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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000504920001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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~encc envy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
February 1986
The New CPSU Program: Charting the Soviet Future
Suwwa ry
The new CPSU program and statute--approved in
draft at the October plenum and scheduled to be adopted
in final form at the 27th Congress later this month--
provide unique insights into the Gorbachev regime's
vision of the future and its strategy for getting
there. Mhile offering few specifics in wany areas, the
program nonetheless establishes general parameters for
future programs? it fectively opens up new options to
Gorbachev.
This is only the third tune since its founding in
1903 that the party has concomitantly rewritten its
fundamental guiding docuwents. The last wa3or
revisions occurred in 1961 under Khrushchev.
-- Although often couched in vague terms, the
prograw is the party leadership's wort
comprehensive statement of its long-terw
ob3ectives in key areas of dowestic and foreign
policy.
-- The statute sets out the rules for the party's
organization and operation that will define the
levers of porter available bachev in
running the party.
Thi s paper was prepared by
a contribution from SOVA ana yst
directed to the out ho r ~
h Office of Soviet Analysis, with
Comments and questions may be
or to the Chief, Domestic Policy Davison,
SOVA M- 86-20012
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while the new program bears 6orbachev's
unmistakable imprint, particularly on economic policy,
it also contains indications that he is running into
conservative opposition on certain issues. In many
parts of the draft different points of view appear to
have been intentionally papered over with ambiguous
language. The continued influence of conservative
elements in the party is evident in the failure of the
program and statute to reflect Gorbachev 's views on
several controversial issues, such as limiting the
tenure in office of party officials and expanding
public participation in decisionmaking. There are
tentative signs that "second" Secretary Yegor Ligachev
supported the conservative position on some of these
i ssuac _
i
ng s strategic position.
preserving and, as in the past, even
enhanci th
The new program presents an image of a party
leadership that sees strengthening the country's
economic base as related to foreign policy
considerations. It gives higher priority to domestic
issues than the 1961 program, and suggests that Soviet
influence abroad is directly dependent upon the
country's economic strength and its ability to provide
an attractive model for developing countries. At the
same tiwe, the program provides no evidence of a
retreat from current foreign commitments. It presents
the achievement of strategic parity with the United
States as a "historic" accomplishment on which there
can be no compromise. It suggests that the Gorbachev
regime sees negotiations with the United States as
useful in
p ~c policies in the years ahead.
ec
the door tops wide rangeoofaoptions bysremoving somes
ideological barriers to reform and calling for a
thorough reassessment of the policies inherited from
the Brezhnev era. The program's flexible language on
both domestic and foreign policy appears to have been
crafted to give the regime broad latitude as it hammers
out more s ecif'
The new program paints a more sober view of Soviet
prospects for the future, both at home and abroad. It
discards the 1961 program's predictions that the
present generation would see the Soviet Union surpass
the capitalist world's standard of living and witness
major successes in the global advance of "communism.'
Instead, it features a more pragmatic view e
domestic and international situation.
Although the program sakes clear that new policies
are needed to get the country moving again, it does not
provide a s
ifi
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The 1981 decision to subwit a new prograw to the
27th Congress forced Gorbachev to cove up with a draft
before he could fully develop his own blueprint for the
future or force a resolution of soave controversial
issues. Because he was confronted with a largely
finished document upon assuming power, his redrafting
efforts appear to have been focused on softening
language which could potentionally constrain his
freedom of action. Its flexible forwulations are
likely to spur intense debate over the future direction
of Soviet
oli
p
cy, not end it.
Discussion of the prograw and the statute will
continue at the party congress, and it is likely that
Gorbachev Mill attempt to take this opportunity to ^ake
the docuwents wore to his liking. Nhile changes in the
program at the congress should give soave indication of
the direction the party is heading, want' of the
controversial issues it raises Mill be resolved only in
the years ahead as the new leadership thrashes out its
response to th
d
e
omestic and international challenges
that Mere left unans
d
were
by the Brezhnev regiwe.
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Highlights of the Part Program and Statute
(Apparently Controversial Issues are Underlined)
Overall
Communism "ultimate" goal
of party, to be achieved
in distant future.
No specific economic
comparisons to the
United States.
Features domestic
policy, dealing with it
before foreign policy.
Domestic Policy
Sanctions continued role
for private agr~cu ture.
Calls for makin "fuller"
use of commo ~t -mone
re ations, opening the door
to expansion of the market.
No limit on tenure in
office of party off cials
in draft, but campai n under
way to restore to statute.
Promises "practically"
every family an apartment
by 2000.
Calls for "stren thenin
t e state.
Abundance of Communism
"immediate" goal of party
to be achieved by 1980.
USSR will surpass the United
States in key economic
indicators by 1970.
Deals with foreign policy
before domestic matters.
1961
Calls for elimination of
private sector in agricul-
ture.
Calls for eliminating role
of commodity-money
relations from the economy.
Provision limiting tenure
of all party officials
(dropped after overthrow of
Khrushchev).
Promises every family
"comfortable" apartment
by 1980.
Calls for "withering away
of the state."
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Specifically points out
the party's leading role
in formulating strategic
and defense policy.
Refers more generally to
party's leadership of military.
Foreign Policy
Recognizes that the capitalist
world is still strop .
Sees three compete ng
centers of capitalism:
the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan.
Allows limited diversit
n internal develo ment of
b oc countries.
Stresses im ortance of the
experience of al socia ist
countries.
Emphasizes need for Third
World countries to
deve op wit meted
_Soviet financial support.
Predicts capitalist world
undergoing serious crisis
and "ripe" for revolution.
Views West as more monolithic.
Calls for East European
countries to have "uniform"
political and economic
systems.
Stresses importance of
Soviet experience.
