(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 16, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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-TwSecret
Directorate of
DOC NO 4, ._, t
Intelligence
OIR
P & PD
Afghanistan Situation Report
16 September 1986
NESA M 86-20145CX
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16 September 1986
Copy 080
F/c
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Soviet and Afghan forces shifted the focus of
combat operations near Kabul from Paghman, west of
the city, to northern outlying areas last week,
RESISTANCE
Falling oil revenues have prompted a cutback in
Kuwaiti aid to the resistance, although Kuwait has
not altered its basic policy of support for the
insurgents.
ALLIANCE DELEGATION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLYI 3 25X1
The resistance alliance has not yet discussed
sending a delegation to the 41st session of the UN
General Assembly. The Pakistani Government has
indicated it will urce the insurgents to make a
decision soon.
AFTERMATH OF KABUL EXPLOSION I 3 25X1
The insurgents' rocket attack on an air defense
missile support facility and ammunition dump in
Kabul has increased pressures on new Afghan party
chief Najibullah to show progress in the
counterinsurgency.
IN BRIEF 4
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AFGHANISTAN: SMUGGLING ACROSS THE BORDER L-1 5
The reexport trade in Afghanistan, which involves
importing and then smuggling the imported goods
out of Afghanistan, is an important source of
revenue for the Afghan regime. The smuggling is
encouraged by Pakistani trade restrictions. F
PERSPECTIVE
THE WAR IN AUGUST
During August, Soviet and Afghan forces lar
reacted to widespread insurgent activity.
This document was prepared by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication sh
16 September 1986
NESA M 86-20145CX
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16 September 1986
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PAGHMAN OFFENSIVE WINDS DOWN
The combined Soviet and Afghan offensive in Paghman has
wound down, according to the US Embassy in Kabul.
Soviet and Afghan forces have turned to combat sweeps
in Estalef and Shakar Darreh, north of Kabul, and in
the mountains west of Paghman. These sweeps are
intended to push insurgent forces farther from the
capital to curtail the rocket attacks that have
increased this summer. Despite the intensity of the
air and artillery strikes in the Paghman offensive,
sources of the US Embassy state that the guerrillas'
support network in the area remains generally intact.
CX)NSTRA I NTS ON KUWAITI SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN RESISTANCE
Kuwait has reduced its aid to Afghan refugees in recent
months because of constraints caused by falling oil
revenues, according to a Pakistani diplomat. The US
Consulate in Peshawar states private aid from Kuwaiti
Islamic fundamentalists may also have been curtailed
because of their displeasure over the visit of the
resistance alliance to the US in June. Last month,
Kuwait declined to participate in the McCollum patient
airlift program, saying that it did not want to link
its assistance to the Afghan resistance with a "great
power," according to the US Embassy in Kuwait. Kuwait
has been channelling "sizable" amounts of humanitarian
aid to the resistance through voluntary organizations
and the Government of Pakistan, according to the
Pakistani diplomat.
COMMENT: The Kuwaiti Govenment is unlikely to make any
significant shifts in its Afghan policy. Several
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regional issues--particularly the Iran-Iraq conflict--
have heightened Kuwait's interest in maintaining
cordial relations with both the US and the Soviet
Union.
ALLIANCE DELEGATION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Afghan resistance leader Sayed Ahmad Gailani recently
told the US Ambassador in Pakistan that the alliance
had not yet discussed sending a delegation to the 41st
session of the UN General Assembly next month. Tariq
Fatmi, Pakistan's Deputy Chief of Mission in the United
States, commented last week that he is hopeful the
Pakistan Government will be able to prevent the
alliance from waiting until the last moment before
deciding on a delegation. Resistance indecision last
year hampered the effectiveness of its UN appearance.
According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, President Zia
said this past weekend that Pakistan intends to push
the alliance to send a delegation.
QOMVIENT: Rivalries among insurgent leaders and
differences over key issues, such as peace negotiations
and relations with the US, have repeatedly hindered
cooperation.
The United a es
and, to a lesser extent, a is an have emphasized the
need for an alliance representation at the General
Assembly session to show a unified resistance and to
add to the pressure on the Soviet Union to end its
armed intervention in Afghanistan.
AFTERMATH OF KABUL EXPLOSION
Soviet military advisers have criticized Afghan party
chief Najibullah for failing to provide adequate
security for the surface-to-air missile support
facility and ammunition depot destroyed last month.
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COMMENT: The insurgents' attack on the Kabul depot,
coupled with the extensive damage to the Soviet
ammunition area at Bagram in July, are particularly
embarrassing to the regime. These incidents early in
the term of Najibullah considerably increase the
pressure on the regime to show gains against the
resistance. The Soviets have too much invested in
Najibullah, however, to try to remove him so soon after
his appointment.
the US Mission at the United Nations
suggests that UNICEF is again considering including
resistance-held areas in its child immunization program in
Afghanistan. The change of heart is probably motivated,
in part, by a desire for US funding for the project.
the Soviets have moved 25X15X1
the two SA-8 batteries at an a ar and the two at Bagram
to new locations The units are 25X25X1
probably returning to their respective headquarters at
Shindand and Kabul in preparation for withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
16 September 1986
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AFGHANISTAN: SMUGGLING ACROSS THE BORDER L-1
By NESA
The reexport trade in Afghanistan--which involves
importation of luxury and manufactured goods that are
then smuggled out, most often to Pakistan--is a time-
honored custom for Afghans and an important source of
income for the Kabul regime. This trade, although
illegal in Pakistan, is encouraged by Pakistani trade
restrictions that exclude some imports, subject others
to quota and licensing restrictions, and apply high
tariffs to additional categories, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul. The Pakistanis, who cannot collect
customs fees on the smuggled item, are unable to stop
the illegal flow of goods, however.
