SOUTH KOREA: REENACTING THE PHILIPPINE DRAMA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000605920001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
31 March 1986
South Korea: Reenacting the Philippine Drama?
Summary
The collapse of the Marcos government has
captured the attention of South Korean government
and opposition leaders and has generated speculation
on both sides of the Pacific about whether a
political crisis in Seoul could follow the pattern
set in Manila. Discussions with analysts who have
followed developments in the Philippines provided
the basis for our own comparison by identifying the
preconditions for the crisis in Manila and
delineating key elements to look for in South
V____
Apparent parallels abound: South Korean
President Chun Doo Hwan is deeply unpopular; in the
past year he has returned to the hardline approach
of his first year in power to cope with increasingly
open challenges to his authority; the political
opposition, student activists, and other dissidents
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 31 March 1986 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia
Division nra
EA M 86-20044
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are trying to mobilize the public behind demands for
basic political reforms. Such seeming parallels
have put the Chun government on the defensive and
emboldened its opponents.
We believe there are equally and in some cases
more important differences in the Philippine and
South Korean situations, however. The government
still holds the loyalty of most military officers,
who distrust the current opposition leaders. The
economy is strong, and few Koreans are anxious to
participate in antigovernment activities that could
endanger continued development. Christian
activists, although influential beyond their
numbers, remain a minority within a minority, and
most South Korean Christians continue to eschew
church involvement in politics. Finally, the North
Korean threat has deterred broad-based challenges to
government authority. Nonetheless, with political
tensions on the rise, events in the coming weeks
could provide still missing ingredients of a full-
blown political crisis. And if Chun navigates
safely through this spring, he still is likely to
face a series of further challenges over the next
two years, as attention focuses increasingly on his
approach to the promised political succession in
early 1988.
Same Scene, Different Views
Nowhere is attention to South Korean-Philippine parallels
more intense than in South Korea itself. The independent media
have given unprecedented coverage to President Aquino's rise to
power, comparing it in thinly veiled terms with the political
situation in South Korea. Several bold editorials have suggested
openly that the government has lessons to learn from Mares
failure to respond to the public's desire for reform.
Leaders of the staunchly anti-Chun New Korea Democratic 25X1
Party are openly euphoric over events in Manila. They contend a
"domino effect" will soon bring democracy to South Korea. In
their eyes, Marcos fell because he was a dictator who did not
enjoy the support of the people or ultimately of the United
States. Kim Young Sam, who with Kim Dae Jung represents Chun's
most prominent opponents, brushed aside US Embassy officers'
analysis of the differences between the two situations, stressing
that Chun will fall as Marcos did. In a prerecorded rally
address on 23 March, Kim Dae Jung urged his countrymen to make
South Korea a "second Philippines." 25X1
As might be expected, government officials have loudly
rejected the notion that parallels exist. In their eyes, Marcos
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fell because he stayed in power too long and bungled management
of the economy--a sharp contrast to South Korea's economic
success and President Chun's commitment to a eaceful transfer of
power in 1988.
Comparing Political and Economic Settings
The Philippines showed a growing potential for political
instability months, even years, before the recent crisis began to
unfold. Some indicators, such as the country's deepening
economic woes, had been apparent since the early 1980s. Other
warning signs emerged in the aftermath of the assassination of
opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August 1983. 25X1
South Korea displays some of the conditions that were
apparent in the Philippines by mid-1985, but others are absent or
of much lesser magnitude. In particular, we see key differences
with regard to military-government relations, the role of 25X1
domestic and external threats to national security, the political
involvement of religious groups, and the economic situation.
Perhaps most important, we believe the South Korean
president still holds the loyalty of the large majority of the
Army officer corps. (The Air Force and Navy have demonstrated no
inclination to become involved in politics). This judgment is
based principally on Chun's obvious and pervasive effort to
manage the Army's promotion and assignment system
Some officers have voiced discontent
over Chun's favoritism toward loyalists and their proteges, but
we have seen no indication that the South Korean military is
becoming divided, as were the Philippine armed forces following
General Ver's implication in the Aquino assassination. In South
Korea the cronyism issue appears to be chiefly an individual
concern over career prospects.
