SOVIET MILITARY OPTIONS FOR NEUTRALIZING SOUTH AFRICAN AIR POWER IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SOVA/RIG/TWA/FA:
(2 May 86) 25X1
SUBJECT: Soviet Military Options for Neutralizing
South African Air Power in Angola
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Capra) krodl FM AJqCy
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 May 1986
Soviet Military Options for Neutralizing
South African Air Power in Angola
Summary
Luanda's Soviet-supported offensive against ONITA in 1985
was stopped short of a key objective last fall by South African
air strikes. In helping to plan the nett offensive, which could
begin as early as this spring, Soviet advisors in Angola are
probably looking for ways to prevent the South African Air Force
from repeating its successful intervention. Their best option is
probably a defensive one--increasing the effectiveness with which
Angolans and Cubans use the large amount of air defense equipment
already in Angola, especially mobile surface-to-air missiles and
jet interceptors. The Soviet advisors also, however, have
available an offensive option--airstrikes against the
South African airfields in northern Namibia from which last
fall's attacks were launched. From a military point of view,
such airstrikes appear feasible and might inflict significant
damage. Even disregarding political considerations, however,
they also have serious military drawbacks, such as transitory
results and a high likelihood of South African reprisals.
*This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe 25X1
Third World Activities Division, Office of Soviet Analysis.
Comments and queries can be directed to the Chief, Third World
Activities Division, 25X1
SOV M 86-20041
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1. Angolan government operations thus far have occurred
only inside Angola's borders (although Angola allows its
territory to serve as a base for SWAPO guerrilla operations in
Namibia). the Soviets avoid 25X1
directly involving their own personnel in these combat operations
except under unusual circumstances. In light of last fall's
South African airstrikes, however, we can not rule out the
possibility that the Angolans and their Soviet advisors will
decide they need to break one or both of these precedents to
neutralize South African air power during future Angolan
offensives. This analysis examines the military options
available under such a scenario, but does not address their
political ramifications or the likelihood that they will be
adopted.* 25X1
South African Air Strikes
2. In September and October 1985, South Africa deployed
combat aircraft to four airfields near the Angolan border:
Ondangwa, Rundu, Grootfontein, and (in the Caprivi strip) Mpacha
(see Figure 1). In mid-September, five Canberras, four
Buccaneers, and ten Mirage F-ls were observed at Grootfontein,
six possible Mirage F-la at Ondangwa, and 8 Impalas at Rundu.**
Sometime before 1 October the Mirages at Ondangwa apparently
moved to Rundu, closer to the scene of combat, and the number of
Impalas there increased to fourteen. The move to Rundu
effectively halved the distance between the South African
aircraft and the forces spearheading the Angolan government
3.I Ibomb craters around a 25X1
position that had been occupied by Angolan government forces
advancing against the UNITA town of Mavinga. Luanda later
accused Pretoria of staging four air attacks in support of
UNITA. Although the South Africans have consistently denied any
involvement, evidence of air bombing indicates that they launched
a strike within a few days of the arrival of their aircraft in
Namibia and one or more around 1 October. The Angolan offensive
stalled at the time of the first strike and Angolan forces
'retrea.ted at the time of the later ones. 25X1
4. During this operation, the four South African airfields
were vulnerable to attack. There were no early-warning radar
networks nor long-range SAM systems protecting' them. In
addition, aircraft were not dispersed or maintained on strip
**Appendix A describes South African fighter aircraft and
air defense capabilites.
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Ranges From Selected South African Airfields in Namibia
200 Miles 1
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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alert; the Mirages seen at Rundu were parked wingtip to wingtip
well away from the runway. Other than the fighter aircraft, air
defenses consisted of only seven field-deployed Tigercat SAM
launchers and a single 70-mile range Ames radar installation at
Ondangwa. Revetments at several fields were designed primarily
Angolan Response
5. Angola failed to respond to South African air incursions
into its territory during last fall's offensive. In September,
after the first attack, Luanda moved MIG-23 Floggers forward to
Menongue--the field closest to the battle zone.* Angola did not,
so far as we know, scramble interceptors against South African
aircraft and did not even maintain them on strip alert. It also
did not move its mobile SAMs to provide air defenses for troops
in the field. The troops were an easy target--they only had
limited air defenses consisting of small arms and, perhaps,
optically-controlled anti-aircraft guns.
