NORTH AFRICA: THE POWER EQUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5 25X1
r ~ L~
North Africa: The Power Equation
NESA M#86-20096
Morocco: On the Eve of Kin Hassan's Visit to Washington
NESA M#86-20098
EXTERNAL:
1 - Elaine Morton (NSC)
1 - Morton I. Abramowitz (State)
1 - Patrick N. Theros (State)
1 - David E. Zweifel (State)
1 - Sandra Charles (Pentagon)
1 - Michael Ussery (State)
1 - Robert H. Pelletreau (Pentagon)
1~- Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser (Pentagon)
1 - Douglas P. Mulholland (Treasury)
1 - Roger F. Pajak (Treasury)
1 - Dennis Ross (Old EOB)
1 - Donald Gregg (Old EOB)
1 - Carol Minor (Commerce)
INTERNAL:
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staf f
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 -CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - PPS/NESA
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
1 - NESA/IA
1 - NESA/PG
1 - NESA/SO'
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DATE 7 / ~~(p ~ G~
DOC NO Nl~l9 M ~'.'a0oy~
ocR 3
DDI/NESA/AI/M/
27 June 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
wasl,in~fon, a c. Zosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 June 1986
North Africa: The Power Equation
Summary
The two major alliances of North Africa are
undergoing internal strains which could lead to a shift
in the balance of power in the Maghreb. Morocco's King
Hassan and Libyan leader Qadhafi are increasingly
dissatisfied with the implementation of their"union;
longstanding differences among Algeria, Tunisia, and
Mauritania have prevented their loose pact-from taking
root. We do not anticipate a dissolution of the
current groupings in the near term, but friction, if
unchecked, could lead the countries to realign their
foreign policies. The most likely change would involve
a rapprochement between Algeria and Libya, and that
these two states would benefit the most from such a
shift. Morocco and Tunisia would be more isolated and
vulnerable. Overall, the balance of power in the
Maghreb would not change appreciably under this
scenario, unless in the unlikely event that Algeria and'
Libya form some sort of an alliance. Such shifts in
the region would provide opportunities for Moscow to
expand its influence and produce mixed results for
Washington.
This memorandum was prepared by 25X1
the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of 25X1
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 27 June
was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be
directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division',
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
Background
Since late 1984, the two North African groupings -- the
Arab-African Union of Morocco and Libya and the loose coalition
of Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania have sparred for advantages.
Both alliances are built on the sand of profound differences and
old rivalries between partners. Historically, Morocco's King
Hassan and Tunisia's President Bourguiba have been strongly
oriented toward the West, while Algeria and Libya have been among
the foremost proponents of radical socialism in the Third World
and have had fairly close ties with Moscow in recent years. .5X1
~ ~ 25X1
During 1986 there have been indications of tensions within
these two alliances. Libyan leader Qadhafi is disappointed with
his union with Morocco, even though it is a gambit that so far
has entailed few costs for him. Qadhafi is particularly
frustrated with Morocco's reluctance to cooperate on defense as
called for in the treaty establishing the union, and by Rabat's
refusal to provide embargoed spare parts for Libya's inventory of
Morocco, which has more to lose in the relationship, also is
dissatisfied with the union. Hassan realizes that the union has
damaged Morocco's ties with Washington
He also has ina vertent y
aided Algeria's efforts to draw closer to the US. Moreover,
Hassan almost certainly is aware that the union has resulted in a
sizable influx of Libyans into Morocco, which increases the
potential for Qadhafi to create trouble for Hassan, especially if
the union fails.
Libya's military threats against Tunisia during the past year
have given impetus to cooperation between Algeria and Tunisia.
Even so, Tunisian leaders are uncomfortable with the newfound
relationship. -They worry about becoming militarily dependent on
Algiers and have longstanding suspicions that Algiers sees
Tunisia as part of Algeria's sphere of influence, according to
Embassy Tunis. Unlike the other countries, Algerian leaders have
less scruples about their alliances and the effects on the
country's overall foreign policy, but they fear that these
commitments risk war with Libya and Morocco.