Furthermore, the leading opposition politicians have 25X1
virtually no personal connections with or support from the
military.
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In addition, the North Korean threat works to the 25X1
government's advantage. The Marcos government faced increasing
opposition from reform-minded military officers who believed
cronyism and corruption had weakened the army's ability to check
the growing Communist insurgency; the Chun government faces no
such challenge. Rather, the widely shared conviction that North
Korea is poised to exploit opportunities to reunify Korea
reinforces the military's sense of professionalism and self-image
as the nation's guardian, inhibiting internal political
manuevering. These same factors may also work to Chun's
disadvantage, however, if senior officers became convinced that
his political problems were eroding military discipline or
undermining the all-important US-South Korean security
relationship. 25X1
The palpable North Korean threat also deters the majority of
South Koreans from supporting more radical anti-Chun actions.
Even the widespread perception that Chun, like his predecessors,
has used the danger of North Korean aggression to justify
repressive political controls has not made the public less wary
of P'yongyang's intentions.
Both government policy and Korea's Confucian political
heritage have inhibited religious communities, including the
approximately 25 percent of the population that is Christian,
from seeking a collective political role. To be sure,
endorsement of the opposition's signature drive by dissident
church groups, and particularly Cardinal Kim--the moderate
Catholic prelate for one-fifth of South Korea's Christians--adds
greater moral force to demands for constitutional reform.
Cardinal Kim has pursued a lower key course than Philippine
Cardinal Sin, however, and a strong conservative element,
particularly within the mainline Protestant denominations,
hampers the vocal activist minority in expanding church
involvement in politics.
Nor do South Korea's economic worries resemble the
Philippines's massive problems. Three decades of remarkable
development have made South Korea arguably the strongest of the
newly industrializing countries, instilling most South Koreans
with confidence in the future and a jaundiced view of actions by
either the opposition or the government that would endanger
continued growth.
-- Unlike Marcos, Chun has given skilled technocrats
considerable authority over economic policy. A
recasting of the key economic posts in mid-January made
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an already strong team better. The economy's
fundamental strengths also give the government room to
deal with economic fluctuations without the need for
drastic reforms.
We anticipate that, for at least the next few months,
plunging oil prices, moderating interest rates, and favorable
exchange rate trends will ease stresses arising from last year's
lackluster economic performance. Stronger economic performance
should make several contentious issues less volatile, including:
-- The perception that the captains of South Korea's large
conglomerates command an unfair share of the benefits of
growth.
-- Worker discontent over tough controls on unions and
collective bargaining.
-- The difficulty of meeting the high occupational goals of
the growing number of university graduates.
Chun: Not Teetering on the Brink
Analysts who followed the Philippine crisis agree that the
assassination of Benigno Aquino fuzed an already unstable
political situation. In particular, the assassination and
subsequent coverup:
-- Blemished indelibly Marcos's leadership and legitimacy.
-- Created deep fissures in the government's political
base.
-- Gave Marcos's opponents a dramatic and potent symbol.
-- Galvanized important segments of mainstream Philippine
society into active opposition to Marcos.
We do see some parallels between the key elements of this second
stage of the Philippine crisis and possible future developments
Chun's legitimacy, like that of Marcos, is under a cloud.
Most South Koreans see Chun as a military usurper who exploited
the confusion following President Park Chong Hee's assassination
in 1979.
-- The bloody suppression in 1980 of civil disturbances in
Kwangju City by army troops, as Chun moved to
consolidate his power, continues to shadow the
president.
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-- Few Koreans accept the government-orchestrated
presidential election in 1981 as a genuine popular
endorsement of Chun's leadership.