Future Military Options
__- -Vi"
have taken a more direct role in planning and directing Angolan
combat operations since a series of government reverses in 1982,
1983 and 1984.** This involvement probably was a contributing
factor in the government's improved performance during the 1985
offensive. The Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Luanda
is probably now deeply involved in planning the next offensive,
and one of its highest priorities is likely to be finding ways to
prevent a repeat of South Africa's successful airstrikes of last
L_ , ,
Improved Air Defenses
7. One option for Soviet planners is to improve Angolan and
Cuban performance in a type of warfare for which they are already
organized and equipped--air defense. Soviet advisors need look
no further than Soviet operational doctrine to find techniques
that could appreciably improve Angolan air defenses. Moscow has
detailed procedures for maintaining aircraft on ready alert and
scrambling them against unidentified or hostile radar contacts.
The Soviets also have well-developed tactics for using mobile
SAMs like the SA-9 and SA-13 to cover troops advancing in the
field. Advances in these areas should be supplemented by
progress in command and control in general, control of
*Appendix B -describes Angolan fighter aircraft and air
defense capabilites.
**Appendix C describes past Soviet involvement in combat in
Angola.
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interceptors from the ground, and logistics. These are areas in
which the Soviets could play a direct coordinating role until
loc
l f
i
a
orces
mplement the appropriate techniques.
8. Relatively little new equipment would be necessary to
improve air defenses. Angola already has more than enough
fighter aircraft and SAMs to mount substantial air defenses. Its
major equipment deficiency is the lack of radar coverage over
UNITA's strong points in the southeast corner of Angola and the
South African airfields in northern Namibia. Moscow could
provide high-altitude coverage over both areas from existing
defended locations by supplying the long-range Tall King radar.
9. Soviet emphasis on a more aggressive style of air
defense operations could pay substantial dividends. An
aggressively and competently piloted Flogger or Fishbed could be
competitive with a South African Mirage, particularly if within
range of friendly air controllers, although the South Africans
might still have an advantage in both personnel and equipment.
SAMs accompanying troop columns could eliminate the type of easy
target the South Africans struck last fall. Shifting the
location of mobile SAMs around fixed targets would increase even
further the chance of South African losses. Thus far, the South
Africans have been extremely reluctant to take on defended
targets. South Africa might not be deterred altogether from
attacking, but its attacks might be conducted in a more
i
conservat
ve--and less effective manner.
Soviet Par.tici a-tion
10. If Soviet planners decide to concentrate on improving
Angolan air defenses, they could probably achieve significant
results while remaining within current limits on their
participation in combat. Most of the necessary improvements
involve training and supervision, not actual combat. Soviet
advisors, for instance, could further instill in Cuban and
Angolan crews the need for better alert procedures for
interceptors and increase pressure on higher Angolan authorities
to launch the aircraft against unidentified or hostile targets.
Soviet personnel themselves could assume air control functions,
directing the interceptors to their targets. Likewise, if they
are not already doing so, Soviet MAG personnel could increase
training of Cuban and Angolan air defense troops in Soviet
procedures for the use of mobile SAMs, particularly SA-9s and
SA-13s, for covering troops in the field. Finally, as in the
past, the MAG could arrange for the supply of additional
equipment, notably Tall King radars. Under this option, there
appears to be no imperative need for Soviet pilots to take to the
air or for Soviet advisors to accompany missile batteries in the'
field.
4
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Air Strikes in Namibia
11. Soviet MAG planners could also break precedent and go
on the offensive against South African airpower, although so far
we have no evidence that they are contemplating such a plan. An
offensive air strike probably would take the form of an attack on
South African airfields in Namibia--particularly Ondangwa and
Rundu, the apparent staging points for last fall's strikes. The
strikes could be aimed at damaging the unoccupied airfields
themselves or could be carried out against South African aircraft
after they have moved forward to the airfields.
At Unoccupied Airfields
12. Attacks against the airfields would focus on cutting
runways, with a secondary objective of destroying buildings,
support equipment, and supplies. Dropping a pattern of bombs on
a runway from a fast-moving fighter, however, is a difficult task
even for a well-trained pilot with precision fire-control
equipment. Angolan pilots.(probably in Fishbeds) who attacked
the Mavinga airstrip during the offensive last fall missed the
runway altogether, and even the fire control in the Angolan
Fitters is not precise enough to eliminate the need for a high
level of pilot proficiency. in addition, interdiction of these
fields for more than a few days would require repeated strikes,
since even a local highway department has the capability to patch
a damaged asphalt runway like those in Namibia in a day or two.
