GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS: TROUBLE AHEAD?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404250001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 4, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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7'/~ ~-
Distribution:
External:
Captain Ellsworth, Naval Intelligence Support
Colonel Tyrus Cobb, DESA, NSC Staff
Mr. Peter R. Sommer, DESA, NSC Staff
Major
Mr.
Mr. Cerasco, OUSDRE ,
Mayor Steve Fleet, DA1lO/SSE, Pentagon
LTC Mary S. Maclearri, USAF, Pentagon
Lt. Col. Ed Moore,~EUROPEAN Div., Pentagon
Lt. Col. Brian Mullady, Pentagon
Col. Michael J. McNamara, ISP/EUR, Pentagon
Internal:
1 - C/EUKA/i:I
1 - EURA/EI/SI
2 - EURA/PS
4 - I?tC/CB
1 - DD/Eura
i - C/EURA/WE
1 - C/EURA/WE/IA
DDI/EURA/WE/IA/
DATE 9 // ~ ri ~
DOC NO ~~ ~,~ ~~- do/oL
0 I R~
P ~ PD~
Command
Sept. 1986
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w.snr~on.aczosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 September 1986
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS: Trouble Ahead?
Executive Summary
Tensions are once again on the rise in the eastern
Mediterranean as:Greeks;`and";Turks'step up-their
Wrangling over air`corr~dors,. the continental shelf,
the Greek island of Limos, and Turkey's relationship
with the EC. Further aggravating the situation is the
failure of the latest IIN peace plan on Cyprus and
recent Turkish Cypriot moves aimed at solidifying the
independent status of the northern third of the
island. Although alternating periods of tension and
relative calm have become a common feature in the
relationship between Greece and Turkey, a number of
factors suggest that the situation is worsening in
subtle and potentially dangerous ways. Turkey, for
example, appears to be. adopting a tougher policy toward
Greece as suggested by Prime Minister Ozal's public 25X6
statements this spring about the limits of Turkish
patience. Likewise, Prime Minister Pa andreou
has gone 25X6
eyon previous limits in his warning that any attempt
to 'expand the Turkish occupation' in Cyprus would lead
to open conflict. Although we continue to believe that
neither side is spoiling for a fight--both leaders
recognize the potential costs of hostilities--we are
concerned that relations have marginally deteriorated
over the past months and that the potential for
miscalculation or an accidental incident is greater now
than in the past. Any military confrontation between
Greece and Turkey would have serious repercussions for
IIS and NATO interests and could place in 'eo ardy IIS
facilities in one or both countries. ~ 25X1
This memorandu-n was prepared.by t5e Office of European Analfsis. Questions
and comments are welcome and may be addressed to Deputy Chief, West
European Division 25X1
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EURIi 86 20102
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Over the past three to four months Greece and Turkey seem to
have entered another period of tense relations. A sharpening of
the dispute over Greece's right to militarize the island of
Limnos, for example, is again threatenin3 to disrupt NATO defense
planning and to jeopardize US bilateral relations with the
disputing parties. Similarly, a recent flap over the designation
of air corridors in the Aegean and wrangling over the
normalization of Turkish-EC relations are turning essentially
technical and economic forums into political battlegrounds. At
the same time, mounting tensions on Cyprus--in particular, Greek
Cypriot rejection of the UN Secretary General's peace plan,
recent Turkish Cypriot challenges to the status of the UN
peacekeeping forces, and reports of increases in Turkish troop
levels and the upgrading of Turkish armor capability on the
island--are adding further strains to relations between Athens
Background .,
Greece and Turkey have been at odds over Cyprus,~the Aegean,
and a variety of other questions for many years. (For a moY~
detailed discussion of the issues, see Appendix.) The degree of
tension has varied--ranging from periods verging on open
hostility to periods of relative calm. The Greek-instigated coup
on Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish invasion in 1974 marked an
obvious low point, although the two sides nearly came to blows
again twice in the decade over mineral exploration rights in the
Aegean. Since then, diplomatic skirmishes have become a common
feature of the relationship and have occasionally brought the two
sides close to conflict. The periods of stability in the last
two decades have fallen.= a short of anything approaching
friendly relations.
