TALKING POINTS FOR (SANITIZED)MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404150001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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P & PD 21 July 86
Talking Points for Your Meeting with Ambassador Bartholomew
The Base Talks
The most pressing issue in bilateral relations with Spain is the
current negotiation over the future of the US military presence.
The opening round was on 10 July, and the talks are likely to
resume in early October.
Spanish Negotiating Position
Spanish negotiators say they are prepared to renew the bilateral
agreement that expires in 1988 and have hinted that they are
willing to allow the US presence at Rota Naval Base to remain
largely intact. In return, they want the US to cease basing
forces permanently at airbases at Zaragoza, Moron,
and--especially--Torrejon. The Spanish are offering the US use
of the airbases for exercises and emergency deployment, but they
want to largely eliminate their use in out-of-area operations.
Madrid will also seek increased grant aid, additional US
purchases of Spanish military materiel, and military coproduction
agreements.
The Spanish are trying to make US troop reductions the first
item on the agenda. They are also trying to back away from
their agreement last December to substitute Spanish forces
on a mission-by-mission basis for US forces withdrawn from
Spain. They are arguing instead that Spanish membership in
NATO provides a net increase in Western security even with
the US force cutbacks they want.
Although the Spanish are trying to maintain an amicable
atmosphere at the negotiating table, they will be very tough
negotiators and are likely to continue using press leaks to
keep pressure on Washington.
This paper was prepared by
Analysis.
Office of European
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Several factors will encourage the Spanish to compromise.
Discord with the US over the bases might diminish Gonzalez's
stature as a Western statesman and undermine the hard-earned
image of moderation that has boosted his political image at
home.
Budgetary considerations will also encourage Gonzalez to
compromise once it is clear that a decreased US presence
would lead to reductions in direct US aid as well as in the
substantial indirect US contribution to the already badly
strained Spanish defense budget.
Gonzalez, moreover, has room for maneuver on the base issue
despite gains in the parliamentary election on 22 June by the
Communists and former Prime Minister Suarez's center-left party,
both of which advocate pursuing a tough line with Washington.
Unlike the question of NATO membership, the base issue does
not have a yes or no answer, but is a matter of degree. Few
Spanish voters are likely to follow closely a complicated
debate about the relative merits of one or another formula
for regulating the US presence.
Cosmetic adjustments could reduce resistance to the US
military presence--the authorized ceiling for US troops
could be reduced by approximately 20 percent, F_ -1
it
might be possible to find a formula that wou d i e~y the
US military presence as part of the defense against what
Spaniards view as potential challenges from North Africa;
and US facilities could be redesignated as NATO
installations.
A More Independent Foreign Policy
While Spain is firmly committed to a pro-Western policy,
Gonzalez wants to strengthen the European pilla of the Alliance
an pursue a more independent foreign policy in the Third-World.
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Gonzalez recognizes that Madrid lacks the resources to
exercise much authority in Latin America, but he has worked
hard to cultivate regional leaders and is starting to play a
more active role in the area--primarily in support of the
Contadora process.
He has also fashioned himself at times as a potential
interlocutor between the US and Cuba, and his interest in
playing that part will probably increase this fall when he
visits Havana as part of a larger trip to the region.
Spanish Democracy: Pluses and Minuses
Since Franco's death in 1975 and the abortive coup attempt in
1981 Spanish democracy has largely been consolidated. The
Socialist Party's election victories in 1982 and in June 1986 and
Gonzalez's moderate and generally popular performance have
convinced skeptics that power can safely alternate between left
and right.
Military leaders remain strongly conservative, but they
respect, at least grudgingly, Gonzalez's record and his
popular support. Their awareness of the King's commitment
to democracy as well as their recollection of the failed
coup plot has also convinced them to accept constitutionally
mandated subordination to civilian authority.
The principal shortcoming in Spanish democracy is the failure of
the center and right politicians to overcome policy and personal
differences and to unite in an effective alternative to the
Socialists.
The second leading problem facing Spanish democracy is ETA, the
Basque terrorist organization. ETA has been in slow decline for
several years as a result of increased regional autonomy after
Franco's death, better police work, and improved French
cooperation against terrorist leaders in their hideouts North of
the Pyrenees.
Recent terrorist attacks have shown, however, that the
terrorists still pack a punch and at least another five or
six years will probably be necessary to eliminate the
problem.
Voters reelected Gonzalez because they generally support his
program and lack an effective alternative, but some recent
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developments are likely to erode enthusiasm for the new democracy
and could in time generate wide cynicism about the political
process.
Much of the public is aware that the government has hired
professional hit men to hunt down terrorists
Distribution:
Original - DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
1 - D/EURA
2 - EURA Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - C /WE
1 - WE/IA Production Files
1 - WE/IA
1 - MPS/PES
EURA/WE/IA/ I(21 JUL 86)
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