USSR: POSSIBLE MILITARY MANPOWER CUTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505230001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. Q C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 August 1986
DATE GI T=ILC~
DOC NO S0 VA 14 gl~; ao7$r )(
OIR 3 ....
P $ PD I
USSR: Possible Military Manpower Cuts
Summary
Ithe Soviets may soon
ilitary manpower_
_ __
i
n m
reductions
by Gorbachev's proposal for mutuai re u s*?from the Atlantic to the
Urals' and the allusion in his Vladivostok spee h to a possible
reduction of Soviet forces in Mongolia.
Although the Soviets would doubtless seek to portray any unilateral
cutback as a 'peace initiative,' we judge the real cause would be the
adverse demographic trends in the USSR. Since 1978 there has been a
sharp decline in the number of 18-year-old males, and recovery to the
mid-1970s level is not expected to occur until the end of the 1990s.
The military has had to make several adjustments to its conscription and
general personnel policies in recent years in an effort to maintain the
active-duty strength of the armed forces. This has added to the
pressure on an already stretched labor pool. The Soviet political
leadership, whose immediate priority is the domestic economy, has
probably become dissatisfied with the military's efforts to claim what
in effect is an increasing proportion of a shrinking pool. Under such
circumstances, even if cutbacks are not specifically ordered, the
military would have to find ways to accommodate a reduction in
manpower.
The demographic situation does not require cutbacks so drastic as
to reduce substantially the general readiness level of the USSR's armed
forces. While we cannot rule out such cuts, the military clearly would
resist strongly, and we doubt that the political leadership would force
anything radical. Reductions of up to a few hundred thousand might be
accommodated, however, and while they would not relieve the overall
labor force problems, they could have an important effect at the margin,
W is assessment was prepared b
Defense-Ecenomics
Division, and
European Assessments Division, of the Office of Soviet Ana~s~s. Z`ommenia and
questions are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Defense .Economics
Division or Chief, European Assessments Division
SOVA M 86-20078X
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particularly in certain areas such as the USSR's western industrial
heartland. Whatever their size, Moscow would certainly seek to exploit
the potential benefits of such cuts in terms of impact on world
opinion. The Soviets might open with an announcement of small, token
cuts to be taken unilaterally from Central Europe or Mongolia and at the
same time call for larger, mutual cuts by NATO and the Warsaw Pact and,
perhaps, by China.
The Evidence
these cuts would take
place over a period of three to six months, would focus on military personnel
nearing retirement age or in ill health, and in the Soviet case would be drawn
from ground forces stationed in the USSR. The exact base to which the io to
20 bercent would be applied was ambiguous, but a literal interpretation
would imply cuts of a half million in the soviet union.
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recent public pronouncements by General Secretary Gorbachev
and other Warsaw Pact leaders about possible troop cutbacks:
-- In early June, Warsaw Pact leaders issued an appeal to NATO to
join the Pact in reducing conventional and nuclear forces--both
troops and weapons--in Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic.
The appeal follows statements by Gorbachev in April that called
for initial reductions of 100,000 to 150,000 troops by each
side. Further cuts, to be completed by the early 1990s, would
result in overall reductions of about 25 percent (more than
500,000 men) from each side's present force level.
-- In his 28 July Vladivostok speech Gorbachev announced that the
withdrawal of a "considerable number" of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan and the Far East is now being examined. This
follows numerous other public statements by Gorbachev in which
he has called for improving relations with China. Even an
essentially symbolic reduction of Soviet forces in this region
could be seen in Beijing as reducing one of the th obstacles"
to improved relations the Chinese have cited.
Demographic Concerns
Primarily because of demographic distortions created during World War II,
the USSR has been experiencing a decline in the number of 18-year-old males
since the mid-1970s that has led to increased competition for manpower between
the civilian labor force and the military forces. The number of males
reaching 18 in 1986 is only about three-fourths of the 1978 postwar peak, and
there is no quick recovery in prospect (see figure 1). Although the pool of
18-year-old males will begin to increase after this year, it will remain too
small to meet the conscription demand until the late 1990s. In fact, since
1980, the Soviets have had to initiate increasingly stringent draft policies
to maintain the existing size of the armed forces, which we estimate at 5.5
million. They have:
-- Virtually eliminated educational deferments.