F_ I
13. Opposition to the initial strike against unoccupied
airfields would be light--probably just minimal ground artillery
fire in the near term, although mounds now under construction at
Rundu may be for air defense equipment. During later strikes,
the South Africans probably would be able to build up their
defenses quickly with fighter aircraft and field-deployed SAM
At Occupied Airfields
14. Attacks against South African aircraft after they have
moved forward to Namibian airfields pose a different set of
problems. If the South Africans do not disperse their aircraft--
as they failed to do at Rundu last October--the aircraft could be
relatively easy to destroy. Weapons such as cluster bombs and
even aircraft cannons could be used, and secondary explosions
from fuel and ordnance could be expected after a few hits. Even
if the South Africans did not deploy air defense equipment,
however, the risk of opposition would be greater than in the case
of a strike against unoccupied airfields, since failure to
achieve surprise would permit the South Africans to get some
Mirage fighter aircraft into the air. Timely intelligence also
would be a problem, because the South Africans appear to limit
r,
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the presence of all but a handful of their aircraft at the
northern Namibian fields to as short a period as possible.
15. Angola has the aircraft to carry out strikes on at
least Ondangwa and Rundu, although operational considerations
might restrict the composition of the strike force. Political
considerations aside, aircraft range would be the principal
problem. Our calculations indicate that Soviet planners would
expect a Fishbed to be able to conduct a mission out to around
250 nautical miles with two fuel tanks and two bombs. These
calculations are based on a Western standard (Mil-C) which
appears to approximate Soviet standards. Calculations for
various aircraft models under various conditions lead to the
following conclusions:
-- Against targets within 250 nautical miles of Angolan bases
(including Ondangwa and Rundu but not Grootfontein or
Mpacha), a strike force could include Fishbeds with two
drop tanks and a light load of bombs or missiles, Floggers
with one drop tank and a full armament of air-to-air
missiles, and Fitters with two medium-sized drop tanks and
a relatively heavy= bomb load of 6-500kg bombs. The
mission profile involves a high-altitude approach to the
target, five minutes of.low-altitude combat, and a
high-altitude return to base.
-- Against more distant targets out to 350 nautical miles
with a similar mission profile, planners could use
Floggers with three drop tanks and a full AAM load, and
Fitters with two large drop tanks and a light bomb load.
The target would be outside Fishbed range.
A requirement to approach the target at low altitude to
avoid air surveillance would substantially reduce the
feasible strike ranges. Our calculations indicate that a
low-low-high mission could be flown out to 250 miles by
the same'aircraft that could fly a 350-mile high-low-high
mission. Fishbeds could not be used, and Grootfontein and
Mpacha would be out of range under these conditions.
16. Figure 2 shows 250-mile and 350-mile range arcs from
the three airfields in southern Angola from which fighters have
operated--Namibe, Lubango, and Menongue. Arcs are also shown for
a fourth airfield, Cuito Cuanavale, which is currently being
improved and could be operational as a fighter base in time for
the forthcoming offensive.
17., Angola currently does not have radar surveillance or
ground-controlled intercept capabilities over the potential
targets--target selection and air combat would have to be carried
out exclusively by pilots in the strike force. Angolan forces,
however, have or could probably get the remaining equipment that
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Ranges From Selected Angolan Military Airfields
250-nm radius for Fishbed;
Flogger G with one tank;
Fitter with two medium
tanks, heavy bombs loaded
360-nm radius for Flogger G
with three tanks; Fitter
with two big tanks, light
bomb load
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they would need to mount a strike. Even if Fishbeds could not be
used, the Fitters and Floggers already in the Angolan inventory
would be enough to mount strong simultaneous attacks on at least
two targets. Soviet planners could arrange for the necessary
stockpiles of expendable stores, including bombs and drop
tanks. A decision to mount a series of strikes would require
larger stocks of expendable stores, more maintenance support at
advanced fields such as Menongue, and probably some additional
aircraft, particularly Fitters. The Soviets should be able to
provide the timely intelligence that would be required.
