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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505320001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
September 10, 1986
Soviet Views of Democratically-Oriented Change
and Economic Liberalization in the Third World
Summary
Soviet analysts for the most part have viewed the transition of
Third World military regimes to elected civilian governments as
working to Moscow's advantage. Such moves, they have claimed, often.
opened opportunities for leftist forces, improved political and
economic relations with the USSR, and seemed to accord with Soviet
ideological conceptions of Third World progression toward socialism.
Most Soviet observers, for example, have viewed the move toward
democracy in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay favorably, seeing in
these changes opportunities for local communists to prosper and for
improved Soviet political and economic ties.
This Memorandum was prepared for Ronald St. Martin of the National Security
Council by Office of Soviet Analysis, with a contribution
by Office of European Analysis. Comments and,queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division,
SOVA
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But recently, a series of such transitions have taken place -- in
the Philippines, Pakistan, and Haiti -- that has led at least some
Soviet observers to take a somewhat more skeptical attitude toward
the whole issue of democratization in the Third World. These
observers have expressed concern that the United States has
engineered transitions to new elite-dominated regimes that are still
willing to protect US interests while giving the appearance of
responding to popular pressure for change.
At the same time, the Soviets have also been generally critical
of Third World states when they liberalized their economies and
expanded economic ties with the West. Yet, the turn in recent years
of several socialist African states in this direction, recognition of
the limited Soviet resources available for foreign aid, and a desire
to avert economic disaster from premature leftist policies have led
most Soviet observers to conclude that some economic engagement with
the West is an unavoidable necessity. These observers have taken
solace from the fact that the USSR's military relationships with
these socialist states continue to endure and serve as a basis for
continued Soviet influence.
West European states have welcomed the democratizing and
liberalizing trends in the Third World, although they recognize that
newly democratic governments may prove more difficult to deal with on
issues such as international debt. The trend toward democracy has
also in some cases alleviated potential US-West European discord over
particular countries.
Introduction
Over the past four years several Third World states have moved from
authoritarian civilian and military regimes to democratic government or to
systems committed to a transition to democracy, while others have liberalized
ideologically-inspired socialist economies and turned to the West for economic
assistance. For example:
o In Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985), and Uruguay (1985), authoritarian
military rulers gave way to elected civilian governments.
o In the Philippines and Haiti (both 1986), autocratic leaders were forced
out of office.
o The military government in Pakistan held parliamentary elections, lifted
martial law, and turned over extensive responsibilities to a civilian
prime minister (1985-1986).
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o A number of West African socialist states including Guinea, Benin, Cape
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, and Mali that once looked to the USSR as a
development model and economic benefactor have moderated their socialist
economic policies and turned Westward for economic aid.
Over the past three decades the Kremlin has usually looked favorably on
political transition from military regimes to elected civilian governments. On
a practical level, this change frequently opened opportunities for previously
suppressed communist and leftist forces and removed what the Soviets described
as "artificial barriers", to diplomatic and economic relations with the USSR.
Moreover, political movement of this kind accorded with Soviet ideological
precepts that posited a historically-mandated progression from feudalism
through capitalism and "bourgeois democracy" to socialism. On the other hand,
Soviet observers were generally critical when Third World states liberalized
their economies, expanded trade with the West, and opened themselves to Western
investment, seeing this as a step toward eventual domination by "imperialism."
The situations raised above have posed some challenges for Soviet
international affairs analysts. Change in the democratizing states was not
necessarily entirely favorable toy the USSR or unfavorable to the West. Indeed,
in some cases the US appeared to be the agent and prime beneficiary of such
change. Also, the historically determined transition from pre-capitalist to
capitalist and socialist forms of national development proved to be a rocky
progression at best, and virtually impossible in many cases. Meanwhile, the
failure of socialist models of economic development and the frustration of
Third World socialist states with the Soviet Bloc's limited economic aid was
patently obvious to Soviet observers by the late 1970s, leading them to look
for new versions of "Soviet-approved" Third World development models.
The "New Democracies" of South America
Moscow's stake in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay was fairly limited under
the military regimes. The Soviets had diplomatic relations and varying levels
of trade with all three countries. However, Moscow and the military
governments -- particularly those in Brasilia and Montevideo -- had little in
common on foreign policy issues, and all three suppressed their national
communist parties to varying degrees. Soviet analysis of the implications of
the transition to civilian rule has concentrated on the following four
questions:
o Was change in a given country the result of pressure from internal
political forces, or was it orchestrated from outside by "imperialist
interests" -- the United States?
o How do these political and economic changes affect the prospects of
leftist -- especially communist -- forces in a given country?
