the major
cause is Arafat's weakened leadership over the Palestinian
groups. The split in the Palestine Liberation Organization that
followed the Palestine National Council meeting in Amman in late
1984 formalized Arafat's declining control over the radicals.
Arafat's political setbacks in late 1985 and 1986--his failure to
implement the terms of the agreement signed with King Hussein and
the concurrent ability of Palestinian terrorist groups, such as
Abu Nidal, to discredit his political strategy--have further
weakened his leadership.
Recent Palestinian terrorism, in our view, is indicative of a
growing attitude among younger Palestinians that violence is the
only effective means of focusing international attention on their
plight. We believe that many of them think Arafat lacks the
political clout to elicit significant concessions from Hussein,
and, more importantly, that the United States lacks interest in
continuing to broker the peace process.
Following the assassination of the newly appointed mayor of
the West Bank town of Nablus by anti-Arafat Palestinians last
March, US Embassy reports indicate that old-line West Bank Arab
leaders voiced distress and frustration at their growing
inability to convince younger Palestinians that political
activity is the most effective means to resolve their problems.
Since the assassination, a localized radical youth movement is
emerging
Well-organized and anti-US, this more assertive generation of
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leaders reportedly is using threats and violence to intimidate
moderate West Bank Palestinians.
Leadership Challenges
Competition for leadership of the Palestinian movement
probably is driving some Palestinian groups to display their
prowess at terrorism. The "successes" over the past year of the
Abu Nidal group, which has avoided alliances with other
pro-Syrian, pro-Libyan radical Palestinians, may have set the
tone for terrorism and has probably implicitly challenged other
factions to prove their terrorist credentials. We believe
younger Palestinians in particular, disenchanted by barren
diplomatic initiatives, may be buoyed by the Abu Nidal group's
sense of showmanship and action.
We believe that a violent group requires acts of escalating
violence to keep its name in the headlines. The publicity that
surrounded such operations as the hijacking of TWA and Egyptair
aircraft and the cruise ship Achille Lauro the attacks on the
Rome and Vienna airports, and the bombing of the West Berlin
disco increases the likelihood that factions will contend for
status and public attention with more dramatic operations.
The sense of competition also probably contributes to a more
assertive role by second-echelon leaders. Internal differences
are at least as prevalent in Palestinian terrorist groups as in
any other organization, and a new generation of aggressive
subordinates may be pressing the traditional leaders into more
daring displays of terrorism, including operations against
high-profile targets. Maverick members of established factions
also may now feel more free to take advantage of the greater
erosion of control by traditional leaders to conduct their own
attacks.
We believe that Fatah's ideological tilt that favors the
attitudes of hardline senior subordinates to Arafat such as Salah
Khalaf is indicative of the increasing influence of aggressive
secondary leaders. In our view, resistance to Arafat's political
strategy by the hardliners is far more prevalent than it was a
year ago, when the moderates were intensely involved in
negotiations with King Hussein. If this shift continues, it
eventually could lead Fatah to a return to international
terrorist operations similar to those in the 1970s.
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We believe that disappointment and anger following more than
a decade of unsuccessful political efforts to create a
Palestinian homeland provide strong motivation for a new
generation of Fatah terrorists. Arafat's ban on PLO terrorist
operations outside Israel and the Occupied Territories,
implemented in 1974, has eroded over the past year or so. The
attack by Fatah Force 17 operatives on three Israelis in Cyprus,
the Achille Lauro operation by the Palestine Liberation Front
associated with the PLO, and Fatah's apparent retaliatory
operations against Syria last year suggest either that Arafat has
more tolerance for a broader range of targets or that he is
increasingly unable to control such operations by the Palestinian
groups that still support him.
Palestinian groups outside mainline Fatah may also be
experiencing leadership challenges. Although we have no
conclusive information about ongoing changes in the PFLP--the
second most influential Palestinian group after Fatah--there is
reason to surmise that squabbling over strategy within the PFLP
leadership may lead the PFLP to
step up terrorism, with a broader set of targets. The
assassination of the Palestinian mayor of Nablus last March, for
which we believe the PFLP was responsible, may signal such a
change. PFLP leaders now may feel more obliged or even anxious
to challenge Arafat through means that go beyond just a political
break. We do not believe that recent talk of PLO
reconciliation--which is probably doomed from the start--will
reverse this trend.
