POLAND: NATIONAL RECONCILLIATION REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000504810001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE
DOC NO /,' /`I ~~-.iaxs7
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Ccigial hiIclli hxc At clKy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
18 December 1986
Poland: National Reconciliation Remains an Elusive Goal
Party leader Jaruzelski has pursued two contradictory goals
over the past five years. He has sought to regain control over
the opposition while also seeking ways to create the popular
acceptance needed to help bring Poland's economy out of its
current morass. Although Jaruzelski is skeptical about the
Party's ability to rule effectively, there is little doubt that
he firmly believes political power must remain concentrated in
the regime's hands. The Polish Communist rulers and their
patrons in Moscow also remember the Solidarity era and what can
happen if they start making significant political compromises to;
keep domestic tranquility. For these reasons, Jaruzelski may
tolerate some diversity, but he is not likely to recognize
defacto autonomous groups as legitimate partners with the ruling
authorities in solving Poland's problems.
This memorandum was prepared by
East European Division, Office of European Analysis. it
was requested by Mr. Robert Rackmales, Director, Office of Human
Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
Department of State and Mr. Barry Lowenkron, Policy Planning
Staff, Department of Statemments and questions are welcome.
t
E
hi
f
as
e
,
and should be addressed to Acting C
European Division
EUR-M-86-20158
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Jaruzelski has had significant but by no means complete
success in dividing and weakening the opposition. Most
importantly, he has convinced leaders of Solidarity as well as
workers in factories that they would lose in an open
confrontation with the regime's well-trained security forces.
Nevertheless, there is an extensive underground press numbering
more than 500 publications and numerous social, cultural, and
educational activities outside the government's control. Because'
the opposition was never fully routed, as it was in Hungary after
1956, the Poles have been more suspicious than the Hungary
were of "conciliatory" gestures offered by the regime.
Jaruzelski's Strategy
Jaruzelski has proceeded at his own pace. Encouraged by the
limited resistance to martial law, he moved relatively quickly
first to suspend and then to remove it. In the process, however,z
he put on the books new legal powers for the government which in
many ways duplicate those the government had under martial law.
Indeed, these provisions afford the regime better means to head
off future crises. Some top Polish officials now believe that at.
times they may have moved too quickly. Party secretary Jozef
Czyrek recently told a US official that the extensive amnesty in
the summer of 1984 may have been a mistake because the released
political prisoners quickly returned to the fray. The generally
tougher actions against dissent, including numerous arrests, that'
followed over the next two years were also conditioned by the
need to mollify the security service in the aftermath of the
trial of security officers for the murder of Father Popieluszko, z
to win the confidence of the new Soviet first secretary '
Gorbachev, and to consolidate Jaruzelski's position in the run-up
to the Polish party congress in the summer of 1986.
Following that congress, at which he strengthened his own
position in the party and with Gorbachev, Jaruzelski once again
sought to move forward quickly to pursue what government
officials call "national reconciliation" and to effect the
removal of Western, primarily US, economic sanctions. In a
dramatic move he released nearly all political prisoners and
created expectations within the Church and underground that he
might be prepared to make other compromises. Such optimism has
accompanied previous conciliatory gestures by the regime. Most
attention has focused on Jaruzelski's proposal for a Consultative
Council that would advise him as head of the Council of State.
The initial proposal made by Jaruzelski at the Party Congress in
late June was vague about the rights or powers of such a council.?
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That ambiguity has persisted with regime spokesmen promising to
have all such details ironed out after establishment of the
Council.
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Church, Opposition Response
The regime's vagueness about the Council's roles has troubled.:
most independents, some of whom want such a Council to have a
veto power over government plans and actions while others just 25X1
seek assurances that the Council's deliberations will be
published in an uncensored form. Most are not prepared to
participate solely on the basis of governments promises. The
social stigma of being seen as collaborating with the regime is 25X1
very high, and man fear that the Council will turn out to be an
empty gesture. 25X1
The cautious optimism initially felt by some in the Church
25X1
nd opposition that the Council might be a "first step" has waned:,
'n the wake
of the regime's footdra in . 25X1
senior Church leaders, have 25X1
ome to ieve that the Council probably will have i e real
impact on the government's policies. They also believe that the 25X1
government has packed the Council with sufficient loyalists who
would be able to dominate the proceedings. 25X1
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The skepticism about the Council was more quickly 25X1
and deeply felt by Walesa and other Solidarity leaders who were
in agreement that without Solidarit representatives, the Council`
would not be of any significance. 25X1
The first session of the Council was held on 6 December, and
many prominent independents who had been approached by the regime.