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o What does the USSR stand to gain or lose in the realm of state-to-state
and economic relations?
o What are the chances that a country experiencing these changes will
reorient its foreign policy? Will the reorientation be favorable to the
USSR or, at least, unfavorable to the West?
Journalists and academicians who have examined the three cases
individually do not credit the United States with a significant role in
bringing about the end of military government. For example, Pravda and
Izvestiya articles at the time of the Argentine elections focused on the
actions of Argentine popular and "patriotic" forces -- left, center, and even
elements of the right -- in forcing the armed forces from power. Similarly, an
extended discussion of Uruguay in the academic journal Latinskaya Amerika did
not mention the United States at all in its description of the Uruguayan
political process.
In all three countries, Soviet publications saw the move to democracy
as favorable to leftist forces in general and communist parties -- which were
officially legalized by the new governments -- in particular, though this was
qualified by an acknowledgement of the relative weakness of the communists. As
the leader of the Brazilian Communist Party put it, the BCP "nowadays ...can
really breathe, think and feel." However, he noted that the communists had to
operate as part of a broad democratic front and not on their own, owing to
their organizational weakness and the strength of anti-communist elements in
Brazilian politics. TASS coverage of the December 1985 party congress of the
Uruguayan Communist Party followed a similar line, highlighting the ability of
the UCP to hold a conference legally after twelve years of repression, but
noting the need for the party to increase its numbers, to consolidate its links
to the working class, and to continue its participation in the "Broad Front" of
Uruguayan "democratic" parties.
Soviet observers have given an almost universally positive assessment to
the opportunities the New Democracies open for the USSR to improve diplomatic
and economic relations with the three states. For example, press coverage of
the visits of Brazilian Foreign Minister Setubal (December 1985), Argentine
Foreign Minister Caputo (January 1986), and Uruguayan Foreign Minister Iglesias
(July 1986) to the USSR prominently featured the growth in state-to-state
contacts and the potential for expansion of trade between the USSR and these
countries.
Soviet writings on the foreign policy implications of the New Democracies
do not forecast serious deterioration in the relations of these countries with
the United States. However, they do describe two trends favorable to the USSR.
First, they see all three moving toward "genuine non-alignment" that contrasts
favorably with the "pro-imperialist" stance of the military regimes, notably on
the issues of international debt, the new international economic order, and
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support for Non-Aligned Movement positions-on disarmament. Also, and perhaps
more significantly, several Soviet observers see the new governments as
inclined to oppose US policy in Central America, most prominently on Nicaragua,
and to reinvigorate relations with Cuba.
The positive Soviet assessment of the emergence of the New Democracies was
reflected in a December 1985 general treatment of the subject, by an official of
the Latin America Institute in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs journal
International Affairs. In the spring of 1986, however, an article by Vladislav
Chirkov in the "popular" foreign affairs magazine New Times painted a gloomy
picture. Chirkov argued that the US and international imperialism actually
prefer the bourgeois parliamentary democracies of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
to the military governments, the former being a more efficient system for
suppressing revolutionary forces and covering up exploitation'' by multinational
corporations. He implied that much of the optimism other commentators had
expressed on the potential for improved state-to-state relations and foreign
policy change favorable to the USSR was at least premature, if not entirely
misplaced. While Chirkov appears to represent a minority position, the
appearance of his article suggests that at least some figures; with policy
responsibility have doubts about the Kremlin's ability to take advantage of the
rise of the'New Democracies.
Haiti and the Philippines: Washington Exiles The Autocrats?
The predominant issue in Soviet discussion of events in Haiti and the
Philippines has been the role of the United States in bringing about the
deposition of the Duvalier and Marcos regimes. Soviet stakes in Haiti were
virtually non-existent under the Duvalier regime, which they painted as a
pliant tool of the US and multinational corporations. This line continued as
the basis of their analysis of the overthrow of Duvalier, described in a
New Times piece as a stage-managed American attempt to protect US interests
from popular upheaval. While some commentators have seen the beginnings of
real popular and anti-US opposition in Haiti that may offer some opportunities
favorable to the Soviets over the long run, the New Times correspondent notes
that the Haitians are politically inexperienced and that the US, while feeling
threatened by the unrest, still has a variety of options for maintaining its
control of Haiti's domestic and foreign orientation.