Soviet Participation
18. Soviet officers might conclude that, if Angola were to
undertake strikes on Namibian airfields, direct Soviet
participation in combat would be required. The reasons for this
conclusion, and the type of intervention required, would vary
d
di
epen
ng on the nature of the target.
19. If the objective of the mission were to attack airport
runways and facilities, the Soviets might choose to fly most of
the strike aircraft--or at least the Fitters--themselves. They
might feel that only Soviet pilots could be depended on to hit
the runways, and they might also feel that the absence of South
African aircraft would make the risk of losses acceptably low.
The presence of Soviets in any attacking aircraft, in turn,
probably would cause.the Soviets to want to have their own pilots
in the covering interceptors as well. If repeated strikes were
to be carried out, the Soviets might plan to turn over more
combat duties to Cubans and Angolans as they learned lessons from
the initial strikes. The Soviets probably also would want to
reduce their exposure to the risk of losses, which could be
expected to increase on subsequent strikes.
20. For an attack on airfields occupied by South African
aircraft, the Soviets might feel that Cuban or even Angolan
pilots could wreak havoc on a row of parked aircraft, making it
unnecessary for Soviet pilots to incur the risk of finding the
South Africans in the air. In this case, they probably would
also entrust air cover missions to Cuban or Angolan pilots,
particularly if ground-controlled-intercept radar coverage had
been extended over the target fields. In either scenario,
however, the Soviets might feel that a Soviet pilot should lead
the formation to the target, since the strike would have to
transit a substantial distance without help from external
navigation aids.
Implications
21. The military payoffs of increasing ' the' effectiveness of
Angolan air defenses appear to be all positive. Little would be
lost (except probably some equipment) by increasing Cuban and
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Angolan exploitation of the mobility of their mobile SAM
systems. More aggressive efforts to intercept South African
aircraft over Angolan territory might lead to some embarrassing
losses, but the lost aircraft would be easily replaced and the
engagements might cause the South Africans to be more cautious in
future air support of UNITA. Another risky move might be the
extension of radar coverage over South African territory by
providing Angola Tall King radars or by moving Bar Lock radars
farther south. The South Africans in 1981 made clear their
objections to radar coverage over Namibia by destroying the two
southernmost Angolan Bar Lock installations, and attacks on such
radar sites could be anticipated. Despite the chances of
increased hostilities under this option, the Soviets would
probably be able to avoid exposing their own personnel any more
than they do currently. 25X1
22. The payoffs from strikes against South African bases in
Namibia are more problematic. The effects of a single strike
against unoccupied runways are probably too transitory to be
worth the effort, and repeated strikes could prove too costly,
both in terms of logistics and probable losses.
23. A strike which destroyed some South African Mirages on
the ground might have more lasting effects--both negative and
positive. At least in the short term, it would probably produce
an escalation of the conflict. South Africa would probably be
quick to retaliate--and therefore plans for Angolan air strikes
in Namibia probably would be preceded by enhanced air and ground
defenses around high-value targets in southern Angola as well as
precautions against other types of reprisals. Assuming that
South African retaliation did not destroy Angolan air power,
however, a successful Angolan strike might also cause the South
Africans to be more cautious in future air support of UNITA.
They might deploy fewer aircraft to Namibia at a time, further
limit their presence at the advanced fields, and attack only when
the need was overwhelming. Coupled with improved air defenses
within Angola, the result might be a decrease in the South
African air threat over Angola. Although the Soviets, Cubans and
Angolans would have to be concerned about pilot losses in a
continuing air conflict, any losses of South African Mirage
aircraft would be irreplaceable in today's international
political environment. 25X1
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South African Fighter Aircraft
and Air Defense Capabilties
The South African Air Force is the most powerful air force
in Africa south of the Sahara. It combines a high level of pilot
proficiency with a substantial inventory of combat aircraft. The
South African air order of battle, summarized in Table 1,
features some 240 domestically-produced Impala light attack
aircraft, less than 100 French-built Mirage III and Mirage F-1
fighters, and a handful of longer-range Buccaneer and Canberra
strike aircraft. Although some of these aircraft were
inititially produced in the early 1960s or before, all are
competitive with, if not superior to, their Soviet-supplied
Angolan counterparts
The main constraint on South African air force equipment is
the arms embargo which cuts South Africa off from foreign
suppliers. Pretoria could replace lost light attack aircraft and
even increase this part of its force thanks to its domestic
production of the Impala,'but it has no comparable source of
high-performance fighters. Although some second-hand aircraft
might become available on the world market, the South African air
force must assume that any Mirage downed in combat is lost for
years, if not forever. As a result, South Africa is likely to be
particularly risk-averse in its employment of these aircraft.
