AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303240001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 25, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
79- 80 IMC/CB
Afghanistan Situation Report
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Last week Afghan General Secretary Najib removed
Babrak Karmal from his remaining positions of
power within the Afghan Government. The move,
probably an effort to reduce damage from
infighting in the regime, might have the opposite
The recent appointment of Pavel Mozhayev--a
comparatively lower level Communist Party
official--as the new Soviet Ambassador to
Afghanistan may indicate that Soviet
decisionmaking on Afghan policy will be even
further centralized in Moscow.
AFGHANISTAN: CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE INSURGENCY--MIXED
BLESSINGS. E7
Afghan ethnic, cultural, and religious factors
strengthen the insurgents' capability to resist
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Soviet domination. At the same time, these
factors help to create numerous obstacles to
developing a cohesive resistance. F-]
This document was prepared by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
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Afghan party chief Najib removed Barak Karmal from his
major positions yesterday, apparently convincing
Moscow--after weeks of intensified party infighting--
that it had to choose between the two rival leaders of
the ruling party. The 20th Plenum of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan's Central Committee met
last week in Kabul and accepted Babrak Karmal's
"resignation" from the Politburo and as President,
according to regime media accounts. The move came less
than two weeks after the Central Committee
warned Babrak Karmal to
cease his alleged' antigovernment activities or face the
consequences. At the same time, Interior Minister
Gulabzoi, leader of the Khalqi faction, was elevated to
the Politburo, as was Farid Ahmed Mazduk, a leader in
the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan.
East European diplomats in Kabul said Moscow had been
urging restraint on Najib because of. substantial
support for Babrak in the party. According to the US
Embassy in Kabul, major government decisions--such as
promulgating a new constitution, selecting a new
legislature and convening the National Fatherland Front
Congress--had been bogged down in feuding between the
party factions over power-sharing arrangements.
Prime Minister Keshtmand told diplomats in Kabul
Saturday that Haji Mohammad Chamkani will function as
head of state in lieu of Babrak until the regime holds
the traditional assembly that legitimizes a
government. The assembly, called a "loya jirga," will
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approve a new constitution, after which a presidential
election will be held. Chamkani, one of the few
nonmembers of the ruling party to be appointed to a
high government post, became vice-chairman of the
Revolutionary Council in January.
Comment: Moscow's efforts to engineer compromises
between the two squabbling wings of the ruling party's
Parchami faction apparently failed. The Soviets
probably believe that the programs they designed for
improving the effectiveness and popularity of the Kabul
regime were becoming casualties of the party
disputes. Babrak's dismissal, however, could set off a
new, more serious period of instability in the regime
that would allow the Khalqi faction--which has been
relatively quiet during the infighting--to exploit the
disarray. Offering Gulabzoi a Politburo seat was
intended to forestall such a development.
Moreover, party chairman Najib has apparently failed to
neutralize Babrak Karmal, who retains his membership on
the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council and
whose key supporters on the Politburo survived the
Central Committee plenum last week.
tabrak's continued presence in party circles will make
him a rallying point for anti-Najib sentiment, despite
Moscow's apparent decision to continue support for
Najib in the power struggle that has plagued the party
since May. The explosion of a bomb Saturday near where
Najib was scheduled to hold a press conference may have
been the work of disgruntled Babrak supporters.
Pavel Mozhayev, the new Soviet Ambassador to
Afghanistan who was appointed in August 1986, had been
an official in the Leningrad Communist Party apparatus
for two decades, most recently as second secretary of
the oblast party committee (from 1983 to 1985). A
candidate member of the Communist Party Central
Committee since March 1986, Mozhayev is lower in party
rank than his predecessor.
COMMENT: Mozhayev's appointment conforms with the
practice of sending party officials rather than career
diplomats as ambassadors to socialist nations. But
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because of his low party rank, other elements of the
Soviet establishment in Kabul may be able to encroach
on his authority, and decisionmaking on Afghan policy
may shift toward Moscow.
US Embassy officials in Moscow see Mozhayev's
assignment to so important and sensitive a post as a
promotion and anticipate his attainment of full Central
Committee membership before the next party congress.
Other analysts, however, see his departure from the
most powerful oblast party committee in the Soviet
Union to Kabul as a "diplomatic exile."
-- Sources of the US Embassy in Kabul claim the
Afghan regime has made little progress in
providing health care to children in areas under
its control, despite substantial international
assistance. Afghan Government programs
apparently favor children of party members,
while virutally ignoring children of refugees
and nomads. International medical experts in
Kabul report still high infant mortality, an
increase in war-related wounds, widespread
malnutrition, and other health problems among
children there.
