(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606160001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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~ ~ ~/ Lr
Our judgment that Kim tl-song's son will succeed him as absolute
ruler of North Korea has been strengthened by new information from
Kim Chong-il, reportedly a sel -centers wor a o rc, a rea y
Central Intelligence Agency
OCR
DOC NO )C~' M ~(v',~dOSZ
P&PD /
25 June 1986
North Korea: Kim Chong-il in Charge
Summary
r I s urces,
eve a -
manages North Korea's day-to-day affairs, although his father apparently
retains control over foreign policy. The ounger Kim's long-term
survivability is more problematic.
Kim Chong-il appears to be responsible for several new policy
directions. He wants to modernize his country, for example, and probably
is behind limited efforts at economic reform, but he is having trouble
overcoming the inertia inherent in North Korea's rigid bureaucratic
structure. He hopes to attract Western capital to North Korea, suggesting
he may have pushed for the joint venture law passed in 1984, but he is
uncomfortable around foreigners and knows little about the West except
what he learns from movies and television.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis, and ~
Office of Leadership Analysis. Information available as of 25 June 1986 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia, OEA,
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Among his international contacts, Kim Chong-il prefers the Chinese
over the Soviets, but on policy issues recognizes the importance of good
relations with Moscow and apparently has not blocked stronger bilateral
ties. We have only limited information on Kim Chong-il's views on
reunification of the peninsula, but the little we do know suggests it may
not be the all-consuming goal it has been for Kim II-song. ~~
The Transition Takes Shape
continue to quote both Kims as authorities for policy guidance and ideological
inspiration; Kim II-song, in fact, appears at more important public affairs than his son.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Kim
Chong-il is assuming an increasingly prominent role and has taken over many of his
father's responsibilities:
the younger Kim makes decisions on nearly all matters
without seeking his father's counsel.
the Korean Workers' Party and is his father's heir.
the younger Kim already leads
? Reporting from US military and other sources also indicates the son is playing a
growing role in the North Korean-South Korean dialogue.
?
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increased attention to Kim Chong-il in the media and in
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private conversation among educated North Koreans
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It is also clear, however, from the evidence available that Kim Chong-il remains
loyal to his father. For most of his public and private life, Kim Chong-il--even more
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than other North Koreans--has been dominated by his father's views.
the son's political education consisted largely of observing, 25X1
implementing, and glorifying his father's policies. L~x1
Kim Chong-il has had virtually no contact with anyone challenging the official line.
Moreover, the pervasiveness of his father's insistence on conformity appears to have
impeded, and perhaps prevented, the emer ence of rival courtiers who could fan rivalry
between father and son. Kim II-song, for his part, views Kim 25X1
Chong-il as the guarantor of his legacy.
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The steady drumbeat of public adulation for both Kims is designed to prepare the
North Korean populace for the dynastic succession, and the little we know about North
Korean political dynamics suggests that Kim Chong-il possesses all the levers of power
he should need to assert control once his father dies. There is n i
organized opposition to the Kims.
all personnel matters;
because all serve at the whim of father and son.
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The Kims control 25X1
no other official has any power base 25X1
? Many leading government and party posts are staffed by the Kims' relatives.
? Defense Minister 0 Chin-u, Kim II-song's old comrade-in-arms who is ranked
third in the leadership, reportedly is Kim Chong-il's leading factotum. His
obsessive flattery of Kim Chong-il belies his status as Kim's elder.
O is genuinely dedicated to the succession, although his fawning
behavior could well mask other plans, possibly an intention to push the son aside
once the father dies. The military would be best placed to take over if Kim
Chong-il stumbles, but we have no evidence suggesting OChin-u is not loyal to
his masters.
? Ho Tam, Premier Kang Song-san, and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam are among
the younger leaders most sources claim owe their positions to Kim Chong-il. In
addition, one US scholar has noted that 83 percent of the Politburo and 57
percent of the Central Committee that emerged from the last Party Congress
(when the son became the official heir) belong to this younger generation and
persumably are beholden to Kim Chong-il.
as the emerging and
future head of North Korea, he will demonstrate many of the characteristics that have
marked his father's leadership. Like Kim II-song, he is a micromanager who intervenes
in every project, taking an ad hoc approach to managing events:
? Kim works 19 to 20 hours a day and demands his staff work in shifts around the
clock.