Stresses "internationalist
duty" to aid development
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Preface
This memorandum is based primarily on the drafts of the CPSU
program and statute and the 19~t documents they replace.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Summary .............................................. i
Preface .............................................vi
Gorbachev's Imprint ...................................3
A Sober Document ......................................3
A License for Change ..................................6
The Domestic Agenda ...................................8
Economic Policy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,~~...~...~.......,,,,10
Social Policy .....................................13
The Political System .....................x...,,,,,14
Defense Policy ....................................18
Foreign Policy .......................................19
East West Relations ...............................20
Soviet Bloc .......................................22
International Communism,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,23
Third World .......................................25
Political Implications,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,26
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The New CPSU Pro ram: Chartin
the Soviet uture
The new Soviet party program, approved in draft by the
Central Committee's October plenum for presentation to the 27th
CPSU Congress that opens 25 February, is the Gorbachev regime's
most comprehensive and authoritative statement of overall goals
and strategy. The language it enshrines as party doctrine is the
result of long and often difficult negotiations and deb to
directly involving the top party leadership.
The need to revise and update the last party program,
approved under Nikita Khrushchev in 1961, provided the impetus
for the new draft. Khrushchev's projections of a life of
abundance for the present generation of Soviet citizens and the
rapid expansion of communism throughout the world were soon
recognized by his successors as unrealistic and naive. Although
some of its assertions were repudiated at the 23rd CPSU Congress
in 1966, it was allowed to sit on the shelf untouched until 1981,
when Brezhnev told the 26th CPSU Congress that it should be
Officially, the new program is a revision of the Khrushchev
program. (See Box) In fact, however, it has been largely
rewritten. While it retains the same ultimate goals of Soviet
foreign and domestic policy--the worldwide victory of communism
and a life of material abundance for Soviet citizens--the pro ram
refl t
ec
revised to reflect current realities.
s a ma3or rethinking of how they are to be achieved.
Gorbachev's Imprint
Gorbachev appears to have inherited a nearly completed draft
from Chernenko and had it rewritten to reflect his own agenda.
In April 1984 Chernenko stated that "substantial work" had been
done on the revision, and before his death in March 1985 Embassy
sources reported that a draft was nearing completion and would be
.. .,t ,.~.._~ _~__~,__
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CPSU PROGRAMS
Since the founding of the party in 1903, the program has
been the most fundamental statement of party policies. It serves
both propaganda and policy functions. As the leadership's vision
of the future, it is intended to mobilize the rank-and-file and
non-party members in support of the party's goals. At the same
time, it lays down parameters governing practical policy
decisions.
1ST PROGRAM 1903
Objective: Overthrow the tsar.
Result: Fulfilled with 1917 October Revolution.
2ND PROGRAM 1919
Objective: Creation of a socialist society.
Result: Fulfilled when Stalin declared that the Soviet
Union reached stage of socialism in 1936.
3RD PROGRAM 1961
Objectives: Surpass United States in per capita production by
1970. Creation of foundations of communism by 1980
with abundance of material and cultural wealth for
all.
Workweek of 34-36 hours by 1910.
"Comfortable" apartment for every family by 1980.
Result: Goals still unfulfilled.
NEW EDITION OF 3RD PROGRAM 1986
Objectives: Prepare way for eventual transition to abundance of
communism.
Apartment for "practically every" family by 2000.
Double national income by 2000.
More than double labor productivity by 2000.
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Once Gorbachev became party leader, however, the release of
the program was delayed:
Gorbachev mandated changes in a finished draft of the
-- The draft finally published on 24 October 1985 made
evident that major last minute changes were made to
reflect the policies outlined by Gorbachev at the April
party plenum and the June conference on science and
technology.
stated in
ovem er a e saw severa versions of the program
While Gorbachev clearly won some key points as part of his
redrafting process, there is evidence that he had to compromise
on some issues. In many places the party's new guiding document
provides only a dim outline of future direction:
-- The program has a number of internal inconsistencies (see
sections on the political system and foreign policy) that
suggest passages were put in to please specific interest
groups.
-- While it takes a clear stand on some controversial issues,
it sidesteps others that continue to be hotly debated.
-- While the program reflects Gorbachev's views on many
issues, it is not consistent with positions he has
publicly advocated on others.
-- Gorbachev and second Secretary Ligachev have publicl
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A Sober Document
Viewed in the light of the document it replaces, the new
program presents a sobering picture of Soviet reality. The 1961
program of Khrushchev made wildly unrealistic projections of a
life of abundance for the present generation of Soviet citizens
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Drafting the New Party Program
The task of revising the program was entrusted to a
commission of Central Committee members headed by the General
Secretary that drew upon a wide range of expertise. The
commission was formed under Brezhnev and composed of the
Politburo, Secretariat, and about two dozen other Central
Committee members, including:
Viktor Afanasyev Editor of PRAVDA
Nikolay Baybakov
Petr Fedoseyev
Boris Gostev
Richard Kosolapov
Georgiy Markov
Oleg Rakhmanin
Stepan Shalayev
Boris Stukalin
Aleksandr Vlasov
Vadim Zagladin
International Department
Head of Gosplan (1965-85)
Vice President of the Academy of Sciences
First deputy head of CPSU Economics
Department (1983-85)
Editor of KOMMUNIST
Head of the USSR Writers Union
First Deputy Chief of CPSU Bloc
Relations Department
Soviet Trade Union head
Head of the CPSU Propaganda
Department (1982-85)
First Secretary of Rostov (1984-86)
First Deputy Chief of the CPSU
The program commission set up working groups of specialists
to provide input on specific topics. Other specialists submitted
written suggestions to the commission. Although only two
meetings of the commission were publicly reported, Ligachev
stated ^in~~awNovember 1985 KOMMUNIST article that it had met on
The party leadership did not publicly turn its attention to
the revision until after Brezhnev's death in November 1982:
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-- The first major discussion of the program was at the June
1983 plenum.
-- The first reported meeting of the program commission took
place under Chernenko's chairmanship in April 1984.
-- The Politburo discussed the program at an August 1984
meeting and decided to revise the party statute as well.