did not show up. Nevertheless, several well-known critics have
joined the Council apparently persuaded by the belief that even 25X1
limited opportunities must be explored. At his regularly
scheduled press conference on 9 December, press spokesman Urban
seemed to confirm the skeptics' fears. He emphasized that the
Council would work toward consensus and gave no indication that
there would be full public disclosure of Council proceedings.
At best, the Council could become an advisory body capable of.
laying out before Jaruzelski alternate critical assessments on
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key issues. And, as such, it would become another unique Polish
institution because of its inclusion of some independent voices.
At worst, it could become yet another, mostly ceremonial, body
ic discussions that
t
er
meeting infrequently to carry on eso
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delight Polish intellectuals. In any case, Jaruzelski is free to.
accept or reject any advice and will seek to use the Council's
discussions in his maneuvering to implement his own political
agenda. 25X1
Some intellectuals, including such key individuals in the
Solidarity movement as Adam Michnik, have speculated that
Jaruzelski could be more flexible if he chose to be. But even
they probably do not believe that the party leader would, in
fact, seriously seek to break new ground. On some tactical
issues that do not affect the regime's control, the authorities
have displayed impressive finesse. But on issues that touch the
core of who is to,rule Poland, Jaruzelski is no more inclined to
compromise than other leaders in Eastern Europe. The Solidarity
era will long haunt the Polish Communists as an example of what
can happen if they start making significant political compromises:
to ensure domestic tranquility. 25X1
Alternatives Used Up
In its search for reconciliation, the regime has now used up
a number of options. The positive psychological impact created
by the most recent amnesty (the fourth since martial law) is
wearing off. For another amnesty, the regime would have to
re-arrest a number of senior opposition leaders which is hardly
the way to go about winning popular approval.
It is also unlikely that the government would float anytime
soon the idea of another council. If it cannot make the current
one work as a symbol of reconciliation, given the initial hopes,
other efforts along the same lines are not likely to be more
effective.
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The one option that probably would succeed in creating ,
toleration if not trust -- a higher standard of living -- is not
likely to materialize. The reason behind the regime's search for
reconciliation is that it needs society's patience for the
implementation of economic reforms and austerity measures.
Lacking confidence in the regime's policies, Polish workers
simply are not willing to work harder for little immediate gain.
Even if independent Polish intellectuals get their way with a
Consultative Council that can freely debate issues, this probably
will do little to placate workers. The sources of Poland's
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political and economic problems have been widely discussed. What
is missing are concrete, politically acceptable solutions that
will bring results. Workers know that debates won't put meat on
the table.
The Economy: Difficult Choices
The Jaruzeiski regime has not come to grips with Poland's
intractable economic problems. Gross National Product remains
below the 1979 peak level, living standards are still depressed,
and Poland's hard currency debt continues to grow.
Poland's economic problems are the focal issue in the
national debate. The Jaruzelski regime is unable to secure
improved economic performance without popular support for its
programs, yet popular support will prove elusive without first
some improvements in living conditions. Solidarity bases its
continued existence on the failure of the regime to solve
Poland's economic crisis or to expand workers' rights. The
regime, Polish workers, and opposition leaders have different
perspectives on the problem, so a consensus on solutions will be
hard to find.
The regime's primary goal is to maintain party control over
society while trying to solve Poland's current problems in a way
that will break the cycle of economic crisis and popular unrest.
Because of its fear of renewed worker unrest, the regime appears
reluctant to go through with the unpopular measures necessary to
balance the economy and rationalize resource allocation. For
example, real incomes and imports of Western consumer goods
continue to increase. Warsaw also has stated that it will not
allow living standards to decline to service its hard currency
debt.
