(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302990001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 26, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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I I
SUBJECT: Libyans in Western Europe: Status and Implications
of Personnel Reductions
NESA M#86-20134
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
1 - Elaine Morton (NSC)
1 - Ronald C. St. Martin (NSC)
1 - James Stark (NSC)
1 - Michael Ussery (State Department)
1 - Morton I, Abramowitz (State Department)
1 - Arnold Raphel (State Department)
1 - Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots (Pentagon)
1 - Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks (Pentagon)
1 - Douglas P. Mulholland (Treasury)
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff DATE o FIL(.~
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI DOC NO I1(R
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - CPAS/ILS OIR 3
6 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - C/PES P $ PD
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - PPS/NESA (One copy to analyst to source1
) 25X1
1 - NESA/IA
1 - NESA/PG
1 - NESA/SO
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M/1
26 August 1986
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 August 1986
Libyans in Western Europe:
Status and Implications of Personnel Reductions
Summary
Libya decided to reduce its official overseas
presence in late 1983. The move was prompted by
deteriorating economic conditions and a shifting of
economic priorities; Tripoli believed personnel
reductions at diplomatic'*-e"stablishments abroad would
save foreign exchange for costly showcase development
projects at a time when declining world oil prices were
significantly reducing Libyan revenues.
Bureaucratic haggling over control of popular
overseas assignments delayed implementation of
personnel reductions until after the US airstrike last
April. Since then, Libyan leader Qadhafi has
accelerated implementation of the reduction as a means
of covering his embarrassment over the widespread West
European crackdown on, Libyan officials involved in
terrorist activities.
Nevertheless, personnel withdrawals and expulsions
by West European governments--reducing the number of
Libyans assigned to People's Bureaus there by
two-thirds--have not lessened the Libyan terrorist
threat. Tripoli probably is using the personnel shifts
to confuse Western intelligence services about the
identity of Libyan operatives and to cover its transfer
of terrorist support functions from diplomats to agents
using nonofficial cover. In some cases, Libya has even
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Maghreb
25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and Arab-Israeli Division, Office of
25X1
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 22
August was used in its preparation. Questions and comments
should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
25X1
NESA M# 86-20134
25X1
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attempted to reassign diplomats who previously had been
withdrawn.
Recent reductions in personnel at Libyan diplomatic
establishments in Western Europe are part of a program initiated
by Tripoli in late 1983 and early 1984 to cut back on official
presence worldwide. As early as late 1983 Tripoli was ordering
its diplomatic missions to cut back on local hires
Qadhafi tentatively decided in February 1984 to close over 50
People's Bureaus during the following year. At the same time,
the General People's Congress--the legislative body created by
Qadhafi in the late 1970s to legitimize his revolution--rubber
stamped his decision to reduce the number of Libyans serving
25X1
abroad, according to press.
25X1
Behind Libya's decision to reduce its diplomatic presence in
1983 was its perception that the People's Bureaus were draining
scarce financial and administrative resources
We believe that Qa a i was 25X1
particularly concerned in late 1983 about financing his costly
showcase development project--the $7 billion Great Man-Made
River--at a time when he was facing increasing domestic political
and economic difficulties. Qadhafi made the project a 25X1
centerpiece of 1 September ceremonies commemorating the 16th
anniversary of his takeover in Libya.
Reducing the number
of Libyans abroad was only part of a package of budgetary
proposals designed to generate revenue for the projectF_
Libya's increasing economic difficulties since the initial
drawdown proposal ensured that the issue would remain at the top
of Qadhafi's economic agenda, in our view. Although the Foreign
Affairs Secretariat, which operates Libya's diplomatic
establishments, spent only 2.6 percent of the Libyan budget last
year, the Secretariat's administrative costs almost doubled
1 Libya has replaced most of its embassies by "People's
Bureaus," manned largely by noncareer diplomats, since 1979, as
part of a reviewed campaign by Qadhafi to institutionalize his
revolution.
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between 1984 and 19851 25X1
At the same time, constraints imposed by the soft oil 25X1
market reduced Libyan foreign exchange earnings to only $11.5
billion compared with a high of $22 billion in 1981. We project
these earnings to fall to about $5-6 billion this year, primarily
because of the continuing decline in world oil prices. 25X1
Why the Delay?
Until this year Qadhafi hesitated to implement the
reductions, probably in part because his decision was complicated
by infighting in the Libyan bureaucracy over who would control
assignments to the declining number of overseas positions.
Abd al-Salam
Turayki--a longtime professional diplomat and Foreign Secretary
from 1984 to 1986--argued for the appointment of only career
diplomats as a means of minimizing the damage to Libyan interests
that could result from egregious actions by the radicals.
he reportedly was opposed by influential
members of the Revolutionary Committees, the radical group that
promotes Qadhafi's philosophies of revolution and terrorist
policies abroad, who apparently argued that proven revolutionary
fervor and loyalty should be the principal qualifications for
such assignments.