The government's civilian political base is brittle. Chun
has been careful to prevent any of his political allies from
developing support bases of their own, with the result that:
-- The ruling Democratic Justice Party, which claims a
million-plus members, has little independence or "stand
alone" capability; its roots are only as deep as the
party's political slush funds.
-- Chun has few fans among businessmen, whose pro forma
support is chiefly a matter of self-protection; the
business community is even less attracted to Chun's
opponents, who are mistrusted and judged to have little
appreciation for or skill in economic matters.
The urban middle and working classes have been alienated
by the government's zealous suppression of student
dissent, the repression and blackballing of activist
workers, and Chun's failure to address popular desires
for democratization. The First Family's imperious
public manner and the widespread stories of nepotism and
corruption involving presidential relatives make them
the target of extensive private vituperation.
Even politically conservative farmers, now less than 25
percent of South Korea's population, show little
positive enthusiasm for Chun. The phasing out of costly
farm price support programs has undermined their
traditional passivity and reflexive support for the
government.
Nonetheless, several key ingredients of a full-blown
political crisis are still missing in South Korea. In
particular, Chun's opponents do not yet have a dramatic symbol
that commands widespread, active support.
-- Leaders of the New Korea Democratic Party hope their
petition campaign for direct presidential elections will
provide such a focus, but the public's cynicism toward
most opposition politicians and a reluctance to get 25X1
involved have thus far helped check the momentum.
Equally important, no single leader has been able to rise
above factional rivalries and unify the diverse opposition and
dissident elements.
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Kim Dae Jung sees himself in this role, but his
unvarnished presidential ambition and reputation for
intrigue have alienated some former supporters and hurt
his charismatic appeal among students and the middle
Finally, the South Korean opposition faces several
roadblocks in any effort to galvanize the population into a
broadly-based, anti-Chun movement.
-- The internal security apparatus, including a pervasive
network of informers and more than 40,000 specially
trained riot police, has effectively prevented dissident
groups from coordinating their activities.
-- Chun, more than Marcos, has been willing to use the
government's sweeping administrative and legal powers to
control political opponents and suppress public
protests.
-- A virtual government monopoly on the broadcast media,
tough press laws, and manipulation of the media's
political coverage have prevented a freewheeling
opposition press from emerging, even though the more
independent newspapers regularly test the limits of the
government's tolerance.
Beyond Parallels
Although parallels can be drawn between South Korea and the
Philippines, recent political developments in South Korea, by
themselves, are grounds for concern given South Korea's own
historical precedents for dramatic political change. Indeed, the
circumstances--economic stagnation, corruption, an enfeebled
leader, and crony politics--and events--including blatant
election fraud and withdrawal of US backing--surroundin-g the
collapse of the Marcos regime have an earlier Korean precedent in
the fall of President Syngman Rhee in 1960, an event South Korean
students typically commemorate on 19 April with noisy
At this point, however, we are less worried by current
parallels between South Korea and the Philippines than by the
real possibility that the perception of similarities could set
the stage for a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Chun government is
increasingly concerned that US support may be fraying.
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Meanwhile, Chun's opponents know they have caught US
attention and are attempting to make the most of what they see as
greater domestic pressure on Washington to distance itself from
authoritarian allies--a perception that openly sympathetic
statements by official and unofficial Americans will reinforce.
Leaders of the opposition New Korea Democratic Party,
convinced Chun is vulnerable to US pressure, are now
demanding an accelerated timetable for political
liberalization that would allow for constitutional
amendment this year and direct presidential elections in
1987.
New Korea Democratic Party leaders have announced the
formation of an alliance with several dissident
organizations, including the activist Korean National
Council of Churches, to step up the democratization
movement. Opposition leaders are expanding the petition
drive to the provinces and are now quietly encouraging
student participation.
Difficult Weeks Ahead
With the added complication of the Philippine precedent,
Chun faces a turbulent spring. He confronts an opposition that
now believes it has a window of opportunity to extract major
concessions. Several important events and anniversaries during
the next several weeks may well prompt the opposition to press
its challenge:
21 March to 9 April...National Assembly in
session... debate over the agenda and authority of the
constitution deliberation committee will probably
ensnarl the session.