Regional differences compound the normal welter of
bureaucratic claims on scarce resources. For Jaruzeiski, this
means it is exceedingly difficult to develop a coherent economic
strategy. Once plans have been formulated, they are subject to
numerous pressure points where they can be effectively derailed.
The economic reforms introduced in 1981, for example, have been
watered down, and are obstructed by party and government
bureaucrats who fear loss of their authority and perquisites.
Warsaw has also backed away from the, reform program in the area
of workers rights.
The opposition has made economic reform the most important
plank of its platform. Solidarity probably would lend its
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backing to wage controls and price reforms aimed at balancing 25X1
supply and demand on domestic markets only if the regime made
significant concessions in the area of workers rights.
Specifically, the opposition seeks the right to reestablish
independent trade unions and give workers greater input in
management. The new trade unions that were created after the
delegalization of Solidarity in 1982 are occasionally outspoken
on issues sensitive to workers and seemingly cause the
authorities some problems. However, the unions are not seen by
workers as genuine representatives of their views. Without some
guarantee of union pluralism -- which we do not expect --
Solidarity will continue to be critical of the reforms and cite
any austerity measures as further evidence of the regime's
inability to manage the economy. 25X1
The reform program has not gained acceptance among workers.
They resist change because they equate reform with wage controls,,
price hikes, and possible unemployment. Significant gains in
productivity and support for economic change will remain elusive
unless workers gain a greater say in national political decisions
and enterprise management. 25X1
Implications of Stalemate
It is widely assumed inside and outside of Poland that it is
only a matter of time until Polish workers once again take to the,
streets in defiance of the regime. We believe it highly unlikely'
that Polish workers will quietly put up with a long-term decline.-
in their standard of living or suffer, on a short-term basis, the
kinds of deprivation that Romanian workers are now forced to
disgruntlement that would indicate a near-term crisis. 25X1
o The Solidarity leadership under Walesa is neither willing
nor able to rally workers around a common cause. Although-
they disagree on some tactics, the moderates around Walesa
and the radicals around Bujak do not believe that they
could win in an outright confrontation with the regime.
o open activism in the factories still appears to be on the 25X1
decline. The regime's demonstration that it is. willing to
use force has had a chilling effect on enthusiasm for open
confrontation.
If a crisis does erupt it will most likely start as a result
of spontaneous worker reaction to an ill-considered regime
policy.
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o With the lessons learned from the Solidarity era -- and
several years of on-the-job training of the security
services -- the government will try not to show weakness
or indecision and will move swiftly to put down worker
disturbances.
o The primary danger to the regime is if the unrest is
sufficiently widespread to spread the security forces too
thin. This did not happen on the imposition of martial
law and has not come even close to happening since then.
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Whatever the source of future trouble we believe that finding
a peaceful resolution will be difficult and that there is likely
to be more bloodshed than during previous crises. Workers
learned as a result of martial law that they cannot trust the 25X1
regime and the authorities learned that it must be tough. Thus,
neither side will look to negotiated settlements. 25X1
Although the mainline Solidarity groups generally pursue a
non-provocative course, there are certain fringe elements which
have the regime worried. The relatively new Freedom and Peace
organization has attracted increasing support from alienated
youth with its opposition to military service. This, or a
similar group, is more likely to react vigorously to events and
could act as a catalyst for a larger confrontation. 25X1
Barring the worst, we expect over the next several years to
see a continuation of the three cornered contest between the
regime, Church and opposition in which the authorities hold most
of the cards. Tensions may increase, however, as problems mount..
Solidarity will remain a highly fragmented movement, preserving
its underground operations and stymied in its efforts to create
above ground structures. The authorities will continue trying to
whittle away at the underground but will avoid large scale
arrests of leaders as long as they remain relatively inactive.