-- Toughened standards for medical exclusions.
-- Conscripted men up to age 26 who had not been
inducted earlier.
-- Conscripted women with medical or certain other
specialized training.
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SOVIET ARMED FORCES CONSCRIPT REQUIREMENTS AND 18 YEAR-OLD MALES AVAILABLE
(THOUSANDS OF MEN)
Legend
BOUNDARY
CONSCRIPT DEMAND
MALES AVAILABLE
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Even if large troop reductions were to occur, Moscow would still face the
problem of ensuring that the resulting increases in the civilian labor force
took place in regions facing the greatest labor shortage. This might require
selectively reducing draft calls from labor-deficit areas in the western USSR
while continuing existing stringent practices in tapping the conscript pool
from Central Asia and other surplus areas. Such an approach probably would
face opposition from the military leadership, which traditionally has regarded
Central Asians--because of their limited technical and Russian language
skills--as suitable primarily for support functions, such as construction
percent--would exacerbate the labor shortage.
Indeed, this problem has become all the more acute in the face of
Gorbachev's modernization program with its emphasis on new equipment that will
require a more highly skilled labor force. The increasingly stringent
conscription policies the military has implemented have added to the pressures
on the labor pool. In fact, in his speech to the party plenum in June,
Gorbachev stated that industry was already short 700,000 workers. As a
result, the Soviet political leadership has probably become dissatisfied with
the military's efforts to claim what in effect is an increasing proportion of
a'shrinking pool. Under such circumstances, even if cutbacks have not yet
been specifically ordered the military would have to find ways to accommodate
a reduction in manpower.
Accommodating Manpower Reductions
Several options are available if the Soviets decide to reduce military
manpower. A straightforward demobilization of existing personnel before the
expiration of their service terms would augment the civilian work force on a
one-time basis. Alternatively, reduction of the number of men drafted
annually--currently about 2.2 million--would bring down force levels through
attrition as men ending their service are not replaced, and would expand the
labor force on an ongoing basis. Either approach would have to involve
substantial cutbacks to have a significant impact on the overall size of the
Soviet labor force which now numbers over 150 million. The Soviets might also
combine initial demobilization with reduced conscription rates, providing a
one-time boost in labor availability with smaller follow-on increments.
Finally, the Soviets could increase the role of women in auxiliary support
positions, but the military leadership would almost certainly not allow them
in combat or combat support units where they would be needed most. In any
case, drafting women--whose labor force partic' aip tion Irate is close to 90
.
USSR's western industrial heartland or among ur
Soviet efforts to maintain the armed services at its current size would
compound civilian labor problems. The civilian labor force, after increasing
by an average of 2 million new workers per year during the 1970s, is projected
to rise by less than 1 million per year during 1986-90. In addition, almost
all of this expansion will be among non-Slavic minorities in Central Asia,
predominantly rural peoples with below-average educational levels, weak
Russian language skills, and a traditional resistance to relocate for
employment purposes. Little or no labor force growth is ex ep cted in the
ban Slavs
I
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troops, rather than service in combat units. Moreover, it would require
lowering the proportion of Slavic personnel--thought by the overwhelmingly
Russian officer corps to be more competent--in combat units. It could also
exacerbate ethnic tensions both within and outside the military by opening the
regime to criticism for pursuing discriminatory policies for the benefit of
the Slavic majority.
