SOVIET POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505420001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE
DOC NO /V/
OIR
P $ PD
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE, OF INTELLIGENCE
25 November 1986
Soviet Policy Toward Nicaragua
Summary
Over the last few years, the Soviet Union has seized new
opportunities to increase its influence in Latin America at the
expense of the United States. Next to Cuba, a key element in its
policy is Nicaragua. While seeking over the longer term to
establish a firmer strategic position in the region through
consolidation of the Sandinista regime, the Soviets hope to
exploit the Nicaraguan conflict to isolate Washington
diplomatically and encourage the Latin American Left.
The Soviets are playing for time. They see short-term risks
to their interests in precipitating a US ^i l?i tary move against
Nicaragua--and are thus probably wary of provoking Washington by
allowing the Sandinistas to obtain jet fighter aircraft in the
near term. Moscow appears to believe US resolve to oppose the
Sandinista regime will weaken by the 1988 US election. We expect
the Soviets--in conjunction with their Warsaw Pact partners and
Cuba--to continue, and indeed increase, their military and other
assistance to the regime. To avoid fueling the wrong side of the
debate in Washington, however, we expect the military aid to be
delivered with discretion for the time being.
General Secretary Gorbachev's projected trip to Latin
America next year reflects both the new activism in Soviet
foreign policy and a heightened interest in this region.
Moscow's perception of opportunity in the area was stimulated in
the late 1970s by the Sandinista victory and subsequently by the
political repercussions of the Falklands war and the
opportunities for penetration in South America offered by the
region's transition to democratic rule and its economic crisis.
Today, in Latin America, the Soviets see numerous possibilities
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Third WDrld Division, SOYA
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for enhancing their position and putting Washington on the
defensive. Moscow sees the potential for long-term gain as
gradually increasing, but, at the same time, it seeks to maximize
the prospects for near term advantage by exploiting its position
in Nicaragua.
Nicaragua in Soviet Strategy Toward Latin America
Moscow seeks to build a Marxist-Leninist state in a
Nicaragua that is militarily strong, economically stable,
institutionally unified, and responsive to Soviet political and
strategic interests.
-- In the near term, the struggle over Nicaragua provides an
opening for the Soviet presence in the region as
protection for an embattled regime, fuels anti-
Americanism, and complicates US relations with other Latin
American countries. It demonstrates the Soviets' capacity
to play a critical role in a prime US sphere of
influence. It strengthens, moreover, their capability, in
association with Cuba, to aid leftist forces and helps to
normalize the status of Cuba by highlighting its role as a
Latin patron to the besieged Sandinistas.
-- In the longer term, if the Sandinista regime can be
consolidated, it promises to create a platform for further
extending Soviet influence and supporting the Left in
Latin America. Inevitably, Moscow will press Managua--as
it has Cuba, Vietnam, and other Third World regimes--for
military concessions, such as air and naval access rights
and signals intelligence sites.
Soviet Assessment of Trends in Nicaragua
Despite the Soviets' continued public statements that the
United States is planning to intervene in Nicaragua and topple
the Sandinista regime, privately they reportedly believe that
their support of Managua is effective and that the Sandinistas
have a good chance of surviving.
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At the same time, the Soviets have a clear appreciation of
the problems that still must be surmounted during the near term
in Nicaragua: the potential for a more active insurgency,`
continued economic deterioration, and lingering internal
political opposition to Sandinista rule. They also understand
that their investment in Nicaragua co.1d be put at risk by their
own provocation of the United States, by ill-timed Sandinista
activities similar to 0rtega's?visit to Moscow in the spring of
1985, and by uncoordinated Cuban actions that might provoke a
harsh US response.
Soviet Actions
The Soviets--aided by their Warsaw Pact partners--are
meanwhile stepping up support for the Sandinistas in a variety of
ways.
Military Aid. Since 1982 Soviet military assistance to
Nicaragua has steadily risen (see Figure 1) , and thi s assi stance
has included helicopters and other equipment useful in combating
the insurgency. Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua so far
this year amounts to about 18,350 tons of materiel, up from 7,600
tons last year and 6,900 tons in 1984. Deliveries this year have
included at least 24 MI-8/17 and six MI-24 Felicopters, more than
doubling the helicopter inventory. Since 1984, support from the
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact has substantially declined, highlighting
the increasing share supplied by the USSR. .
Economic Aid and Advisers. The Soviets have also provided
increasing economic assistance and have encouraged other Bloc
states to do so as well. Moscow's aid alone this year is up
about 30 percent over 1985. Bloc support includes economic
credits, oil deliveries, and even scarce hard currency: East
Germany, for example, provides a greater share of hard currency
support than Moscow. The Soviet Union is also pressing Managua
to reorganize its economic institutions according to the Soviet
model. In the fall of 1985 and during 1986 Soviet Gosplan
experts visited Managua to examine Sandinista economic
performance and to advise the Sandinistas on reordering their
planning procedures.
Propaganda. The Soviets are supporting a major propaganda
effort to legitimize the Sandinista regime internationally,
especially within Europe and Latin America, and to isolate those
who oppose the regime. Moscow reportedly has advised the
Sandinistas that the best way to maintain the flow of necessary
Western economic support to Nicaragua is to'carry out the charade
of a multiparty state. According to the US.Embassy in Moscow,
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Vsevol od Ovchi nni kov , a Pravda commentator, speaking at a foreign
policy seminar at Patrice Lumumba University, stated that the
appearance of a multipart state provides Nicaragua with "good
camouflage."
