FRENCH POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
DATE /Z`~ -~q
DOC NO L ~,~ f'I ~~ .100 ~9
OIR -
P $ PD 1
MEMO: FRENCH POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA
1. What is the relationship between the Elysee and the Quai
d'Or'say on Central American decision-caking?
The relationship between the Elysee and the Qua! d'Orsay on
Central American policy seems to have varied in relation to the amount
of personal interest Mitterrand has taken towards developments in the
region. My impression is that, for the most part, it has been the
Qua! d'Orsay (and in particular.the Foreign Minister) which has played
the primary role in French Central American policy, primarily because
Mitterrand has been more concerned with what he sees as more important
issues. Mitterrand's Interest in Central America was highest during
1981. Elysee adviser Regis Debray played a key role during this
period, especially in the arms sale to Nicaragua. However, Cheysson
was also active during this period and there are no indications of any
diversity in their views or approaches. The impression one gets from
this period is that French policy toward Central America was guided by
a coherent strategy and well co-ordinated from the top. Evidence of
this coordination can be seen in the similar justifications for the
Niaraguan arms sale given by Foreing Minister Cheysson, Defense
Minister Hernu and Elysee adviser Regis Debray.
DDI/EURA/WE/CM
EUR M86.-20099
.
17 Aug. 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
Mitterrand's interest in Central American affairs cooled
considerably after the negative US and Latin American responses to the
point declaration with Mexico and the arms sale to Nicaragua.
Mitterrand turned to other issues, particularly the crisis over INF
deployment in West Germany during 1982-83. It seems most likely that
during this period Mitterrand let the Quaff handle Central American
issues within certain well-defined parameters. Mitterrand probably
made it clear to Cheysson during this period that solidarity within
NATO was crucial during this period and therefore France should not
seek a confrontation with the US on Central America.
After the successful INF deployment in West Germany and the US
invasion of Grenada in late 1983, it seems that Mitterrand loosened
the reigns and allowed Cheysson to pursue a more confrontational
policy toward the US in Central America. France began an active
policy of vocally opposing US attempts to apply economic and military
pressure against the Sandinistas in various international fora. A few
factors seem to support the thesis that Cheysson rather than
Mitterrand was the main mover in French Central American policy.
First Mitterrand made very few public statements referring to Central
America during this period and those he did make either said nothing,
new or were calculated so as not to be too offensive to the US. On
the other hand it seems that Cheysson was directly responsible for
leaking Shultz's letter at the San Jose conference in 1984, for
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
and France's internal security service (under the Interior Ministry)
have played a more important role over the objections of the Foreign
Ministry. The French Defense Ministry sees Cuban and Libyan
activitiea in the region as a threat to French strategic interests
(particularly the space facilities at Kouru in French Guiana). The
Foreign Ministry on the other hand is more concerned with developing a
rapprochement with Cuba, which the Qual sees as a regional power with
whom France might cooperate to help stabilize the Caribbean Basin.
The beefed up French security presence in the Eastern Caribbean,
increased aid and diplomatic contacts with the East Caribbean islands
and French help in training the security forces of some of these
islands indicates that the Defense Ministry has prevailed in this
area.
3. What has been (and is) the role of Regis Debray and Alain
Rouquie on Central American policy-making?
Regis Debray probably has not played a significant role in
France's Central America policy since the end of 1981. Debray had
much to do with the conceptualization of France's early approach to
Central America, particularly the arms sale to Nicaragua in 1981. The
joint declaration with Mexico on the FDR and the arms sale to
Nicaragua were soon seen as'a disaster by the higher echelons of the
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
French government and Debray's association with this policy damaged
his reputation within French government and PSF circles. Furthermore,
Debray has enemies on the left and the right in Latin America which
made him unsuitable as an emissary.
On the other hand, Alain Roquie has had an effect on the
formulation of French policy. Roquie is one of the few real Latin
American experts in France and his opinion is highly regarded by the
Quaff. Recently Roquie has been skeptical of Duarte's ability to
control the army and his seriousness about discussions with the
rebels. These attitudes have been adopted by the Quai and his advice
has probably been responsible, at least in part, for French reluctance
to abandon the FDR/FMLN and reluctance to be more supportive of the
Duarte regime.