-- West German press reports claim unknown
assailants attempted to assassinate General
Secretary Najib on 23 November. According to
the report, Najib was uninjured, but four
members of his entourage were either killed or
wounded. The US Embassy in Kabul has received a
report of shooting that day in the area where
Najib maintains a residence. Police and
military units erected roadblocks in the area.
-- Canadian officials claim that Canada's decision
to reestablish cultural, scientific, and
academic exchanges with the Soviet Union does
not represent a change in Canadian foreign
policy, according to the US Embassy in Ottawa.
Last week, press reports asserted that Canada
was dropping sanctions it imposed on the Soviet
Union following the invasion of Afghanistan in
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1979. In fact, some sanctions--including a
limited grain embargo and the prohibition of
high-level visits--lapsed in 1981, and the
reestablishment of cultural exchanges had been
under negotiation since 1982. Bans on the
export of high technology and military exchanges
are still in effect, however.
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Ethnic, cultural, and religious factors generally
strengthen the Afghan resistance's ability to resist
Soviet domination. Deep commitments to defending
family and religion sustain the will of the fighters,
while the fragmented nature of Afghan society tends to
hamper regime policies aimed at coopting the
population. At the same time, however, deeply rooted
hatreds among ethnic groups and tribes, xenophobic
attitudes, opportunism, and individuality slow the
transition of fighters or even groups of fighters into
a strong insurgency.
Traditional Local Social Organizations
The tightly knit Afghan family, tribal and village
structures provide strong barriers to Soviet
penetration. Traditional tribal structures have long
provided a basis for organizing opposition to outside
invaders, but the tribal leaders are fickle and quick
to shift their loyalties in return for bribes or to
stay on the winning side.
The Family
The primary allegiance of Afghans is to the family.
rural areas, the most common form is the extended
family consisting of brothers and their families
sharing the same household.
To an Afghan, family and extended kinship ties
determine to a great extent who he is, who he can
become, where he can go, and how he should fight the
war. Afghans do not take actions independently, but
rather in kinship units.
Scholars of Afghanistan have pointed out that although
a family may experience competition and feuds, it
presents a united front to the outside world and is
quite impermeable to outside influence. In part, the
Soviet movement of thousands of Afghan youths for
education in the USSR away from their families reflects
a recognition by Moscow of the difficulties in changing
attitudes within the traditional family units. 7 7
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Providing for the family comes before fighting.
Historically this has meant that military campaigns
lasted for limited periods of time so that men could
return for farming or herding to provide for their
families. This is still largely the case with the
Afghan guerrillas, even in the areas where there has
been an attempt to build a professional paid army.
Many men with families in Pakistan go back and forth
between Pakistan and the battlefronts in Afghanistan.
Many Afghan guerrilla commanders have a rotation
system, with the men spending two weeks in Afghanistan
and two weeks with their families in Pakistan. For the
groups fighting farther inside Afghanistan, the
rotation period is longer.
Afghans also owe allegiance to larger social units.
There are essentially two types of such units: tribal
structures--found mostly among the Pashtuns--and
village structures, found among the Hazaras, Uzbeks,
Nuristanis, and Tajiks.
Tribes. The tribal areas of Afghanistan are in the
east, primarily among the Pashtuns near the Pakistani
border. The tribes include the Mohmand; Jaji, Jadran,
Mangul, Tani, Shinwari and Waziri in Paktia, Nangarhar
and Konarha Provinces. Tribal structures
characteristically divide into subtribes, lineages,
clans, and extended families. F]
In Afghanistan, as in other traditional societies,
tribal leaders often can quickly mobilize thousands of
men at a moment's notice for a battle. The Pashtun
tribes are particularly bellicose. Fighting over
pasture land, tribal honor or tribal autonomy against
neighboring tribes, national governments or invading
armies has long been a way of life. Acquiring war
booty is also a motivating factor.
Pashtun tribal groups under traditional leaders have
fought against the regime and the Soviets in many areas
for several years, but their capacity to increase
pressure on the regime is limited. They usually
participate in the fighting only if it suits their own
tribal objectives and tend not to fight in areas
outside their tribal region. They resist being
organized into units led by nontribal members and
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generally resist military training from nontribal
people. Tribal leaders often are allied with Gailani
or Mojadedi--the so-called "traditionalist" insurgent
leaders--partly because these groups are very loosely
organized and present no challenge to established
tribal authorities.
The tribes most often fight on the side of the
resistance but owe little allegiance to it. They
strike deals with Kabul when it suits their interest.
Several tribes cooperate to some degree with Kabul,
including part of the Mohmand, the Jaji and the
Shinwari. They will quickly abandon Kabul if they feel
their interests rest elsewhere.