During the fall 1985 'offensive it concentrated on undefended
targets, such as troops in the field, even though strikes on
defended targets, notably supply and air facilities at Menongue,
might have been even more decisive.
Another constraint on the South African air force is that
its forces are based in eastern South Africa, far from Angola
(see Figure 3). The long-range Buccaneers and Canberras and some
of the Mirages are stationed at Waterkloof airbase near Pretoria,
while the remaining Mirages are at Hoedspruit airbase near the
Mozambique border. The permanent presence of combat aircraft in
northern Namibia is limited to eight or ten Impalas, and any
substantial strike force must be forward-deployed from distant
home bases.
South Africa's remaining air defense assets are less
impressive than its aircraft. South Africa has two SAM systems--
the Tigercat and the Cactus--but both are relatively short-range
systems and also are in relatively short supply. Replacement of
launchers and even missiles may be difficult--the Tigercats are
surplus Jordanian equipment purchased in 1976, and Cactus (an
early variant of the French Crotale) was domestically produced
but may be out of production. The South African air early
warning radar network is concentrated in the. southern and eastern
parts of South Africa and does not cover the portion of Namibia
adjacent to Angola.
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Aircraft
Initial
IOC
Attack
Impala
1962
240
Mirage
F-lA
1974
31
Buccaneer
1962
5
Canberra
1951
6
Fighter
Mirage
F-1C
1974
13
Mirage
III
1961
56*
Air Defenses
SAM: Tigercat (36 launchers), Cactus (24 launchers)
EW Radar: Network in RSA, not in Namibia.
*About 30 of these aircraft are trainer versions, although they
have a combat capability.
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Selected South African Home Airfields
South.
0
Cape Town D. F. Malan
H. F. Verwoerd
0 Port Elizabeth
Boundary re ,,esentetion is
not nece ssanly authoritative
Aircraft Type
^ Buccaneer
? Canberra
o Impala
? Mirage
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Angolan Fighter Aircraft and Air Defense Capabilities
Angola's air force and air defense equipment, summarized in
Table 2, is entirely of Soviet origin. The bulk of the air force
consists of around 80 late-model MIG-21s (Fishbed is and Ls).
The Fishbed has good speed and maneuverability, but lacks the
range for long-range strike operations and does not have
electronics and missiles comparable to those in modern
interceptors. In 1984 the Soviets began supplying aircraft which
provide these capabilities--the SU-22 Fitter J ground-attack
aircraft and the MIG-23 Flogger G interceptor. The number of
these in Angola, however, is still relatively low--around 25
Floggers and only 9 Fitters.
Angola has probably received every SAM model which the
Soviets have exported to the Third World except the SA-5. Much
of Angola's large SAM inventory is concentrated in the south
along the Namibe-Menongue railroad (see Figure 4). They do not
form a complete barrier, due to Angola's size, but provide
defenses for most key locations. For example, South African
attacks on the two largest airfields in the area, Namibe and
Cubango, would have to evade SA-6 sites south of the rail line
and then penetrate defenses by multiple SAM systems, including
the long-range SA-2, around the airfields. The other main
airfield in the area, Menongue, is defended by SA-3s, SA-8s, and
SA-9s.
The Angolan SAMs are supported by a radar network which
provides high-altitude coverage of most of the country (see
Figure 5). The network employs Bar Lock, Flat Face, and Spoon
Rest surveillance radars and odd Pair and Side Net height
finders. The radar network also gives Angola the capability to
control its interceptor aircraft from the ground--the principal
Soviet technique for using fighters in an air-defense role.
Notably absent is the newer and longer-range Tall King
surveillance radar which, if positioned at current radar sites,
could extend Angolan high-altitude early warning and ground-
controlled intercept capabilities over the South African
airfields in northern Namibia.
i1)
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Angolan Air OOB
Aircraft Initial
IOC
Attack
Fitter J 1979 9
Fighter
Flogger G and C 1978 25
Fishbed J/L 1968/72 80*
Air Defenses
SAM: Fixed: SA-2, 3
SAM: Mobile: SA-6, 8, 9, 13
Radar: Network inside Angola
* Over 100 have been delivered, but substantially fewer have
been observed in service.
