THE MAGHREB: AFTER OUJDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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L~?--25X1
SUBJECT: The Maghreb: After Oujdal 25X1
NESA M# 86-20149 DATE
DISTRIBUTION: DOC NO /(/E-3- Yr46-aoil,/1
EXTERNAL: OIR 3
1 - Howard Teicher (NSC) P & PD
1 - Elaine Morton (NSC)
1 - Vincent Cannistraro (NSC)
1 - Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots (Pentagon)
1 - Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser (Pentagon)
1 - James L. Woods (Pentagon)
1 - Sandra Charles (Pentagon)
1 - Arnold Raphel (State Department)
1 - R. Rand Beers (State Department)
1 - Patrick N. Theros (State Department)
1 - Ambassador David E. Zweifel (State Department)
1 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz (State Department)
1 - Roger Merrick (State Department)
1 - Richard Solomon (State Department)
1 - US Embassy Rabat, Morocco
1 - US Embassy Algiers, Algeria
1 - US Embassy Tunis, Tunisia
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/AFR
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - PPS/NESA (One copy to analyst to source)
1 - NESA/IA
1 - NESA/PG
1 - NESA/SO
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M/
r29 Sept 1986
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 September 1986
The Maghreb: After Oujda
Summary
King Hassan's decision on 29 August to unilaterally
abrogate Morocco's political union with Libya--the
Treaty of Oujda--will not significantly alter relations
among the states of the Maghreb. The most likely
outcome will be Libyan sponsorship of terrorism
directed against Moroccan interests and eventually
renewal of some Libyan support for the Polisario. We
do not expect any significant, near term changes in
Moroccan-Algerian and Algerian-Libyan relations or
Tunisia's diplomatic position as a result of the
short-lived treaty. The rupture between Rabat and
Tripoli is a boon to US interests--it removes a sore
spot in our ties with our closest ally in the Maghreb
and reinforces US claims that Qadhafi is isolated in
King Hassan ended the Moroccan-Libyan political union in a
nationwide television address on 29 August. He stated that his
decision was a response to Libyan and Syrian condemnation of the
visit to Morocco last July by Israeli Prime Minister Peres. We
believe, however, that Hassan was looking for a pretext to end a
relationship that had been under strain since its inception two
years ago. For Morocco, the primary reason for the union was no
longer valid. King Hassan initiated the union because he wanted
assurances that Qadhafi would abide by a 1983 agreement with
Morocco to curtail Libyan support for the Polisario guerrillas
This memorandum was Drenared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as
of 25 September 1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division) 25Y!
NESA M# 86-20149
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fighting Morocco for control of the Western Sahara. By this
August, Hassan saw Qadhafi as increasingly weak at home and a
diplomatic liability for Rabat. Morocco is winning the war and
probably less worried about a resumption of Libyan support to the
guerrillas.
There also were secondary considerations for Hassan's
decision. He may have detected Libyan plans to retaliate against
Morocco through terrorism following the Peres trip. The bad
feeling between the United States and Libya also made Qadhafi a
liability to Hassan, who wants to improve ties with
Washington--especially whenever he detects a warming in
Algerian-US relations. Finally, Qadhafi's growing economic woes
probably have destroyed any hope the King may hav
achieving further economic benefit from the pact. 25X1
What it Means Domestically for Morocco
There has been little reaction at home to the King's
announcement. Nevertheless, King Hassan almost certainly expects
Qadhafi to try to cause trouble for Rabat. We believe Tripoli
never ceased its machinations against Morocco during the life of
the treaty and probably used the two years to recruit agents.
For example, the 25X1
number of Libyan visitors to Morocco, including those involved in
espionage, increased dramatically after the conclusion of the
Oujda accord.
Tripoli
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also may decide to deport the nearly 18,000 Moroccan workers in
Libya, as it did in the case of Tunisian workers last year. Such 25X1
a move would compound problems for a government already grappling
with severe unemployment and under pressure from foreign donors
to implement additional austerity measures. 25X1
As a precaution, Moroccan security services are on alert for
terrorism The police 25X1
have adopted aggressive and highly visible measures, including
tighter security at airports and borders.
Moroccan press reports that the government has 25X1
apprehended four foreign nationals, allegedly members of the
Palestinian 15 May group, who were planning acts of subversion. 25X1
Hassan could restrict the entry of Libyans, expel Libyan
residents, or impose restrictions on Libyan diplomats. These
actions would hamper Libyan intelligence and terrorist operations
in Morocco and elsewhere, since Libyan intelli ence operatives
use Morocco as a convenient point of transit. 25X1
Algiers' reaction to the King's announcement has been muted,
but the government almost certainly is relieved that its two
neighbors are no longer allied. Nonetheless, relations between
Rabat and Algiers are not likely to undergo much change. Both
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sides are concerned about stability and economic problems in the
Maghreb, but the Polisario question stands in the way of
significant cooperation and is a threat to peace between the two
countries. Algerian aid to the Polisario could lead to the
resumption of limited border skirmishes that characterized
Moroccan-Algerian relations in the past. We also do not expect
any progress in the diplomatic arena in settling bilateral
differences or the Western Sahara dispute.
There is a strong possibility that Qadhafi will resume some
military support for the Polisario.
the Algerians might approve renewed
Libyan aid to the Polisario, since it would reduce the burden of
economic support for the Polisario's Saharan Arab Democratic
Republic. The major constraint on Qadhafi is that supporting the
Polisario would prompt Moroccan countermeasures, including a
renewal of Moroccan support for Chadian President Habre and
Libyan dissidents, and possibly a break in diplomatic ties. In
any case, since the Polisario already has more equipment than it
can effectively use, additional Libyan shipments are not likely
to affect significantly the military situation.
