NORTH KOREA'S NAMPO LOCK-GATE: GOING AGAINST THE TIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 May 1986
North Korea's Nampo Lock-gate: Going Against the Tide
Summary
North Korea's construction of the Nampo lock-gate, a large dam
and shipping lock complex, typifies the style of P'yongyang's economic
management as well as the close link between its economic and political
agendas. The project is a model of President Kim 11-song's chuche, or
self-reliant development strategy: labor intensive, designed to strengthen
the country's infrastructure, and undertaken with little or no outside
assistance. Kim Chong-il, the elder Kim's son and heir, is closely
identified with the lock-gate scheme, as is the military, which oversees
Announced in 1981, and originally scheduled for completion by
1985, the Nampo lock-gate has made a priority claim on manpower and
material. But setbacks and delays have beset the project, and construction
is only now nearing completion. At least one of three shipping locks is
open for river traffic, but it is unlikely that the lock-gate complex will be
fully operational until at least 1987. We believe that the history of this
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 13 May 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia
EA M 86-20057C
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
unusually visible project is indicative of the broader economic problems
that have forced modifications in North Korea's domestic political calendar.
Indeed, a case can be made that the Nampo project's troubles were a
major factor causing P'yongyang to tone down the party's 40th anniversary
cele gyratio
last October
n
Remaking Nature on a Grand Scale
North Korea prides itself on overcoming hardships and obstacles, as it did after
the devastation of the Korean war. In October 1981, the Korean Workers' Party unveiled
at its fourth plenary meeting what is perhaps the regime's most ambitious civil
engineering project. It set for completion by 1988 "four great nature-remaking tasks":
the reclamation of 300,000 hectares of tideland, the development of 200,000 hectares of
new farmland, the building of a large hydroelectric power station at Taechon in
northwest North Korea, and the construction of a lock-gate on the estuary of the
Taedong River in southwest North Korea. The plenum went a step further in stipulating
that the lock-
ate wo
ld b
fi
g
u
e
nished by 1985.
The 8-kilometer-long combination dam and shipping lock complex clearly has
been treated as the centerpiece of the "four great" tasks. In addition to giving Nampo
the most publicity since 1981, P'yongyang has underscored the project's importance with
a number of on-the-spot inspection visits by Kim II-song and his son and heir, Kim
Chong-il. There are practical reasons for the regime to concentrate its efforts on the
lock-gate: its fresh water reservoir is essential to expanding cropland; the lock-gate will
probably not require imported machinery; and from an engineering standpoint it is the
onl
f
h
y one o
t
e four tasks that is likely to be completed in this decade.
The site for the lock-gate is about 11 kilometers southwest (downriver) of
Nampo, the largest of several industrial cities on the lower reaches of the Taedong
River. Several islands near the south bank at this point on the river offer a convenient
shipping channel and anchoring point for the complex. This consideration is important
because of the strong currents developed by the 9-meter tides along North Korea's west
coas+
To build the lock-gate, North Korean engineers first had to construct an
oval-shaped cofferdam between the islands and the south shoreline. Using special
underwater construction equipment built at the nearby Nampo shipyard, workers closed
off the construction site from the sea at depths of up to 30 meters. The site was
pumped dry by March 1984, according to P'yongyang's published accounts.
The North Koreans are building three separate locks, of differing sizes, which will
accommodate ships of 2,000, 20,000, and 50,000 tons respectively, according to press
accounts. The design should increase the efficiency of the lock-gate operations and
provide a measure of redundancy. The construction of multiple locks also suggests the
re ime is planning to significantly increase the limited shipping on the Taedong River.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
North Korea:
Conceptual Drawing of Namp'o Lock-gate
eoundky recresenlnuon ~s
not feCe Sa,IIy Buthorilellvo
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
A highway and railroad will be constructed on top of the dam and lock-gate, and
there will be a large swing bridge to permit the passage of ships through the locks.
The lock-gate structure also includes a spillway and a medium-size hydroelectric power
plant
A Multipurpose Structure
The Nampo lock-gate will serve a variety of civilian as well as military purposes.
