NORTH KOREA'S COMPETITION WITH THE SOUTH HEATS UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 21, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86TO1017R000605600001-3
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
21 January 1986
North Korea's Competition With the
South Heats Up
Summa ry
Since the late 1960s, North and South Korea have
competed fiercely for diplomatic recognition and
political influence as well as for allies who would
back them. In recent months, Peru has been the
focus of a particularly intense struggle, with each
side using proven economic and diplomatic tactics.
Despite the 11th-hour setback to P'yongyang's
efforts to secure diplomatic recognition from Lima
last November, when pressure from Seoul as well as
dissension in Peru altered President Garcia's
decision, the North is unlikely to give up the
struggle to expand into traditionally "South Korean"
territory in Central and South America. We also
expect the Korean rivalry to escalate, particularly
in Africa, as P'yongyang tries to drum up support
for its faltering bid to cohost the 1988 Olympics
or, if this fails, to lead a boycott of the games in
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 8 January 1986 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia
Division OE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86TO1017R000605600001-3 25X1
Seoul. North Korea may cooperate with the Soviet
Union in the Third World on a case-by-case basis,
but its major activities, in our view, are driven by
a desire for international prestige and support for
its reunification goals, rather than issuing from an
assigned role as a Soviet surrogate.
Longstanding Rivalry
Over the past two years, P'yongyang has escalated its
diplomatic competition with Seoul to refurbish its international
standing following the 1983 Rangoon bombing and Seoul's success
in winning sponsorship of the 1986 Asian Games and 1988
Olympics. In particular, North Korea is attempting to secure new
footholds in Central and South America, where the South has made
extensive inroads, and to hold its own in the Caribbean, where
Seoul has mounted its own diplomatic push. Only 10 of 33
countries in the region formally recognize North Korea and only
four resident rth Korean ambassadors are in place. (See
chart.)
P'yongyang faces an uphill battle. South Korea has been
skillful in depicting North Korea as a pariah state that foments
insurrection and subversion, an image that strikes a responsive
chord with many Latin American leaders concerned about external
powers meddling in domestic politics. For example, in 1985 the
South Koreans told Peruvian leaders they had "conclusive proof"
that two Sendero Luminoso terrorists were trained in North Korea
in the 1970s--a charge we have been unable to confirm. Seoul
almost certainly has spread other information about North Korean
activities in Latin America. Moreover, North Korea's reputation
as a provider of clandestine training, and efforts by local
groups to find benefactors, undoubtedly aid the South Korean
cause. As a case in point, press releases after the US
intervention in Grenada in October 1983 revealed the existence of
secret treaties under which North Korea, Cuba, and the Soviet
Union agreed to provide free weapons and ammunition to the
leftist Bishop regime. The South Korean Foreign Ministry
publicized North Korean activity in Grenada as an example of
P'yongyang's attempt to "export" Communist revolution to Central
Seoul has a substantial advantage over P'yongyang when it
comes to offering aid or increased trade. In recent months,
South Korea has used this leverage to best the North in the
Caribbean, winning recognition from the Bahamas, St. Christopher-
Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago. These gains are probably all the
more disturbing to the North because of P'yongyang's setbacks in
the region and the generally more conservative political trends
there in the aftermath of the Grenada episode. P'yongyang's
mission was expelled from Grenada in November 1983, and according
to sources of the US Embassy in Bridgetown, the North's relations
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86TO1017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
25X1
with St. Vincent have deteriorated to the point of virtual
nonrecognition.
Countries that are targets of the competition between North
and South frequently play the rivalry to their own advantage.
Some have withheld recognition of South Korea or accreditation of
its ambassadors (Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana) or
threatened to recognize North Korea (Bolivia, Argentina, and
Peru) in order to extract commercial concessions. Recognizing
that money speaks louder than proselytization in many developing
countries, Seoul has been willing to endure imbalanced trade t
block its rival.
North Korean Tactics in Peru: A Case Study
Peru has been the site of intense North-South rivalry during
the past year. North Korea established a trade office in Peru in
1974; in 1981, following an exchange of official visits and a
North Korean pledge to support Peru's claim of 200-mile
territorial waters, P'yongyang almost won diplomatic
recognition. With promises of its own, however, South Korea
convinced President Belaunde to postpone recognition
indefinitely. The North next focused on the American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance Party (APRA) and its presidential
candidate, Alan Garcia. The North Koreans gave Garcia the red
carpet treatment during two highly publicized visits to
P'yongyang in 1983 and 1984. Even more important, according to
sources of the US Embassy in Lima, P'yongyang helped Garcia
finance his campaign.
