KOREAN COMPETITION IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AT STAKE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000605890001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE 3 ) 3 I ~5 to
DOCNOCA Mnl-0041
P&PD
OCR 3
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 March 1986
Korean Competition in Africa: International
Prestige at Stake
Summary
North Korea's renewed drive to win allies at
South Korea's expense has made little headway in
Africa, where expulsions, contract cancellations,
and a rejection of the cohosting idea by African
Olympic committees capped a bad year for
P'yongyang. North Korea was asked to leave Uganda,
Lesotho, Seychelles, and Somalia, and now its
military presence in Madagascar is threatened
because of dissatisfaction with the high cost and
poor quality of its equipment and training.
Despite such setbacks, we expect North Korea
will keep pressing for Third World political
support; P'yongyang is especially active when it
sees an opening or need to score a diplomatic or
propaganda victory in its global competition with
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 27 March 1986 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia
EA M 86-20041
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South Korea--and the 1988 Olympics provide just such
an occasion. Although Soviet and North Korean
military interests may coincide in some instances in
Africa and elsewhere, we have seen no evidence that
P'yongyang is acting at Moscow's direction.
The South Koreans, meanwhile, have mounted
their own diplomatic offensive in Africa, driven in
part by their goal of ensuring full participation in
the Seoul Olympics. Seoul's major leg up has been
economic assistance for the region's impoverished
countries. As the South tries to capitalize on
recent North Korean setbacks in Africa, we expect
Seoul to call on Washington and its allies to help
Diplomatic Competition
Since Seoul's selection as the site for the 1988 Olympic
Games, North Korea has stepped up its efforts to improve its own
international standing by seeking Third World support for its
positions on reunification of the Korean peninsula, withdrawal of
US troops in South Korea, and, more recently, cohosting--or a
boycott--of the Seoul Games. The 46 Nonaligned nations in sub-
Saharan Africa offer fertile ground for P'yongyang's efforts to
best the South. The region is the only one where North Korea has
an edge over South Korea in diplomatic representation (see
chart), and P'yongyang has tried to maintain its position by
capitalizing on its early support for African preindependence
movements and its quick recognition of their new governments.
North Korea has emphasized its Nonaligned credentials and its
image as a cohesive, authoritarian state. This model appeals to
some African leaders, including Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu,
Madagascar's President Ratsiraka, and Zimbabwe's Prime Minister
Mugabe, who have publicly expressed their admiration of President
Kim Il-song. The North also has increased the number of
invitations to African leaders to tour P'yongyang, promoted
cultural exchanges, and financed chuche--self-reliance--study
groups to peddle its political wares.
Economic Competition: The South's Strong Suit
South Korea's own campaign for influence and diplomatic
recognition has made gains in the region, relying most heavily on
its substantial--by African standards--economic inducement. For
example, according to an official Bissau announcement, Seoul won
formal recognition from Guinea-Bissau in 1984 after donating six
luxury automobiles, 40 tractors, and 20 other vehicles. In 1985,
both Koreas donated sports equipment to Mauritius for the Indian
Ocean Games, but Seoul was able to open a diplomatic mission in
Mauritius--despite P'yongyang's objections--only after providing
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six automobiles and $188,000, according to sources of the US
South Korea also has used economic pressure to impede the
North's influence. In our view, a South Korean donation of
$50,000 in 1985 and establishment of a medical assistance program
probably explain Swaziland's rejection of several North Korean
requests for diplomatic relations.
Seoul's reliance on economic ties makes it vulnerable to
African efforts to play North against South to extract the
maximum aid:
In late 1984, for example, President Chun sent a
special envoy to Ivory Coast hoping to dissaude
President Houphouet from recognizing P'yongyang.
Houphouet requested greatly increased economic aid,
and, when South Korea refused, Ivory Coast established
ambassador-level ties with the North.
In Cape Verde, according to sources of the US Embassy
in Seoul, a formal announcement of recognition has been
stalled by Seoul's reluctance to compel Korean fishing
boats to use local repair facilities.
In 1984, after South Korea donated $50,000 to Niger and
opened an embassy, a local official told the US Embassy
that Niger had linked r1nczior ions with increased
economic assistance. 25X1
North Korea's economy constrains P'yongyang's efforts to
match South Korean largesse. When the Guinean President sent a
delegation to Seoul in 1984 to discuss economic ties, North Korea
quickly dispatched a delegation to Conakry to propose closer
economic cooperation. The intervention blocked recognition of
Seoul
To get the most visibility from its limited resources, North
Korea has built monuments and public buildings, often defraying
expenses by insisting that the local government pay the salaries
and living expenses of North Korean workers and advisers.