25X6
25X6
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
Shifting Coalitions
The members of these alliances have begun to take steps to
compensate for recent strains with their partners. Since
November, Libya has undertaken a diplomatic offensive to improve
relations with Algiers. Qadhafi traveled to Algeria in late
January for a meeting with President Bendjedid, and since then
the two sides have had several high-level contacts between
political, economic, and military delegations. Algeria and
Libya, for example, signed a comprehensive economic cooperation
agreement in late February, and a visit to Tripoli in March by
the Algerian Prime Minister produced a protocol in which both
sides called for achievement of a union as a prelude to unity in
the Maghreb. Algeria, like Morocco, supported Libya in the
aftermath of the US airstrikes in March and April, but did not
directly criticize the US for its actions.
Qadhafi probably wants to gain a measure of security in light
of his confrontation with the US and break up nascent Algerian
cooperation with Egypt and the US. He also wants to lessen
tension with Algeria arising from conflicting claims over the
border. An accommodation with Algeria would better allow him to
meddle in Chad and elsewhere in the region.
Algeria remains highly skeptical of Qadhafi`s motives, but
President Bendjedid appears to believe that the possible
advantages of expanded contacts outweigh the risks. Algeria
wants to blunt Libyan subversion in Tunisia and Chad and pressure
Qadhafi to cease his support for Algerian dissidents. Both
Algeria and Libya have found common cause in OPEC over policy
toward oil prices, and Algerian leaders would want to gain
renewed Libyan support for the Polisario guerrillas battling
Morocco for control of the Western Sahara. Reports from the US
Embassy in Tunis indicating that Algeria was encouraging Tunis to
adopt a less confrontational posture toward Libya suggest
Bendjedid could use Tunisia as a pawn to placate Libya.
Morocco generally has looked outside the Maghreb to make up
for its isolation in North Africa. Hassan probably believes that
he has little choice as long as he continues his union with
Qadhafi .
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
Tunisia, more than the other countries, is militarily
vulnerable. Bourguiba's primary concern has been stablity in the
face of Libyan blandishments and doubts about French and American
willingness to come to his defense. Even so, Tunisia remains
wary of Algeria, and has looked outside the region to Egypt and
Iraq for military support. President Bourguiba, however, has
little choice but to~ on US military support to bolster
national defense.
Regional Prospects
Neither of the two North African alliances is in imminent
danger of collapse, despite the strains. Both Hassan and Qadhafi
view the Moroccan-Libyan union as a "marriage of convenience"
that serves useful purposes despite the limited progress in
political cooperation. Algeria and Tunisia will find it
necessary to maintain their close ties, as long as the
Rabat-Tripoli alliance endures, and the threat exists of Libyan
interference in Tunisian succession politics.
Nevertheless, we believe the Maghreb countries would not be
reluctant to realign their foreign political relations if current
frictions intensify over the next year.
Algeria and Libya would be the most likely countries in the
region to change partners and negotiate a practical compromise
with each other. They also would be the primary beneficiaries of
any shift in the existing alliances. Reconciliation would serve
to lessen the military threats each faces from abroad. Both
countries are surrounded by hostile neighbors, and each would be
able to reorient its forces toward its traditional enemies.
Libya would be able to strengthen its border with Egypt, while
Algeria would be able to refocus its attention on Morocco.
In our judgment, any Libyan-Algerian rapprochement would be 25X6
no more advanced than a fairly loose association because of
com etition for re Tonal dominance.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
Morocco and Tunisia would find themselves more vulnerable if
the current alliances were to shift, especially because of their
weaker military position and economic problems. They would be
without any partners in North Africa, or be thrown together in a
The loss of Algeria as a key ally would be a blow for
Tunisia, since the country's leaders have leaned on Algeria in
the wake of disillusionment with France and the US over what
Tunisian leaders perceive as parsimonious security assistance of
late. Both Tunisia and Morocco would be prone to Libyan
subversion.
