KEY THIRD WORLD HOTSPOTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505210001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 22, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Key Third World Hotspots
22 August 1986
DATE A&
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of Soviet Analysis
At the request of the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Michael H. Armacost, this memorandum was prepared by the
Offices of Soviet Analysis, African and Latin American Analysis,
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, and East Asian Analysis of
the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries may be
addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division, Office
SOV M 86-20075X
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1. AFGHANISTAN
The pace of combat has increased in recent weeks, but Soviet
ground forces have been considerably less active than during the
same period last year. Air activity, however, has expanded
substantially in comparison with last year. Although the Soviets
apparently encouraged the Kabul regime to shoulder a greater
share of the fighting early this year, all major operations since
late spring have been conducted primarily by Soviet units. Kabul
has made some marginal improvements in developing paramilitary
forces and intelligence capabilities, but manpower shortages,
factionalism, poor morale and serious defection problems persist
in the Afghan armed forces. The two offensives since late June
made extensive use of artillery bombardment and air strikes, but
we saw no evidence of either significant contact with insurgent
groups or the destruction of any insurgent strongholds.
Operations against insurgent supply routes and bases in the
eastern border regions and wider use of ambushes by Soviet
Special Purpose Forces apparently have complicated insurgent
logistics. Higher transportation costs and lack of transport
have caused some supply bottlenecks, but the insurgents continue
to hamper the movement of Soviet and Afghan convoys and recently
struck a heavily defended Soviet ammunition depot. The Soviets
have had some success in improving urban security, but Kabul--
which had been relatively quiet last year--recently has been
subjected to a series of insurgent rocket attacks. Control of
other urban areas--such as Qandahar and Herat--remains strongly
contested. Since becoming head of the Afghan party in May,
Najibullah has laid the groundwork for consolidating his control
by naming supporters to important positions, but factionalism in
the party persists.
we ee no
indication that involvement in ATgnanisi caused the Soviets
enough distress to make them contemplate withdrawal in the
absence of a viable, pro-Soviet regime. We doubt that Gorbachev's
recent announcement of plans to withdraw six regiments reflects a
strongly positive assessment of the military. situation. It
probably does indicate, however, some degree of confidence that
Soviet/Afghan forces can maintain their present level of
effectiveness and that this gesture will not undermine Afghan
morale. There are tentative signs that the withdrawal of at
least one antiaircraft unit has begun.
Continued factional strife in the Afghan party since the
accession of Najibullah, the disappointing recruiting efforts. of
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the Afghan Army, and the only token participation of Afghan
forces in recent military operations suggest that Moscow is
unlikely to believe that the Kabul regime could survive a total
Soviet withdrawal in the near term. At the recently concluded
proximity talks in Geneva, Moscow had Kabul offer a three-year,
"front loaded" withdrawal timetable but refused to consider
Cordovez's proposal for a two-year time frame, much less
Pakistan's demand for withdrawal in less than a year. Moscow
will probably pursue private discussions with Islamabad on
establishing a "government of national reconciliation" in
Afghanistan while hinting that a more reasonable withdrawal
timetable will follow agreement on other issues. We believe,
however, that such moves are designed to draw out negotiations,
softening international opinion and sapping the will of the
Afghan resistance and its supporters while the Najibullah regime
gains time to consolidate its position.
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Since April the insurgents have sustained about 9-,000 to
10,000 combatants inside Nicaragua and kept up a steady string of
hit-and-run attacks. ;
-- In recent weeks the rebels, operating largely in the
northwest, have successfully hit military barracks and
economic targets such as state farms and electric power
pylons. They maintain considerable local support in areas
where they operate.
-- With renewed US military assistance the insurgents hope to
increase combat activity on other - fronts in an, effort to
draw regime troops away from northern combat zones.
For their part, the Sandinistas appear to have improved their
.tactics and command and control, but neverthless face continued
manpower and materiel shortfalls. Sandinista casualties have
increased, and larger numbers of desertions probably ",reflect
lower morale. The Sandinista leadership, however, remains united
in its determination to suppress any challenges to its goal of
establishing a Marxist-Leninist regime, and we expect internal
repression to intensify as the armed insurgency--bolstered by
renewed US military assistance--expands in size and operating
areas. On the domestic political front, the Sandinistas are
determined to prevent the creation of an internal fro'ht in
support of the insurgents.
-- Since late June, Managua has closed the only independent
newspaper, denied the Catholic Church spokesman reentry
into Nicaragua, forced a bishop into exile, and stepped up
harassment of second-echelon leaders in the political
opposition.