At Stake
US interest in maintaining t:~e stability of NATO's southern
flank and in retaining bases in both Turkey and Greece gives it a
major stake in the preservation of peace in the region. Together
Greece and Turkey form a critical part of Western defenses on the
southeastern flank of NATO, for the forces they supply as well as
the bases and intelligence monitoring facilities they provide to
the United States and other Allies. Contingency planning for
southwest Asia, protection of oil supply linen from ttie,Middle
East, and the security of Israel, moreover, all hinge on an
effective and committed Allied effort in the eastern
Mediterranean.. Assessing the extent to which this latest round
of tensions goes beyond the "normal" pattern of the past decade
and. threatens more serious consequences is therefore crucial to
US security interests.
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Since the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the uneasy peace between
Greece and Turkey has been punctuated by periods of sharp ~,
tension. Turkish efforts in 1976 to assert a right to an equal
share of the Aegean by sending a research vessel and naval ~5cort
into contested waters ushered in one such period. The Panther
incident in 1984, when three salvos fired by Turkish warships
conducting an antiaircraft exercise landed close to a Greek
destroyer shadowing the exercise, created another. Papandreou's
proclamation in early 1985 of a "new" defense doctrine formally
identifying Turkey as the main threat to Greece led to a third
.period of tense relations. At a less publicized level, both
sides routinely schedule military exercises at overlapping times,
a practice that frequently brings armed aircraft and naval
vessels into close proximity to .one another.
Rhetoric and actions on these and other occasions. justify
concern about an .escalation into military confrontation. Yet in
the past both sides have shown a recognition of the potential
costs of open conflict and have taken action to prevent incidents
from escalating. After announcing a new defense doctrine, for
example, the Greeks refrained from any sudden redeployment of
troops that might have aggravated Turkish nervousness.
Similarly, last Christmas, the Turks cancelled an air and naval
exercise when they learned that the timing had excited Gree;c
suspicions and prompted Athens to cancel holiday leaves and ut
its Air Force on full alert. More recently,
An Gree an Greek Cypriot forces on Cyprus were
Warne o avoid provocations alor}g the buffer zone during the
recent Turkish exercises in northern Cyprus.
Recent Developments
A number of events over the past few months appear to signal
the beginning of a new period of sharp tension between Athens and
Ankara.
Limnos: A SACEUR umbrella defense plan is the latest focus
of the dispute over Greece's clai,~n of a right to militarize
Limnos--a dispute which contributed to Greece's withdrawal fro.
NATO exercises in 1984 and which has led to recurring
difficulties in approving ,,the annual. NATO;_,forGe.,,gc,~,;~~.,~e,.;, y,;..
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*The Greeks currently have approxi.-nately 4,000 troops on Limnos. The Turks
insist that this violates a prohibition against the militarization of the island set
forth in the Dardanelles Convention of 1923. The Greeks hold that this aas succeeded
by the Montreux Convention of 1936,.. which contains no such restriction. ~~ 25X1
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The Greeks want A 0 to
inc ude the island in warti~ae contingency planning becauseey
believe it would give some weight to their desire to station
military forces on the island--and more generally, to take
whatever action they deem necessary to provide for the defense of
the whole of their national territory. Athens also argues that
the plan fills a longstanding void in NATO defense of the
region. ~~
Ankara objects to the NATO plan because it fears its
approval would prejudice the Turkish case on Limnos, and wore
important, would set a precedent for Greek militarization of
other.islands in the Aegean ~-which in Ankara's view is"the real'
motive underlying Greek actions on Limnos. Complicating the
issue is Turkey's conviction that the US has actively pushed
implementation of the plan, presumably as a quid pro quo for
continued access to military bases in Greece. So far, NATO has
dodged the issue by keeping the matter under study.