Military Implications
Despite their advantages, force reductions would involve difficult
military choices. Of the 5.5 million men in the armed forces, some 1.2
million are noncombat service troops--construction, railroad, internal
security, and civil defense troops--that would not be counted in the US
definition of national security forces. Concentrating a large reduction in
these forces, such as construction and railroad troops, might prove self-
defeating. Such units provide substantial support services for the civilian
economy and are used particularly in areas where it difficult to attract
civilian workers. The Baikal-Amur Railroad in eastern Siberia, for example,
is being built principally by conscripts serving in the railroad troops. The
men released from such service meanwhile would be disproportionately Central
Asians and similar minorities, who probably would return to their labor-
surplus places of origin.
On the other hand a 15- to 20-percent reduction in the remaining 4.3
million troops
readiness throughout the Soviet armed forces. If the Soviets concentrated a
half-million-man reduction in the ground forces, which have 1.8 million men,
manning would be cut by almost 30 percent and a large number of units might
have to be eliminated from the force.
Such a cut would oblige the Soviets to make hard choices. Slightly over
half a million Soviet troops are stationed in Central Europe, and another half
million men are opposite China. Manning reductions of 30 percent in these
areas--opposite what the Soviets see as dangerous adversaries--would eliminate
the Soviets' capability to mount offensive operations there without months of
preparation. The Soviets might even see such weakened forces as unable to
guarantee credible defensive operations. Alternatively, large cuts in the
already poorly manned units in the Soviet interior could lead to the
disbanding of most of the force structure the Soviets plan to mobilize in a
major war, and would take months to reconstitute. For these reasons, large
l
k
y.
e
cuts in the ground forces seem unli
Even a smaller reduction could result in decreases in readiness.
example, a reauction UT Uriiy 1 ''14
uire reducing many ready divisions
re
q
5 percent -cou
about
to cadre strength, large reductions in support units, or some combination of
these steps, if it were taken entirely in the ground forces. It is likely,
therefore, that even this level of reduction would not be absorbed entirely by
the ground forces and support services, but would affect the other branches of
the armed forces as well, probably causing some reduction in readiness of all
forces
i
.
ve
components except, perhaps, the strategic offens
L
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Large reductions in force structure and organization--as opposed to
manning cuts in existing units--would also lower military manpower
requirements, but would be a major reversal of strategic thinking and
developmental trends in the general purpose forces during the past 15 years.
The large structural reductions in the ground forces made by Khrushchev in the
1950s and 1960s, for example, were justified by a Soviet judgment that war
l
arge
with NATO would be nuclear virtually from its outset and that
concentrations of conventional firepower were, therefore, unnecessary.
More recently, senior Soviet military officials including former Chief of
Staff Ogarkov have asserted that a war with the West is increasingly likely to
remain conventional, thus restoring the justification of mass and staying
power embodied in large standing general purpose forces. This conclusion
apparently has been a major cause for the expansion of the ground forces since
the early 1970s by a gradual increase in the number, type, and internal
structure of combat and support units. With their growing appreciation for
the need of a large force structure--which could be fleshed out by reservists
in an emergency--we doubt that any reductions the Soviets might announce would
result in a major reduction in the size of the general purpose force
structure. Severe reductions in manpower, even if leaving the structure
intact, would make the force incapable of any large-scale operations--even
i
on.
defensive operations--without large-scale mobilizat
Furthermore, any reduction in Soviet military manpower is likely to
complicate Moscow's management of its alliance relations. Most East European
raahic trends and
d
emog
members of the Warsaw Pact are also facing adverse
o et s
he
ho
S
,
European moves to reduce their armed forces. In the sixties, for example,
the Soviets successfully induced the East
cuts
f
,
orce
despite their own
Europeans to build up their own forces and to take on important operations in
the event of war with NATO. More recently, the Soviets tried to shelter the
forces of some of their allies from large troop cuts in the MBFR forum while
steadily pressing the East Europeans to slowly modernize and expand their
forces to keep pace with changes in Soviet operational thinking. Finally,
only last June, Soviet Marshal Kulikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact's
Combined Armed Forces, reportedly insisted that no reductions coi uld Ibe made in
member armies despite Soviet public calls for arms control.
