YUGOSLAVIA: PLO TIES AND TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403500001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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.3 51 ` Central Intelligence Agency 25X1
DOC No LUG/ 7 SG-.)COLIC
OCR
P&PD / ?
Washington. D. C. 20505
3 March 1986
a (/~Cc-L) Yugoslavia: PLO Ties and Terrorism
SUMMARY
Belgrade's close ties to the mainline PLO
represent the most solid basis for western charges that
Yugoslavia abets international terrorism. The Yugoslav
government has had sporadic contact in the past with
more radical Palestinian factions--including Abu Nidal
and the PFLP-SC--and it continues to cultivate links
with South African insurgent groups such as SWAPO, the
ANC, and the PAC. But the Yugoslavs have invested
little in these relationships by comparison with their
commitment of diplomatic support, material assistance,
and military training to the mainline PLO. Belgrade,
concerned by recent Western criticism, may decide to
restrict its contacts with at least some of these
groups and may even become more circumspect in its
dealings with Arafat. Yet it will not likely alter its
basic relationship with the PLO for the foreseeable
future, nor wi~l it become a reliable ally of Western
This memorandum was prepared byl (Southeast
European Branch, East European Division, 0 ice of European
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Global Issues,
the Office of Near East South Asia and the Directorate of
Operations. It was requested by Roland Kuchel, Bureau of East
European and Yugoslav Affairs, Department of State. Comments and
questions are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, East
European Division, EURA
EURM86-20028
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Diplomatic Support
Yugoslavia's backing of the Arab and Palestinian sides in
their dispute with Israel dates from Tito's close relationship
with Nasser in the 1950s during the formative years of the
Nonaligned Movement. Tito made no secret of his pro-Arab tilt or
his sympathy with the PLO. He allowed Soviet cargo aircraft to
fly over Yugoslavia en route to Egypt during its 1967 war with
Israel and he pushed hard in 1975 for the UN resolution
condemning Zionism as a form of racism. While denouncing the
threat to Yugoslavia of Croatian terrorists abroad, Tito
permitted PLO terrorists to pass freely through his own
country. He approved the opening in Belgrade in the 1970s of a
PLO diplomatic mission, which continues to cooperate with the
Yugoslav government in monitoring the activities of Palestinian
radicals transiting or residing in the country.
The Yugoslavs appear strongly committed to Arafat.
In recent weeks Yugoslav
leaders have repeatedly reasserted that Arafat's PLO was "the
only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."
The Yugoslav government regularly receives high-level PLO
visitors, including Arafat who last visited the country in July
1983. The US Embassy in Belgrade reports that Arafat may again
visit Yugoslavia in March. In late January Abu Jihad (Halil Al
Wazir), Fatah's deputy military commander and a veteran of
numerous anti-Israeli terrorist operations, met in Belgrade with
the Yugoslav ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal
Affairs, and other senior officials. According to the Yugoslav
press, Abu Jihad was promised continued "comprehensive" support
in the struggle against Israel.
Belgrade has not altered its pro-Arab slant or its staunch
support for the PLO in the wake of the Achille Lauro affair last
October, even though it has indicated a willingness to increase
cooperation with the West on terrorism. In January, Deputy
Foreign Minister Loncar asserted that the United States and
Israel shared equal responsibility with Libya for heightened
tensions in the Mediterranean.
Military Training
Belgrade continues to provide military training for the
mainline PLO.. The Jordanian press recently quoted a Palestinian
source in Amman affirming that Palestine Liberation Army
personnel are now receiving training in Yugoslavia. Military
training for PLO members has been almost constant since the early
1980's.
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Belgrade openly condemned Abu Nidal for the first time following
the Rome and Vienna airport attacks in December. The State
Presidency, which oversees foreign and security policies,
apparently is now attempting to distance itself from Abu Nidal
with its public denunciations of terrorism, although we would not
rule out a resumption of secret, close contacts if Belgrade
should again perceive it to be in its interest to do so.
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Yugoslavia's international image also has been hurt by its
reputation as a transit point for international terrorists, even
though the government likely has little control over such
Motivations for Supporting Terrorist/Liberation Groups
Belgrade probably perceives its support for the PLO as
strengthening its hand within the Nonaligned Movement, of which
it was a cofounder and is a leader of the moderate wing. In
recent years Yugoslavia has been under assault from Cuba and
other nonaligned radicals--as well as Moscow--for its allegedly
lax record in supporting anti-Western causes. Belgrade probably
felt rewarded, for example, by the positive reaction in the
movement to Yugoslavia" upport for Abu Abbas in the Achille
Lauro affair.
Economically, Belgrade has long been concerned to maintain
its good standing among the Arab states. The region accounts for
a large share of Belgrade's annual billion dollar arms export
trade and has been a growing market for exports of machinery and
chemicals. Yugoslavia earns significant foreign exchange from
civilian and military planning, engineering, and construction
projects in Libya and Iraq and in recent years Belgrade has
accepted partial payment in oil for these services.
