(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000605520001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DATE
DOCNO SO k'M~~-~Oa
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P $ PD 1
Washington.D.C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 September 1986
Shevardnadze Visits Mexico:
i Working Moscow's Agenda
Summary
Heightened Soviet diplomatic activity in Mexico over
the last two years will accelerate this fall with Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's trip to Mexico City. The
trip will occur against a backdrop of intense Soviet efforts
to court Mexican media
The Foreign Minister's visit apparently was initiated
by Moscow for the primary purpose of laying the groundwork
for a Gorbachev visit to Mexico next year. It has, however,
a major diplomatic value in its own right. Besides possibly
leading to the signing of cultural and diplomatic protocols,
Shevardnadze's visit is aimed at bolstering some major
Soviet objectives in bilateral relations with Mexico,
including:
o Stimulating Mexico to step up flagging diplomatic
support for Nicaragua and other regional
revolutionary movements.
o Encouraging Mexico's participation in the
international 'peace? movement, especially the Group
of Six. One result of the visit could be a joint
statement endorsing peace and disarmament.
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division,
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Office
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o Maintaining strong bilateral ties in hopes of
press a longstanding Soviet request for a new
consulate on the US-Mexican border. F
While seeking progress in these areas, Moscow probably
does not believe the visit will result in any
breakthroughs. Mexico's current heavy economic dependence
on the United States is likely to limit Soviet ability to
influence Mexico's regional policy and discourage Mexico
from blatantly anti-US behavior. Mexico probably will also
still balk at establishing a Soviet consulate along the
Shevardnadze's Objectives
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's trip to Mexico City in
early October will feature the highest ranking Soviet
delegation to visit Mexico since 1959. The visit clearly
signals the priority Moscow assigns to strengthening the
relationship and will follow an increasingly well-worn
path. Over the last four years, the frequency of
parliamentary delegation exchanges has roughly tripled and
has included visits by the Soviet Ministers of Culture and
Trade, Ambassadors-at-Large, and other high-ranking
officials. In January and February 1986, the chief of the
Foreign Ministry's First Latin American Department made two
closely spaced visits, delivering a letter from Gorbachev to
Mexican President de la Madrid and, according to press
reports, discussing various international issues, including
the situation in Central America. Moscow also sent a
Supreme Soviet delegation in April to discuss Mexico's role
as an organizer of the Five Continent Peace Initiative--the
Group of Six, which includes Mexico, Tanzania, Argentina,
Greece, Sweden, and India--and followed that with a second
such delegation in July.
While the principal rationale for the trip probably is
to firm up a Gorbachev visit next year, we expect the Soviet
Foreign Minister to focus on several themes during his
Support for Contadora. Support for Mexican involvement
in the Contadora process has been a major theme in Moscow's
propaganda, and we expect Shevardnadze to work the subject
into his public and private discussions. The Soviets began
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Shevardnadze may, for example,
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in 1983 to display increasing eagerness to have Mexico play
a larger regional role in Central America, hoping to build
up regional pressure against the United States to force it
into a less "interventionist" stance in the area
But Moscow came to its position of
supporting the Contadora process somewhat slowly; t-hroughout
1983 and early 1984, the Mexican Ambassador to Moscow
repeatedly requested more public Soviet support of th-e
Contadora peace initiative. The Soviets at first demurred,
declaring that overt Soviet backing might sabotage
Contadora's legitimacy as a regional initiative, according
to Embassy reporting. By mid-1984, however, a visiting
Soviet delegation issued a joint communique with the Mexican
Government endorsing the Contadora process--if not every
detail of the Contadora proposals--as a route to peace in
Central America. The delegation was featured prominently in
Pravda and Izvestiya, and Soviet academic journals began to
publish articles supporting Contadora. As US criticism of
Nicaragua increased, the Soviet press increasingly praised
Mexico's role as a regional peacemaker while disparaging
what it termed US efforts to pressure Mexico into distancing
The upturn in Soviet enthuasism for Mexican involvement
in regional affairs took place, however, at a time when
Mexico's enthuasism for it was waning. Driven by the
economics of a disintegrating economy dependent on US
financial support, Mexico's growing disenchantment with the
course of the Sandinista revolution, and the new Mexican
President's more conservative bent, Mexico began backing
away from its support of Nicaragua in 1982 and has more
recently backed away from, although not abandoned, Contadora
Plugging Arms Control. Another standard line in Soviet
propaganda in Latin America--one we expect Shevardnadze to
press--is the need for countries in the region to he active
in supporting arms control positions favored by the USSR.