Plausible Gambits
Although we do not rule out large cuts over a short period, they are less
likely because of their impact on readiness and force structure. Smaller cuts
over time--perhaps numbering as many as a few hundred thousand troops--are
plausible and could be carried out without seriously undermining Soviet
national security. For example, the Soviets could withdraw and reduce a few
divisions in Central Europe and several opposite China, eliminate some service
support and construction units in the interior, and reduce manpower in some of
it
l
s.
un
their aging air defense missile units and surface nava
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cuts as domestically destabilizing.
The East European regimes probably would view any massive cutbacks with
mixed emotions. Each would argue for a share of the cuts for their own forces
to relieve their beleaguered economies. While they would welcome small cuts
of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe, they probably would resist large
modernization programs in NATO.
An announcement of large cuts, though unlikely, would have a dramatic
political impact on several fronts. Such cuts would capture West European
interests across the political spectrum. The United States' staunchest allies
would come under strong domestic pressure to lean on Washington to
reciprocate--at least in the form of "grand" arms control proposals. The
numerous Soviet arms control offers of recent months--together with the
existing imbalance of forces in Central Europe--have fostered some cynicism in
Western Europe about Soviet machinations. Any pressure exerted by the allies
on Washington, moreover, probably would be tempered by a wait-and-see
attitude. In any event, the Soviets would strive to intensify the impact in
Western Europe with a simultaneous propaganda campaign playing on "pan
European" interests and Washington's alleged disregard of them. The Soviets
probably would calculate that their proposal would stiffen opposition in West
European capitals to the expensive US inspired conventional force
of relations.
In the short term, Gorbachev could possibly announce even smaller cuts--
on the order of several tens of thousands--hoping to reap maximum political
benefit both at home and abroad. To play to the international audience, he
could, for example, reduce and withdraw one or two divisions from Soviet
forces in Eastern Europe and/or one or two divisions in Mongolia. Withdrawal
and reduction of a large unit such as a division (about 10,000 men) would be
highly visible, and Gorbachev would claim it could be verified by the West.
He might even invite Western observers--perhaps sympathetic European
journalists--to "cover" the withdrawal ceremonies. Such a token withdrawal
would place the United States and its allies on the defensive without harming
Soviet strength or regional security. With major elections scheduled soon in
Great Britain and West Germany, leaders of these nations might feel forced to
respond to such an initiative. Withdrawals opposite China would begin to meet
one of the political "obstacles" the Chinese claim is impeding normalization
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I I
USSR: Possible Military Manpower Cuts
1
-- DCI
1
-- DDCI
1
-- DDI
1
-- Senior Review Panel
7
-- CPAS/IMD/CB
1
-- Chairman/NIC
1
-- NIO/USSR
1
-- NIO/EUR
1
-- C/ACIS
1
-- OIR/ASG
1
-- AC/CRES
1
-- C/IPC
1
-- C/DO/SE
2
-- C/DO/SE
1
-- D/ALA
1
-- D/EURA
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-- D/NESA
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-- C/PES/MPSS
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-- D/CPAS
1
-- D/OIR
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-- D/OEA
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-- D/OGI
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-- D/OIA
1
-- D/OSWR
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-- C/EURA/EED
1
-- C/EURA/WED
1
-- NIC/AG
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-- D/SOVA
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-- DD/SOVA
1
-- C/SOVA/NIG
1
-- C/SOVA/RIG
1
-- C/SOVA/RIG/EAD
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-- C/SOVA/RIG/TWAD
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-- C/SOVA/SIG
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-- C/SOVA/DEIG
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-- C/SOVA/DEIG/DED
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-- C/SOVA/DEIG/DED/DC
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-- C/SOVA/DEIG/DED/EI
1
-- C/SOVA/DEIG/DED/DEP
1
-- C/SOVA/DEIG/DID/SP
1
-- C/SOVA/DEIG/DID/IT
1
-- C/SOVA/DEIG/DID/DM
1
-- C/PDB Staff
1
-- C/SOVA/CI
1
-- C/FBIS/AG
DDI/SOVA/DEIG/DED/
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