Soviet analysis of the situation in the Philippines has been less
clear-cut, in part because of the policy line that Moscow took during the
February 1986 elections. At the time, the Kremlin sought to appeal to
President Marcos by portraying him as a victim of US interference in internal
Filipino affairs. The Soviet media thus played the Marcos election "victory"
in straightforward fashion while implying that Corazon Aquino was the favorite
of the US and the Catholic Church. Coverage of subsequent events -- Marcos's
flight, and Aquino's assumption and consolidation of power --'has had a
schizophrenic quality. Some analysis has carried forward the election period
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line that Aquino is an inexperienced and pliant representative -of elite and
American interests. Other more recent coverage, including a Pravda article by
political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, has argued that the new government
does indeed represent some popular, "progressive," and potentially
anti-American elements. To date this debate has not been resolved, and likely
reflects a parallel debate in policy circles on how the USSR should proceed to
deal with Manila in the aftermath of the failure of its bid to court Marcos.
Influential Izvestiya political analyst Aleksandr Bovin and New Times
writer Vladislav Chirkov have looked at the general question of US ability to
"replace" leaders that have supposedly outlived their usefulness and suggested
that it could pose a threat to long-term Soviet interests in the Third World.
Bovin sees the US-orchestrated replacement of Duvalier and Marcos as an example
of American "neo-globalism" -- a policy of aggressive US political and military
involvement in the Third World -- designed to thwart pressure for genuine
revolutionary change. Chirkov, meanwhile, asserts that Chile's Pinochet and
Paraguay's Stroessner are next on Washington's list, to which Bovin has added
South African President Botha.
Pakistan: No Change On the Key Issue
Most Soviet coverage of Pakistan focuses on Islamabad's role in
Afghanistan, where, the Soviets claim, the regime of President Zia has
prostituted itself in the service of American imperialist objectives in return
for massive military and economic aid. Analysis of domestic political change
in Pakistan usually has been filtered through this prism.
The Soviet line that has emerged on Pakistan has acknowledged the fact
that some steps have been taken in a democratic direction but this is almost
always followed by sharp criticism of the Zia regime for not responding to
"popular demands" that it change its policy in Afghanistan. In the most
detailed analysis of the Pakistani political scene to date, the journal
Asia and Africa Today claimed that even though the military "was compelled to
manoeuvre and give civilians some secondary powers... the former basic trends of
government policy remain intact behind the facade of the 'independent' civilian
government." The article went on to state that "Pakistan's foreign policy,
which has not undergone any essential changes, provides a vivid example" of
this continuity and followed with an attack on Islamabad's role in Afghanistan.
Some Soviet commentators have suggested that what they describe as rising
popular opposition to the Zia regime will eventually lead either to its
downfall, or at least to a modification of its Afghan involvement, but none
seem optimistic that this will happen in the near future.
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The African Socialists Look to the West
The turn of several socialist African states -- Guinea, Benin, Cape Verde,
Guinea-Bissau, Congo, and Mali -- away from extreme centralization and state
control of the economy and toward the West for investment and economic aid*
contributed to a lively debate among Soviet international relations and
development specialists, with most of the controversy centered on the foreign
policy aspects of the issue. All of these states were dependent on the USSR
for military aid and supported Soviet approved positions in the international
arena.
On the domestic side, most Soviet observers have acknowledged that "real"
socialist development in sub-Saharan Africa is very difficult to obtain in the
short term due to most countries' lack of resources, the power of tribal,
religious, and other traditional elements, the absence of clearly
differentiated class forces, and the strong influence wielded by former
colonial powers in many countries. .These observers have argued that African
leaders trying to build socialism should proceed relatively cautiously,
avoiding "left extremist" policies -- notably overly ambitious nationalization
and agricultural collectivization -- that could retard overall economic
development and provoke a political backlash. As such, Soviet academic and
journalistic observers have expressed relatively little concern about the
domestic economic liberalization attempted in Guinea, Congo, Mali, and
elsewhere.
Soviet writing on the foreign policy implications of the turn of the
African socialists to Western countries for aid and to multinational
corporations for investment has provoked a wider debate encompassing several
schools of thought:
o The Traditionalists. A few Soviet theorists have argued that Third World
economic interaction with the West will inevitably promote neocolonialist
dependency and the eventual subjugation of socialist oriented states to
the capitalist world. They have usually advocated the elimination of
such ties with the "capitalist system of production and exchange" as soon
as possible.
o A Third World "New Economic Policy?" At least one Soviet theorist has
advocated an approach that has overtones of Lenin's New Economic-Policy
of the 1920s. This would involve taking maximum advantage of Western
aid, trade, and investment to build the national economy, which would
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presumably take on a more socialist form at some unspecified time in the
future. He is relatively unconcerned that this might lead the country in
an unfavorable foreign policy direction.
o A Middle Road. Most recent discussion has been dominated by the view
that trading with and accepting aid from the West is an unavoidable
necessity for socialist-oriented states in a "complex world economy,"
especially in view of limits to the Soviets' own ability and willingness
to provide economic aid. Some theoreticians have worried that this
interaction with the West could lead to gains in Western political
influence at the expense of the USSR, while others have expressed
confidence that a country's socialist orientation would not be in
jeopardy as long as proper political control was maintained by the Third
World government.