? The slightest deviation from his orders can result in demotion or imprisonment.
For example, Kim had his brother-in-law (an architect) exiled to a minor rural
post because he introduced slight modifications to Kim's design of an aquarium.
? On the other hand, Kim Chong-il is lavish in his attention to his favorites, and,
often on the spur of the moment, will promote officials who please him,
regardless of the bureaucratic chain of command.
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despite his power, he is an
insecure man whose need for constant and uncritical admiration almost certainly reflects
underlying doubts about his own self-worth. Although he realizes
public displays of affection are insincere, his desire for adoration makes him susceptible
to syncophancy. he does not let flattery change his decisions on
key policy issues, but we believe it may, at times, impair his ability to make objective
assessments. While Kim Chong-il is a political pragmatist, he also can act on impulse,
makins~ rash decisions or promises he later forgets completely.
Policy Priority: Economic Modernization
Kim is already using his authority to try to change selected North Korean policies.
P'yongyang's press campaigns clearly identify Kim Chong-il's preference for technical
experts over ideological zealots to implement his push for development of light industry
and to improve the standard of living. a "general
understanding" among party and government officials that Kim Chong-il is attempting to
correct his father's economic mistakes--although no one refers to any of Kim II-song's
"mistakes" in front of either Kim. The younger Kim reportedly wants to open North
Korea to new economic methods and to adapt Chinese economic reforms. Kim's
interest in modernization suggests he may have been behind P'yongyang's joint venture
law, passed in 1984 and patterned after the Chinese model. This law is designed to
attract Western technology and capital. We believe North Korean media calls for
increased reliance on technical expertise in industry is evidence that Kim Chong-il's
reform efforts are under way.
Kim's modernization policies will face a variety of roadblocks, perhaps most
important his own management style, which will dissuade even senior officials from
offering candid advice and no doubt stunt initiative in the bureaucratic ranks. Other
factors that will hold back his efforts probably include:
? Raw material shortages.
enterprises are reluctant to share scarce resources, and do so only when Kim
Chong-il orders them to.
? A bureaucratic obsession with security. For example, while Kim Chong-il
reportedly is behind the public North Korean effort to promote a tourist industry,
he has commented that the great number of closed military areas in North Korea
will prevent the country from attracting many foreigners.
Failure of expensive, highly publicized public works projects also could set back
modernization efforts, and might weaken Kim Chong-il as well. For example
the Nampo lock gate--a major project personally
supervised by Kim--is constructed on an inadequate foundation and is settling rapidly.
problems there might reflect badly on Kim Chong-il.
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Foreign Policy
Although change in North Korean economic policy is possible under Kim
Chong-il's guidance, we expect continuity in foreign policy, at least over the short term,
in part because Kim Chong-il- -has less to do with
international affairs than with other aspects of North Korean affairs.
Kim is uneasy around foreigners, a fact substantiated by press coverage that
makes it clear that Kim II-song, but not his son, greets foreign visitors. While the elder
Kim often receives gifts personally, his son almost always receives them only after they
have first been handed to a "responsible official." Pro-Pyongyang Koreans living in
Japan have reported that, while they can expect an audience with Kim II-song, they
probably cannot expect to meet his son. Kim Chong-il's apparent xenophobia could well
be associated with his need for uncritical adoration. His reluctance to meet foreigners
probably reflects less his fear of non-Koreans than his concern about entering a
situation that would expose his lack of knowledge or ability to handle himself on an
international stage.
North Korea is now doing all it can to improve
relations with Tokyo and Washington. The North may believe its role in the North-South
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dialogue and offer to end military exercises, for example, go a Ion
way toward meeting
US conditions for direct contacts.
-Pyongyang
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believes the United States will be unresponsive as long as President Reagan is in office.
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The defectors report Kim Chong-il considers the United States and Japan
"fantasy islands," presumably because of their wealth, but perhaps also because he
absorbs so much of what he knows about the outside world from Western films and
television. for example, he believes capitalists are like the
gangsters he has seen on film. But given his interest in modernization and reform we
believe it is reasonable to expect Kim Chong-il will continue present efforts to improve
economic ties to the West and may be willing to open North Korea to limited doses of
Western culture. ~~
A major feature of North Korean foreign policy over the past two years has been
improving ties to the Soviet Union, and we expect Kim Chong-il will stay that course,
despite his personal preference for the Chinese. He lived in China as a child, and
has great regard for Deng Xiaoping and Hu
Yaobang. Kim has referred to the Soviets as
"barbarians" and "hairy armed animals." Kim Chong-il has
little regard for East European "beggar nations" with the exception of Romania--perhaps
because it is the only other Communist country with dynastic pretensions or because it
isis t~ly East European country to cultivate a relationship with North Korea.)