Gorbachev first became publicly involved with the program on
the eve of his elevation to General Secretary, when he discussed
many of its provisions in the keynote address to a major party
conference on ideology in December 1984. After becoming party
leader, he was appointed head of the program commission and
delivered the report on the program and statue to the October
1985 plenum, which approved the drafts.
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and the rapid expansion of communist influence throughout the
world. Reflecting the economic downturn of the Brezhnev era and
slower than expected progress on the international scene, the new
program scales back considerably the 1961 goals and makes clear
that even these will be achieved only through a reexamination of
current policies. While it continues to promise a workers'
paradise, it provides no timetable and acknowledges that major
mistakes by past leaders have retarded domestic development and
reduced Soviet influence abroad. The program makes clear that
Gorbachev intends to rectify these errors, but it is evident that
th
i
e reg
me remains uncertain how to accomplish this goal.
A License for Chan e
Although the program provides no clear blueprint for the
future, it opens a wider range of options to the leadership by
removing some important ideological constraints to fundamental
policy changes. (See Box) It encourages innovation, by
characterizing "the creative development" of Marxism-Leninism as
the party's "most important obligation." Using language similar
to that used by Gorbachev at an important December 1984
conference on ideology, it calls for "the rivalry of ideas and
avenues of science, and fruitful debates and discussions."
The most fundamental ideological change in the program is a
provision deferring communism to the distant future. While the
1961 program described the achievement of communism--a time of
material abundance for all--as an "immediate" task that would be
accomplished by 1980, the new aroaram calls it only the "ultimate
oal" of
t
g
par
y policy.
This shift has important practical implications. Marxist-
Leninist doctrine calls for elimination under communism of
private ownership of production, material differences among the
population, and the market. By deferring the timing of
communism, the new leadership's ability to explore such
unorthodox economic options--actively promoted by some Soviet
econ
i
t
om
s
s--is enhanced.
The new program further prepares the groundwork for
innovation by adding language that will make it easier for the
leadership to discard ineffective policies. It states that
economic and societal problems, so called "contradictions" in
Soviet lexicon, must be carefully studied and "promptly"
resolved. It characterizes measures to remove such
contradictions as ssary and positive force in domestic
development.
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IDEOLOGY AND POLICY
Soviet policymakers, even Stalin, have always been careful
to have their actions solidly grounded in party theory.
Throughout Soviet history fundamental changes in domestic and
foreign policy have gone hand and hand with corresponding
ideological adjustments.
-- Stalin's thesis that class struggle does not diminish, but
intensifies, under socialism paved the way for the purges
which took place under the guise of rooting out class
enemies.
-- Khrushchev's thesis that the "dictatorship of the
proletariat" had been replaced by a "state of the whole
people" provided the theoretical justification for ending
the repressive measures of the Stalin period.
-- Brezhnev's rejection of Khrushchev's thesis that communism
would be achieved soon and substitution of the formula
that socialism will last a long time, helped to justif
the re ime's failure to rovide y
P promised consumer goods.
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The language on "contradictions" is a partial victory for
Soviet reformers. The 1980-81 Polish crisis sparked a sharp
debate in the party, in which advocates of change warned of the
danger of similar unrest in the Soviet Union unless the
leadership addressed popular concerns and implemented domestic
reforms. Specialists at the leading Soviet institute on East
Europe took the lead in advancing this view in the Soviet
press. Their opponents, led by KOMMUNIST chief editor Richard
Kosolapov, argued that Soviet society is too advanced for a
Polish-ty a crisi nd that fundamental policy changes are not
needed.
The program also suggests a new willingness to reassess past
policies by its indirect, but unmistakable criticism of Stalin,
Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Without naming them, it criticizes the
"personality cult" of Stalin, the "subjectivism and voluntarism"
of Khrushchev, and Brezhnev's failure to address growing economic
problems.
-- Although the criticism of Breehnev is in Zine with remarks
bb Andropov and Gorbachev, it is still controversial; a
recent letter in IZVESTIYA suggested that this passage be
dropped.
-- The program further distances the party from the policies
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his regime.
The Domestic Agenda
The Gorbachev program makes clear that revitalizing the
domestic economy is the regime's top priority:
-- The sections on foreign and domestic policy are reversed
from 1961, with the latter now coming first.
-- The domestic policy sections have undergone more
fundamental revision than those on foreign policy.l
-- The foreign policy section opens with the pronouncement
that-the main goal of the USSR in the international sphere
is to "ensure favorable conditions" for domestic
development.
that the changing wor situation~mad~e ~ ess imperative to
snel 1 out dpta;7 ~ .-f f,,..e;,.., .._, _ ___
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PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PROGRAM AND STATUTE
A broad public discussion is now taking place at party
meetings and in the Soviet press of the drafts of the party
program and statute. A similar procedure was used to discuss the
1961 program and other major Soviet documents, such as the 1971
Constitution and recent five year plans. The leaderships use
such discussions to examine various policy options, to guage
public opinion, and allow the population to let off steam. Based
on past experience only a few of the thousands of ideas aired
during the public discussion will be incorporated into the final
versions of the program and statute adopted at the party
cnnaraee
The public discussion provides a unique insight into the
concerns of the Soviet population as well as policy options now
under debate. Proposals with broader policy significance are
discussed in the appropriate sections of this memorandum. Other
ideas aired in the discussion include:
-- A letter by a Soviet general in the army paper called for
adding language to the program pledging to supply the
armed forces with "all the modern means necessary" for the
country s defense.
-- A number of letters have suggested changes in the statute
that would make party members directly responsible for the
actions of candidates they recommend for party membership.
-- Various proposals have been made to raise or lower the age
of admission for party members and to increase the
accountability of party officials.
-- A letter in PRAVDA from a member of a small national group
proposed abolishing nationality quotas at institutes of
higher education and replacing the current system of
republic passports with a single system for the entire
country.