The North Korean effort in Peru typifies P'yongyang's use of
two important policy tools--political funding and "trade
Funding. Financial backing for local political groups is a
common North Korean tactic. For example, the North is trying to
use financial support to revive its influence in Jamaica, where
its presence dates from the beginning of Michael Manley's tenure
as Prime Minister in 1974. Throughout the 1970s, North Korea
maintained an active embassy that performed normal diplomatic
functions and probably--like P'yongyang's other missions--
conducted smuggling and black marketeering in order to fund the
post. With Edward Seaga's election as Prime Minister in 1980,
North Korean influence declined as Jamaica shifted politically
from left to center.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T0 i 1017R000605600001-3 25X1
Kecent reporting from the US Embassy in Bridgetown indicates that
North Korea is seeking out and offering financial support to "up
and coming leftist" politicians elsewhere in the Caribbean in the
h
ope of consolidating its position there.
The Trade Office Connection. P'yongyang's trade office in
Lima was a major element in the North Korean campaign for
recognition. The trade offices have frequently been used as a
first step toward more formal ties. For example, in 1984,
following President Mitterrand's campaign promise to recognize
P'yongyang, North Korea upgraded its "commercial delegation" in
Paris to a "general delegation," but South Korea, with US
support, intervened to prevent further expansion of ties. With
the low volume of trade between Peru and North Korea, the Lima
office, in practice, is largely dedicated to political activities
and serves as a base for North Korea's operations elsewhere in
the region. In addition to activities in Peru, trade office
members have tried to foster pro-North Korean cultural and
friendship associations in Colombia, Honduras, and Mexico, and
traveled to capitals where there is no official North Korean
presence. Like the trade offices, friendship associations have
served P'yongyang as a foot in the door, and a means to win the
establishment of diplomatic missions.
Together, funding and trade office tactics in Peru won the
support of some of Garcia's senior advisers. As early as March
1984, APRA parliamentarian and Garcia confidant Carlos Roca told
US Embassy officials in Lima that the new APRA government would
establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. In the months
following Garcia's July 1985 inauguration, recognition of
P'yongyang seemed increasingly likely. By October, all reporting
indicated that Garcia would establish relations with North Korea
South Korean Countermoves
Between July and October, South Korea responded to the
North's apparent success by using one of its most effective
weapons--economic inducement. According to US Embassy officials
in Lima, Roca said that a South Korean diplomat had warned that
Seoul might reconsider its large annual purchase of iron ore if
Peru recognized the North. President Chun Doo Hwan also sent a
special envoy to discuss bilateral trade cooperation with the new
Peruvian administration. In addition to the carrot-stick
approach, South Korea asked the United States to oppose a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
Peruvian movement toward recognition. In early November, Foreign
Minister Allan Wagner notified the North Korean trade office that
bl
h
esta
is
ment of relations would be postponed indefinitely.
We believe Peru's last-minute reversal reflects South
Korea's success in capitalizing on a division among Garcia's
advisers on the issue. APRA moderates won out, perhaps only
temporarily, by persuading Garcia that Peruvian interests would
be better served by placating South Korea while offering the
North a gradual upgrading of its status. Specifically, Garcia's
advisers proposed opening a Peruvian trade office in P'yongyang
and holding out the possibility of establishing consular
relations should North Korea expand trade with Peru. If trade
increased sufficiently (and, by implication, if South Korea did
not extend a generous counteroffer), Peru would then establish
diplomatic relations with North Korea.
Still hoping for formal recognition, North Korea rejected
this plan, according to sources of the US Embassy in Lima.
Because of apparently shifting coalitions among APRA advisers,
however, Garcia may be reconsidering his decision. In late
November, APRA Secretary General Armando Villanueva spoke
favorably of North Korean recognition on Peruvian television.
Furthermore, Roca, who had been out of the country when Wagner
summoned the North Koreans, has returned to Peru and is lobbying
on P'yongyang's behalf. In the near term, Garcia's concern about
Peru's relations with the United States may temper his actions
toward North Korea. According to the South Korean ambassador to
Lima, in late December Garcia asked for Seoul's assistance in
serving as a bridge to Washington.
Outlook: In Peru and Beyond
Given Garcia's vacillation on the recognition issue, North
Korea is certain to continue pressing, and South Korea will
remain alert for a shift in Peru's position. Garcia's
ambivalence and the lack of unanimous support for recognition
among his advisers also may require North Korea to sweeten its
offer with substantial financial commitments.
(would be politically
unwise to accept free weapons. Instead, Vice Minister of the
Interior Maximo Mantilla made an official visit to P' on ang in
early January 1986 to buy the rifles at cost. 25X1
Even if P'yongyang attempts to increase trade and economic
aid, however, it will be hard to outdo Seoul, which has announced 25X1
plans to increase trade and chnological ties with Peru Br
and Panama 25X1
Seoul p l a n s u its economic activit
i
y
n
the region, hoping to increase indirectly its exports to the 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3 25X1
United States by encouraging the private sector to build
factories in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries. Using
local labor, the factories would finish or repackage Korean
goods, such as cameras, photo albums, and luggage.
We believe that the late 1980s will be a critical period for
North Korean diplomacy. P'yongyang's international standing,
already undercut by the Rangoon bombing, will be further eroded
if it cannot generate some Third World support for either its
cohosting or a boycott of the 1988 Olympics. The North's
pretentions to a leadership role in the Third World almost
certainly will lead it to seek international backing for its
position on reunification in the North-South talks as well. In
the North-South dialogue, P'yongyang has projected an image of
cooperation while accusing Seoul of insincerity and stalling.