The authorities are now using fines and other forms of harassment:
instead of imprisonment. Some in the opposition are likely to
chafe but the regime is ready to create "martyrs" to keep the lid
on opposition activity. :25X1
Tensions in Church-State relations, which have been on an
upswing over the past several years, will probably abate in the
run-up to the Papal visit in June 1987. That visit -- the third
by the Pope to his native country -- will attract millions and
arouse deep emotions but is unlikely to affect the course of
Polish developments. Afterwards, the authorities may even feel
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compelled to step up the pressure on the Church to demonstrate
who is the real boss. We do not expect any sharp turn in
relations, however. Any demonstrable crackdown on the Church
would very quickly escalate tensions to a scale that the regime
could not control. For its part, the Church will continue its
efforts to prevent an eruption of social tension. 25X1
On the economic front over the next few years, Poland's
limited resources must be divided between financing badly-needed .
industrial modernization, satisfying pent-up consumer demand, 25X1
servicing hard and soft currency debt, and funding spiralling
demand for social services. The current regime is unlikely to
allow a greater role for market forces in the economy or to
permit the creation of independent unions, suggestin that the
prospects for a reform-driven recovery are slight. 25X1
A more likely scenario for the Polish economy is one of
"muddling through" -- which appears to be the pattern of the last
three years. The regime is likely to continue to pay lip service.:
to economic reform but to implement only marginal changes.
Living standards will continue to stagnate, Poland's hard
currency debt will continue to grow, and key Polish industries
such as shipbuilding and steel will become more outmoded and less', 25X1
competitive leading to gradually closer integration with the
USSR. Without some improvement in such basic measures of living
standards as food and consumer goods supplies, housing, and
health care, worker frustrations will increase, heightening the
possibility of renewed unrest. 25X1
Poland is also unlikely to reap immediate gains from the
anticipated repeal of US economic sanctions. The Poles most
likely do not expect Washington to resume past lending levels and`.
Poland's poor creditworthiness will prevent a rapid renewal of
commercial bank loans. Poland also is unlikely to reap immediate.
benefits from the restoration of MFN because some Polish products
have lost markets in the US while poor quality makes many
products uncompetitive here. On the other hand, the financial 25X1
squeeze will prevent a quick rebound in US exports to Poland.
Warsaw may believe that the most immediate economic gains will be
indirect and will provide the catalyst for improved economic
relations with West European governments and commercial lenders
as well as a way to gain more favorable IMF consideration of
Polish loan requests. F____1 25X1
Moscow Stands By
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The Soviets seem relatively pleased with Jaruzelski. They
know they can count on him to support Soviet foreign policy
initiatives and approve of his success in reestablishing control.
They are keeping a watchful eye but as long as his efforts are
successful they are willing to give him a good deal of latitude
ut his problems.
question some of the Polish party leader's tinkering with
il
C
i
.
ounc
ve
political institutions, such as the Consultat
25X1
The USSR will seek to reduce its economic support for Poland
over the next few years, but in a crunch we believe that Soviet
concern for Polish stability will override economic 25X1
considerations. Moscow will probably press the Jaruzelski regime
to improve economic efficiency, quality, and cooperation with
Soviet enterprises, but would discourage any reform measures that
entailed free play for market forces or political liberalization.
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SUBJECT: Poland: National Reconciliation Remains an Elusive
Goal
External Distribution:
Mr. Robert Rackmales
Director, Office of Human Rights
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Room 7802
Department of State
Mr. Barry Lowenkron
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7316
Department of State
Mr. Richard Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311
Department of State
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Ambassador Jack Matlock
National Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old Executive Building
Ms. Paula Dobriansky
National Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old EOB
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
Department of State
Mr. Robert Baraz 4
Director of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
Department of State
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Mr. Charles Smith
Chief, East Europe Division, INR
Room 4750
Department of State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327
Department of State
Mr. Martin Wenick
Director of Eastern European Affairs
Room 5220
Department of State
Mr. John Evans
Deputy Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
Mr. Thomas W. Simons
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
Mr. William H. Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Room 7240
Department of State
Colonel Tyrus Cobb
Staff Member, National Security Council
Room 373
Old EOB
Mr. Harvey Shapiro
Deputy Director, Office of East-West
Trade Policy
Room 4450
Department of Treasury
Mr. Frank Vargo
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Room 3865
Herbert Hoover Bldg
Department of Commerce
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Or . WYnfred
for Joshua
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Mr. Dar
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Mr.
James Morrison
Room 1D469f Re9io a1
The Pentagon
Policy DASD/70
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Room D.
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The 96 Staff Y. J_5
Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Poland: National Reconciliation Remains an Elusive
Goal
Internal Distribution:
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D/EURA
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zuxA rono
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Authors
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