4. Which parties and countries in Latin America and Central
America are France's preferred interlocuteurs?
Since the Franco-Mexican declaration on the FDR/FMLN in August
1981, France has found it very difficult to find diplomatic partners
toward the region. The Franco-Mexican declaration was condemned by
nine Latin American countries and the Nicaraguan arms sale was
condemned by these nine countries and Mexico and Brazil. Mexico had
been France's preferred partner, due to its size and economic power in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
the region. The joint declaration on the FDR/FMLN was as much a
symbol of a Franco-Mexican partnership as it was a statement on El
Salvador. However, after the negative reaction to the joint
declaration and the Nicaraguan arms sale, Mexico began to distance
itself from France and seek out its traditional diplomatic partners as
evidenced by the establishment of the Contadora group in 1983.
During 1982 and 1983, France also sought to improve its ties with
Cuba as a means of increasing its influence in the Caribbean Basin.
However, there were too many obstacles to a French-Cuban
rapprochement. The INF deployment crisis of 1982-83 set a premium on
Alliance solidarity and made a dramatic French gesture toward Castro
difficult. Furthermore, Castro proved unwilling to make any
concessions on human rights, Africa or Central America which would
make a French-Cuban rapprochement worthwhile. However, many people in
the Quai still see advantages in cutting a deal with Castro and trying
to allow him to extricate himself from the Soviet orbit so that a
possible move toward Cuba in the future remains a distinct
possibility.
France has found it difficult to find diplomatic partners in Latin
America for several reasons. First, the Nicaraguan arms sale and-the
joint declaration on the FDR/FMLN alienated many Latin American
countries. French support for Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas
war also gravely damaged French stock in Latin America. French
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
efforts to mediate between Nicaragua and Costa Rica were also seen as
an intrusion into the
of the Contadora group.
France has had more luck working with European countries, but here
too its success has been limited. In 1983, France made an offer to
start a point initiative with the newly elected Socialist government
in Spain, however, the Spanish were more interested in acting on their
own. France has worked through the EC and played an important role in
organizing the 1984 San Jose conference. However, other European
countries have been wary to become involved with diplomatic
initiatives toward Central america with the French.
5. What role does the PS as an institution as well as Lionel
Jospin, Jacques Huntzinger and Nicole Bourdillat play in Central
Aemrican policy-making?
As an institution, the PS has played a minor role in France's
Central American policy. Party organs have served more as policy
instruments rather than policy-makers. At times, the PS has served as
an effective and informal instrument for President Mitterrand. The
party's first secretary, Lionel Jospin, is a close associate and loyal
lieutenant of President Mitterrand's. Jacques Huntzinger, the party's
international secretary is an intellectual with no base within the
25X1 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
Socialist Party. A long-time adviser to Mitterrand, Huntzinger
probably owes his position within the PS leadership directly to
Mitterrand. As Mitterrand became less interested in Central American
affairs after 1981-82, he used Socialist party organs less frequently.
After 1981, the party paid lip service to solidarity with Nicaragua
but actually did very little.
Frustration with the growing pragmatism of the party leadership on
a wide range of issues caused Third Worldists within the party to seek
other means of making their voices heard. Opposition to government
policy began to coalesce around the party's parliamentary group in the
National Assembly, lead by Pierre Joxe. Joxe was one of Mitterrand's
oldest political supporters and a heavyweight within the Socialist
party. Joxe's long-standing personal relationship with Mitterrand
strengthened his hand in dealing with Elysee and Matignon staffers.
Under the leadership of Joxe, the PS parliamentary group conceived
of itself as the "conscience" of the Socialist party. Left wing
"study commissions" were established which acted as shadow cabinets
within the ruling party examing the party's compliance to the
Socialist program.