Air corridors: In late t4ay, Athens announced that it would
be partially implementing a new ICAO-recommended air route (G-13)
running in a direct path from the intersection of the Greek and
Yugoslav flight information region near the island of Khios to
the Greek island of Rhodes. At the same time, Athens announced
that it was redesignating the old corridor as J-60 and that the
old corridor, which included a dog-leg over Limnos, would remain
in effect until the new route was fully operational. Turkish
officials .a n3 newspapers reacted stridently, apparently convinced
the Greeks were about to renege on full implementation of the new
corridor. The Greeks, in turn, cited "technical and operational
difficulties" for not fully implementing the new route, but
assured ICAO that they would ultimately abandon the old
reluctance to move a ea stems in part from their concern over
the periodic intrusion of Turkish military aircraft into Greek-
claimed airspace without coordination. They are deter,'nined to
assert their airspace claims and preserve their civil air service
to the Greek islands in the Aegean--a right they suspect Turkey
is covertly challenging. For its part, Ankara argues that Athens
unilaterally implemented the old route in 1981, knowing that it
traversed an area in which the Turkish Air Force regularly
exercised. Ankara has also pointed out that the new route is
safer and more direct. The flap over the air corridors appears
to have subsided for the time being, although recent Turkis:z
Dress reports indicate Ankara may raise the issue with the ICAO
The Greeks
again in September.
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Airspace Dispute Between Greece and Turkey
Crete
Greek airspace recognized by Turkey
(6 nm)
Limit of airspace claimed by Greece
(10 nm)
Boundary of flight information region
(median line measured from low-water
coastline)
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Turkey's Relations with the EC: The EC only recently has
become a major forum for the ventilation of Greek-Turkish
disputes. The Turks are anxious to improve their relation with
the EC both for the economic benefits--including the releas'~ of
about $540 million in development aid--and for the political
symbolism of Western endorsement and confidence in Turkey's
stability. Turkey's relations with the EC were effectively
frozen after the military takeover in 1980, and Ankara's
subsequent efforts to normalize the relationship were stymied
until recently because of the reservations of some EC members
over the Turkish commitment to democratic freedom and human
rights.
Most states now-appear willing to give Turkey the benefit of
the doubt and.; to suppor-t=:Ankara's efforts tb reactivate the
Turkish association agreement with the EC, but Greece has begun
to place conditions on the process. Athens has said it will sign
the association protocol only if Turkey agrees to lift
restrictive laws on the property rights of Greeks living in
Turkey and accepts limits on the freedom of movement of Turkish
labor. Athens has cited its own security concerns. and the need
for Turkey to conform to EC conventions as its reasons for
withholding approval of the protocol. The Greeks view th-e LC as
the one forum in which they have leverage over Turkey, and they
appear determined to use their LC membership to press for Turkish
concessions on specific issues. As it does in other forums when
disputes with Greece arise, Ankara argues that Athens should
negotiate the issues bilaterally.
Continental Shelf: Late last month Greece strongly
criticized Turkey for sending a research vessel and a naval
escort into a disputed area in the Aegean without first askin3
Greece's permission. Athens maintained that the research vessel
was conducting seismic research on a portion of the seabed t:~at
is part of its continental shelf. Ankara countered that the
vessel was not engaged in seabed research and was accompanied by
an armed escort because of Greece's alleged harrassment of past
Turkish scientific expeditions in the Aegean. Ankara also
complained .later to .the United States that Greece was violating
the 1976 Berne Declaration in which both Greece and Turkey
pledged to refrain from exploratory activities in the disputed
waters in the Aegean pending a delimitation of the continental
shelf. In particular, Turkey expressed:_concern that last year
Greece granted exploration licenses for 'areas along the
northwestern coast of Greece that lay outside Greek territorial
waters. (Athens informed Ankara at the time that it had no
intention of drilling in the disputed areas but that in ant case
it-no longer recognized the Berne Declaration.)