-- A philologist proposed making Russian the official
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-- The revival of the Leninist formula that socialism will
influence the world not through force of arms, but by
force of example--an idea that fell into disuse under
Brezhnev--reflects an apparent appreciation that the
Soviet Union will not be an attractive model as long as
capitalist countries do a Bette 'ob providing for their
citizens' wellbeing.
Economic Policy
Gorbachev was successful in getting his way on economic
issues--the heart of the new program. These sections of the 1961
program have been completely rewritten and his imprint is clearly
evident. Soviet nffi~;~l~ +..,a
part of the pro ram received the mos a ention in the draftings
process_
The only specific economic measures spelled out in the new
program were previously set out by Gorbachev in his speeches:
-- Decentralizing economic management by increasing the
financial autonomy of enterprises.
-- Reorganizing the ministries to shift their role toward
long-term strategic planning and reducing their staff.
-- Accelerating the introduction of advances in science and
technology.
-- Increasing the role of machine building in revitalizing
the economy.
-- Increasing reliance on "human factors"--more effective
management, improved discipline, and reduced corruption--
to boost
rod
ti
p
uc
on.
While the program makes a strong rhetorical commitment to
the Soviet consumer, it is short on specifics:
-- It qualifies the 1961 promise that communism will "fully
satisfy" the needs of the people to the more modest pledge
to satisfy only "sensible needs."
-- It says that "practically every" family will have a house
or apartment by 2000. This is a step back from the 1961
program which predicted that every family would have a
"comfortable" apartment by 1980. An article in KOMMUNIST
proposed that the language in the new draft be changed to
guarantee "each family comfortable housing" with more
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The program also unveiled the economic goals that were set
out in greater detail in the draft five year plan and guidelines
to the year 2000 published in November. These extremely
ambitious goals (see box on CPSU programs) were set at
Gorbachev's personal urging--he stated in a speech last May that
the growth rate of national income should be boosted from 3
percent to a minimum of 4 percent (the program set it at 4.7
percent). As a whole economic goals are formulated in more
general terms than in the 1961 program, and specific targets for
sectors of the economy have been dropped.
-- It is surprising that they are included in the program at
att in view of the embarrassment of Khrushchev's
unfulfilled goats and the criticism Soviet officiate have
directed at his program for setting specific targets.
Their inclusion means that the program ma a sin require
revision at the end of the mittennium. 25X1
The economic sections of the program provide few details on
future policy that go beyond the agenda already set forth in
public by Gorbachev, suggesting that long-term strategy is still
being worked out and may yet be under dispute. The most
significant development may be several doctrinal changes that
will make it more difficult for conservatives to ex loit the
program as a barrier to economic reform: 25X1
Role of the Market. The program leaves the door open to
expanding the role of the market should the leadership decide to
move in that direction. Indeed, Gorbachev's May 1985 speech in
Leningrad, suggests that he favors a policy of allowing greater
private initiative in the service sector. The program calls for
the economy to make "fuller" use of commodity-money relations and
economic levers. In a December KOMMUNIST article, a Soviet
economist described this as the most im ortant passage on
domestic policy in the program. 25X1
The term commodity-money relations is vague and has been
used by Soviets to denote the use of economic variables such as
prices, credit, profits, sales, and profitability to better
im lement central ns. Although some Soviet officials stated
that the formulation in the program 25X1
ores a owe an expansion of the "market," it is not clear that
they had in mind decentralized price setting and resource
allocation based on supply and demand considerations. 25X1
The role of market forces in the Soviet economy is highly
controversial, and any significant movement to rely on them is
problematical. The widely divergent views espoused by Soviet
officials on the proper role of the market indicate that no
policy has yet been worked out. Kosolapov, for example, takes a
narrow approach, arguing that the market is not a "natural part"
of the Soviet economy and that the expansion of commodity-money
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relations should not be viewed as a "panacea" for all disorders
in the economy. Others, such as reform economist P. G. Bunich,
have been pressing for an even stronger endorsement of commodity-
money relations in the nrnnr~m
The formulation in the program on commodity-money relations
hews closely to Gorbachev's language at the December 1984
ideology conference, where he called for making "better" use of
commodity-money relations and increasing reliance on economic
levers such as "price, production costs, profit, and credit."
Gorbachev s remarks were controversial, and other speakers at the
conference argued for a more restrictive definition of the role
of commodity-money relations in the economy.
Despite his rhetorical tilt toward the view of reformers,
Gorbachev has not challenged the legitimacy of centralized
control over price setting and resource allocation. His focus on
general themes rather than specific measures that could galvanize
opposition may reflect an intent to encourage public debate on
controversial issues until he has consolidated his political
strength and has the necessary support to implement more far-
reaching measures. Since the December conference commodity-money
relations have been the subject of continuing debate in the
$AV~Pt nroec
The Private Sector. The program appears to give a strong
guarantee that private agriculture will continue to play an
important role in the Soviet economy in the foreseeable future.
These changes in the program also undermine some conservative
arguments against the private sector. The new program:
-- Drops language in the 1961 program calling for the
eventual elimination of private agriculture.
-- Adds an implicit endorsement of private agriculture, by
crediting individual private plots with supplementing food
resources.
-- Gives a new explicit guarantee of the continuing role for
kolkhoz markets, where individuals can sell privately
produced foodstuffs at prices determined by supply and
demand.
-- Leaves the door open to private enterprise by specifying
only that the "basic means" of production must be owned
socially--a ualific ion not present i
h
program.
n t
e 1961
25X1
Soviet officials
ev
d
25X1
en a
vocates for the pr va a sector, did not nterpret these
changes to mean there would be an expansion of private 25X1
enter
i
pr
se. They suggested instead that consumer services and
1?
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other small businesses might be operated by cooperatives or small
brigades in order to stimulate individual initiative, without
expanding private ownership per se.