On Central American Issues, a Franco-Nicaraguan friendship group
was formed in the National Assembly under the leadership of CERES
hard-liner Jean Natiez. At times these parliamentary groups seemed to
be conducting their own foreign policy, issuing declarations of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
solidarity with the Sandinistas, sending official delegations to
Central America and receiving Nicaraguan officials in Paris. Several
Socialist deputies were also active in extra-parliamentary
organizations opposed to US policy, organizing demonstrations, letter
writinag and fundraising campaigns, and volunterr solidarity brigades
to help build roads and schools in Nicaragua. Among the Committee's
more notable members were Elysee counsellor Regis Debray and Danielle
Mitterrand, wife of the French president.
The activities of Third Norldists within the Socialist party
affected the rhetoric of France's policy more than its substance. At
a time when France's economic policy was moving to the right, its
African policy becoming increasingly reminiscent of Giscard's and the
government taking a strongly Atlanticist, pro-American stand in
Europe, there were few other than Central America where the left could
vent its frustrations. The leadership had determined by this time
that Central America was an area of marginal concern for France but an
emotional issue with the party's rank and file. By echoing empty
platitudes about French solidarity with revolutionary movements in
Central America, the government could placate the party's left at
little cost, while in fact pursuing a more moderate policy aimed at
disturbing as few people as possible while still seeking opportunites
for France to expand its interests.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
Several Third Worldists in the party were particularly displeased
with Nicole Bourdillat, the party's secretary for Central American
affairs. Bourdillat became increasingly more critical of the
Sandinisttas during her tenure and more vocal in her criticism. Her
replacement, Marie Duflo has been much more sympathetic to the
Sandinistas. It is probable that Bourdillat was sacrificed to appease
rank and file Third Worldists within the PS. However, the replacement
of Bourdillat by Duflo has not made the organs of the Socialist party
any more important in the formation of French Central American policy.
6. Are there any present or planned institutions (similar to the
Ebert Stiftung or the Spanish Institute for Iberoamerican Cooperation)
that France might use to extend its influence and presence in the
region?
As already mentioned, some Socialists have set up and participated
in solidarity and friendship groups outside the party. However, as
far as I can see there have been no plans by the Socialists to set up
an institution devoted to Central or Latin America.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
PLUS CA CHANGE?: FRENCH POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA
One Analyst's View
In private conversations with high-ranking US officials' during the last
six months, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac expressed full support for
US policy in Central America, and promised to change France's policy toward
the region from that followed by the previous Socialist government. Since
the election in March, France has indeed been less confrontational toward
the US on Central American issues, but this has been due more to the
political situation created by cohabitation, than any directive for change.
Neither Chirac nor President Mitterrand -- whose office traditionally
directs foreign policy -- is willing to take a position on Central America
that might come back to haunt him later. This lack of any strong direction
from the top mitigates against any major shifts in French Central American
policy in the near future. France will probably continue to gradually
reduce support for the Sandinistas in favor of the Central American
democracies. Lack of support for the Sandinistas, however, will not
necessarily translate into support for US policy and France is not likely
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
to support active US measures to apply economic and military pressure
against the Sandinistas.
FRENCH POLICY UNDER THE SOCIALISTS
French policy toward Central America during the early days of Socialist
rule was blatantly antagonistic to the United States. Originally, French
Socialists followed a policy of actively supporting revolutionary groups in
Central America based on a PSF I view of global politics which conveniently
combined Socialist ideology with French national Interests: The Socialists
saw Central America as a microcosm of broader trends in the Third World.
In their view, inequality, exploitation and authoritarianism rather than
East-West competition were responsible for instability in the Third World.
In addition, they believed the US and the Soviet Union were exploiting this
unrest in order to reassert their own faltering hegemony, thereby risking a
dangerous confrontation.
According to the Socialists, socio-economic reform would lead to the
domestic political stabilty needed to close off opportunities for super-
power Intervention and thus restore international stability. France could
play a leading role in this process by supporting "progressive" (i.e.
revolutionary) forces. Optimistic Socialists envisoned a global trans-
formation bringing peace, independence and democracy to the nations of the
world. In addition to these altruistic goals, pragmatic Socialists hoped
to increase French influence with other Latin American countries and
enhance France's prestige as a world power.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
Once in power, the Socialists moved quickly to implement their goals.