Third World forums in the past have given the North opportunities
to contend that its anti-US and anti-South Korean arguments have
broadly based fraternal support. F__1 25X1
On the basis of its behavior in Latin America and elsewhere--
evidenced by recent high-level visits to Indonesia, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Singapore--we believe that North Korea has tried to
repair its international reputation since Rangoon by adopting a
moderate tone in discussions with Third World governments. The
shift in tactics, in our view, has been driven in part by North
Korea's failure to achieve its goals through unconventional means
such as bribery, blackmail, kidnaping, and assassination, pushing
P'yongyang to choose consciously to foster a public image of
respectability. Nonetheless, the North obviously retains the
option of choosing other methods, if its more conventional
approach does not produce results.
The North Korean trade office in Lima--P'yongyang's only
representation in South America outside Guyana--will probably
continue to push the North's cause actively, seeking to establish
new ties, as well as to maintain current ones, check Seoul's
influence, and mobilize support for P'yongyang's longstanding
demand for withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. The North
will probably be most tenacious in its drive for diplomatic
recognition in countries where it has already made substantial
investment in opposition leaders 25X1
P'yongyang's softer line will probably continue to 25X1
include promoting cultural and study groups, such as those
already in place in Honduras, Mexico, and Colombia. Even so, we
expect the North to keep alert to opportunities for intervention
in countries with economic or political problems--Bolivia,
Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, for example--where
P'yongyang can offer funds or arms to insurgents. 25X1
Because P'yongyang has long kept its distance from Moscow,
we do not believe that the improved Soviet-North Korean
relationship will produce a coordinated approach to intervention
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
in the Third World soon. North Korea has sometimes worked with
other activists, such as Cuba and Libya, to gain influence in
South and Central America. All three, for example, made
financial contributions to political campaigns in Jamaica and
Dominica. More often than not, however, P'yongyang appears to be
in competition with Havana and Tripoli--and running a distant
third place. Overall, P'yongyang's activities will continue to
derive more from a unique1 Korean struggle than from the larger
East-West competition. 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
North and South Korea Diplomatic Relations, 1985
Regional total: 33 countries 10 North Korea
31 South Korea
Caribbean
North Korea
South Korea
Antigua-Barbuda
no
yes nonres.)
Bahamas
no
yes
Barbados
yes
(nonres.
yes
Cuba
2
yes
no
Dominica
yes (no amb.)
yes
Dominican Republic
no
yes
Grenada
no
yes (nonres.)
Haiti
no
yes (nonres.) 3
Jamaica
yes
yes
St. Christopher-Nevis
no
yes (nonres.
St. Lucia
yes (nonres.)
yes (nonres.
St. Vincent-Grenadines
yes (no amb.)
yes
(nonres.
Trinidad and Tobago
no
4
yes
Total of 13 countries
Central America
North Korea
South Korea
Belize
no
no
Costa Rica
no
yes
El Salvador
no
yes
Guatemala
no
yes
Honduras
no
yes
Mexico
yes (no amb.)
yes
Nicaragua
yes
yes (no amb.)
Panama
no
yes
South America
North Korea
South Korea
Argentina
no
yes
Bolivia
no
yes
Brazil
no
yes
Chile
no
yes
Colombia
no
yes
Ecuador
no
yes
Guyana
yes5
yes
(no amb.)
Paraguay
no
yes
Peru
no (trade office)
yes
Suriname
no
yes
Uruguay
no
yes
Venezuela
yes (nonres.)
yes
'South Korean Ambassador to Barbados is concurrent to Antigua-
Barbuda, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent-
Grenadines.
2North Korean Ambassador
3South Korean Ambassador
4South Korean Ambassaodr
Grenada.
5North Korean Ambassador
Barbados.
is concurrent to Venezuela.
to Venezuela is concurrent to Haiti.
to Trinidad-Tobago
to Guyana is concurrent to St. Lucia,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3
SUBJECT: North Korea's Competition With the South Heats Up
Distribution:
Original - Author
1 - Harriet Isom, State/EAP/Korea
1 - Celia Conlon, State Department
1 - Bill Eaton, State/INR
1 - Jay Sloan, DIA/DIO/Korea
DDI/OEA/NA/
1 - NIO/EA (7E-62)
1 - C/PPS/DO (D01)
1 - C/EA/L5E18)
1 - OGI/IIC/PI
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch
1 - OEA/NEA Division
1 - OEA/China Division
1 - OEA/SEA Division
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - C/Research/OEA
1 - FBIS Analysis Group
1 - D D I
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - PDB Staff (7F30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7GO7)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G50)
1 - C/PES (7F24)
1 - NIC/AG (7E47)
1 - DDO/EA Division (5DOO)
1 - ALA/MC D/CAR
1 - ALA/SAD/AN
1 - DDO/EA
1 - nnn/FA
Korea /
(21 January 1986)
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000605600001-3