-- In one such experiment in Estonia, described in an August
IZVESTIYA article, a group of workers repairs home
tetevision seta, working with apace and equipment rented
from a state enterprise and keeps a portion of the
profits. The party program gives a strong endorsement to
this type of economic activit calting it an "effective
//18an8" Of dPVo_1 nn~ ~,., mot,., __ _~~~_ _
Social Policy
The program charts a relatively low-key, pragmatic course on
social policy. It sidesteps key issues in this sphere,
suggesting that the Gorbachev regime has not yet worked out its
policies:
-- The program and statute do not reflect the current
campaign against alcoholism. Letters in the press have
called for adding provisions punishing party members for
drunkenness.
At the same time, the program shows greater deference to the
persistence of societal groups' differing interests than was
evident in the 1961 program, and it is less optimistic about
Soviet progress toward a homogeneous society:
-- Despite tentative signs of a thawing of cultural policy,
this section of the program is lifted practically verbatim
from the 1961 program, retaining the conservative stress
on the need for "partymindedness" (partiynost). 25X1
While continuing to press assimilation, it is more
flexible on nationality issues and shows greater
toleration of cultural differences. It avoids calling for
the "merging" of nations--a controversial term that came
back into use under Andropov--and defers the "complete
unity" of Soviet nations to the "remote historical
future."
Exhibiting a new sensitivity to workers' attitudes that
developed as a result of the 1980-81 Polish crisis, it
calls for a more active role for trade unions in
protecting workers' rights than the 1961 program--which
emphasized the unions' role in boosting production.
Echoing a theme that has been publicly raised by
Gorbachev, it places greater emphasis on the role of women
than the 1961 program, calling for the party to "more
actively nominate women for leadership work."
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-- Reflecting the Soviet leadership's concern in recent years
to strengthen the family as a pillar of social stability,
the new program places greater emphasis on the importance
of the nuclear family than the 1961 program--which
stressed the communal upbringing of children.
The Political System
The program provides evidence of persisting differences
within the regime over the desirability of opening up the system
to broader participation by Soviet citizens. Gorbachev's public
remarks at the December ideology conference suggest that he
favored stronger language promoting participation in the
political process than was contained in the program and party
+~+~~+e
Reform-minded Soviet academics argue that expanding popular
input into decisionmaking is necessary to overcome public apathy
and to make economic reforms effective. In a November 1985
meeting with U.S. officials, Anatoliy Butenko, a department head
at the leading Soviet institute on East Europe, stressed the link
between improving economic performance and expanding public
participation. Some of the specific measures he and others have
advocated include: giving workers expanded rights in running
enterprises, such as electing managers (a measure Kosolapov told
a US official was considered by the drafting commission); giving
individual enterprises broad autonomy in decisionmaking; allowing
local areas to decide issues by referendum; allowing greater
freedom in public discussions; making information on sensitive
issues more available; and making the party and state election
processes more responsive to the electorate. Opponents, like
Kosolapov, fear that such changes could get out of hand and
undermine political stability. Pointing to the examples of
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-81,
Kosolapov and other conservatives argue instead for strengthening
e*~to ~...,+....i
This disagreement surfaced during the drafting of the
program:
-- In October 1984, Kosolapov stated that disagreements in
the commission over this issue had brought its work "to a
stop."
-- There are inconsistencies in the program's treatment of
this subject: While the program's theoretical
formulations appear to discourage expanding public
participation, several recommendations go in the opposite
direction.
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-- The sharpest differences aired in public by the leadership
in 1961 were over this issue, and debate over them has
persisted in the Soviet press.
The program makes a nod toward expanding public particiation
by calling for increasing the role of local soviets (governing
councils), broadening public discussion of issues, calling for a
more open information policy, and holding national referendums on
major issues. It does not, however, contain more far-reaching
measures advocated by reformers. Conservatives, moreover, appear
to have scored by removing language from the program calling for
the "withering away of the state" and replacing it with a call
for "strengthening" state institutions.
-- In an October 1984 interviera, Kosotapov criticised
theories of the dectine of the state as "utopian," and
using language almost identical to that in the Hera
program, stated that although the state raiZZ become
"apotiticat", the need for a "scientific, conscious center
of management" raouZd continue to exist.
-- Ligachev appeared to associate himself raith this viers in a
November KOMMUNIST article rahich argued that setf-
government can onty be achieved through the state, thus
rejecting in stronger language than the program the idea
that the state mitt rive up poser to organs of aetf-
i.n~twrr-.wr 1
Gorbachev may have preferred a stronger endorsement of
expanding public participation in the program:
-- At the December 1984 ideology conference, he criticized
unnamed officials for arguing that practical measures
expanding public participation should be put off until the
distant future.
-- He called for expanding political participation in
stronger terms than the new draft program at the October
plenum where it was approved.
-- Since he became party leader, top government officials
have begun to be exposed to public scrutiny by answering
u
ti
h
q
es
ons p
oned in by citizens on live television.
Revitalizing the Party. Changes in the party statute--approved
at the October plenum along with the program and published three
weeks later--appear to be aimed at restoring the credibility of
the party leadership. (See Box) Soviet historian Roy Medvedev,
one of the Embassy's regular sources, claims that the changes in
the statute are of greater political consequence than those in
the program. The major proposed changes include:
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The Party Statute
The statute is the party's basic document outlining its
organizational structure and, operating procedures. Since the
first statute was adopted in 1903, it has been revised 16
times. The rules currently in force were adopted with the party
program in 1961, but were amended at the 23rd Congress in 1966
and the 24th Congress in 1971. A decision to revise the statute
in conjunction with the program was taken at an August 1984
Politburo meeting, and a commission was appointed to oversee the
~~~~e~~
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-- Party members are given expanded rights of criticism.
Under the new provisions they would be able to now
criticize any party organization, even those to which they
do not belong.
-- Party members' immunity before the law is eliminated by a
new provision holding them responsible for criminal
charges before the party and the judicial system.
According to Medvedev, until now party members could not
face criminal charges unless they were first expelled from
the party.
-- It appears to give the central party leadership greater
leeway in overseeing the work of party and government
organizations.