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The differences in Kim's treatment by Moscow and Beijing may both reflect his 25X1
preferences and reinforce them. Kim was enteftained lavishly when he visited China in
1983, but he has yet to visit the USSR, and it is clear the Soviets are reluctant to
recognize his succession publicly. North Korean press reports of last December's visit
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by Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze highlighted the presence of father and son at
the meetings. Soviet reports, on the other hand, barely mentioned Kim Chong-il.
Moreover, while Schevardnadze issued a public invitation to Kim II-song to come to the
USSR, press coverage of his visit only noted that "other invitations" also were made,
presumably a reference to Kim Chong-il.
Despite widespread public and diplomatic speculation, Kim Chong-il did not head
the North Korean delegation to the Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1986.
Explanations varied between those who thought the two sides had agreed that Kim
would not receive the attention he deserved and others who argued there had been
friction over protocol. We believe the latter contention. As early as September 1985,
Soviet officials preferred Kim be only a
member, rather than the head, of the delegation.
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We do not have a coherent picture based on plausible reporting to explain North
Korea's current tilt toward the Soviets, but some of Kim Chong-il's statements0
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confirm our speculation that it is motivated by practical considerations and
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pique with the Chinese. Kim Chong-il apparently shares
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a general North Korean belief that Moscow is more reliable than Beijing as a source of
economic and military aid.
Although he has warm regard for
the Chinese, he
recognizes that Moscow "has the money." In
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addition, he complained
about China's indirect trade with South Korea
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and noted
that fri tions over t e economic relationship are damaging Sino-North Korean
relations.
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In view of Kim Chong-il's realistic appraisal of his country's reliance on Soviet
aid, we do not believe his differences with Moscow pose an immediate threat to the
blossoming Soviet-North Korean relationship. We judge a Kim Chong-il visit to Moscow
likely, perhaps this year. In the longer run, the son could reverse his country's tilt
toward Moscow if Western aid and Chinese-style reforms prove beneficial to the North's
economy, and if he comes to perceive China as a more reliable source of economic aid.
In addition, perceived personal slights by the Soviets could eventually affect Kim's view
of the bilateral relationship.
Korean reunification remains a key issue for Kim II-song,
but the information we have on the younger Kim's views indicates he may not be as
obsessed with it. he has some
doubts about the advantages of reunification, at the same dime highlighting his limited
understandin of the South's econ mi
in line with his growing power, Kim
Chong-il is increasingly involved with policy toward the North-South dialogue. We
believe reunification will remain a powerful theme on both sides of the DMZ, and the
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younger Kim almost certainly will a it li service to strengthen his claim to be his
father's successor. Kim once told all South Korean intellectuals,
advanced technology, and industria ac ievements would become "his" once the
peninsula was reunified, but he does not now appear interested in using force to
achieve that goal. both he and his father have denied 0
Chin-u permission to invade the South. Nonetheless, pressure from military advisers
probably will lead the younger Kim to reserve this option if economic modernization
efforts founder and diplomatic initiatives fail to stem North Korea's declining fortunes.
Could Things Change?
The limited evidence we have suggests Kim Chong-il will indeed succeed his
father and already is guiding an increasingly wide range of both domestic and foreign
policy activity. If opposition does exist in Pyongyang, it must be one of the best hidden
political movements in the world. We still know very little about North Korea, however,
and cannot judge with confidence the political preferences of leaders who currently
guard every word to prevent running afoul of Kim II-song and his son.
Although the initial succession appears fairly secure, we believe Kim Chong-il's
prospects for a long tenure will depend on his ability to maintain the loyalty of younger
North Korean political and military leaders and--at the same time--to ameliorate his
country's serious economic problems. Indeed, the defectors doubt the younger Kim will
be able to stay in power after his father is gone. They believe he lacks Kim II-song's
charisma and that North Korea's troubled economy and repressive political system
cannot hold together without the elder Kim. We are inclined to believe the younger Kim
initially will be able to consolidate his authority, and that any leaders opposed to him
will need time to overcome their organizational disadvantage. lul
We note the possibility that Kim Chong-il, who reportedly is a reckless driver and
at one time had a drinking problem, could die before his father. We believe the North is
thoroughly unprepared for this eventuality; it would force Kim II-song to rethink
completely North Korea's future. The elder Kim would not only have to build an entirely
new succession scenario but might even consider reunifying Korea by force before his
death brings with it the specter of domestic instability.