Construction of these buildings frequently fuels North-South
competition--shortly after North Korea announced its plans to
build a National Assembly for the Central African Republic in
1984, South Korea gave the government 12 trucks and
automobiles. In Equatorial Guinea, P'yongyang promised to
complete a convention hall only after the government asked the
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South Koreans to pick up construction costs, according to sources
of the US Embassy in Yaounde. 25X1
Military Aid--Recent Setbacks for P'yongyang
To supplement its ideological message and counteract Seoul's
economic advantages, P'yongyang relies heavily on military
assistance. North Korean military advisers have trained
presidential guards and other security units in Togo, Uganda,
Madagascar, Seychelles, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Burkina-Faso. In
addition:
A North Korean team, although reduced from
approximately 100 to 10 in 1985, trained the Zimbabwean
5th Brigade--used extensively in antidissident
open ns--and, 25X1
supplied rniiitary equipment, including 20 LOAI
personnel carriers, to the Zimbabwean Army.
North Korea has agreed to supply Zimbabwe with small
arms to support its operations in Mozambique. Harare
is also negotiating with P'yongyang for the
construction of an ammunition factory in Zimbabwe,
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North Korean 25X1
military trainers--perhaps as many as 150--in Angola.
Here too, however, North Korean setbacks may offer
opportunities for Seoul. Several countries have become
increasingly dissatisfied with North Korean military training
methods and poor-quality equipment, as well as with the high
costs of salaries and billeting. By last summer, the Ugandan
Government had decided to phase out the costly North Korean
military training program
Although a coup toppled Presi ent Obote before he could take
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action, over 200 North Korean military and civilian advisers
subsequently left the country in August at the request of the
interim Okello government. 25X1
The expulsion of its advisers was certainly a serious
disappointment for P'yongyang; however, Uganda's new President
Museveni told the British press in February 1986 he may ask North
Korean military advisers to return. Although North Korea
certainly wishes to retain relations with Uganda--President Kim 25X1
Il-song congratulated Museveni upon the latter's assumption of
office--we believe the relationship will be strained because of
the strong North Korean links to the Obote regime.
In our view,
it is possible that Uganda's threat to call bac the North
Koreans is simply an effort to win increased economic or military
aid--Seoul recently donated $100,000 to Uganda and announced that
it was ready to name a new ambassador.
Host dissatisfaction with equipment and staff also seemed to
be behind North Korea's problems in Zimbabwe last year, when the
government cut back the large North Korean military team that had
trained the notoriously brutal 5th Brigade and presidential guard
in Zimbabwe.
spent more !me teaching political thought than
basic infantry tactics. 25X1
Finally, in late 1985, a group of about 10 North Korean
military instructors left Burkina-Faso
Other issues have caused trouble for P'yongyang elsewhere in
Africa:
Seychelles President 25X1
Rene informed North Korea in August 1985 that the
military training agreement between the two countries
would not be renewed, and about 50 to 100 North Koreans
reportedly left in September. Although Rene indicated
the North Koreans would be replaced with Tanzanians, we
believe he has been unable to negotiate an agreement
with Tanzania, and some Koreans--estimated at 80 by the
US Embassy in Seychelles--probably remain. Rene's
dissatisfaction with the North Koreans stems in part
from P'yongyang's intense pressure on Seychelles to
announce a boycott of the Seoul Olympics, according to
sources of the US Embassy in Tanzania.
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In Lesotho, a group of North Korean military trainers,
as well as agricultural and construction workers, were
expelled in January 1986 after a cou ousted Prime
Minister Jonathan.
- P'yongyang's relations with Somalia have deteriorated
because of North Korea's expandin ties to Ethiopia.