Despite this initial setback for Gorbachev, an effort is
being mounted to have such provisions added to the rules before
they are adopted at the congress. Proposals to strictly limit
tenure in office have been the prominently featured in the
officially sanctioned "debate" of the draft statute. Two
successive issues of the leading party journal KOMMUNIST have
carried letters calling for such measures:
-- Many of these call for limiting the tenure of party
officials to two or three consecutive terms.
-- One said that the decision of the 23rd Congress on this
subject needs to be reconsidered.
-- Another calls for placing age limits on party officials.
ongress following Khrushchev's ouster.
Gorbachev may have run into resistance in an effort to
include more radical measures in the statute to facilitate the
replacement of ineffective leaders and prevent the formation of
local party fiefdoms that occurred under Brezhnev. Medvedev
maintains that Gorbachev initially sought provisions to limit the
tenure of party officials, but that he backed off due to the
strength of the opposition. The draft statute contains only a
vague reference to the need for "systematic renewal" of cadres.
Tough provisions in the 1961 statute limiting terms of office of
all party officials, including the Politburo, were strongly
Opposed by the party rank-and-file and rescinded at the 23rd
scuss~on at party meetings.
-- It contains stronger language calling for public reporting
on internal party business and encourages more open
di
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I I
Ligachev appears to be trying to hold the line against such
pressures. He supported eliminating the requirement that
officials be elected by secret ballot in the smallest party
organizations in his November KOMMUNIST article and suggested
tha~s should also be done in larger party organizations. ~
e y secret ballot.
The discussion of the statute also reveals that there is
pressure for changes in party voting procedures that would make
it easier for the rank-and-file to hold leaders to account:
-- A letter in a major Soviet daily claimed that secret
voting is now a sham since party members must cross names
off a list in public view in order to vote against a
candidate and that as a result "far from everyone" who
would like to cast a negative vote does. It calls for new
procedures to make voting more secret, such as requiring
ballots to be marked in a booth.
-- A letter in KOMMUNIST went further, suggesting that
multiple candidates run for party posts and that winners
be decid d b
This shift may be intended to define civilian influence in
areas where military questions have taken on increased political
significance. One Central Committee member explained the change
to a US official by pointing out that advances in weaponry over
the past 25 years have made military doctrine less a question of
military maneuvers and ex rtise and more one of foreign policy
and politics.
There is also some tentative evidence that civilians are
playing a larger role in shaping national security doctrine:
-- Civilian specialists have been playing a more prominent
role in articulating Soviet strategic policy for foreign
audiences.
e ense policy.
Defense Policy
While the 1961 and the current version of the program both
stress the party's leadership of the military, the new program
places additional emphasis on the party's role in formulating
military policy. A passage has been added that specifically
points to the leading role of the party in formulating military
doctrine and strategic and d f
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Changes in doctrinal formulations in the draft program also
suggest that the emphasis on party direction of defense policy
reflects an increased sensitivity in the leadership to the
foreign policy implications of military doctrine. Portions of
the program essentially emphasize positions that were articulated
by Brezhnev beginning in a landmark speech at Tula in January
1977.
-- It presents the achievement of "strategic parity" with the
United States as an "historic" accomplishment which must
be preserved.
-- The 1961 program bluntly stated that in a world war
imperialism would be "buried." The language in the new
willrbe 'neitherhvictors norlvanquished?iin ahnuclearewar
-- It reaffirms the idea--introduced into Soviet military
doctrine by Khrushchev--that nuclear war is not
incvit~l.l..
Foreign Policy
The new program's scaled-down expectations on the
international scene are a further indication of the Gorbachev
regime's focus on its domestic agenda. It is more cautious about
the advance of communism--and more respectful of the strength of
the capitalist world--than the Khrushchev-inspired document it
replaces. At the same time, the program contains no hint that
the Soviet Union will pull back from its international
commitments.
-- In a speech to the Turkmen republic congress First Deputy
Head of the CPSU International Department Zagladin
directly linked Soviet economic strength to Moscow's
success in managing relations with the United States. He
claimed that one of the reasons for the failure of detente
in the late 1970's was that domestic economic difficul
created an i ssion of Soviet weakness in the West.
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I I
The international affairs sections of the program, just as
the domestic portions, show the effects of an attempt to balance
divergent views. The program opens with an indictment of
"imperialism" and an orthodox Leninist interpretation of
international developments that should please party
conservatives. Later sections, in contrast, spell out current
li
po
cies in practical terms that are devoid of harsh rhetoric.
As a whole, the foreign policy sections of the program are
considerably less detailed than in 1961. As in domestic affairs
the Gorbachev regime appears to be keeping its options open.
East-West Relations
The new program reflects the growing role of arms control
and trade in the Soviet view of the East-West relationship.
While it emphasizes the importance of relations with the United
States, it appears to be more optimistic about the prospects for
improving ties with Western Europe. Specifically, the language
in the new draft is supportive of Gorbachev's efforts to re-
engage the West in direct diplomacy, and it bears little trace of
the rhetoric of confrontation that Andropov was proposing only
three years ago:
-- In his speech to the June 1983 party plenum, Andropov said
that the program should contain language reflecting the
"unprecedented sharpening of the struggle between the two
"
world systems.
In contrast, the program avoids harsh rhetoric and focuses
instead on resolving specific bilateral issues.
-- Arms control is given high priority. Compared to the
general formulations contained in most of the program,
Soviet arms control negotiating positions are spelled out
in detail.
-- An expansion of East-West trade is endorsed. At the same
time, the draft reflects the impact of U.S. embargoes and
international economic instability over the last decade,
calling for steps to make the Soviet economy independent
from the West in "strategically important" areas and
immune from the effects of crises. 25X1
The program endorses the expanded efforts Moscow has been
devoting to using public opinion and political movements in the
West as a means of influencing Western governments. It contains
a new recognition that "mass democratic movements" are an
important "progressive" force in capitalist countries. 25X1
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The relatively sober attitude toward competition with the
West is evidently based on a new appreciation of the strength of
the capitalist system.