-- We also expect the regime will use its growing internal
security capabilities--developed largely with Cuban and
Soviet Bloc assistance--to step up large-scale sweeps in
rural areas while monitoring the domestic opposition and
US presence in the cities.
The Soviets remain committed to keeping the Sandinista
regime afloat despite rising costs of economic and military
materiel assistance. Moscow clearly believes that the advantages
gained by Sandinista consolidation justify its investment, which
is still small relative to its other high-priority Third World
aid programs. The Soviets probably had hoped that domestic
political pressure in the US would have cut off external support
to the insurgents, lessening the need for Soviet aid, but now
take a longer term view of the prospects for Sandinista
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consolidation. Moscow has tried to limit assistance to Nicaragua
over the past five years by urging the Sandinistas to seek other
sources of financial support. But with Western assistance drying
up and consumer shortages growing, we believe the USSR has
decided to expand its commitment to subsidize the deteriorating
Nicaraguan economy, and will urge its Warsaw Pact allies to
increase aid as well. Moscow may
have increased Managua's credit ines by as much as 60 percent
over last year, approaching $350 million in 1986 alone. Moscow
steadily increasing role as a direct supplier of arms to the
Sandinistas underscores the continued Soviet commitment to the
regime. Nevertheless, we believe the Soviets continue to use
Cuba as a transhipment point for arms destined for the
Sandinistas, particularly larger'military items such as transport
aircraft. This year's deliveries include at least 10 MI-8/17
transport helicopters, several hundred military vehicles, and an
AN-30 aerial survey aircraft probably on loan from the Soviets.
The Sandinistas expect to receive a total of 23 MI-8/17s and four
additional AN-26 transport aircraft, doubling the size of their
air force. The Soviets have already delivered more military
equipment this year than in any previous year, indicating that
total Warsaw Pact military aid for 1986 could exceed the previous
peak of 1984. Nevertheless, Moscow will probably refrain from
sending Managua jet fighter aircraft to avoid provoking US
military intervention. The Soviets are also likely to keep their
advisory presence--about 75 military and 200 economic advisers--
as small and low-profile as possible.
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Over the past several months, Luanda has undertaken major
preparations for a large scale ground and air operation directed
against UNITA's stronghold in southern Angola. Luanda has about
two months of favorable weather in which to launch its expected
offensive before the rainy season begins in November. There is
currently fighting around the forward government staging area of
Cuito Cuanavale following a UNITA surprise attack on 10 August
designed to disrupt Luanda's military preparations. So far,
UNITA appears to have inflicted little damage. Fighting. has also
been under way since May around the central Angolan town of
Munhango--which sits astride important logistical lines of both
sides--where UNITA units have been harassing Angolan forces in
control of the town.
President dos Santos, who now.appears to be in an
unchallenged political position, is committed to prosecuting a
long-term military effort against UNITA while trying,to split its
ranks by holding out the prospect of negotiations. The
approximately 1,200 Soviet military advisers in Angola are
assigned to virtually all command and staff functions' down to at
least the brigade level, with responsibilities including
planning, training, recruitment, political supervision, and
logistical support. We believe the Soviets played a significant
role in the planning of last year's Angolan offensive and are
likely also heavily involved in planning this year's 'combat
operations. The Soviets have generally avoided direct
.participation in combat, relying.on the Cubans to fly important
air missions and handle advanced equipment. However,, we believe
there is a growing chance that the Soviets, Cubans, and South
Africans, through support to their clients, may themselves be
drawn into more direct conflict.
We believe that the Soviets take a long view of 'the
situation in Angola, where they have limited military access to
air and naval facilities and extensive economic and political
relations. They appear to favor a strategy involving gradual
consolidation of government political control through' the
extension of the state and party apparatus combined with
continuing military pressure on UNITA. The scale, timing and
composition of Soviet arms deliveries suggest that they support
offensive action by Luanda once deliberate logistical': and
defensive preparations have been made. However, Moscow would
probably prefer that Luanda avoid precipitant offensive moves
that risk exposing its forces to South African counterattack.
Over the long run, the Soviets are probably counting'on
incremental government military gains, exhaustion on'the part of
UNITA followers, and the eventual passing from the scene of
Savimbi to facilitate Luanda's victory in the contest with UNITA.
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IV. IRAN/IRAQ.
il.
Iraq and Iran have increased pressure on each ofh,er' in the
last six months in anticipation of major battles this fa,11.
Iran's successes at Al Faw and Mehran this year, its domestic
economic problems, and the fall in oil prices have caused the
Iranians to change their strategy and attempt to end~;the,war by..
early 1987. Over the last two months, Iran has mobil!izeda large
number of men and redeployed troops to prepare for an
offensive.. The threat of another Iranian attack and recent
military defeats, economic problems, and declining civilian and
military morale have weakened Iraq more than at any time in the
six-year. war. Baghdad's increase in air attacks on economic
targets'in Iran and the Persian Gulf have not deterred the
Iranians from continuing the war.