On the lower reaches of the Taedong River, it will create a large artificial reservoir of
fresh water, which can be used to irrigate existing cropland and orchards as well as
much of the tideland that is scheduled for reclamation to the north and south of the
river's mouth. The regime claims the water will irrigate 105,000 hectares of reclaimed
tideland and 135,000 hectares of existing cropland, but we believe the figures are
By raising and stabilizing the level of the Taedong River, the lock-gate will
enable larger ships to call at Nampo and other industrial centers upriver. Other smaller
lock-gate facilities are in operation or under construction along the upper reaches of the
Taedong, which flows through the capital city of P'yongyang. Ultimately, this series of
lock-gates will result in an improved waterway navigable from Sunchon (north of
P'yongyang) to Chaeryong in the south. (There is no evidence that North Korea is
building an east-west canal across the peninsula, as has been reported from time to
.:m-
I I
)
With the Taedong River system more navigable, North Korea plans to expand port
facilities at Nampo and Songnim. Songnim has figured prominently in the expansion of
North Korean arms shipments to the Third World in recent years, especially to Iran. In
addition, North Korea will upgrade some minor ports and build several new ones. Last
December, the North announced it is building the "Kilsongpo Port" at Sariwon, capital of
North Hwanghae Province. The waterway at Sariwon will be made navigable by the
i
ant
cipated raising of the water level of the entire Taedong River basin.
The coastal highway and railroad being built in conjunction with the Nampo 25X1
lock-gate will provide needed links to South Hwanghae Province--an important
agricultural region--and cut hours off the transit from there to road and rail hubs in the
Pyongyang area. The improved transport network will also help speed military forces
and supplies from reserve areas near the capital to forward positions adjacent to the
western end of the Demilitarized Zone. The rail line along the dam and lock-gate would
be vulnerable to interdiction, however. F__ 25X1
A Progress Report
Satellite photography of early April shows that the lock-gate complex is nearing
completion. The small lock (lock 1) near the shore appears to be operational. Sliding
caisson gates are installed at either end of the lock, which measures about 210 by 16
meter
s
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
At the large double lock (locks 2 and 3), work is continuing on the common wall
and on the recesses in the lock wall for the sliding caisson gates. The double locks
measure about 277 by 37 meters and 236 by 28 meters. The photography confirms
North Korean public statements that the temporary cofferdam is being dismantled and
that th
--_ - - ..
lock
e
s
A dam spans the length of the estuary from the lockgate structure to the
northern shore of the Taedong River except for an opening of some 300 meters. The
opening allows river traffic to move past the site while the locks are under construction.
A road has been built across the top of the dam to support construction activities. Rail
li
nes end at the construction areas on the north and south banks.
On 18 April, North Korea announced the closing of the last section of the main
dam. This indicates that at least one of the three shipping locks is now open for river
traffic. It will take considerable time, however, to adjust the water level on the river,
test the lock system, and complete the rail and road connections spanning the dam and
ship. i
loc
ng
ks
Management of the Project
The Nampo lock-gate project has provided some insight into the workings of the
bureaucracy in North Korea. P'yongyang obviously wants the project to be seen and
praised by the outside world--normally highly secretive about such projects, it has been
forthcoming on the lock-gate story. On the one hand, this approach may have been
shaped by the large scale of the project, which precludes the kind of secrecy maintained
during the construction of the arch of triumph and chuche tower in P'yongyang. But the
public relations campaign also suggests that the leadership is reasonably confident that
th
l
e
ock-gate will perform as planned.
In another departure, North Korea made a point of publicizing the heavy
involvement of the armed forces in the construction of the lock-gate. As in other Asian
Communist nations, the military in North Korea has several civilian construction tasks,
capitalizing on its heavy engineering equipment and disciplined labor force. P'yongyang
likes to point to this project to underscore the contention that its army is engaged only
in peaceful pursuits. 0 Chin-u, the defense minister and senior military leader on the
Korean Workers' Party Political Bureau, is openly acknowledged as the site supervisor.
Foreign visitors are told that three divisions, some 30,000 soldiers, are working in three
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
Assignment to the Nampo lock-gate project is portrayed by P'yongyang as a
atriotic duty,
most soldiers who work there
are teenage conscripts using mainly hand tools and putmoded construction techniques.