Paris issued a joint declaration with Mexico in August 1981 supporting El
Salvador's guerilla movement, the Frente Democratico Revolucionario/Frente
Nacional pars la Liberacion Nacional (FDR/FMLN), and sold arms to Nicaragua
in December 1981. This initial activism was short-lived, however, and
French policy toward Central America was rather restrained during 1982 and
1983. The joint declaration with Mexico on the FDR/FMLN and the arms sale
to Nicaragua drew heavy censure from the United States and many major Latin
American countries. Increased repression by the Sandinistas and lack of
popular support for the rebels in El Salvador convinced pragmatic
Socialists that their original perceptions of these groups had been in-
correct. Furthermore, after late 1982, the crisis over INF deployment in
West Germany dominated France's foreign policy agenda. Faced with the need
for NATO solidarity the French government became more reluctant to antag-
onize the US on Central American issues.
Toward the end of 1983, France again assumed an active posture toward
Central American affairs. Successful INF deployment in West Germany
alleviated French security concerns, while the US-led Grenada invasion
exacerbated French fears of direct US military intervention in Central
America. France saw US economic and military pressure on Nicaragua as a
dangerous step down this road and took a number of actions in various
international fora to undermine US policy. By serving as an intermediary
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, p and the Duarte government and the
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
FDR/FNLN, France tried to defuse the growing militarization of the Central
American crisis.
FRENCH POLICY UNDER COHABITATION
While the tone of French policy has certainly changed since March, this
has more to do with the vagaries of the political situation created by
cohabitation than anything else. Chirac's proclaimed support for US e
policy in Central America, is probably rather thin. Neither Chirac nor his
key advisers is very knowledgeable about Central American issues and Chirac
has paid little attention to the region since conning to power. A dramatic
move on Chirac's part in support of US policy, such as direct contact
between Chirac and Nicaraguan rebel leaders is unlikely, especially after
the July 1986 death of a French citizen at the hands of the contras.
Furthermore, diplomatic relations between France and El Salvador had been
gradually improving since 1983, culminating in the appointment of a
permanent French ambassador in April 1985. In any case, the amount of
redirected aid these democracies can expect from France will be low, since
French aid to Nicaragua has been rather small at around $15 million a year.
Mitterrand, on the other hand, seems less willing to become involved in
Central American issues than he has in the past. His reaction to US House
of Representatives approval of contra aid in July 1986 was mild compared to
his response to the US trade embargo against Nicaragua announced in April
1985. Furthermore, Mitterrand apparently has not tried to influence
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
France's position on the UN Security Council's debate on the International
Court of Justice decision that condemned the mining of Nicaraguan ports.
For the time being, Central America is a banana peel no one wants to
slip on. Both Chirac and Mitterrand probably worry that supporting either
the Sandinistas or the contras is potentially embarrassing, and each is
wary of making a mistake his opponent night exploit.
With neither Mitterrand nor Chirac willing to take a leading role,
Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond is likely to play a key role in
determining the substance of Central American policy. Raimond, a com-
promise choice for Foreign Minister, is a career diplomat, not a Chirac
loyalist. ^ A Soviet/East European specialist, Raimond does not have a
strong background in Central American affairs, but he has laid down some
principles for France's future Central American policy which emphasize
continuity over change. Raimond has expressed continued support for the
Contadora process and the EC's policy of granting aid to all the nations in
the region, including Nicaragua. Raimond has stated that France will not
undercut US policy in the region, and he is unlikely to seek a confronta-
tion with the US on Central America. However, he has also stressed that
France will reject military means to bring about change in the region and
will continue to support the principle of non-intervention in internal
affairs. Raimond has expressed the opinion to US diplomats that, unlike
Cuba, Nicaragua is not yet a member of the Soviet bloc. As a result,
Raimond is unlikely to support Nicaraguan rebels.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
As part of his effort to ensure continuity in French foreign policy,
Raimond has left in place at the Foreign Ministry several officials
responsible for Central America appointed under the Socialists, especially
Remy Lahaye, the pro-Sandinista director for Central America. Furthermore
actions by French officials in Managua indicate they remain strongly
sympathetic to the Sandinistas. As a result, much of the information French
policy-makers receive on Central American affairs carries a bias against US
policy.