Several conceivable but unlikely developments could produce
an escalation of the Western Saharan conflict. Bendjedid is
firmly in control of the Algerian Government, but his policies
are being challenged by radical hardliners. This opposition
supports the regime's overall stance toward Morocco, but it
supports a more aggressive military strategy for the
Polisario--including terrorism within Morocco--and apparently is
less sensitive to the risks of conflict with Morocco. We doubt
that the opposition has the strength to overturn Bendjedid's
cautious policy on the war, but the President may decide to
accommodate the hardliners and allow the Polisario to pursue more
aggressive tactics. These might include land or sea commando
raids deep inside the Western Sahara or in Morocco.
In addition, Qadhafi eventually may try to expand his
influence with the Polisario, exploiting the dissatisfaction of
some insurgent leaders over Algiers' conservative strategy in the
conflict. Qadhafi would hope that his dispensation of weapons
would strengthen the hand of Algerian hardliners. Algiers,
however, would not relinquish its control over the Polisario,
because of the risks such a development might pose for
Algerian-Moroccan relations. The Algerians provide the Polisario
the bulk of the movement's military and economic resources and
territory for the Polisario refugee population.
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The Fallout for Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia
During the past two years, Algeria's policy toward Libya has
gone from hostility to a more ambiguous stance. The breakup of
the Moroccan-Libyan union, a key goal of Algiers, diminishes
Algiers' fear of the possibility of joint Libyan-Moroccan actions
against Algeria. Bendjedid thus has greater flexibility in
dealing with Qadhafi, especially because of the Libyan leader's
In our judgment, however, Bendjedid will be reluctant to meet
with the Libyan leader anytime soon because of his concern over
Algeria's diplomatic image in the Arab world and in the West.
The Algerians deeply distrust Qadhafi and differ with him on a
range of issues such as Chad and Tunisia. Even though Algiers
will try to reach an accommodation with Qadhafi, President
Bendjedid will not go so far as to sign a pol.itical accord with
him--as some Algerian hardliners recommend--unless, as we think
unlikely, Qadhafi makes substantial concessions on issues of
bilateral interest.
Qadhafi, for his part, is eager to strengthen ties with
Algiers and to seek a rapprochement with Tunis because of his
international isolation since the US air strike last April. His
principal interest is to prevent Algeria from expanding relations
with the United States and to minimize Algerian support for
exiled Libyan dissidents. To achieve this, he may give the
appearance of greater receptivity to Algerian conditions for
reconciliation, including demarcation of their common border,
cessation of support for Algerian and other dissidents, and
settlement of Tunisian claims against Libya. Qadhafi may also
respond favorably to a direct Algerian call for assistance for
the Polisario, even though he regards such a posture as extremely
risky. Unless Algeria agrees to some form of union with Libya--a
highly unlikely development at this juncture--Qadhafi will avoid
commitments and go no farther than necessary to placate Algeria.
Tunisia will be the least affected by developments between
Morocco and Libya. The Bourguiba government probably believes
that Qadhafi's growing problems and need for better ties with
neighbors will strengthen Tunis' hand in bilateral relations.
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Since the rupture of diplomatic ties last year, Tunisia has been
seeking financial compensation for Libya's abrupt expulsion of
Tunisian guest workers, and recent press reports indicate that
Qadhafi is now meeting some of these Tunisian demands. Tunis
probably will be most concerned about any signs of progress
between Algeria and Libya, since closer ties between these
powerful neighbors might limit its own diplomatic options. As
long as Algeria maintains its distance from Libya, Bourguiba can
afford to adopt a hardline position toward Qadhafi. A settlement
of differences between Libya and Tunisia would help ease tensions
between Algeria and Libya and reduce somewhat the threat of overt
Libyan aggression against Tunisia. We doubt, however, that peace
between Tunisia and Libya would remove the danger of Libyan
subversion against the Bourguiba regime.
Implications for the United States
Hassan's move draws Morocco closer to the United States and
helps to isolate Libya. The King not only hopes that the United
States will reward him with economic and military aid, but also
that Morocco's overall image in the West will improve and pave
the way for expanded financial credits from Western governments
and banks. His most important objective probably is obtaining
sophisticated military equipment to replace Morocco's aging
inventory of weapons. Even so, we believe that the King will
want to avoid appearing especially close to the United States.
Bilateral relations probably will cool only moderately if the
King concludes that Washington is unwilling to reward him
sufficiently for his meeting with Peres and the breakup of the
Oujda accord. Hassan would be tempted to broaden further
Morocco's ties with Western Europe, in particular France, Spain,
and Italy, and to expand contacts with the Soviet Union. Since
the abrogation of the Oujda accord, Moroccan officials have
hosted Italy's Defense Minister Spadolini for discussions of
military and security cooperation.
addition, the Moroccans have allowed two Soviet naval combattants
to weigh anchor in Casablanca--the first Soviet combattant port
call in a decade.
The principal concern for the United States would be closer
relations between Algeria and Libya. Such a development would
erode Tunisia's national security, reduce Washington's access to
Algeria, undermine Algerian willingness to maintain ties with
Libyan dissidents, and make it more difficult for the United
States to help Algeria and Morocco achieve a peaceful settlement
of the Western Sahara dispute. Closer US-Moroccan ties, and
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especially a decision by the United States to increase military
assistance to Morocco, would give impetus to Algerian-Libyan
relations.
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