Looking Ahead to the Olympic Games
As the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics approach, we
expect North Korea to advertise its ties to the Nonaligned
Movement and to press member states to lend rhetorical support to
its position in North-South reunification talks and back its call
for cohosting, a joint team, or boycott of the Olympics. The
response so far, however, has been poor. P'yongyang failed to
win support for a cohosting resolution at a meeting of the
Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa in December
1985. In the months before the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers'
Conference in Angola in September 1985, North Korea pressed
unsuccessfully for an anti-South Korean resolution; we believe
P'yongyang will redouble such efforts at the Nonaligned Summit
Meeting in Zimbabwe this August. Because the site of the 1988
Nonaligned Foreign Ministers' Conference has not been chosen, we
expect P'yongyang will bid for hosting rights. 25X1
North Korea's political influence will probably remain
strongest in those countries--Ethiopia, Madagascar, Zimbabwe--
where leaders are attracted to Kim Il-song's style of centralized
one-man rule, and to his independent socialist ideology. We
expect North Korea also will look for other openings to
strengthen ties to African nations. P'yongyang almost certainly
is aware of Zimbabwe's difficulty in financing this fall's
Nonaligned Summit. It would be consistent with past North Korean
behavior to offer funding in exchange for backing on an anti-
Seoul resolution. Cuba and the Soviet Union probably also will
provide funds to Zimbabwe, but, in this case, as in other
instances where North Korean and Soviet interests have coincided
in the Third World, we have seen no evidence g is
acting at Moscow's direction. North 25X1
Korea will primarily seek to serve its own goals in relation to
Seoul, not function in an assigned role as a Soviet surrogate.
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To counter P'yongyang's political ties to Third World
countries and push Seoul's Olympic priority, President Chun has
ordered a stepped-up diplomatic effort to improve ties to
Nonaligned and Communist countries. Economic aid will be a key
part of that campaign. Seoul was undoubtedly relieved when the
African National Olympic Committee declined to consider a
Malagasy motion supporting North-South cohosting of the Olympics
and probably will try to isolate North Korea further on the
Olympic issue by offering assistance such as the $2.12 million
donated to African drought relief in 1985. South Korea's
generosity, however, faces constraints. We expect expenses
associated with hosting the Asian and Olympic Games to limit
Seoul's ability to underwrite extensive foreign aid
We also expect South Korea to capitalize on recent North
Korean setbacks by trying to reestablish embassies--or to close
P'yongyang's missions--in Lesotho and Uganda. In 1983 and 1984,
North Korea successfully pressed both governments to expel the
South Korean ambassadors. In February, the new Lesotho
Government announced that relations with Seoul would be
Elsewhere, the South will continue to use economic
inducements where it has no formal relations but has identified
local interest in commercial ties--Somalia, Zambia, Guinea, Togo,
Zimbabwe, Congo, Mali, Angola, and Cape Verde. Several of these
countries are willing to permit the establishment of South Korean
trade offices, holding out the possibility of gradual upgrading
of ties to the ambassadorial level. Since this incremental
approach is in all cases contingent on South Korean economic or
military aid, we believe Seoul will consider the costs and
benefits on a case-by-case basis. In 1985, for example, South
Korea donated $50,000 to Swaziland in a successful bid for a new
embassy. In contrast, in the same year, a visiting South Korean
Foreign Ministry official told US Embassy staff in Mogadishu that
Somalia's economic demands were more than South Korea was willing
to offer in exchange for diplomatic ties.
South Korea probably will also call upon the United States
and its other allies for assistance in selected cases. In 1984,
for instance, Seoul asked Washington and Tokyo to intervene on
its behalf during diplomatic and economic negotiations with
Zambia. South Korea will also continue to seek support from
friendly African countries--Zaire, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Equatorial Guinea--on Nonaligned and Olympic Games issues.
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North and South Korea, Diplomatic Relations, March 1986
Regional total: 45 countries; 40 North Korea 27 South Korea
North Korea
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Total 45 countries
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no (severed 1983)
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
South Korea
no
no (severed 1975)
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no (severed 1980)
no
yes
no (severed 1980)
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
no (severed 1974)
yes
yes
no
no
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SUBJECT: Korean Competition in Africa: International
Prestige at Stake
1-
DDI/OEA/NA/Korea
Author
Harriet Isom, State/EAP/Korea
Celia Conlon, State Department
Bill Eaton, State/INR
State/INR/AA
State/AFR
Jay Sloan, DIA/DIO/Korea
DIA/DB-2D
NIO/EA 7E-6
C/PPS/DO (DO1)
C/EAD (5E18)
OGI/IIC/PI
DIA/JSI-3C
OEA/NEA/Korea Branch
OEA/NEA/Japan Branch
OEA/NEA/STI Branch
OEA/NEA Division
OEA/China Division
OEA/SEA Division
D/OEA (4F18)
C/Production
FBIS Analysis Group
DDI
Senior Review Panel
PDB Staff (7F30)
CPAS/IMC/CG (7G07)
CPAS/ILS (7G50)
C/PES (7F24)
NIC/AG (7E47)
DDO/EA Division (5D00)
ALA/AF
DDO/EA (5C19)
DDO/EA (5C19)
(27 March 1986)
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