OUTLOOK
In the short run, the political situation will deep the French from
undrtaking any major new initiatives toward Central America. Support for
the Sandinistas is likely to gradually. France will probably oppose
military solutions to the region's problems, but not in a way that might
provoke a confrontation with the US. France is also unlikely to support a
policy of isolating Nicaragua diplomatically or economically.
However, the present political situation will probably not last I very
long. Legislative elections are likely after France's next presidential
election which will probably occur in March 1988. A left-wing president
would seek to gain a governing majority, while a right-wing president would
try to capitalize on his election victory to expand the right's razor-thin
majority in the National Assembly. If the Socialists came back to power,
they would probably again oppose US economic and military pressure against
Nicaragua. They might also try to placate hard-core supporters of the
25X1 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
Sandinistas on the party's left, by I making a few symbolic gestures toward
Nicaragua. For the most part, however, the Socialists are likely to be
suspicious of the Sandinistas and cautious in their dealings with
Nicaragua.
If the right should take the presidency as well as maintain power in
the National Assembly, the best that the US could probably hope for in
Central American policy would be a kind of benign neglect. Although the
right would certainly be less reluctant to criticize the Sandinistas, this
will not necessarily translate into support for US policy. Chirac n has
indicated such support, but his attachment to this position (as to any
position) is probably not very deep. The French right has traditionally
taken less interest in Latin American affairs than the left. Furthermore,
broad elements of the center and right worry that US military involvement
in Central America might weaken US commitment to Western Europe and provoke
anti-American sentiment in France as it did in the Vietnam War. On a more
negative note, many old and new style Gaullists on the French right might
argue for a more active role in Central America. Therefore, if fears of US
intervention were to increase, a right-wing French government night become
more critical of US policy. However, for the most part, the right may
feel there is little to be gained by provoking the US over Central America.
Future French governments of either the left or the right could revive
a more activust French policy in Central America. The persistent influence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
of Gaullism and the desire to play a world role often lead the French to
prematurely herald the decline of superpower influence as the basis for
French opportunity. However, France does not have the power to shape o
events in the region, but can only react to opportunities as they arise.
Furthermore, before making any serious effort to exercise its influence in
Central America, France must feel that it can afford to provoke the US and
that there is something to be gained by becoming involved in the region's
affairs.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
CHRONOLOGY OF FRENCH POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
1978 Socialist International admits National Revolutionary
Movement (MNR), left wing party in El Salvador headed
by Guillermo Ungo, as member; grants observer status to
Sandinista National Liberation Front; calls for suspension
of economic, diplomatic and financial support for
Sandinistas; provide Sandinistas financial and organization-
al support
1980 Socialist International calls for "active solidarity" with
Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), politicial wing of
guerrilla movement in El Salvador, headed by Guillermo Ungo
and including his party, the MNR. EC Commissioner Cheysson
advocates providing food and
medical aid for Nicaragua
28 August 1981 France signs joint declaration with Mexico recognizing FDR/
FMLN as "a representative political force" in El Salvador.
2 September 1981 Foreign Ministers from 9 Latin American countries -- Argen-
tid na, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras,
Dominican Republic, Paraguay & Venezuela -- sign joint
statement condemning French-Mexican joint declaration as
interference in Salvadoran internal affairs
December 1981 France finalizes $15 million sale of "defensive" weapons to
Nicaragua; included 2 patrol boats, 2 Alouette-3 helicopters
45 trucks, 7000 air to surface rockets and training for
10 Nicaraguan naval officers and 10 pilots. 11 Latin
American nations including Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela &
Colombia express displeasure with French action
March 1982 Sandinistas declare state of emergency in Nicaragua.
Constituent Assembly elections in El Salvador; overwhelming
turnout for candidates of centre and right.