This question remains one of the more wide open subjects in Soviet
international relations theory, and no one line had emerged as a guide to
official views and policy. However, Moscow has not been forthcoming with the
kind of economic aid that might encourage these countries to move back into the
socialist fold, in spite of the fact that-the Kremlin is probably not pleased
with the departure from socialist forms and opening to the West. While
Moscow's limited response to the problem is probably to some degree a function
of economic constraints, we believe it also reflects a conclusion on Moscow's
part that it is its military relationship with these states that underpins the
Soviet position there and that as long as military ties are intact, the USSR
can afford to acquiesce in the socialists' turn to the West without
compromising its essential interests.
The West European Perspective
West Europeans have welcomed political democratization and economic
liberalization in the Third World, but recognize that domestic constraints may
make some newly democratic states more difficult to deal with on international
economic issues such as the debt. With the notable exceptions of Grenada, El
Salvador, and the Philippines, the US role in the democratization process is
generally considered to have been minor and its success is attributed more to
domestic conditions than to foreign influences, either US or Soviet.
Nevertheless, this democratization alleviates one potential source of US-West
European discord that the Soviets could otherwise effectively exploit.
The restoration of democratic rule in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, in
particular, is not strongly associated with specific US policies. Indeed, many
Europeans criticize the United States for not pressing more actively for
democratization in its Latin American "sphere of influence." This is
especially the case in Chile, where many Europeans would like to see stronger
US pressure on the Pinochet government, even though they recognize that the
opposition remains weak and divided.
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Paradoxically, in Central America and the Caribbean the, United States is
often criticized for being too active. Although the US military intervention
in Grenada has proved remarkably successful, the operation was criticized for
further legitimizing the use of force. In Nicaragua the West Europeans have
become increasingly critical of the Sandinistas' authoritarian turn, but they
believe that social conditions there require US patience and consider
Washington's funding of the Contras dangerous and probably counterproductive.
On the other hand, the strengthening of democratic rule in El Salvador, thanks
largely to US influence, is cautiously applauded, and Europeans have also
welcomed the tacit US support for the Duvalier regime's ouster in Haiti. In
the eyes of the Europeans, however, the major triumph of American diplomacy is
the Philippines, where they believe US support for the opposition at a critical
juncture ensured a peaceful changeover.
The liberalization of a number of centralized socialist economies in west
and southern Africa is welcomed since it opens up new markets' for European
products and investment. Europeans are not very optimistic about the chances
for democratization anytime soon inmost of these countries, but hope that
these minor steps may portend some political liberalization in the future. In
black Africa the Europeans see themselves as the principal point of African
contact with the West and would probably look askance at significant moves by
the US to increase its influence. South Africa is a major exception to this
rule. Although it remains a divisive issue in Europe, there is a common sense
-- outside of Britain -- that the US is in the best position to play a
moderating role and pressure the white regime to reform.
Overall, the West Europeans will continue to welcome any sign that the
United States is supporting democratic forces in the Third World. Western
Europe's socialist tradition, however, will probably continue to incline some
West Europeans to believe that US policymakers are too concerned about
fostering elections and inadequately sensitive to the need to strengthen the
social and economic underpinnings of democratic rule. This may provide the
Soviets with at least some opportunities to drive a wedge between the US and
its allies, but they will be hampered by the fact that, except for a few cases
such as Nicaragua, Chile, and the unique case of South Africa-- which evokes
ambivalence among West Europeans themselves -- the US and its,allies see eye to
eye on political and economic liberalization in the Third World: it is to be
encouraged.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Views of Democratically-Oriented Change and Economic
Liberalization in the Third World
DISTRIBUTION:
External .
Ronald St. Martin
National Security Council
SOVA/TWAD
EURA
Chief ?OVA/SIG_
Director, EURA
-Internal-_.---- -
Chief, SOVA/RIG
Chief, SOVA/DEIG
Chief, SOVA/NIG
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