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The current flare-up is part of the more fundamental and
longstanding dispute between Greece and Turkey over the ~.
exploitation and distribution of resources on the Aegean ~~ '
seabed. Over the past four years, .however, the issue was "'
relatively dormant, and incidents were handled by Greece and
Turkey in a relatively low-key manner. The resort of both sides
to publicizing the issue and attempting to secure third-party
support will complicate efforts to resolve their differences on
C rus: The apparent collapse of the UN Secretary General's
latest effort to construct a peace plan further complicates
Greek-Turkish relations. The Secretary General's peace effort
effectively came to an end in April when Greek Cypriots rejected
a draft "framework~agreement" on the grounds that't was
biased. The Secretary General has nonetheless scheduled meetings
next month with both Cypriot leaders, and various reporting
suggests he will continue to push his current framework. In our
view, there~is little likelihood that the Greek Cypriots can be
brought to accept the Uy peace plan in its current form. At the
same time, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal and Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash have made it clear that they would be unwilling to
consider any changes in the current UN draft or any other'UN
this and other recent disputes.
initiative at this time.
Tensions on Cyprus were further heightened by Turkish Pri:ne
Minister Ozal's visit in early July to the so-called "Turkish-
Republic of Northern Cyprus." The Greek Cypriots staged a
protest demonstration along the buffer zone separating the
Turkish ana"Greek Cypriot sections of Nicosia--a rove that
resulted in temporary Greek Cypriot closure of the border. When
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash subsequently closed the border
from his side, he initially linked his action not to Greek
Cypriot provocations but to "unacceptable" criticism of the Ozal
visit by Western governments and the UN, and the need of the
north to assert its "legitimacy." Denktash also called on the U:1
to negotiate on procedures for the movement of UN forces in the
north--a step that he hoped would clearly imply the legitimacy of
his government. Such statements by Denktash and Prime Minister
Ozal have caused considerable nervousness among the Greek
Cypriots and their supporters in Athens about Turkish
intentions.
tdilitary Activities: Greek and Turkish exercises have also
contributed to the rise in the political temperature. The Greeks
responded to a Turkish exercise in eastern Thrace in i4ay by
placing their Air Force on its highest state of a12rt.
Similarly, the Greeks responded to a Turkish exercise involving
air., naval,. and ground units in the Sea of Marnara and the
northern Aegean by announcing an exercise of their own in the-
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Aegean. The potential for incidents in these activities was
illustrated on 30 June when Turkish naval vessels conducting
previously announced live fire exercises off Rhodes continued
firing even though a Greek Cypriot cruise liner had moved into'
the area. Two rounds allegedly were fired in the vicinity of the
cruise liner. The Greek response was to announce a joint air and
naval exercise involving live firing in the same area.
Other significant military activities also are afoot.
potential measures to consolidate the Turkish "state" in the
north, they will clearly ratchet up Greek anxiety about Turkish
somewhere between 23,000 and 27,000. The Turks have also begun
replacing some of their older tanks with newer, more modern
tanks--perhaps "upgunned" equivalents of the U3 M48A5 tank.
Whether these moves are only contingency planning or~=connected to
the Turks plan to send about
more troops to Cyprus, raising their total strength to
goals in CYPrus.
Rhetorical Exchan es: As is usually the case, rhetorical
exchanges again aye p ayed a part in poisoning relations between
Athens and Ankara. This time--in contrast to the "normal"
pattern--Papandreou has not been the sole instigator of
inflammatory rhetoric. Indeed, Ozal has matched his Greek
counterpart's occasional bellicose outbursts, beginning with a
speech in western Anatolia in late April, when he warned that
Turkey's patience with Greece had reached its last stage.
Causes for Concern
Although the latest series of incidents are unlikely to lead
to open conflict, we see a number of factors suggesting that
relations between Greece and TurkeS, are worsening in subtle and
potentially dangerous ways. ~~
Turkish attitudes appear to be hardening. Ozal in the past
consistently held out a willingness to meet with Greek leaders to
discuss outstanding issues between the two countries. Ozal's
public warnings this spring about the limits of Turkish atience
strike an uncharacteristically tougher note.