-- The program discards the 1961 assertion that the West is
nearing collapse and concludes that capitalism is still
"strong and dangerous."
-- The 1961 program contained a detailed exegesis on the
decline of capitalism, describing it as a "rotting and
dying" system "ripe" for revolution and calling this the
"age of downfall of imperialism." The new program drops
much of this language and merely says that the crisis of
capitalism is "deepening" s a system which is
"historically doomed."
This change appears to be controversial:
-- First Deputy head of the CPSU International Department
Vadim Zagladin complained in a 1984 article that "some
Marxist scientists" incorrectly argue that the crisis of
capitalism has entered a more acute stage.
-- A KOMMUNIST editorial published after the draft program
was released described the crisis of capitalism in more
dire terms than the program.
The program leaves no doubt that Soviet diplomacy will
increasingly feature differentiated policies toward the Western
powers. It underscores the multi polarity of the West by
introducing a new formulation calling attention to three main
competing centers of capitalism: the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan. It also predicts that new centers of economic
and political rivalry will develop in the Pacific and in Latin
America.
-- The importance of the United States to Soviet foreign
poticb is nevertheless 'underscored in the draft. Atthough
it does not recite poticg totuard any other country
apecificatty, it discusses reZationa r~ith the United
States in detail--calling for "normal, stable reZationa"
and pointing out that "differences of sociat systems are
not a reason for tense reZationa."
-- Prospects for reZationa raith nest Europe are stated in
more positive terms, catting for "peacefut, good-
..n.i wt. 1. .. .~1 .. ~~1 _i _ ___ _ w
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Soviet Bloc
The new program gives bloc countries greater leeway in their
internal policies than did the Khrushchev program:
-- It discards the rigid 1961 line which said that socialist
countries must have a "uniform state structure" marked by
"social-economic and political uni fortuity."
-- In his June 1983 speech on the program, Andropov said that
since the 1961 program the Soviet leadership has
recognized that the internal development of socialist
countries would not be as "uniform" as once thought, but
are more "diverse and complex."
-- The new program places less emphasis on the relevance of
the Soviet model for other socialist countries and
reiterates the legitimacy of various paths to socialism
adapted to the "specific conditions of each country."
reforms tried out in East Europe.
While the program accepts some diversity in domestic
policies, it emphasizes the need for bloc unity on foreign policy
matters. The program's flexible approach to internal matters
could ease the way for Soviet experimentation with economic
The program places greater emphasis on bloc conformity in
foreign policy matters. While it stresses the need for
coordinated policies in the international arena, it stops short
of endorsing the view of hardliners, who rule out any independent
actions:
-- It calls for "increasingly effective collaboration" on
foreign policy matters and a "further deepening" of bloc
economic cooperation.
-- It says that collaboration in the international arena must
take account of both the "situation and interests" of each
bloc member and the "common interests" of the community as
a whole.
-- It softens the position taken fn a hardline June PRAVDA
article, reportedly written by first deputy head of the
CPSU bloc relations department Rakhmanin, that small
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countries cannot play an independent role in East-West
relations-stating that large and small states "regardless
playhinrsolvint~acute problems~andocurbin" theearmsole to
rarer
During the drafting of the program there was obvious
controversy within the Soviet establishment over the acceptable
limits of diversity in the internal and foreign policies of the
Soviet bloc countries.
-- The June 1985 PRAVDA article by Rakhmanin left practically
no room for diversity in internal policy,.lashing out
strongly at unspecified economic reforms that weaken
centralized control or expand the private sector. In
uncompromising terms it attacked East European aspirations
for greater independence in foreign policy, criticizing
"nationalist tendencies" and the position advanced by
Hungary and the GDR that "small states" can act as
mediators between East and West.
-- After the PRAVDA blast, other articles by well-placed
Soviet officials took a more flexible line on diversity
within the bloc.
-- Roy Medvedev claims that Gorbachev and Ligachev did not
see e t
~~ o eye over this section of the program.
International Communism
The program gives Moscow a theoretical framework for dealing
with ruling communist parties not part of the Soviet bloc--such
as China or Yugoslavia--that the previous program lacked. The
1961 program took a narrow view of the world socialist system
that implicitly required recognition of Moscow's supremacy and
left no room for ruling parties following an independent path.
In contrast, the draft program makes a new distinction between
the smaller "socialist community"--Soviet bloc countries
belonging to CEMA and the Warsaw Pact--and the broader "socialist
SvStem" which ;.,ci~,ae~ ~? ____.___ _~ _
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The new program also takes a less doctrinaire and more
pragmatic approach toward nonruling communist parties. It states
that communist parties in each country should "autonomously"
determine their own strategic course and adds that "differences"
over specific issues should not stand in the way of
cooperation. It adopts a far less optimistic view of the
prospects for the "international workers movement noting the
"complex" problems that it faces rather than the "favorable"
situation described in the 1961 program. In what may be an
effort to seek a common denominator to unite disparate parties,
the program eschews calling for support of specific Soviet
policies, and instead promotes common general goals, such as
preventin world war and abolishing "vestiges of colonialism."
Third Wo rl d
The new program is far less sanguine about short-term
prospects for Soviet successes in the Third World. While
underscoring Moscow's commitment to consolidating its position in
the Third World, it accords the Third World less attention than
the 1961 program. In contrast, the Khrushchev program--written
when the de-colonization process was in full bloom--exuded
confidence that the anti-colonial posture of the newly
independent states would bolster the USSR in its global
competition
ith
w
Washington.
The new program also suggests a new sensitivity in the
leadership to the limits of Soviet largesse in abetting socialist
transformation in the Third World. While expressing "profound
sympathy" for Third World nations, the program asserts that they
will have to create the material and technical base of a
socialist society "mainly through their own effort." Moscow, the
program states, will give aid "to the extent of its abilities."