Yugoslav history also shapes Belgrade's perception of
terrorist acts. The creation of the first Yugoslav state in 1918
was the outcome of a terrorist attack in Sarajevo by the Serbian
terrorist "Black Hand Society" with at least the tacit backing of
some elements of the Serbian government. The modern Communist
Yugoslav nation was born'in a national liberation war--raised by
regime propagandists to a struggle of epic proportions--in which
the German invaders viewed the Yugoslav partisans much like
terrorist gangs. Yugoslavs today still celebrate the deeds of
the Hajduks--Yugoslavs who took to the hills to terrorize the
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Turkish occupiers between the 14th and 19th centuries. The
Macedonians at the turn of the century were renowned throughout
Europe for their terrorist deeds in pursuit of their own state.
Yugoslav society is probably more accepting of violence,
such as that used by terrorist movements, than its West European
counterparts. When the US Embassy several years ago installed
metal detectors at its gates it reported an unusually high
proportion of southern Yugoslavs carrying weapons. The ethnic
Albanians in and near Kosovo province still carry on blood
feuds. Even the more Central European Croats indulged in bloody,
brutal actions against the Serbs during World War II, deeds that
were reciprocated in kind.
Belgrade also seems motivated by concerns for its own
internal security. It has long been worried about terrorist
attacks both in the country and against its interests abroad,
dating from the assassination of King Aleksandar in Marseilles by
Croatian extremists in 1934. Belgrade probably calculates that
it can prevent attacks on Yugoslav territory by some groups--such
as Abu Nidal--by cooperating with them. Yugoslav security
officials probably also hope that they will receive warnings of
impending attacks by other organizations from friendly groups
tied to the global terrorism network.
Reactions to Western Criticism
Belgrade is coming under increasing pressure from its
Western neighbors following public reports that terrorists have
transited Yugoslavia enroute to West European targets. Following
Secretary Shultz's visit in December, Italian President Cossiga
in January and Austrian Interior Minister Blecha in February also
pressed Belgrade to act more decisively against terrorism.
Belgrade--while perhaps slow to realize how seriously
Washington regards the issue--has responded with gestures
intended to mollify Western governments. In early February, the
Austrian Interior Minister told the press that Belgrade had
agreed to share information on Armenian and some Palestinian
terrorist groups. In an effort to justify its own awkward
positions following the Achille Lauro affair, Belgrade also
issued a definition of terrorism that--while severely flawed and
falling far short of US positions--seemed designed to mollify
Western critics. According to the definition, violent acts
committed in disputed territories such as the West Bank should be
seen as the actions of "national liberation movements" while
those committed elsewhere could be branded as terrorist.
Yugoslavia's moves so far are largely cosmetic, however, and
will probably not satisfy most governments in Western Europe.
Belgrade is unlikely to provide much useful information to
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Vienna, particularly after a public announcement of the
agreement. And its definition of terrorism, of course, will
allow it to continue providing substantial support to the PLO.
Implications for the US
suggests that the Yugoslav leadership 25X1
is now uncertain how it s ould handle relations with
terrorist/insurgent groups other than the mainline PLO. Some
leaders--prodded by Western criticism--will likely question the
wisdom of such contacts, while others, probably including
security officials, can be expected to persist in arguing that
such contacts are needed to increase Yugoslav influence in the
Middle East. 25X1
Yugoslav support for extremist Palestinian groups, however,
will probably remain limited for some time. In light of Western
concern and adverse publicity, Belgrade is unlikely to move
closer to these groups or provide increased material support or
training. Similiarly, it is unlikely to become significantly
involved with any Western European terrorist groups.
Belgrade will probably continue to make efforts to
demonstrate its commitment to curbing international terrorism,
but it will not risk damaging its Arab ties. Belgrade, however,
may be willing to cooperate with Western governments against
extremist groups which have little support among states it
considers important--such as the Armenian groups mentioned by the
Austrian official.
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Yugoslavia's controversial military and diplomatic support
for the mainline PLO will continue, regardless of Western
concern. If, in the foreseeable future, Western interests clash
with those of the mainline PLO, as was the case in the Abu Abbas
affair, the Yugoslavs will probably again come down on the side
of the terrorists, leaving relations with the West to be repaired
later.
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SUBJECT: Yugoslavia: PLO Ties and Terrorism
Distribution:
DDI
D/EURA
C/EURA/EE
DC/EURA/EE
C/EURA/EE/SE
DDI/PES
NIO/EUROPE
D/OEA
EURA/EE
(Author)
EURA/PES (1 Sourced)
IMC/CB
EURA/EE/NE
EURA/EE/QA
EURA/EE/CE
EURA/EE/CEMA
EURA/EE/EW
SE Branch Chrono
SE Branch File
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