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Surface-to-Air Missile Sites'
Secret
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Secret
Angolan Radar Coverage and Surface-to-Air Missile Sites
Radar site
Limit of radar
coverage
Surface-to-air
missile site
Military region
designation
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Past Soviet Involvement in Combat in Angola
Soviet involvement in military operations in Angola has
increased over the years, and appears to have reached a new high
during the 1985 offensive. We estimate that the Soviet MAG was
deeply involved in planning the offensive and arranging for its
logistic support. High MAG officials undoubtedly monitored the
progress of the offensive, and may even have helped supervise its
execution. 25X1
Soviet officers also accompanied Angolan brigades in the
field. Several probable Angolan prisoners complained that, as
soon as the going got rough, the Soviets would be airlifted out
by helicopter, followed soon afterwards by the Cuban advisors,
leaving the Angolan troops to get out of the situation as best
they could. Soviets are probably also present as advisors with
air defense forces, but air defense units were not exposed to
combat during the offensive.
most Angolan aircraft are
flown Cuban or Angolan pilots. The Soviet HAG probably
includes military pilots qualified in all the Angolan fighter
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
These Soviet activities indicate that limits exist on the
involvement of Soviet personnel in combat. The main purpose of
these limits seems to be to minimize the risk of the loss or
capture of Soviets in the field. There appear to be no
restrictions on Soviet involvement in headquarters functions such
as planning and monitoring combat operations. Such activities
are permitted, not only in Luanda, but at safe locations in the
field. Actual Soviet participation in combat, even by pilots, is
unlikely beyond a possible episodic occurrence. 25X1
It should be noted that, while the Soviets in Angola appear
to avoid combat as a matter of policy, Soviet pilots have flown
combat missions elsewhere it the Third World. The most recent
known case occurred in Aden earlier this year, when two Soviet
pilots were shot down during combat operations.
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DI/SOVA/TWA/FA:I I(2 May 86)
SUBJECT: Soviet Military Options for Neutralizing
South African Air Power in Angola.
External Distribution
1 - Donald Gregg
Office of the Vice President
1 - John Desch
Crisis Support White House
Room 303, Old EOB
1 - Phillip Ringdahl
Director of African Affairs
Room 361, Old EOB
1 - Stephen Sestanovich.
Director, Political-Military Affairs
Room 391, Old EOB,
1 - Jack Matlock
Senior Staff Member, USSR-Eastern Europe
Room 368, Old EOB
1 - Charles Freeman
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of African Affairs
Room 6234A
1 - Robert Cabelly
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of African Affairs
Room 6234
1'- Princeton Lyman
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State
Bureau of African Affairs
Room 6236
1 - Jeffrey S. Davidow
Director, Office of Southern African Affairs
Room 4238
1 - Raymond F. Smith
Deputy Director, Office of Southern African Affairs
Room 4238
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1 - F. Allen Harris
Deputy Director, Office of Southern African Affairs
Room 4238
1 - Douglas Holladay
Working Group on South Africa and Southern Africa
1 - Richard A. Clark
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Analysis, INR
Room 6535
1 - Anthony S. Dalsimer
Director, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR
Room 4536
1 - Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
1 - Martha C. Mautner
Deputy Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe,- INR
Room 4758 _
1 - Wayne Limberg
Chief, Soviet Foreign Political Division, INR
Room 4843
1 - Alexander Vershbow
Multilateral Relations, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4225
1 - Mark R. Parris
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs,
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217
1 - H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Room 7327
1 - William H. Courtney
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs
Room 7240
1 - Gerald M. Gallucci
Desk Officer for Angola
Room 4238
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2 - Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Advisor to the Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Pentagon 4D840
1 - Noel C. Koch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Pentagon 4E813
1 - James L. Woods
Director, Africa Region, ISA
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Pentagon 4B746
1 - Walter Barrows
Assistant to the Director, ISA
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Pentagon 4B747
1 - William Thorns
Acting Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa
Defense Intelligence Agency
Pentagon 2C238
1 - Wynfred Joshua.
Defense Intelligence Officer for European
and Soviet Political Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Pentagon 2C238
1 - Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr.,USN
Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pentagon 2E782
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