IRAN: THE SEARCH FOR ARMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302830001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 12, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 August 1986
Iran: The Search for Arms
Summary
During the past five years, Iran has received arms and
ammunition worth at least $6.5 billion from Communist countries,
the West, and private arms dealers. North Korea has been the
largest supplier of military equipment during the period with over
$1.5 billion in deliveries, but China has already surpassed it in
deliveries this year and is seeking to expand its sales. Iran's
disadvantages in armor, aircraft, air defense, and other advanced
military equipment have been minimized by its decision to fight
mostly an infantry war. Over the long term, Tehran probably will
seek sophisticated weapons; in the short run, however, it will
focus its efforts on acquiring simple weapons, spare parts, air
defense equipment, artillery, and ammunition. US efforts to
discourage arms sales to Iran will complicate Iran's search, but
Tehran will find the necessary weapons to wage its type of war.
This paper was prepared by Persian Gulf Division, Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis, with a contribution by Office of Global Issues.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Perisan Gulf
Division, NESA,
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Throughout the war Iranian leaders have emphasized their determination to be
independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union for arms supplies.
Accordingly, Iran has sought arms from Western Europe, China, Third World suppliers, and
the gray market. We estimate that from 1981 through 1985 Iran signed contracts for at
least $9 billion worth of lethal and nonlethal military materiel, more than two-thirds of
which has been delivered. It has contracted for at least another $1 billion worth of
equipment this year. Communist and non-Communist sales to Iran, based on estimated
values of equipment delivered, have been roughly equal since about 1981. Each has
delivered annually about $600 million in military goods.
Western Suppliers
Despite US efforts to influence governments to halt military sales to Iran, virtually
all major Western countries have chosen to approve or ignore such sales by their arms
manufacturers to Iran. At least 90 percent of the West's military sales to Iran come from
private or government-controlled firms. When directly involved, governments usually
classify supplies as "dual use," "non-lethal," or "support." Italy, Portugal, Spain, France,
and Greece lead the list in terms of dollar values of equipment delivered since 1981 (see
chart). Most of the sales have consisted of ammunition, small arms, spare parts, and
support equipment.
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production equipment.
consisted mostly of small arms, ammunition, spare parts, and a small amount of
Sales from East European countries--a total of about $200 million a year--have
Until 1986, North Korea was the single largest source of ammunition and military
equipment to Iran--delivering roughly 25 percent of Iran's supplies from 1981 through
1985. Although Pyongyang replaced some of Iran's tank losses early in the war, it has
sold Iran mostly artillery--130-mm and 122-mm field guns, 107-mm rocket launchers,
and air defense artillery. It continues to deliver artillery and ammunition, including at
least one delivery of 10,000 tons--probably some $200 million worth of materiel. North
Korea has not, however, signed new contracts with Tehran this year, and it already has
been surpassed in deliveries by China.
Since 1981, Libya and Syria have supplied Iran military equipment and ammunition
worth at least $400 million and $150 million respectively. Sales from Libya are remaining
steady, but those from Syria appear to be dropping slightly. Early in the war, Libya sent
Iran at least 100 T-54/55 tanks and BM-21 rocket launchers. Since 1984, it also has sent
Tripoli also supplied Tehran with SA-2 launchers last year. Meanwhile, in addition to
one to three Scud launchers and up to 40 missiles.
small arms and ammunition, Syria has been supplying Tehran with recoilless rifles,
mortars, antiaircraft guns, 130-mm field guns, and 122-mm rockets.
Is Iran Getting Enough?
Despite occasional shortages in areas where combat is intense, we believe Iran is
receiving supplies of artillery, small arms, and ammunition sufficient to continue its
infantry-dominated warfare at least at the current level. During recent attacks at Al Faw
and Mehran, for example, Iranian units shelled Iraq's forces with thousands of artillery
rounds each day for periods of several days to a week,
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Significant shortages of major equipment, nonetheless, limit Iran's options to
pressure Baghdad and lessen Tehran's capability to defend domestic targets from Iraqi air
attacks. Tehran has been unable to replace armor lost in the war, and it now has less
than one-sixth the number of operational armored vehicles of Iraq. The lack of armored
vehicles has reduced the military's ability to maintain momentum during some offensives.