Relations between the USSR and Iran are troubled, by'
antagonisms that are likely to preventa significant; improvement
in relations. The clerics' abhorrence of atheistic Communism has
,reinforced Iran's historical hostility toward Russia and created
deepseated suspicions about Soviet intentions toward! the Islamic
Republic. The Iranians have sought better ties in the hope of
gaining Soviet arms and the economic benefits of increased trade,
but they have been unwilling to pay the price of meeting Soviet
demands. The Soviets insist that Tehran end the warj;with Iraq,
tone down anti-Soviet propaganda, and cease support or the
Afghan resistance. These issues are likely to continJue.to impede
improved relations even after Khomeini dies.
Iraqi-Soviet relations are generally good despite periodic
strains over military sales, repression of the Iraqi Communist
Party, and arms sales by Soviet allies to-Iran. ThejIragis
remain suspicious of Soviet ambitions in the region and still
resent the USSR for cutting off arms supplies to Iraq' early in
the war. Iraq will continue to rely on the Soviets for the vast
majority of its military equipment but will try to reduce that
dependency after.the war.
Iraq's diplomatic efforts are aimed at isolating Iran and
curtailing arms sales to Tehran. Senior Iraqi officials have
crisscrossed Africa in recent weeks drumming up suppo',jrt for an
anti-Iranian resolution at-the Non-Aligned Summit mee'Iting next
week and to counter similar Iranian efforts to rally African
support at the summit. Baghdad is also seeking worldwide backing
for Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's five-point plan for ending
the conflict. The Iraqis continue to press the United States,
other Western states, and the Soviets to embargo arms to'Tehran.
The Gulf war has not served Moscow's overall interests in
the region despite boosting Soviet arms sales to Iraq'I: it
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sparked the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which
turned to the United States for strategic assistance; it
complicated Soviet efforts to achieve greater cooperation among
Iraq, Syria, and Libya; and it tended to offset resentment
against the US for its pro-Israeli stance among moderate Gulf
Arab states. Despite Moscow's support for Baghdad (Iraq buys
approximately half of its arms from the USSR and most of its
major weapons systems are Soviet-made), the Soviets probably do'
not want either Iran or Iraq to emerge as clear victor, having
long preferred a relative balance between the two countries as
the best way to exert Soviet influence in the region. A
victorious Iran not only would undermine Soviet influence in
Baghdad, but also probably would make the Khomeini regime even
less susceptible to Soviet inroads or pressure and free up assets
that could be used to support the Afghan mujahadeen or help
spread Islamic fundamentalism beyond Iranian borders. Moscow's
inability to influence Tehran and Iraq's inability to force Iran
to enter negotiations suggest the USSR will continue to support
Iraq in its war effort, especially as long as the United States
remains locked out of Iran.
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The regime in Aden seized power over seven months ago, but
has failed to consolidate its position at home or gain more than
limited support abroad. Violent personal and factional rivalries'
and policy disagreements divide the ruling coalition. No person
or group has emerged capable of forming a stable, broadly-based.
government. The fragile, balance between factions could easily be
upset as maneuvering for power leads to renewed fighting.
The security situation, especially in Aden, remains
unstable; reports of unrest, revenge killings, and continuing
detentions are commonplace. The regime continues tolpurge
,supporters of former South Yemeni President Hasani from its ranks
and is preparing to try in absentia Hasani and the top 45 leaders
.who fled the country with him. Refugees are still streaming
across the border to North Yemen where as many as 15;000 South
Yemenis are encamped.
Economic problems, serious before the coup, have grown
worse. The Aden refinery and port facilities--key sources of
foreign' exchange--are functioning normally, but earnings from
other sources have fallen. South Yemeni envoys recently met with
Soviet and Gulf leaders to request funds, but so farhave not
gotten the hard cash Aden, desperately needs. Aden has employed a
.number of stopgap measures, including cutting imports and halting
development projects, but without additional foreign assistance
these moves will be insufficient to arrest economic
deterioration.
The exile issue remains the main stumbling block to better
relations'with North Yemen and traditional allies such as Syria,
Libya, and Ethiopia, who still support Hasani to varying
degrees. North Yemeni President Salih is providing military
training to the exiles and is threatening to unleashjthem in
operations across the border. Aden so far has resisted ,all
attempts, both Soviet and North Yemeni inspired, to work out a
political compromise. Talks collapsed last week--the fourth such
effort to fail in. the last month--and the participants may now
think negotiations are futile.
