SYRIAN PROSPECTS FOR ACQUIRING THE SS-23

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303060001-8
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SUBJECT: Syrian Prospects for Acquiring the SS-23
NESA M#86-20142
Distribution:
External:
1 - Mr. Robert Taylor, OSD/ISA/NESA
1 - Mr. Aaron Miller, State/Policy Planning
1 - Ms. April Glaspie, State/NEA/ARN
1 - Mr. Philip Wilcox, State/NEA/IAI
1 - Mr. George Harris, State/INR/NESA
1 - Mr. Fred C. Smith, OSD/ISA/Plans & Requirements
1 - Dr. Norman Cigar, Hq DA (DAMI) FII Pentagon
1 - Defense Intelligence College
1 - DIA/JSI
1 - Mr. Dennis Ross, NSC
1 - Mr. Howard Teicher, NSC
Internal: DATE
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff --~~
1 - DDI
DOC NO
1 A
T
DD
1 - NIO/NESA OIR 3
J. - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
P & PD
2 - NESA/PPS (1 copy to analyst for sourcing)
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
3 - NESA/AI/L
DI/NESA/AI/L/
9 Sep 86
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Central Intelligence Agency
w hin ,DC205O$
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 September 1986
Syrian Prospects for Acquiring the SS-23
Summary
Israel is worried that Syria will soon acquire the
new SS-23 short-range ballistic missile, but we do not
believe that the Soviets will export it in the near
term. The Soviets want to demonstrate solid support
for their most important Arab ally, but at the same
time they want to discourage Syrian President Assad
from acting rashly against Israel.
they want to be particularly careful to avoi
the SS-23 to Western exploitation.
Considering that the SS-23 SRBM had previously been described in
the Western press as part of the growing tactical ballistic
threat to airfields, the Syrians almost certainly were aware of
the system and probably requested SS-23s as part of a new arms
package. We believe that Israeli concerns about the export of
the SS-23 are well-founded.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe
Levant Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis at the request of OSD/ISA. Information as
of 10 September 1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
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In their negotiations with Moscow, the Syrians apparently are
using the war scare with Israel this May and the perceived poor
performance of Soviet weaponry during the US-Libyan clashes to
argue for the delivery of advanced military equipment. The
Soviets probably feel under pressure to bolster their most
important ally in the Arab world. Consequently, Moscow almost
certainly will live up to its commitment and soon begin
deliveries of the MIG-29, a counterpart of the US F-16, and
probably will agree to provide other new arms. We expect
President Assad will travel to the USSR later this year to sign a
new agreement.
We believe that the arms agreement will call for the Soviets
to provide T-80 tanks and additional air defense missile
systems--probably including the SA-11--but we judge they are
unlikely to agree to export either the SU-27 Flanker fighter, a
counterpart to the US F-15 Eagle, or the SS-23 within the next
few years. The Soviets are clearly determined to provide Syria
with enough modern equipment to discourage an Israeli attack, but
they want to prevent their newest technology from being
compromised and seem leery about providing equipment that could
embolden Assad to act rashly. With its improved conventional
munitions warhead, high accuracy, and 500-kilometer range, the
SS-23 could be launched from existing operating areas near
Damascus against high-value targets anywhere in Israel.
we believe the Soviets wi
adhere to their standard practice of delivering new ground forces 25X1
equipment to their troops in Eastern Europe before they export
it. 25X1
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