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Appendix: Personal Data
Kim Chong-il, aged 44, is the son of Kim II-song by his first wife, Kim Chong-suk.
He is married to a woman in her late 30s and has a son about 15 and a daughter about
12.
rumors that he keeps a mistress, with w
hom he has a son, and 25X1
that he has ha at eas
t one liaison with a young actress
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Kim Chong-il is devoted to the
memory of his mother, who died when he was eight years old. She is the object of yet
another North Korean cult of personality. Kim apparently resents his stepmother, Kim
Song-ae. Kim Chong-il cuts her figure out of photographs.
In 1978--before Kim Chong-il became heir apparent--his stepmother was prominent in
publicity surrounding the visit to North Korea of Romanian President Ceaucescu and his
powertul wife, Elena. Kim Song-ae's presence at official functions apparently was
needed to balance the attention given to her Romanian counterpart. Her pictures also
were prominent in Romanian coverage of the Ceaucescus' 1985 visit to Pyongyang, but
North Korean papers carried no pictures of her--presumably at the direction of Kim
Chong-il.
unattractive; he wears high-heeled shoes and sports a fled-u hair-do in order to
make himself look taller. Although he encouraged new styles
into North Korean clothing, he continues to wear Mao-style tunics, reportedly because
he fears Western dress would make him look too fat. Kim Chong-il once was a heavy
drinker but cut back after warnings from his doctors. He reportedly is imaginative and
Kim Chong-il considers himself obese and
has some musical aptitude--he plays the piano
Kim Chong-il is an "absolute" materialist who believes money
vthina_ He reportedly has ec
.,
cess to his "own" Mold mine, which he need not
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SUBJECT: North Korea: Kim Chong-I1 in Charge) 25X1
Distribution:
Original - Requester
1 - Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security, Room 298, OEOB
1 - William Sherman (departs 30 June 1986) Deputy Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 6250, Dept. of State
1 - Dr. Karl Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs, International Security Affairs, Room 4E817, Dept. of Defense
1 - James Lilley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Room 5205, Dept. of State
1 - Harriet Isom, (Reassigned as of 30 June 1986) Director,
Office of Korean Affairs, EAP/K Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - Jay Taylor, Director, Office of Analysis for East
Asia and Pacific, Room 8840, Dept. of State
1 - Bill Newcomb, INR/EC/CER, Room 8442, Dept. of State
1 - Bill Eaton, INR/EAP, Room 8840, Dept. of State
1 - Celia Conlon, Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - Rear Admiral Edward Baker, Jr., Director, East Asia and Pacific Region,
International Security Affairs, Room 4C 839, Dept. of Defense
1 - Wallace Knowles, OASD/ISA/EAPR, Room 4C840,
Dept. of Defense, Pentagon 25X1
1 - Jay Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer/EA/P, Room X238,
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - DB-2D, Room C 2951, DIA 25X1
1 - DE-2, Room B6823, DIA
1 - JSI-3C, Room 1C930, DIA 25X1
1 - Col. Ned Murata, DOD/OJCS/J-5/Northeast Asia, Room 2E-973,
Dept. of Defense, Pentagon
1 - I I ~ 25X1
Room 67900, DIA
1 - Director/DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (7E 12
1 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
1 - C/PPS/DO (3D O1)
1 - OGI/FSIC/PI (2G 18)
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
1 - OEA/China Division (4G 32)
1 - OEA/SEA Division (4F 24)
1 - D/OEA (4F 18)
1 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
1 - DDI (7E 47) `
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
1 Office of Legislative Liaison (7B 14)
1 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G 07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7F 50)
1 - OLA/LDA/PPD/(5G 03)
1 - C/PES (7F 24)
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1 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
1 - DDO/EA Division (5D 00)
1 - DDO EA 5C 19)
1-
1 -
1 - I I
DDI/OEA/NA/Korea/ 25 June 1986
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