July 1982 Nicaraaguan President Ortega meets with Mitterrand and
Cheysson in Paris, afteru
meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow.
French grant Nicaragua US=15 million in aid, but caution
Nicaragua to maintain "genuine non-alignment".
early 1983 France unsuccessfully tries to gain support of new Socialist
government in Spain for joint diplomatic initiative toward
Central America.
February 1983 Roving Ambassador to Latin America Antoine Blanca announces
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
French intention to upgrade diplomatic relations with El
Salvador to the charge level
October 1983 US led invasion of Grenada
November 1983 Foreign Minister Cheysson meets with Salvadoran Foreign
Minister, Fidel Chavez Mena, in Paris. First official con-
tact between Socialist government and the government of
El Salvador
April 1984 Cheysson sends letter to Colombian President Betancur
June
1984
July
1984
September
1984
EC, Contadora and Central American countries meet in San
Jose, Costa Rica. French leak letter from US Secretary of
State George Shultz calling on conference participants not
to grant political or economic assistance to Nicaragua.
France and West Germany facilitate negotiations between
FDR/FMLN and Duarte government at La Palma.
proposing multinational force to remove mines from
Nicaraguan ports planted by US-backed rebels. Letter
reportedly authorized by Mitterrand.
French offer resolution in UN Security Council calling for
freedom of navigation in Central American region (vetoed by
US) (AFP 4/9/84)
Mitterrand meets with Guillermo Ungo, leader of FDR.
Duarte elected president in El Salvador.
France hosts border talks between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
Mitterrand meets with Salvadoran President Duarte in Paris,
encourages negotiations with FDR/FMLN.
Second round of Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border talks hosted
by France. France attempts to solicit Canada, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and Mexico for multinational peacekeeping
force.
November 1984 Nicaraguan elections, French government declines to send
observers, however, French National Assembly sends Jean
Natiez, president of French-Nicaraguan friendship group as
representative. Indication of PSF rank and file support for
Sandini t
a
F_ I
.
s
1985 French lead European members of International Bank of
Development protest US veto of $58 million development loan
to Nicaragua.
January 1985 Inauguration of Daniel Ortega as President of Nicaragua,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
France sends low-level delegation.
April 1985 France upgrades relations with El Salvdor to ambassadorial
level, appoints Alain Roquier as resident ambassador.
April-May 1985 US declares trade embargo against Nicaragua. French protest
embargo at Bonn summit. Mitterrand meets with Ortega in
Paris May 13.
June 1985 Costa Rica rejects French offer to mediate talks with
Nicaragua in Paris.
October 1985 French officials facilitate negotiations for release of Ines
Duarte, kidnapped daughter of Salvadoran president.
15 October 1985 Sandinistas reimpose state of emergency in Nicaragua.
December 1985 French UN delegation collaborates with Nicaragua to draft
General Assembly resolution criticizing Us embargo against
Nicar
agua.
25X1
March 1986 French legislative election results in conservative majority
20 March 1986 Chirac indicates support for US Central America policy in
meeting with Secretary Shultz, although other Gaullists
22 May 1986 Chirac Foreign Policy speech calls for French "modesty" in
Central America.
6 June 1986 Nicaraguan Vice President Sergio Ramirez pays official visit
to Paris. Meets with Mitterrand and Foreign Minister
Raimond, but not Chirac.
16 June 1986 French Embassy in Nicaragua refuses to send report by
independent Nicaraguan human rights agency (Permanent
Commission on Human Rights) to Paris unless data on human
rights changed to reflect French embassy figures (which are
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8
based on Sandinista figures)
20 June 1986 Chirac states "full support" for US policy in meets
Special Envoy Habib. Also indicates that France will phwith
ase
out aid to Nicaragua in favor of Central American
25 June 1986 US House of Representatives approves $100 million in aid for
Nicaraguan contras. Sandinsitas shut down La Prensa the
next day.
July 1986 In UN Security Council, France abstains on Nicaraguan
resolution on condeming US support for contras.
French citizen killed by contras in Nicaragua.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404220001-8