As a member of the Group of Six that is urging the
superpowers to pursue nuclear disarmament, Mexico is likely
to provide a receptive audience. Both Soviet and Mexican
media have devoted extensive coverage to Mexico's
participation in the Group's disarmament initiative. Moscow
has used the issue to play to Mexico's aspirations as a
Third World leader, to tout its own nuclear test ban, and to
portray the United States as a nuclear superpower bent
sustaining hegemony over the Western hemisphere.
Roosting Moscow at Washington's Expense. We assume
S h e v a r n a z e w i l l also attempt to iscre irthe United
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States by playing up what Moscow characterizes as
traditional Soviet-Mexican affinities--a common
revolutionary heritage and mutual opposition to US
"interventionist" policies. Soviet-Mexican diplomatic
relations were established in 1924 in part because of
Mexico's determination to demonstrate its independence from
the United States and Moscow's desire to gain international
legitimacy wherever possible and to establish its influence
in the Western hemisphere. The same impulses, in our
judgment, continue at least partially to affect relations
between Mexico and the Soviet Union today.
Last year, however, de
la Madrid denied a Soviet request for a port visit by two
Soviet warships, apparently to avoid aggravating the United
States.
Working the Mexican Media
In pushing these lines, Shevardnadze will be working
against a backdrop of stepped-up Soviet Bloc activity in
recent years to increase Moscow's influence in the Mexican
media and among Mexican elites in general.
The Soviet press corps in Mexico has meanwhile nearly
doubled this .year, increasing from eight to 15
and Soviet influence in the llexican
media is apparently extensive. Soviet wire services
routinely place about 10 articles a day in local newspapers,
including the official government paper, El National, and
the most influential daily, Excelsior. Both papers together
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The Soviets have also stepped up their efforts to
discredit the United States by playing up US-Mexican discord
in Soviet media, through placements in Mexican media, and
through diplomatic channels. The Soviet Ambassador, who is
widely quoted by the Mexican press, has frequently
criticized Washington--in particular charging that-it has
used the drug problem to interfere in Mexico's internal
political affairs. More recently, Soviet media have -
portrayed the United States Senate hearings on Mexico as an
attempt to punish Mexico for its independent foreign
policy. According to the US Embassy in Mexico City, the
Soviets are also behind recent stories in the Mexican press
alleging that US nuclear testing was responsible for the
earthquakes Mexico experienced in September 1985.
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Other Targets for Influence
Outside the ruling party, Moscow's range of contacts is
extensive, but--probably to avoid undermining friendly
relations--the Soviets do not openly court subversives and
revolutionaries who, they currently .fudge, have litt
The USSR, along with Cuba and Bloc countries, is also
trying to create a bridge to Mexican students and youth
through university contacts, academic exchanges, and
scholarships. The Soviets maintain an active academic
exchange program--sending at least 10 Soviet professors a
year to Mexico for six-month exchanges, as well as others
who attend conferences throughout the year. Soviet academic
contacts with Mexico center on the National Autonomous
University (UNAM), which most Soviet exchange students
attend,
Mexican academics occasionally travel to Moscow on
exchange as well, and a number of Mexican faculty members at
UNAM received their training in the USSR,
Soviet scholarship effor s have bee less
successful. A small number of Mexican students study on
exchange in the USSR, and the US Embassy reports that the
Mexican Government has stipulated that only graduate
students may participate in such exchanges on the grounds
that undergraduates are less mature and too easily
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As with Soviet missions elsewhere in the Third World,
Moscow's presence in Mexico is far beyond the size necessary
to conduct official political, cultural, and economic
functions. Soviet-Mexican economic relations, for example,
total less than 1 percent of Mexico's annual foreign trade,
but the Soviets have 42 commercial officers in Mexico.
Moscow's diplomatic presence, meanwhile, continues to
expand, growing from 129 to 147 official representatives in
the past year. The Soviets have also made repeated requests
for additional consulates in the border towns of Tijuana and
Mexicali--a request the Foreign Minister may reiterate
during his visit. The sole purpose of such posts, if
established, would he to serve as intelligence outposts on
the US border. The Mexicans have denied these requests,
prohahly out of concern over the US reaction, but have
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allowed the Soviets to set u a consulate in the coasts
resort city of Veracruz.
Outlook
Although Shevardnadze will press Soviet policy aims
across the entire spectrum of issues, Moscow probably does
not expect the visit to bring any diplomatic breakthroughs.
Ostensibly, the visit appears calculated to reaffirm Soviet-
Mexican ties and provide a forum for mutually admiring
rhetoric on disarmament. Yet, despite the visit and the
Soviet's' broad-based efforts to influence Mexico's regional
policy, Mexico's economic dependence on the United States
remains beyond Moscow's control and places a check on how
far Mexico will go to accommodate a specific Soviet wish
list.