Turkish domestic political motives may also be at work.. The
slow return to democracy has expanded the range and sharpened the
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tone of political debate in Turke y
Turkey also may be anxious about perceived Greek gains in
their competition for international support. As already noted,
the Turks saw the proposed NATO plan for the wartime
reinforcement of Limnos as an indication of a "lestern tilt in
favor of Greece. Similarly, they fear that the Greeks will
somehow block Turkey's rapprochement with the ~C. They have long
charged that the United States and other Western allies appease
Papandreou, and they may have conclude~t a harder and more
demanding line will pay dividends.
On the Greek side of the equation, the forced retirement of
Greek President Karamanlis in 1385 removed an important
moderating factor in Greek-Turkish relations.
Equally important was the Turkish
perception that as long as Karamanlis was in office, he would
prevent Papandreou from acting rashly. The absence of Karamanlis
has almost certainly deepened Turkish uncertainty about possible
Greek behavior in a crisis.
Papandreou's posturing in some ways has also gone beyond
previous limits. His tougher tone toward Turkey can be
attributed in part to his need to redirect domestic attention as
he mends fences with the United States. Although always given to
inflammatory rhetoric about Turkey, however, Papandreou generally
has avoided painting himself into dangerous corners. Thus, his
speech before the EC in late June, in which he warned t:~at any
attempts to expand the Turkish occupation in Cyprus wou13 lead to
open conflict, was a significant departure from previous
statements. This laying down of markers will make it more
for him to back down in a crisis without loping face.
The -failure of the. -iJN initiative on Cyprus adds another
disturbing new element to the picture. As long as the peace
process was alive, both sides .had an interest in appearing
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moderately reasonable--if for no other reason than to earn credit
within the international community. In the short term, the mos t
likely threat to the status quo on the island comes from Ankara
and the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots appear to ~'
positioning themselves to solidify their hold on the northern
third of the island. Beyond their recent attempts to challenge
the status of the UN forces on Cyprus, the steps they appear to
be contemplating include settlement of the deserted city of
Varosha and a full scale push to secure diplomatic recognition
The Turkish side, now that the Greek Cypriots have assumed
the onus for torpedoing the UN plan, may believe it can risk new
.nation-building efforts in northern Cyprus. Ozal's strong
statements in support of the political equality of northern and'
southern Cyprus during his visit last month may have been
intended to test the reactions of the UN and Western
governments. Any further movement in this direction almost
certainly will trigger a new series of actions and counteractions
on the part of Athens and Ankara. The Greek Cypriots, moreover,
would be likely to speed up their defense procurement program in
response to any upgrading and stengthening of Turkish forces on
the island. Athens and Nicosia might also consider sending
additional Greek troops--or possibly even tanks--to the island.
Such a series of steps would be profoundly destabilizing. ~~ 25X1
Outlook
'Ae do not believe either side is contemplating an act of
overt aggression, and we see no ~.ikelihood that either would do
so as things now stand. On the other hand, we see no evidence
that either side is prepared to undertake the sort of
statesmanlike but politically risky action that could break the
present pattern of mutual distrust and suspicion--for example, a
Turkish offer to draw down significantly its forces on Cyprus or
a Greek offer to sit down with the Turks to discuss their
Indeed, all the signs point toward continuing
intransigence. For example, both Athens and Ankara appear to
differences and ways to ameliorate them.
believe that the US will somehow save the two sides
themselves and prevent ooen hostilities
n our view, is min -set
discourages leaders on both sides from taking the kinds of
political risks involved in peacemaking and promotes a
potentiall dan Brous disregard for the implications of their awn
actions.
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In the short term, the most likely prospect for the Aegean
region is a continuation of the present cycle of alternating `,
periods of tension and relative calm. In our view, howeve'~,:
these repeated cycles of tension are incrementally moving t2ie two
sides further from reconciliation and contributing to an
increasingly volatile climate. As a result, we believe the
chances for a miscalculation or accident are marginally greater
now than in previous years.
Furthermore, we can no longer assume that open conflict
brought about in this manner will necessarily be limited to a
quick skirmish on Cyprus or in the Aegean.
imi con .ct were exerted by both sides immediately following
an initial incident, there is at least the possibilit that an
expanded and bloody confrontation could occur.