We believe that Qadhafi probably saw merit in both
arguments; he almost certainly recognized that staffing the
People's Bureaus primarily with inexperienced radicals would risk
another debacle such as occurred in London in 1984, when young
zealots firing from the People's Bureau killed a British
policewoman and precipitated a break in relations. On the other
hand, Qadhafi generally regards professional diplomats as
untrustworthy and too conservative; as early as 1979 he had begun
institutionalizing positions for radicals abroad to ensure and
promote revolutionary fervor among People's Bureau staffs. 0
In any event, the result of Qadhafi's indecision was
compromise and stalemate at lower levels of the political
heirarchy;
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Secretariat 25X1
stiff resistance by diplomats overseas and officials in the
this action had been preceded by
consideration of such cost cutting proposals as paying diplomats
in local currencies instead of US dollars, reducing salaries of
People's Bureau staffs, and curtailing foreign travel by 25X1
officials stationed overseas. These proposals, however, met
personnel reductions a ain last fall. 25X1
Secretariat's expenditures. (the 25X1
Foreign Affairs Secretariat began focusin increased attention on
cutback after ruling out other options for reducing the
Tripoli apparently only began final preparations for a
Impact of US-Libya Tensions
We believe that the US airstrike last April and the
subsequent European Community'1EC) decision to limit the number
and activities of Libyan diplomats in EC countries forced
Qadhafi's hand.
implemented in Western Europe.
(Tripoli began recalling nearly all
foreign service, diplomatic and staff personnel from posts around
the in May 1986. Many personnel, however, have persuaded Tripoli
to exempt them from the recall apparently using as justification
arguments that their departure would undermine Libya's local.
foreign policy objectives. 25X1
The Libyan drawdown apparently is being most fully
the number of Libyan diplomats and staff personnel 25X1
serving in West European countries has declined by about two-
thirds from over 450 to about 150 since the US airstrike--more
than any other area. (see Figure 1 and Figure 2) The widespread
expulsions of Libyans bby West European countries have contributed
to the decline. 25X1
Implications for Libyan Terrorism
In our judgment, disruptions in People's Bureau operations
resulting from personnel reductions and expulsions are a factor
in Libya's reduced level of terrorist support activity since the
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airstrike. Libya has traditionally used its People's Bureaus as
support bases for terrorist activities. 25X1
Libya's
many
commercial ent
erprises in
25X1
Western Europe--particularly
the L
ibyan Arab For
eign Investment
Company
options
(LAFICO) and Libyan
for coordinating suc
Arab A
h oper
irlines--offer
ations, in our
attractive
view (see Figure
(report confusion in the 25X1
People's Bureaus over lines of authority and who was effected by
the recall. Personnel in at least one location, for example,
initially refused to obey instructions from Tripoli to return,
thereb precipitating the temporary closure of the Peo le's
Bureau
at least some planning for terrorist operations was 25X1
put on hol because of these difficulties. In addition, the
reduced Libyan presence probably simplified surveillance for West
European intelligence services, thereby further undermining
Libyan capabilities for terrorism. 25X1
Despite these gains, we believe that the disruptive impact
of personnel reductions on terrbrist operations will only be - 25X1
temporary. Senior Libyan officials responsible for coordinating
terrorist operations are already considering alternatives to the
People's Bureaus as bases of support for terrorism
3 and Figure 4).
Placing operatives under student cover is another
alternative for Libyan planners, in our view.
Libya has large student populations in 25X1
the United Kingdom, West Germany, Spain, Greece, and Italy. 0
Libyan students in the United Kingdom
UK's breaking relations in 1984 resulted in the closure of the
People's Bureau. Tripoli - 25X1
implemented a program earlier this year for training Libyan
students in terrorist operations. 25X1
already have been given intelligence tasks, probably because the 25X1
In addition, Libya is maintaining a reduced intelligence
presence in its People's Bureaus, probably for operational
reasons and in the belief that Western European countries will
eventually relax their tight security. If Tripoli perceived a
trend toward diminished West European support for US policy on
Libya, it probably would try to step up efforts to rebuild its
terrorist and intelligence support network at its diplomatic
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establishments there. I (Tripoli
already is attempting to return some radicals to diplomatic posts
they held prior to their withdrawal.
A decision to strengthen the terrorist support apparatus in
the People's Bereaus would also be influenced by the outcome of
infighting in Tripoli between traditional diplomats and radicals
disputes between revolutionaries and the Foreign Secretariat 25X1
over the appointment of officials abroad are continuing.
favoring terrorism as a political tool.
the radicals are regaining the upperhand 25X1
after having had their influence reduced in the immediate
aftermath of the US airstrike. ? - 25X1
The posting of additional radicals to People's Bureaus in
Western Europe would increase.,-the threat of Libyan-backed
terrorism against US personnel' nd facilities there. On the
other hand, the egregious activities of these radicals probably
in time would strengthen US arguments in Westen Europe for
maintaining and even increasing pressure on Qadhafi.
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FIGURE 1.
Libya's Declining Diplomatic Presence in West European Countries
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Denmark nn~
France 1
Germany
Greece
Italy 2
Malta
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland 3
Turkey 4
United King6om5N
Toicis
100 Zoo 300 400 500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1 includes Libyan People's Bureau in Paris and Consulate in Marseilles
2 includes Libyan Peoples's Bureau in Rome and Consulates in Milan and Palermo
3 includes Libyan People's Bureau and United Nations Mission in Geneva and Consulate in Bern
4 includes Libyan People's Bureau in Ankara and Consulate in Istanbul
5 assigned to Libyan interest section in Saudi Arabian Embassy
Legend
POST-BOMBING
PRE-BOMBING
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FIGURE 2.
Libya's Declining Diplomatic Presence in Western Europe
Malta
V7
Switz
. a..o.
21
pre-bombing
Sw.A.n
Dsnmeru
France
Germany
post-bombing
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II LPIY%w%jr,.1? I I_I\V -1
LIBYAN ARAB FOREIGN INVESTMENT CO. AFFILIATES IN WESTERN EUROPE
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Libyan Arab Airlines Offices in Western Europe
Fa?
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