Village Structure. In the areas where the village-
based system predominates, allegiance beyond the family
traditionally goes primarily to the local landlords,
called khans in most areas. The khans, often natural
and capable leaders, control the distribution of
farmlands and products and most aspects of village
life. They are also, in some cases, quite despotic.
Since the beginning of the war, however, the influence
of landlords has been challenged by young men, often of
humble origin, who have gained prestige as successful
guerrilla leaders, and by some religious leaders. Many
of the landlords have been killed or have fled to
Pakistan or Kabul. F_~
Antilandlord activity is a stated policy of the
Islamist groups--Jamiat-i-Islami, both factions of
Hizbi Islami, and Sayyaf's Islamic Union--and the
groups fighting out of Iran. These groups espouse the
development of a more egalitarian society based on
Islamic principles. Leaders of the "traditionalist"
political groups, including Gailani, Nabi and Mojadedi,
are themselves largely from the landlord class and thus
often support traditional village structures.
The collapse of the khans as traditional leaders in the
villages in some areas, such as in the Panjsher, has
allowed development of a regional front uniting various
villages and groups. In other areas, the ousting of
the khans has had a negative effect, leaving many
villages without good leadership.
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Religious leaders, who generally did not play a large
role in village leadership before 1978, have become
more important, but in some areas the local population
is led by an often ineffective local mullah.
Afghan Codes of Honor and Manhood
The Afghans, especially the tribal Pashtuns, have a
strong code of behavior that emphasizes bravery, honor
and revenge. Pushtunwali, the code of behavior, is an
elaborate but indefinite set of rules that describes
the duties of manhood. The rules specify everything
from how to entertain a guest to how to fight. Among
nontribal people of Afghanistan, these codes have been
largely replaced by religious codes of honor. Among
Tajik and other Persian-speakers, the concept of
bravery and honor is called jarvin maroi.
Codes of honor sometimes enhance the ability of the
Afghans to fight the war. They account for the
incredible bravery and tenaciousness of the Afghan
fighters. The emphasis on the ability to withstand
privation and difficult surroundings without complaint
accounts for the ability of the Afghan insurgents to
wage war in very bleak circumstances.
Still, the codes often work against the development of
good guerrilla fighters and account for many of the
problems that the Afghans have in accepting training
and in using appropriate military tactics. The
emphasis on bravery and on individual action leads
Afghans in many areas not to bother with normal
precautions in planning and executing military
operations. Insurgents often seem to believe that only
courage is required to succeed; training, intelligence
and other preparations are often neglected.
Many Afghans are unnecessarily wounded or killed
because they believe that taking precautions would show
cowardice and violate the codes of honor in front of
fellow Afghans. Moreover, the individual approach to
fighting makes it difficult to develop cooperation in
fighting.
Martyrdom and Fatalism. Martyrdom and fatalism are
closely related to the codes of honor and manhood and
have much the same effect on the fighting. A martyr in
Islam, shaheed in Arabic, is one who dies fighting in
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the sacred Islamic war, the jihad. Like the codes of
honor, the Islamic notion of martyrdom encourages the
Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan to take large risks
without reward to danger, facilitating guerrilla
attacks.
Although strong belief in a just cause and the ultimate
trust in God helps sustain morale, in a guerrilla war
this fatalism also works against developing strategy
and tactics and against the acceptance of proper
training. Many Afghans believe that faith is enough to
drive out the Soviets, and they need only to put
themselves in God's hands to win the war. ~
Afghan Attitudes Toward Other Nationalities
Afghans, very proud people who have defended themselves
against the outside world for centuries, have built up
prejudices towards other nationalities. These
attitudes affect Afghan relations with these people and
also the fighting when the other nations are
involved.
Pakistanis. An Afghan, generally speaking, views
Pakistanis and other peoples of the Indian subcontinent
with contempt. This can be observed in several ways,
including the naming of their major mountain range the
Hindu Kush--the killer of Hindus--and the jokes they
tell of the people from that area. Afghans openly mock
the speech of the subcontinent and consider the
Pakistanis to be inferior. This dislike is strongest
towards the Punjabis and perhaps the least noticeable
toward the Pakistani Pushtuns, who share a similar
cultural heritage with the Afghans. F__1
As a result, Afghans find it difficult to be under
Pakistani supervision. This bias accounts, in part,
for the refusal of some Afghans to be trained by the
Pakistan Army. Even though many of the guerrilla
commanders admit that the Pakistani Army is good and
could probably help them, they cannot accept the idea
of working under an officer who most likely is a
Punjabi. F__]
The Afghans suspect the Pakistanis of cheating them and
resent having to plead with Pakistani (Punjabi)
officials for arms and ammunition they feel are
rightfully theirs. Distrust of the Pakistanis also
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accounts in some part for the stockpiling of military
supplies by the Afghan insurgents in the border region
of Afghanistan, even though these arms depots are not
defensible.