2 to 4 April ... scheduled visit to Seoul by US Secretary
of Defense... possible occasion for demonstrations
demanding US support for democratization.
6 April... opposition rally supporting signature campaign
planned for Taegu.
5 to 21 April ...Chun scheduled to visit Europe.
- 19 April... anniversary of the 1960 Student Revolution
that led to the ouster of President Syngman Rhee.
21 to 26 April...Association of National Olympic
Committees scheduled to meet in Seoul.
2 to 4 May...Prime Minister Thatcher scheduled to visit
Seoul.
25X1
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12 to 15 May.. .Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney to visit
Seoul. .
17 to 27 May... anniversary of Chun's takeover and the
Kwangju rebellion in 1980.
-- 27, 30 May... anniversaries of protest suicides in 1980
and 1981 by two university students. 25X1
Ironically, Chun's own agenda to enhance his international
credentials and domestic standing--his European trip and the
parade of foreign visitors set this year--also adds to his
political vulnerability. With the Asian Games and an historic
visit by the Japanese Crown Prince only six months away, and the
Seoul Olympics on the horizon for 1988, Chun would appear to have
an incentive to mollify his critics in the interest of
maintaining a stable domestic scene and projecting a sense of
national unity. And the government has in fact allowed the
opposition to hold rallies in support of the petition campaign
both in Seoul and in key provincial cities. Both the opposition
organizers and the police have been careful to ensure that the
rallies have come off peacefully.
Nonetheless, we have seen the President surround himself in
the past year with a cadre of personal advisers who are known to
give hardline advice. It is altogether likely that the
government could crack down once more--particularly after Chun's
European trip is safely behind him--if the opposition challenge
continues to grow. We are frankly concerned that such harsh
tactics will provoke stronger opposition defiance--as
historically has been the case in Korea--particularly since
Chun's antagonists believe they have him at a disadvantage.
-- If Chun then made concessions--especially if they
appeared to be a result of US prodding--the opposition
would read this as a sign of vulnerability and be
tempted to press its attack even harder.
In our judgment, such a cycle of escalating confrontation
and repression could provide the missing ingredient that would
turn the present tensions into a full-blown political crisis.
-- The use of excessive force against student demonstrators
or the opposition's signature campaign could give Chun's
challengers the symbol they need to galvanize active
popular support. A similarly heavy-handed effort to
block opposition efforts by, for example, placing Kim
Dae Jung under indefinite house arrest or reimprisoning
him, could again give Kim the mantle of martyrdom and
perhaps make him undisputed leader of the opposition
camp.
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Declaration of martial law, particularly against a
backdrop of broadly based protests and public demarches
from Washington, could also precipitate a larger
In the past, Chun has shown the ability to sidestep danger
at the last moment, but we believe there is significant risk of a
major clash as the spring political season moves toward the
anniversary of the Kwangju uprising in late May. If the
political situation does unravel, Chun might feel compelled to
call in the military to reestablish order.
We believe Army loyalty would not extend to protecting
Chun against a civil disobedience campaign as happened
in the final stages of the Philippines crisis.
Although the tough Special Warfare Forces would probably
obey orders to fire on civilians, the Philippine drama--
as well as memories of the Kwangju rebellion--
undoubtedly have made the generals sensitive to the high
political costs of such a step. 25X1
And More Problems Down The Road
The next few months are only the beginning of a series of
difficult challenges facing Chun over the next two years. The
potential for political turmoil will remain high in South Korea,
in our view, as the spotlight remains on Chun's approach to
democratization through 1988.
-- Chun's refusal to set an acceptable schedule for
political relaxation, including constitutional reform,
or to clarify his plans for a transfer of power in
1988--when he has promised to step down as the
constitution requires--are the key issues. His behavior
has fueled speculation among politically attuned Koreans
that he plans either to install a compliant surrogate,
enabling him to manipulate the government from behind
the scenes, or to seek another term under a new
constitution.