The lock-gate has received unprecedented attention from the two Kims,
suggesting its importance in North Korea's overall economic planning. The elder Kim
selected the construction site in May 1981 and has escorted several high-level visitors
there. Kim Chong-il inspected the site twice on his own, in April 1983 and again in April
1984 he accom
i
d
pan
e
his father on the latest publicized visit in September 1985.
The lock-gate builders also are vying for resources with other major construction
sites in North Korea. The delayed construction startup for Nampo in April 1982, for
example, may have been required because needed skilled engineers and equipment
operators who were finishing P'yongyang's arch of triumph and chuche tower were
unavailable. Both projects were rushed to completion in April 1982, when unveiling
ceremonies m
k
d Ki
'
ar
e
m II-song
s 70th birthday.
Despite the high priority accorded the lock-gate, it is clear the project has
continued to suffer setbacks and delays. It seems likely that the original construction
timetable was too ambitious given the material shortages and supply bottlenecks that
characterize North Korea's economy. The strong tidal currents on the Taedong River
undoubtedly have added to the difficulties faced by North Korean construction crews. In
addition, the decreasing salinity of the water caused thick ice flows in the river last
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7 25X1
A Delayed Celebration
Since he began appearing in public in 1980, Kim Chong-if has been portrayed as
overseeing virtually all aspects of North Korea's economy, and we believe he wants
some concrete achievements to strengthen his position as Kim II-song's successor.
Traditionally, the North has used major party gatherings to publicize its economic
successes. The 10th plenary meeting of the KWP Central Committee in December 1984
forecast that the 40 h nniversary of the party in October 1985 would be celebrated in
grand fashion.
That anniversary could have been used to claim successes on the
nature-remaking campaign announced in 1981 and to set goals for the next long-term
economic plan, which had been expected to start this year. As it turned out, the
anniversary was subdued. P'yongyang's terse announcement claimed only
.main structures" of the lock-gate had been completed,
Once Nampo is completed, several other major infrastructure projects will be
vying for the spotlight. These include the Taechon hydroelectric power plant, billed as
North Korea's largest, and the 400-kilometer long northern railway, being built in the
mountainous regions near the China border. Like Nampo, the media attention focused
on these projects will intensify the pressures on the younger Kim to push them to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
Nampo Lock-Gate Chronology
22 May 1981
April 1982
20 April 1983
March 1984
11, 18 April 1984
19 September 1985
18 April 1986
Kim II-song selects site for lock-gate.
The fourth plenary meeting of the KWP Central
Committee calls for completion of the Nampo lock-gate
by 1985.
Construction begins in earnest.
Kim Chong-il makes first inspection visit.
Cofferdam completed; construction of locks begins.
Kim Chong-il and Kim I1-song make independent
inspection visits.
Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il jointly view lock-gate.
In an announcement timed for the KWP's 40th
anniversary, P'yongyang claims that the "main
structures" of the lock-gate are complete.
Cofferdam removed; locks are filled with sea water.
North Korea announces closing of last section of main
dam.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7
SUBJECT: North Korea's Nampo Lock-gate: Going Against the Tide
Distribution:
Copy 1 - File
2 - Harriet Isom, Director, Office of Korean Affairs, EAP/K
Room 5315, Dept. of State
3 - Celia Conlon, State/EAP/Korea
4 - Bill Newcomb, INR/EC/CER, Room 8442, Dept. of State
5 - Bill Eaton, State/INR/EAP Room 8840. Dent of State
9 - NIO/Economics (7E-48)
10 -
11 - C/EA/ (5E-18)
12 - 13 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G-43)
14 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch/Parker (4G-43)
15 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G-31)
16 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G-43)
17 - OEA/NEA Division (4G-43)
18 - OEA/China Division (4G-32)
19 - OEA/SEA Division (4F-24)
20 - D/OEA (4F-18)
21 - C/Production/OEA (4G-48)
22 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
23 - DDI (7E-47)
24 - Senior Review Panel (5G-00)
25 - PDB Staff (7F-30)
26 - 30 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G-07)
31 - CPAS/ILS (7G-50)
32 - C/PES (7F-24)
33 - NIC/AG (7E-47)
34 - DDO/EA Division (5D-00)
35 -
36 -
37 -
38 -
DDO/EA
DDO/EA
DDI/OEA/NA/Korea/
(5C-19)
(5C-19
9 May 1986
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606010001-7