In contrast, in his discussion of the program at the 1961
congress, Khrushchev interpreted the program's statement of the
party's "internationalist duty" to mean that the Soviet Union
would actively assist in the development of mayor economic
pro'ects i th
~ n
Th
The program's stance on the Third World reflects a
reexamination by Soviet officials and specialists of the pace of
social change in the Third World and the effectiveness of Soviet
assistance in winning reliable allies.
e
ird World.
Soviet academics began to write in the Zate 1970 's that
the trend tor~ard socialism in the Third T~orld was
storing. They argue that Third i~ortd countries are
unliketb to fottor the aociatist path untesa the Soviet
Union can become a more attractive model.
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The language on the Third ivortd reflects a shift in
official thinking that mss first spelled out b~ Andropov
in his speech on the program to the~June 1983 plenum, when
he said that the Soviet Union t~ouZd give economic
assistance to devetoping countries to the "extent" of its
abitity_
introduction within two or three years.
Political Implications
Although Gorbachev's imprint on the program and statute is
clear, the political compromises and unsettled questions evident
in these documents suggest that his regime has not yet resolved
some fundamental policy issues. The new leadership does not
appear to be prepared to unveil major reforms; Gorbachev's
emphasis is on making the existing system work better. The
program adds to other indications, however, that the new
leadership may be open to more substantial measures over the long
term should its ambitious goals require them. Indeed, well-
placed Soviet economists have told Embassy officials that far-
reaching economic reforms are being drawn up for aossible
The discussion surrounding the program suggests that the
draft papers over two different philosophical approaches within
the party to solving the problems facing the Soviet Union.
Without challenging the basic assumptions on which the communist
system is based, Gorbachev appears to be willing to consider a
broad range of political and economic options to strengthen the
Soviet state. He appears to be meeting resistance from powerful
conservative forces in the party, who oppose major innovations on
ideological grounds, apparently fearing that reforms could upset
a delicate balance which allows the regime to maintain control.
Their
k
spo
esmen, such as Kosolapov, argue that any significant
relaxation of central control runs the risk of unleashing an
uncontrollable process that could undermine the foundations of
the system. They point to the recent crisis in Poland and past
upheavals in Czech
l
k
os
ova
ia and Hungary to make their case.
Given the cautious nature of the Soviet political leadership
for the past twenty years, it is likely that healthy skepticism
remains among the party rank-and-file about the need for any fac-
reaching changes. Most party officials now gaining positions of
influence spent their formative years in an evironment that
rewarded conservatism and caution, not bold innovation. As
Gorbachev's housecleaning progresses, it is becoming evident that
the conservatives' political base extends well beyond the
diminishing circle of Brezhnev holdovers.
-- Many of the leading spokesmen for the conservative camp
are not members of the old guard but men of the same
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I I
generation as Gorbachev. Kosolapov, for example, is only
a year younger than Gorbachev and a PRAVDA staffer who
authored a recent series of articles staunchly defending
the conservative line is even younger.
-- The continued political vitality of conservatives was
evident in the early February reelection of Ukrainian
party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Kazakh party leader
Dinmukhamed Kunayev. Shcherbitskiy is the most outspoken
conservative spokesman in the Politburo; Kunayev is an old
Brezhnev croney. A wide range of Embassy contacts said in
recent months that Gorbachev wanted to remove both
1 eaders.
party
discussions. On several points, Ligachev's view appears to have 25X1
prevailed. Such posturing in inner party circles could be an
effective strategy for building an independent political base,
and could set the stage for major battles in the years ahead. 25X1
0o a more conservative ~ 9 ev
position during the internal
osition on se oy Medvedevvv - ~~ 25X1
claimed, moreover t at Li ach
-- A steady stream of articles by conservative spokesmen in
the Soviet press continues to challen a reforms that
appear to be favored by Gorbachev. 25X1
Tentative signs have appeared that unofficial "second"
Secretary Ligachev may be drawing on these conservative forces
within the party .to bolster his own position. Although he is 25X1
clearly a political ally of Gorbachev, the public debates over
?L~.. ..~~____ __J _~ _ .
Despite the strength of entrenched conservatism, Gorbachev's
demonstrated willingness to move agressively to build his power
and get his program underway suggest that the prospects for bold
initiatives should not be underestimated:
-- Key changes in the program appear to undermine
conservative arguments against reform and put the party
squaret}~ on record as seeking new solutions to chronic
problems.
-- Most major poticb shifts in Russian and Soviet history
have not reftected the prevailing views of the potiticat
etite, but those of a strong and determined leader rho
takes the initiative.
-- Gorbachev appears to be the kind of leader ruho could take
such initiative, if he conttudes that he can make a good
case for more radicat measures and he is confident he can
overcome resistan~a_
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I I
PARTY CONGRESS SCORECARD
Although major policy issues raised by the party program and
statute are unlikely to be settled at the party congress that
opens on 25 February, there should be new indications of which
way the political winds are blowing. Gorbachev will be trying to
use the gathering to build his political momentum and can be
expected to make every effort to avoid having it resemble the
uninspiring, lackluster congresses of the Brezhnev era. Signs
that Gorbachev is advancing his agenda at the congress would
include:
-- A revision of the party statute to limit the tenure of
party officials or impose a mandatory retirement age.
-- Gorbachev's use of the keynote address to more clearly
define some of the points in the program that were left
ambiguous, such as cultural policy.
-- Changes in the program that would encourage economic
reform--such as a stronger endorsement of the expanded use
of commodity-money relations or economic levers.
-- The unveiling of a specific program for economic reform,
possibly in Premier Ryzhkov's speech.
-- Changes in the program that would encourage broader public
participation in decisionmaking.
-- A frank discussion of the roles of Stalin, Khrushchev, or
Brezhnev. Medvedev claims that Gorbachev plans to push
the theme of "debrezhnevization."
-- A more open airing of views in the congress discussion--
instead of the carefully orchestrated speeches that
characterized the congresses of the Brezhnev era.
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