The fighting in January reduced the ability of South Yemen's
armed forces to conduct offensive operations. Most officers and
technically skilled personnel have defected to the North.. Stocks
of fuel, ammunition, and military spare parts were drawn down
significantly during the fighting and logistic support is poor.
Aden will look. to Moscow to restock its inventory of arms,
ammunition, and spare parts. Even so, the armed forces probably
can sustain routine operations for the next few months without
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major resupplying from the USSR.
The Soviets are eager to protect their equities i:n South
Yemen, the only Marxist Arab state and the USSR's closest ally in
the Middle East. The Soviets have limited use of naval and air
facilities there, deploy IL-38 antisubmarine and reconnaissance
aircraft continuously to Al Anad Air Base. F
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Since the January crisis, their efforts appear almost exclusively
focused on avoiding another outbreak of fighting--both by
encouraging reconciliation within the new regime and by promoting
talks between the exiles in North Yemen and the present
government. The Soviets have staved off more fighting thus far,
but they have yet to reconcile these groups or to gain North
Yemeni President Salih's support for their efforts; in Moscow's
view, the situation will remain unstable until some accommodation
is reached with these parties. While Moscow is concerned not to
lose influence in North Yemen, its presence and influence in the
south will continue to take priority, especially if President
Salih supports an insurgency movement inside South Yemen.
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VI. CAMBODIA
Vietnam continues to focus military pressure along the Thai-
Cambodian border to block resistance infiltration and to' disrupt
guerrilla activity. All nine of Vietnam's combat divisions and
the five People's Republic of Kampuchea divisions are deployed
there. Hanoi also continues to construct barriers throughout the
border region that are designed to impede further resistance
infiltration to the interior. Chinese military pressure along
the Sino-Vietnamese border, which has been limited to the
strategically unimportant area near Malipo where China maintains
70,000 troops, does not seem to deter Vietnam from conducting
operations in Cambodia that it deems necessary. Resistance
forces, however, remain active throughout most of the country.
The Communist Khmer Rouge, in particular, have conducted an
active interior campaign over the past few months exploiting
Vietnam's emphasis on the border area. The Khmer Rouge have
launched numerous small-scale attacks against Vietnamese and
Cambodian military positions,. local government facilities, and
several major population centers, including Phnom Penh. 1 Non-
Communist forces also have stepped up infiltration activities.,
although they still do not have an effective supportj~network in
Cambodia and are not a factor on the battlefield. Despite these
Internal security problems, Vietnam retains the strategic
advantage, which we doubt the resistance will erode appreciably
anytime soon. Diplomatic efforts hold little promise for
achieving a breakthrough.' Hanoi continues to insist;lon the
elimination of the Pol Pot group and the recognitionl1of the Heng
Samrin regime while ASEAN continues to demand the complete
unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese troops; neither side is
likely to compromise in the next few years.
The Soviets continue to portray the Vietnamese approach to
resolving the Cambodian question as reasonable and flexible, and
to deny that they themselves bear any responsibilityifor' the
failure of the warring sides to reach a political settlement.
General Secretary Gorbachev tried to finesse the issue in
Vladivostok last month, in a futile attempt to avoidi!,irr'itating
Beijing any further, but the Soviets have made it clear since
then that they do not intend to end their support ofjiVietnamese
military operations in Cambodia. There are some costs in their
close identification with Hanoi's position, of course, but the
Soviets do not see their fundamental objectives served by
attempts to pressure Vietnam toward changing its current'
Cambodian strategy. Soviet leaders might change their minds on
this point if they believed they had a real opportunity to
achieve a breakthrough in their relations with China; but are not
about to give up the military facilities they have in Vietnam--
and those they might get in Cambodia-for a "maybe.", !Moscow, 'at
the same time, appears to be launching a fresh campaign to woo
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the ASEAN countries--for example, by floating offers on new trade
deals and raising the possibility of a Shevardnadze trip to the
area this fall. It obviously hopes to elicit concessions from
the ASEAN states and other potential players in a Camboidian
settlement, while fingering China as the main obstacle to
progress.
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VII. ETHIOPIA/SUDAN
Chairman Mengistu is firmly in charge and is proceeding with
institutionalizing a Marxist-Leninist state in Ethiopia. His
attention currently is focused on the proposed Soviet-style
constitution now under review. When it is finalized, Mengistu
plants to proclaim Ethiopia a "People's Democratic Republic" to
succeed the "provisional government" he has headed since 1977.