As a result, Iran has fought mostly an infantry war in an effort to minimize its equipment
disadvantages relative to Iraq. Tehran is likely to continue to rely on manpower, small
arms, and artillery because of its difficulty in acquiring large quantities of advanced
military equipment and because it has a large pool of military age men--at least ten
million compared to Iraq's three and one-half million.
Iran also suffers from a serious shortage of air defense equipment, aircraft, and
aircraft parts. We estimate that it may have as few as 50 operational fighter aircraft.
These shortages have prevented Tehran from effectively defending against recent Iraqi air
raids on its economic facilities. Nonetheless, because the Iraqis have failed to bomb rear
areas where the Iranians build up their forces prior to launching offensives, air defense
shortcomings at the front have not been critical.
We estimate that Iran will contract for about $2 billion worth of military equipment
this year. It pays for its purchases both in cash and through barter arrangements. Most
deals with East European and Western firms are for cash, while North Korea and Libya
continue to trade their materiel for oil. Although the evidence is sketchy, we believe the
Iranians probably are paying cash to Beijing in some cases and in others bartering oil,
which China sells on the spot market.
Tehran will have difficulty increasing significantly its military purchases as long as
oil prices remain at present levels. Iranian oil export earnings probably will fall by at
least half compared with last year to about $8 billion for 1986. This probably will force
Iran to limit its purchases to the $2 billion level and to critical items. Tehran also will
continue to press suppliers for lower prices and easier payment terms.
If deliveries to Iran of heavy artillery and ammunition increase--and we believe this
is likely, at least from the Chinese--Iran will strengthen its ability to launch large
offensives or to support simultaneous smaller attacks in several areas. Stepped up
pressure along the border is likely to lead to further reverses for the Ira"ilitary and
deepen civilian discontent with Baghdad's management of the war.
US efforts to reduce arms sales to Iran will help limit Tehran's military options and,
in the eyes of Baghdad and its Arab allies, underscore US resolve to weaken the Iranian
war effort. Unless Baghdad alters its strategy and takes more effective measures to
improve its military's performance, however, US efforts probably will be insufficient to
significantly degrade Iran's military capabilities.
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Countries Providing Military Materiel to Iran
In Order of Largest US Dollar Values of Equipment Delivered
1981-1985
Non-Communist Countries
Estimated Value of Equipment
Delivered
($US millions)
Libya
440
Italy
410
South Korea
310
Portugal
280
Spain
240
France
240
Greece
220
Japan
210
United Kingdom
190
Turkey
170
Switzerland
170
Syria
150
Israel
90
Belgium
60
West Germany
50
Sweden
50
Austria
20
Netherlands
20
Communist Countries
North
Korea
1,620
China
570
USSR
370
East
Germany
230
Bulgaria
190
Romania
80
Czechoslovakia
30
Poland
20
Yugoslovia
20
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Selected Deliveries of Military Materiel
to Iran in 1986
From the West
trucks
ammunition
small arms
protective masks
cluster bombs
artillery
diving suits
ammunition primers
explosive detonators
outboard motors
patrol boats
From Communist Countries
ammunition
small arms
styx antiship missiles
multiple rocket launchers
artillery
tank spare parts
SA-2 surface-to-air missiles
107-mm rockets
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Estimated Value of Equipment Estimated Value of Equipment
Delivered to Iran: 1981-1985 Delivered to Iran: January - July 1986
($ U.S. Millions) ($ U.S. Millions)
O, wrt% .11% ;eoq, %-,L, wt
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SUBJECT: The Weakening Arms Embargo Against Iran
NESA M 86-20117C
Richard W. Murphy, State
Morton Abramowitz, State
Marion Creekmore, State
George S. Harris, State
Peter Burleigh, State
Donald Gregg, NSC
RADM John M. Poindexter, NSC
Dennis Ross, NSC
Ronald St. Martin, NSC
Richard Armitage, OASD, ISA
Robert H. Pelletreau, DASD, ISA
Roger Pajak, Treasury
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(12 August 86)
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