Beyond the deleterious impact on NATO of any fighting
between two member states, should conflict occur between Greece
and Turkey, both sides would look to the United States for
support. Both would also interpret anything less than total
backing as covert support for the other side. Even without a
crisis, US relations with both capitals are like.l;~ to continue to
be complicated by this enduring regional feud.
...
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APPENDIX
The Issues t,_,
The two areas in which Greek and Turkish interests are most
directly and inextricably in conflict--the Aegean and Cyprus--
involve quarrels of long standing. Almost all of the more ti~an
2,000 islands in the Aegean belong to Greece, a circumstance that
gives the Greeks control over almost all of the Aegean sea and
air routes--including sea and air approaches to the Dardanelles
and western Turkey. Some of these islands lie within 3 ,Hiles of
the Turkish coast. This proximity inevitably pits Greek
sovereignty and national security against Turkey's national
~~
Both sides can cite treaty provisions and points of
international law. Often, however, the issues that divide them
have less to do with differing interpretations of international
law and more to do with the long and bloody history of the two
peoples. Greeks across the political spectrum see Turkey as a
growing regional power with designs on Greek territory,
particularly the Greek islands. Athens claims a right sanctioned
by international law and treaty to take any action necessary to
maintain control of air and sea communications between the
mainland and the islands and to defend its national territory.
The Turks, for their part, believe that Greece is seeking to make
the semi-enclosed Aegean into a "Greek lake" and thereby preempt
Turkish rights in the area. Ankara asserts a need to protect its
security and ensure vital commercial and naval access routes
Many of the disputes probably could be resolved easily if
they were not seen by both sides as bearing directly on morn
fundamental issues. Among these more fundamental issues are:
Continental shelf rights: Greece maintains that its inhabited
islands have their own continental shelves, while Turkey
argues that many of the Greek islands lie on t:~e Anatolian
shelf. At issue are the exploitation and distribution of the
Aegean's seabed resources.
Territorial ~aaters: Athens, citing recent international
conventions, reserves the right to extend its sea boundaries
from 6 to 12 nautical miles. Ankara argues that the Aegean
is a special case and that extension of territorial waters
would cut off Turkey's direct access to international
waters. It has warned that any attempt to enforce such an
extension would be a casus belli.
through the Dardanelles and Aegean.
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Airspace and air traffic control: Greece claims an airspace
of 10 nautical miles around its islands and insists for
safety reasons that all Turkish aircraft entering its F~;ight
Information Region file flight plans. Turkey recognizes an
airspace of only .6 nautical miles and, like the United
States, refuses to file plans for military flights.
NATO command and control: Greece is seeking to regain the
NATO command and control responsibilities in tl~e Aegean that
it lost when it temporarily withdrew from NATO in 1974.
Turkey is pressing for some formula that would allow for
joint control.
Limnos and Samothrace: Athens argues that the Montreux
Convention, which allows Turkey to militarize the Straits,
also gives. Greece the right to station troops on the islands
of Limnos and Samothrace. Ankara counters that the
convention does not mention Limnos and Samothrace by name.
Militarization of the Greek Ae can Islands: Greece points to
the creation of the Turkish "Aegean" army in 1975 and argues
that the right of self-defense overrides any treaty
provisions providing for the demilitarization of its Aegean
islands. Turkey notes that the treaties under which the
islands were ceded to Greece dictate that they remain
demilitarized.
Minorities: Greece and Turkey accuse each other of fsiling
to respect the safeguards for minority communities outlined
Uy the. 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, and of discriminating against
the ethnic communities living under their respective
jurisdictions.
C rus: Greece points to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in
1974 as proof of Ankara's aggressive intentions and has
called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops as a condition
for meaningful negotiations between ttie two Cypriot
communities. Turkey counters that the Athens-inspired coup
on Cyprus prompted its intervention and says it must maintain
a military presence on the island in .order to protect ttie
Turkish Cypriot minority pending an acceptable Cyprus
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404250001-5