He reportedly believes that the regional autonomy clauses of the
constitution will establish a political basis for an end to
Ethiopia's insurgencies. However, the Eritreans have already
rejected the premise and autonomy is unlikely to have much appeal
to the Tigreans and most other ethnic groups. We believe
Men.gistu will have no choice but to continue his pursuit of a
military solution to the insurgencies. Military activity in
Eritrea has been light over the past six months; Ethiopian forces
are in a defensive posture and there is no evidence of a planned
offensive. The Marxist Eritrean insurgents-with some 25,000
fighters--have conducted few military operations this year,
although they could move quickly to exploit government
weaknesses. In Tigray, the Marxist-led rebels--with;an estimated
15,000 effectives--rebuffed the regime's spring offensive and
continue to control most of Tigray province. The Soviets have
provided extensive arms and advisory support for Ethiopian
military efforts against the insurgents. Moscow has'supplied
over $3.5 billion in arms since 1977 and has approximately 1,700
military advisers and technicians in Ethiopia. Soviet advisers
are involved in a variety of command and staff functions,
including operational planning, political supervision, and
logistical support.
In neighboring Sudan, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi still
has not made much headway in consolidating power over the
civilian coalition government or winning the loyalty of the armed
forces. Infighting among Sudan's numerous political parties and
Sadiq's weak leadership have created a government where few
decisions are made. The long-festering insurgency in, southern
Sudan is a symptom of the fundamental division between northern
Muslim Arabs who control the central government and the southern
animists and Christians who identify with the African world. The
15,000-man insurgent group--John Garang's Sudanese People's
Liberation Army--receives weapons, training, and logistical
support from Ethiopia and reportedly gets occasional advisory
support from Soviet Bloc advisers. Mengistu sees support for the
SPLA as a lever that he will be able to use to force ;Khartoum to
stop what he sees as its support for Ethiopian insurg'ents. The
SPLA faces some 17,000 government troops whose logistics,
readiness, morale, and leadership problems have allowed the
rebels to gain the upper hand across most of the south. Recent
talks between Sadiq and Mengistu failed to resolve the tensions
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presents an immediate political threat to the Mengistu regime. L
between Sudan and Ethiopia.
The Soviets apparently see the northern insurgen'ci'es as a
difficult military problem for Addis Ababa, but not one that
the Soviets have often counseled
a settlement would give the Mengistu regime some breathing space
to rebuild the Ethiopian economy and expand the state and party
apparatus. However, the Soviets have not applied their primary
source of leverage on Mengistu on this issue--a cut-off of arms--
and we expect them to continue to provide arms and advisory
support for the Ethiopian military. We do not expect the
.tensions that arose in the aftermath of the coup in South Yemen--
when the Soviets pressured Mengistu to cease military support for
former Yemeni President Hasani--will have a significant effect on
Soviet-Ethiopian relations, in view of Mengistu's commitment to
Marxism-Leninism and lack of alternative military and? political
supporters. Over the next several years, the Soviets will push
for the transformation of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia into a
.broadly-based civilian Marxist-Leninist party, a process they
will facilitate by providing training to large numbers of party
officials. Over the longer run, the Soviets will look for the
party to consolidate Marxist-Leninist rule in Ethiopia, ensure
Soviet influence there, and guarantee continued Soviet access to
Ethiopian air and naval facilities.
The Soviets will likely proceed slowly toward warming
relations with Sudan. While Moscow welcomed the overthrow of the
staunchly anti-Soviet Nimieri, it views Sadiq as coming from the
same Sudanese establishment that produced Nimieri and questions
how far Sudan will dissociate itself from the US. During his
recent visit to Moscow, Sadiq sought to revive Soviet economic
projects.begun in the early seventies and to bolster the new
government's claims to nonalignment. He also may have broached
Sudan's need for spare parts for Soviet military equipment
purchased 15-20 years ago and sought relief from Ethi!.opia's
support for John Garang. The Soviets did not give Sadiq an
especially warm reception, however, and probably told him that
Ethiopia's support for Garang was related to Sudan's support for
the Eritreans. Moscow will probably continue to let Mengistu take
the lead with the SPLA, though it might pressure him to back away
from the group if it believed that Khartoum could be,brought
closer to the Soviet orbit.
Mengistu to explore the possibility of some kind of political
settlement with the northern insurgents, apparently in the belief
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SUBJECT: Key Third World Hotspots
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1 - C/DEIG/DID
1 - C/DEIG/DED
1 - C/SOVA/RIG
1 - C/SOYA/TWA
1 - C/SOVA/TWA/FA
1 - C/SOYA/TWA/ASIA
1 - C/SOVA/TWAO
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/08: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505210001-7