Morocco almost certainly would be compelled to break ranks
with Libya if the Algerian-Libyan rapprochement showed promise.
The union might also split if Hassan became convinced that
Qadhafi had resumed military aid to the Polisario or was engaged
in subversive activity in Morocco. In these circumstances,
Hassan could turn to Tunisia, even though he would know that his
new partner would not be able to render the strategic and
economic assistance Morocco needs. Tunisia might reciprocate a
Moroccan overture, but its leaders, too, would see limited
advantages to such a relationship. Amore likely course for
Morocco and Tunisia would be concerted efforts to obtain
assistance from the US, France, wealthy Arab states, or even the
Soviet Union if the US was not receptive to their needs.
25X6
25X6
25X1
We believe that a realignment of states in North Africa would
not significantly alter the balance of power or stability in the
region. Morocco and Algeria will continue to be adversaries and
will remain at loggerheads over the Western Sahara. The position
of Libya vis-a-vis the other Maghreb states would be somewhat
improved, because Al iers is the onl regime that can effectively
challenge Tripoli. 25X6
Overall military stability, at least in the 25X6
short term, would be enhanced by an accommodation by Algeria and
Libya, which have the largest and most lethal inventories of
weapons. Thus while the prospects of military conflict in the
Maghreb may recede with a change in the alliances, heightened
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
anxieties on the part of Morocco and Tunisia would continue to
keep the region on edge.
The emergence of a formal political alliance between Algeria
and Libya would produce a significant change in the balance of
power in the Maghreb. Even cooperation short of a compact
between them, such as support for the Polisario and Moroccan
dissidents, would result in significantly heightened friction in
the region. The war in the Western Sahara would be prolonged and
state-sponsored terrorism would increase. Qadhafi, for his part,
would be careful not to antagonize the Algerians with overt
attacks on Tunisia, but he probably would adopt a more aggressive
stance toward Egypt.
The Soviet Angle
Such shifts in the alliances probably would encourage Libya
and Algeria to look to the Soviet Union as a potential wedge
against the others.. High level contacts between the Soviets and
Algeria and Tunisia suggest that Moscow senses an opportunity to
increase its influence in the region. Moscow favors a
rapprochement between Algeria and Libya, because of the Soviet's
traditional friendship with these two countries.
None of the Maghreb countries, except for Qadhafi's Libya,
are prepared to jeopardize their security links with Western
Europe or the United States. Tunisia probably hopes its contacts
with the Soviets will prompt the US to increase its aid, and
Algiers and Rabat could do the same. These three countries also
probably hope to get Moscow to curb Qadhafi's excesses.
Implications for the United States
These shifts in relations among the Maghreb states would have
mixed results for Washington, but, overall, it is conceivable
that the United States would lose influence in North Africa.
Morocco and Tunisia would move closer to Washington out of
necessity. .Both countries would view Washington. as the best
source of military assistance. Nevertheless, the United States
would not necessarily have greater leverage, because Rabat and
Tunis would probably conclude that Washington would be more
dependent upon them. The degree to which Rabat and Tunis turned
to Washington probably would depend on the nature of the
Algerian-Libyan relationship. The closer the ties between
Algiers and Tripoli -- particularly any hint of military
cooperation -- the more willing Morocco and Tunisia would be to
cooperate with the United States, or even discuss US access to
military facilities.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5
Bilateral relations with Algeria probably would become more
ambivalent. Algeria presumably would want to continue to expand
ties with the United States in order to modernize its economy and
military. To the extent that Algiers felt compelled to placate
Qadhafi, however, it would have less incentive to cooperate with
Washington. Algeria may even decide to refrain from acting as a
political conduit to radical Arab regimes. Qadhafi, for his
part, would eliminate the military threat from Algeria and coopt
a key ally of Washington in the US effort to undermine the Libyan
regime.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302640001-5