We expect the example of the Philippines to contribute to
the siege mentality many observers say has become increasingly
apparent among Chun and his inner circle. The result could
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further diminish Chun's ability to cope constructively with the
succession question.
-- Should the Army leadership and senior ruling party
officials anticipate an election crisis, each will
probably press for a greater role in selecting the
government's presidential candidate--thereby creating
disunity within the ruling camp.
If the military ultimately feels compelled to step in to
quiet political discord, we believe its first move would be
Chun's removal. But we would also expect it would muzzle the
more intransigent opposition leaders, probably using the same
rationale--"political renovation"--applied by earlier military
governments. We regard the military as the single most important
arbiter of political power in South Korea in a crisis. But, even
if it successfully manages a leadership transition on its own
terms, the military will have to come to grips with:
-- Rising aspirations for a more open political system,
which will make South Korea's predominantly urban
population increasingly intolerant of any attempt by
military leaders to postpone political reforms.
-- The growing desire among postwar generation Koreans for
some sort of modus vivendi with North Korea, and their
increasing suspicion that the pursuit of military
superiority in both Seoul and P'yongyang represents a
rationale to hold power.
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SUBJECT: South Korea: Reenacting the Philippines Drama?
Distribution:
Original - Author
1 - Michael Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Room 6208, Dept. of State
1 - Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Room 6205, Dept. of State
1 - Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs, Room 4E808, Dept. of Defense
1 - Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security, Room 298, OEOB
1 - William Sherman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 6250, Dept. of State
1 - James Kelly, Deputy Assistant for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs, Room 4E817, Dept. of Defense
1 - Richard Childress, National Security Council,
Room 392, OEOB
1 - David Laux, National Security Council, Room 302, OEOB
1 - Steve Danzansky, National Security Council, Room 363,
OEOB
1 - Harriet Isom, Director, Office of Korean Affairs, EAP/K
Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - Jay Taylor, Director, Office of Analysis for East
Asian and Pacific, Room 8840, Dept. of State
1 - Bill Newcomb, INR/EC/CER, Room 8442, Dept. of State
1 - Celia Conlon, Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - David Straub, Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - DIA 25X1
1 - Jay Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer/EA/P, Room 2C238,
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - DB-2D, Room C 2951, DIA 25X1
1 - JSI-3C, Room 1C930, DIA
1 - Byron L. Jackson, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Room 6854, Dept. of Commerce
1 - The Honorable S. Bruce Smart, Jr., Undersecretary for
International Trade, Room 3850,Dept. of Commerce
1 - Ambassador Michael B. Smith, Deputy USTR, Room 201, USTR
1 - Peter Allgeier, Assistant Trade Rep. for Asia and the
Pacific, Room 322, USTR
1 - Sandra Kristoff, Room 322, USTR
1 - Doug Mulholland, Office of the Special Assistant to the
Secretary for National Security, Room 4324, Dept. of
Treasury
1 - NIO/EA (7E-62)
1 - NIO/Economics (7E-48)
1 - C/PPS/DO (3D-01)
1 - OGI/FS=IC/PI (2G-18) 25X1
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G-43)
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G-31)
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1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G-43)
1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G-43)
1 - OEA/China Division (4G-32)
1 - OEA/SEA Division (4F-24)
1 - D/OEA (4F-18)
1 - C/Production/OEA (4G-48)
1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
1 - DDI (7E-47)
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G-00)
1 - Office of Legislative Liaison (7B-14)
1 - PDB Staff (7F-30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G-07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7F-50)
1 - C/PES (7F-24)
1 - NIC/AG (7E-47)
1 - DDO/EA Division (5D-00)
1 - DDO/EA (5E-22)
1 - DDO/EA (5C-19)
1 - DDO/EA (5C-19)
DDI/OEA/NA/Korea
31 March 1986
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