The Soviets, meanwhile, will continue to play on US-
Mexican discord in the media and among Mexican elites in an
attempt to discredit the United States and undermine its
influence. This tactic, combined with diplomatic gestures
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that appeal to Mexico's desire to be recognized as an
important hemispheric and global actor, will maintain and
perhaps strengthen relations, especially if US-Mexican
tensions continue to grow over sensitive issues such as
narcotics trafficking, electoral fraud, and Central
America. Mexico is unlikely to grant Moscow a new
consulate along the US-Mexican border in the near future,
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SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Visits Mexico: Working Moscow's Agenda
External Distribution
NSC
Ambassador Jack Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
USSR-Eastern Europe
NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
Raymond F. Burghart
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director
for Latin American Affairs
NSC
Room 391, Old EOB
William Perry
Director for Latin American Affairs
NSC
Room 395, Old EOB
Stephen Sestanovich
Senior Director, Policy and Development
NSC
Room 376A, Old EOB
George Van Eron
Intelligence Coordination
NSC
Room 381, EOB
Ronald St. Martin
Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old EOB
Col. Tyrus W. Cobb
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 361, Old EOB
Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
NSC
Room 298, Old EOB
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External Distribution (Continued)
Ambassador Anne Armstrong
Chairman, FIAB
Room 340, Old EOB
Peter R. Sommer
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 368, EOB
Paula J. Dobriansky
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 368, EOB
Robert Lilac
Director, Political-Military Affairs
NSC
Room 391, EOB
State
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Department of State
Elliott Abrams
Assistant Secretary for Latin
American Affairs
Room 7802, Department of State
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, Department of State
Steve Coffey
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
of Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
William G. Walker
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Central America
Room 6263, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Visits Mexico: Working Moscow's Agenda
External Distribution (Continued)
State
The Honorable Vernon A. Walters
US Ambassador to the United Nations
US Mission to the UN
Department of State
Alan L. Keyes
Assistant Secretary of International
Organization Affairs
Room 6323, Department of State
William H. Courtney
Office of International Security Policy
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Room 7244, Department of State
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
of State Security Assistance, Science
and Technology
Room 1206, Department of State
Richard N. Holwill
Director of Caribbean Affairs
Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs
Room 3248, Department of State
Henry S. Myers
Executive Assistant to the Director, INR
Room 6531, Department of State
Jerome H. Kahan
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Functional Analysis and Research
Intelligence and Research Bureau
Room 6535, Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
Robert H. Baraz
Director, INR/SEE
Room 4758, Department of State
Wayne Limherg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Visits Mexico: Working Moscow's Agenda
External Distribution
State
Richard H. Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311, Department of State
V. James Fazio, Jr.
INR-IS
Room 6510A, Department of State
Robert Fouche
Director, INR/IAA
Room 7538, Department of State
David G. Smith
Chief, INR/IAA/MAC
Room 7637, Department of State
Arthor P. Shankle, Jr.
Director, Mexico
Bureau of Inter-Amercian Affairs
Room 4258, Department of State
Everett Briggs
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Room 6263, Department of State
Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 40840, Pentagon
Col. David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3A948, Pentagon
Nestor D. Sanchez
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Inter-American Affairs
Room 4C800, Pentagon
Col. John A. Cash
DIO for Latin America
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Visits Mexico: Working Moscow's Agenda
External Distribution
DoD
Defense Intelligence Agency
JS1-2C
Room 1C294, Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political
and Military Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, Pentagon
GCO/NSA
PO 532
2W1111 Fort Meade, Md.
D/NSA Special Assistant
Q42
Room 9A171, Fort Meade, Md.
Other
DIA/RTS-2C2
Bolling AFB
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SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Visits Mexico: Working Moscow's Agenda
Internal Distribution
1 - D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
1 - ED/DCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI
1 - Senior Review Panel
6 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
1 - Vice Chairman, NIC
1 - NIC/AG
1 - NI0/USSR
1 - NI0/LA
1 - PDB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - OCA/DDI Rep.
1 - D/ALA
1 - C/ALA/MCD
2 - C/ALA/M
1 - D/SOVA
1 - DD/SOVA
1 - SA/SOVA
1 - C/ES/CIB
1 - C/SOVA/RIG
1 - C/SOVA/NIG
1 - C/NIG/DPD
1 - C/NIG/EPD
1 - C/SOVA/SIG
1 - C/SIG/FSD
1 - C/SIG/SPD
1 - C/SO VA/DEIG
1 - C/DEIG/DED
1 - C/DEIG/DID
1 - C/SOVA/TWA
1 - C/SOVA/TWA/FA
1 - C/SOVA/TWA/A
1 - C/SO VA/TWA/AFLAME
1 - SOVA/TWA/AFLAME Chrono
1 - SO VA/TWA/AFLAMEF
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