Securit and Political Advisers.- --
Soviet and other Bloc advisers--especially Cubans and
East Germans--are working closely with the Sandinistas to
structure the Nicaraguan security apparatus along Cuban lines to
increase internal political control. Moscow is encouraging the
Sandinistas to consolidate and stabilize their power, to
reorganize their party, and to propagate their ideology more
deeply among the Nicaraguan population.
Diplomatic Support. Moscow's support for the Contadora
part of the Soviets' attempt to strengthen the
worldwide constituency supporting the Sandinista revolution.
Moscow calculates, in our judgment, that a treaty will never be
formalized, but that Soviet rhetoric favoring Contadora projects
an image of solidarity with the regional Latin powers involved in
the process and throws the spoiler role to the United States.
Near-Term Constraints
Despite the Soviets' enthusiasm for their Nicaraguan client,
there are limits to how far Moscow will go to protect the
Sandinistas. There are no indications, for example, that Moscow
contemplates taking direct military action in support of the
Sandinistas--a disinclination reportedly made'clear to both the
Nicaraguans and the Cubans. Moreover, since the 1983 invasion,
in our judgment, Moscow has been sensitive to the potential for a
harsh US response.
The plethora of material Moscow and its partners have
provided the Sandinistas in recent years clearly suggests that
they are committed to providing the military equipment the
Soviets judge Managua requires to defeat the insurgents. In the
near term this support is likely to include, at a minimum, more
helicopters, upg raded air defense equipment, trucks, mobile
artery, multiple rocket launchers, small arms, and training .
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To protect their interests, the Soviets and their Bloc
partners are also likely to continue and indeed increase economic
assistance to Nicaragua;.Soviet economic assistance in 1987, for
example, could be up to 50 percent higher than in 1986
Moscow is showing increasing irritation
with the waste and inefficienqy of the.Sandinista economy, but it
has tolerated such problems with other clients--as with Cuba and
Vietnam--and there are no indications it will turn off the
economic aid tap.
Assessing US Staying Power
Moscow
anticipates that US opposition to Managua will soften and that
the next administration will tend to accept the Sandinista regime
as a fait accompli. The recent US midterm Congressional
elections may have encouraged Moscow's hope that US backing for
the insurgents will decline even before the next election. This
judgment about US staying power would strongly counsel a Soviet
policy of playing for time, consolidating the Sandinista regime
internally, cultivating international opinion on behalf of
Nicaragua, and avoiding major risks or provocative behavior that
could play into the hands of the Reagan administration.
Moscow also probably calculates that Nicaragua has a more
generalized impact on other aspects of bilateral relations with
the United States, although it is not clear'how finely tuned such
calculations may be. The extent to which Moscow recently went in
trying to conceal the delivery of a Soviet shipment of more
helicopters to the Sandinistas is, perhaps, a measure Qf Soviet
sensitivity to this consideration.
Whether Moscow will deliver MIG-21s or other jet fighter
aircraft to Nicaragua is a ~ey test of how far the Soviets
calculate they ought to go. The weight of evidence leaves
little doubt that Nicaraguans have been trained to fly MIGs, and
such aircraft may already have been set aside in Cuba for
Nicaragua. The Soviets are sensitive to Washington's concern
about the introduction of these aircraft into Nicaragua, and they
almost certainly assume that?the present US administration would
attack such planes if they were discovered there. If the Soviets
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the calculation that a US attack would, once the dust had
settled, strengthen opposition in the United States to further
aid to the insurgents, or would, in any event, inflame opinion in
Latin America and Europe against the United States.
But Moscow probably finds the arguments for restraint more
compelling:
-- Even if the aircraft were not destroyed, they would not
add appreciably to the Sandinistas' ability to defeat the
insurgency.
-- Fallout from- a confrontation with Washington over the jet
fighters could affect the whole range of US-Soviet
bilateral issues, including other regional hotspots, a
possible summit, and arms limitation talks.
-- US destruction of the aircraft would once again expose
Soviet inability to defend a client against US military
power.
-- The act of introducing MIGs or other aircraft might well
be seen as provocative and alarming by Latin American
countries that the Soviets are wooing., such as Mexico.
Prospects for a Trade-Off?
there has been some talk in
Soviet official circles of possible "trade-offs" between Moscow
and Washington involving Nicaragua and other theaters of regional
conflict, including Afghanistan. We believe that the Soviets are
inclined to think in terms of "spheres of influence," although
not to accept the legitimacy of Washington's claims to vital
geographic interests. Indeed, according to the US Embassy in
Moscow, the chief of one of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's two
Latin America Departments claimed last year that the US-USSR
bilateral discussions on Central America signaled the end of the
Monroe Doctrine and legitimized a Soviet role in Central
America. It is quite conceivable, although we have no evidence
for it, that the Soviet leadership itself views its support of
the Sandinistas not only as a move to build Communism and extend
Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, but also as a
"counterweight" to US assistance to insurgencies against Soviet
clients elsewhere.
It would not follow from such thinking, however, that the
Kremlin is interested in or sees A realistic possibility of
cutting a deal with Washington. It is .unclear why the Soviet
leaders would be interested in "trading" Ni carag ua , since they
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apparently think that time is working on their side in
consolidating the Sandinista regime; and it does not appear, in
any event, that they think they now must choose between Nicaragua
and a client of higher priority. Equally, it is unclear what
sort of exchange Moscow would visualize to be acceptable in
principle or politically practicable for the current US
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SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward Nicaragua
External Distribution
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