In addition to younger subordinates assuming a more vocal
role, we believe that leaders who previously have been less
influential, such as Abu Musa of the Fatah dissidents and Abu
Abbas of the pro-Arafat faction of the PLF, are strengthening
their credibility through the use of, or claims of, terrorist
operations.
--US efforts to arrest Abu Abbas have given him
notoriety among some Palestinians that he lacked before
the Achille Lauro operation
In spite of efforts by PLO officials
late last year to expel Abbas from the PLO Executive
Committee, Arafat reportedly believed that Abbas'
expulsion would have elevated him to the status of a
hero and perhaps promoted "another Abu Nidal."
--It has taken Abu Musa nearly two years to emerge as
leader of the still fractured Fatah dissidents. Even
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so, his leadership remains tenuous
We believe that leaders such as Abu Abbas and Abu Musa lack
both the political skills necessary to wield any major impact
among most Palestinians and the capability to compete with
operatives from Abu Nidal, the PFLP, or the reputation of Fatah's
dormant Black September Organization. They will, however, appeal
to some younger Palestinians who seek more involvement in
terrorism.
Manipulation by State Sponsors
Palestinian terrorist groups, for the most part, long have
sought to remain independent of their state sponsors. The loss
of Lebanon as the PLO's main base and the subsequent political
instability among its constituent groups have given radical
states more opportunity for manipulation. All of the major
Palestinian factions suffered heavy financial losses as well
following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Since the PLO
split, the anti-Arafat Palestinians have become more financially
dependent on radical states, having lost the traditional funding
of the moderate Arabs.
Although such major groups as the PFLP and Abu Nidal will
maintain some independence by playing Syria off against Libya,
needs for future funding, safehaven, and logistical support will
almost certainly force weaker Palestinian groups to accept
directions from their patrons. We also believe that more
individual Palestinians will be willing to hire themselves out as
freelance terrorists, going where the financial rewards are the
greatest.
The Lebanese Impact
In addition to the leadership problems in Palestinian groups,
we believe the decade-long Lebanese civil war is creating a pool
of ready recruits for Palestinian organizations intent on more
spectacular terrorist operations. In part, the brutalizing
effect of growing up in violence-torn Lebanon undoubtedly has
hardened this generation of Palestinians, described by one
scholar as the "Kalashnikov kids." These Palestinians probably
believe that the same terrorist tactics they see as responsible
for driving the Israelis from Lebanon will work elsewhere. For
this group, violent behavior is becoming ingrained and likely to
be pursued as an end in itself.
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A secondary outgrowth of Lebanon is that the religious
commitment of the Lebanese Shia has helped to inspire zealotry in
Palestinian nationalism, although most Palestinians are unlikely 25X1
to turn to martyrdom to the same degree that Shia terrorists
have. This deepening commitment was apparent in the attacks at
the Rome and Vienna airports, where the terrorists had little
chance of escaping alive.
Similarly, we believe that more young Palestinians are likely to
volunteer for what will almost certainly be suicide operations.
Prospects
The changes that we believe are emerging in the Palestinian
groups will probably persist, even in the unlikely event of
Arafat's reassertion of authority over most of the Palestinian
factions. Without a promising political outlet, competition
among younger Palestinians with a bent-for activism will hamper
moderate political initiatives and increase the prospects for
more indiscriminate terrorism.
Although most Palestinians still prefer a :. peaceful solution,
their frustration may cause them to tolerate more extreme
behavior in the name of the Palestinian cause and the media
attention that terrorism invokes. They may even conclude that
such measures are temporarily necessary in order to attract more
international attention to their cause.
For some time to come, radical Palestinians are likely to
exploit the US bombing of Libya as a justification to strike back
at the United States. Although Libyan manipulation certainly
raises the probability of Palestinian-sponsored retaliatory
operations against US targets, most Palestinian extremists
already harbor their own grievances against the United States
sufficient to provoke such attacks. Strong US ties with Israel
and anti-Americanism among Arabs increase the likelihood that US
interests, either indirectly or directly, will be targets of
future violence by Palestinian extremists.
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SUBJECT: Terrorist Trends and Leadership Challenges in the
Palestinian Movement
NESA M 86-20094
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SUBJECT: Terrorist Trends and Leadership Challenges in the
Palestinian Movement
NESA M 86-20094
External Distribution (continued)
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