Iranians. The Afghans have a bit of an inferiority
complex toward the Iranians. Parts of Afghan culture
are closer to Iranian culture than to Pakistani
culture; Persian is the most widely spoken language in
Afghanistan, and Iran is looked to by many Afghans,
though not all, as the cultural heartland. Many
Afghans, Sunnis and Shias, go to Iran to study. Before
1978, it was considered desirable among the upper class
in Kabul to speak Persian with an Iranian accent. At
the same time, the Afghans rightly feel that the
Iranians look down on them. Afghans who have gone to
Iran report being treated rudely by the Iranians.
Other Nationalities. The Afghans hold varying
attitudes toward other foreigners, shaped by recent
history.
-- Muslim Arabs are not well liked because the
Afghans find them overly puritanical, preachy,
arrogant, and a bit effete.
-- The Soviets are disliked, in part because they
are atheists, but largely because of the events
of the last eight years. Still, the Soviets are
also grudgingly respected for their brutality
and staying power. Comments heard earlier in
the war about inept Soviet soldiers are heard
less as the Soviets have improved their fighting
capability.
In Sum...
The Afghans have proven to be brave, tough and skilled
fighters. Their ability to fight an effective
guerrilla war has been heightened by the
characteristics of traditional Afghan culture and
social structure. Paradoxically, this traditional
culture has also held the Afghan guerrillas back in
many ways and had a negative effective on efforts to
develop a more sophisticated well-organized fighting
force. FI
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Cultural Factors: A Case History
The following account of 1985 insurgent attack on a
regime post near Jegdalek in Kabol Province was written
by an experienced military observer. It provides a
useful account of the strengths and weaknesses provided
by Afghan cultural traits. FI
Elementary principles of warfare were violated.
Although there was no time pressure, reconnaissance of
the terrain was insufficient. No one knew the exact
location of the minefields. Fire support from infantry
weapons was, at a distance of 800 to 900 meters, much
too far away from the enemy positions for it to have a
serious neutralizing effect on the target. The
insurgents were not divided up into groups until 30
minutes before the attack. Thus, good coordination
between the combatants was impossible from the
outset. There was no contact between the two assault
groups and the fire support teams. No one thought
about the care of possibly injured troops; even bandage
sets had been left behind in the base camp, 10 hours
away by foot. F-1
One impressive aspect was the calmness with which the
guerrillas from Jegdalek prepared for battle. Full of
confidence, they believed that they would capture
weapons and hoped for deserters from the enemy camp.
Enthusiasm in battle was correspondingly high at the
outset. After the disastrous explosion of a land mine,
the troops fell into retreat. But during this phase as
well, there was no discernible panic or despair. The
insurgents were able to come to terms amazingly well
with the demise of one of their comrades. After three
days, they set out, unflustered, on a new attack. They
impressed me as being amazingly carefree and somehow
fatalistic, because they did not draw any kind of basic
conclusions from their most recent defeat.
The guerrillas in the Jegdalek apparently do not know
the idea or even the meaning of a cost-benefit
analysis. This vexing phenomenon is probably explained
more or less as follows:
-- Because many Afghans from the rural population
scarcely have any higher education, their
imagination remains basically supported by and
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limited to their everday surroundings; it is
only with difficulty that they can distance
themselves from their romantic concept of war,
anchored in tradition.
-- Many Afghans are still bound to the idea that
the outcome of a war depends primarily on the
courage and boldness of the individual
combatant.
Only a few of them have realized that in a modern war
the quality of the armaments, the level of military
training and the application of appropriate tactics
have become additional factors in determining
success. Even fewer are capable of drawing useful
conclusions from the above-mentioned realizations.
In Jegdalek, I got the impression that the fighters
scarcely make a direct association between their hopes
for victory and the successes or failures of an
individual campaign. The catastrophic consequences of
the war and the unimaginable strains of permanent
combat have thus far been endured by an amazingly large
number of Afghans without resignation. The convinction
that they are fighting for a just cause appears to be
invincible. Certainly, religion plays a significant
role in this context, found in the idea of the "holy
war" against the "godless Communists." However, one
should be careful not to see purely religious fanatics
among in the Afghan guerrillas. Their strength of
resistance is fed from other sources as well:
-- The close connection to their home and their
deeply rooted demand for self-determination,
which would never permit the assimilation of any
imposed societal forms, are other elements of
their combat morale.
-- Many Afghans would also have sufficient
motivation to maintain their almost axiomatic
will for resistance even without strong
religious convictions. An enormous number of
Afghans have already lost everything except
their own lives; they are driven by one
objective: to win back their country and their
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independence.
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