The Reexport Trade
Reexport trade has been given particular emphasis by
the Communist regime in the interest of earning foreign
exchange. Since 1982, it has been actively promoted by
the Soviet KGB in Afghanistan, working through the
Afghan Minister of Commerce, according to press
reports. A state-owned company--Afghan Kart--has even
been formed for the express purpose of carrying out
this trade.
approximately 80
percent of the goods imported into Afghanistan by Kabul
merchants are reexported--smuggled--abroad. The
reexports go primarily to Pakistan, but some goods are
also smuggled into Iran and India
Textiles,
electrical equipment, tires, and plastics are the
principal goods traded. They are officially imported
from Japan, the US, South Korea and Western Europe and
even assessed customs duties. They are then sold to
buyers who will retail them in Pakistan.
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghan mer-
chants--mostly Pushtuns--sell the goods to Pakistani
traders on credit, with payment due after the goods
have been resold in Pakistan. Payment is normally in
dollars, deutsche marks, or other convertible
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international currency. The buyer receives a valid
Afghan custom clearance vouching that the goods were
legally imported into Afghanistan and that all duties
have been paid.
Kabul is the main transshipment center for this
trade. A common smuggling route for the goods is from
the capital to Bara in the North-West Frontier
Province, according to reporting from the US Embassy in
Kabul. The merchandise is carried by truck to a few
kilometers west of the first Afghan customs checkpoint
at the border. There--usually in the early evening--
the truck leaves the paved road and approaches the
border south of the official crossing point. Goods are
transferred to mules or camels for the trip to Bara,
reportedly the main transshipment point in Pakistan,
according to the US Embassy in Kabul.
The trade is extremely profitable for both the Kabul
merchants who import the goods and the traders who
smuggle them across the border and retail them in
Pakistan and elsewhere. The price charged by Kabul
merchants covers the cost to them of the goods plus
customs duties averaging 35 percent on imports and a
15 percent profit margin. Transportation costs and
"taxes" to insurgent forces along the road to the
border are paid by Pakistani traders, who nevertheless
still make profits in excess of 100 percent on resale
of the goods in Pakistan
The reexport trade also enriches the Afghan regime's
coffers. Because the Kabul merchants receive customs
duties in hard currency, the Government obtains badly
needed foreign exchange. Furthermore, the trade
results in greater net export earnings.
Outlook
With the deterioration of Afghanistan's official trade
situation in recent months, the importance to the
regime of hard currency earnings from the reexport
business has increased, in our view. It is unlikely
that Pakistan will crack down on this trade in the
foreseeable future because of its inability to monitor
the border area and its interest in keeping the border
open for the transit of weapons and supplies for Afghan
insurgents.
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By
north and destruction of a major Afghan air defense
Combat activity in Afghanistan during August was
widespread. Insurgent successes included overruning an
Afghan garrison at Farkhar in Takhar Province in the
missile and'anrnunition storage site in Kabul.
Insurgent Activity on The Upswing
Soviet and Afghan forces responded to insurgent
activity in numerous sections of Afghanistan during the
month. F-1
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Following a major Soviet and Afghan effort near
Sheykhabad in late July to reduce insurgent activity,
operations south of Kabul continued in August. Over a
three-day period in late August, approximately 150
Afghan trucks and armored vehicles moved south on the
highway to Lowgar Province, according to the US Embassy
in Kabul. This Afghan force apparently was tasked with
clearing the road from Gardeyz to Khowst. But traffic
on this route routinely has been interdicted by
guerrillas since the early days of the war, and a
short-lived operation was unlikely to be successful.
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Soviets Reinforcing or Withdrawing?
During August, two additional Soviet motorized rifle
regiments deployed to Soviet garrisons at Konduz and
Shindand in Afghanistan,
The regiments--probably numbering some 4,000
personnel--are equipped with one BTR-60/70 and two
truck-equipped motorized rifle battalions.
the equipment of the new regiment at
Konduz transited the Khairabad transshipment facility
from the USSR, and we believe the new unit at Shindand
mid from the Soviet Union through Towraghondi.
It is not clear why these units were brought into
Afghanistan in the wake of Gorbachev's announcement in
late July that six Soviet regiments would leave
Afghanistan by yearend. A probable reason is that they
were brought in for the purpose of being withdrawn.
Other less likely reasons include to provide route
security for the withdrawal or to prepare for offensive
operations prior to the drawdown in Soviet troops.
Outlook
Soviet and Afghan regime forces largely reacted to
insurgent activity during August. During the early
fall, counterinsurgent operations probably will remain
focused in the cities, where the guerrillas have been
active and in the northern and eastern border
provinces. The Afghan resistance probably will seek to
keep activity levels up, while replenishing supplies
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of materiel drawn down during numerous battles this
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Top Secret
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