CHINA'S CAMBODIA POLICY: STEADY AS SHE GOES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606450001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 September 1986
China's Cambodia Policy: Steady As She Goes
Summary
Beijing's long-term strategy for forcing the Vietnamese out of
Cambodia remains based on the three pillars established soon after
Vietnam's 1978 invasion: military assistance to the Cambodian resistance,
military pressure along Vietnam's northern frontier, and backing for
ASEAN's diplomatic and economic measures. But Beijing--beginning- with
the forced nominal retirement of Pol Pot as Democratic Kampuchea's
(DK--i.e., the Khmer Rouge) Supreme Military Commander in August
1985--has made some notable tactical adjustments to blunt Hanoi's
diplomatic initiatives, to convince ASEAN and others that it does not seek
a return to power of the DK or Pol Pot, and to demonstrate its flexibility
on the potential composition of a Cambodian Government following a
Vietnamese withdrawal. Beijing has apparently pressured the DK
leadership into increased cooperation with non-Communist units operating
inside Cambodia and curbed the DK's excesses in the field. Beijing almost
certainly calculates that by lowering the DK's profile--without diminishing
its fighting strength--the resistance coalition will garner greater domestic
This memorandum was prepared by (Southeast Asia Division,
Office of East Asian Analysis with a contribution from the China Division. Information
available as of 12 September 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, ITM Branch, Southeast Asia Division,
OEA,
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support in Cambodia and international approval, thereby furthering the
goal of convincing the Vietnamese that their efforts to maintain control
over Cambodia are futile.
Since its early 1979 invasion to "teach a lesson" to Hanoi, direct but generally
low-level military pressure on Vietnam's northern frontier has been an important
element of China's strategy for denying the Vietnamese control of Cambodia. Although
casualties for the Chinese have occasionally been high, particularly on a remote border
battlefield north of the Vietnamese provincial capital of Ha Giang where China presently
has some 70,000 troops deployed, this military harassment accomplishes several
important objectives for Beijing:
? Daily crossborder shelling and occasional infantry skirmishes compel Hanoi to
maintain a costly military apparatus in the north and prevent the Vietnamese from
committing significantly greater assets to Cambodia.
? Politically, this strategy helps preserve China's credibility with ASEAN, particularly
Thailand, by demonstrating Beijing's determination to maintain pressure on
Vietnam.
? Large numbers of Chinese soldiers have received valuable- combat experience
through the periodic rotation of different units to the border.
The Diplomatic Card
Beijing has worked hard to strengthen its relations with the ASEAN countries in
order to encourage them to exert constant diplomatic and economic pressure on Hanoi.
Beijing generally is careful to follow
and complement ASEAN's overall lead on diplomatic strategy on the Cambodia issue, at
least partly to avoid fueling long-standing suspicion in Indonesia and Malaysia that
China has expansionist designs on Southeast Asia. ~~
Arming the Resistance
China provides generous aid to the DK and also
provides the majority of arms received by the two non-Communist resistance groups,
Most of its aid, however, has gone to the DK,
a situation which Beijing justifies on the grounds of the numerical and qualitative
superiority of that group to its non-Communist counterparts. Nevertheless, this
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imbalance in aid distribution has fueled concerns in ASEAN that Beijing seeks to restore
the DK to power, while its aid to the non-Communist factions has increased concerns
that China is gaining unacceptable influence over the resistance as a whole.
In our view, Beijing will accept almost any governmental arrangement in
Cambodia that is largely free of Hanoi's control. We believe Beijing recognizes that its
ability to impose its own preferences is sharply limited by such factors as its own
unwillingness to take more decisive military action and international aversion to the DK.
Beijing has thus found it necessary to take new initiatives in the past year to steer a
careful course that clearly shows its strong commitment to sustain opposition to
Vietnam while allaying fears that its seeks a DK-dominated government in Cambodia.
Beijing's fresh series of maneuvers is designed, in part, to inject new credibility
into China's assertion that it will accept a neutral, nonaligned and independent Cambodia
under Prince Sihanouk. Beijing began by pressuring DK Supreme Commander Pol Pot
into retirement in August 1985. According to the US Embassy in Beijing, the Chinese
probably took a leading role in formulating the resistance coalition's eight-point
proposal announced in Beijing in March, which for the first time allowed for inclusion of
Vietnam's puppet Heng Samrin faction in a coalition government. The proposal also
departed from previous demands for a Vietnamese pledge to withdraw its forces prior to
negotiations. Instead, it called for Vietnam and the resistance coalition to hold
negotiations on a two-stage withdrawal. Chinese General Secretary Hu Yaobang
publicly endorsed the proposal as fair and reasonable.
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On the battlefield, (Beijing has clearly succeeded in 25X1
convincing some DK leaders t at a unites front strategy is necessary, although several
DK regional commanders still strongly oppose it. (See appendix). 25X1
China's successes in moderating DK behavior mark a sharp departure, in our view,
from previous years when DK changes (such as abolition of the Kampuchean Communist
Party in 1981) were made only grudgingly.
Preserving Coalition Unity
Chinese officials are continuing to stress to the three resistance groups that
unity is a prerequisite for improved performance and gaining additional international
backing. According to the US Embassy in Beijing, they have also implied that greater
internal cooperation is necessary for continued Chinese support. These themes
undoubtedly were reemphasized in the past few days during the resistance summit in
Beijing.
But the Hardline Diplomacy Remains
China's hardline opposition to any compromise that allows the Vietnamese to
continue to dominate Cambodia remains unaltered. Beijing continues to rebuff
Vietnamese overtures to resume talks that were abandoned by China in 1980.
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The Chinese have also consistently taken the Soviet Union to task for its
unwillingness to press Hanoi to compromise. Of the three "obstacles" to improved
Sino-Soviet relations cited by Beijing, the Chinese insist that Soviet willingness to
terminate support for the Vietnamese in Cambodia is the "litmus test" by which Soviet
sincerity can best be gauged.l Beijing has been particularly critical of General Secretary
Gorbachev for not showing any flexibility on the Cambodia issue in his Vladivostok
speech delivered in July.
Deng Xiaoping dramatized the
importance that China attaches to the necessity for progress on the Cambodia issue in
his "60 Minutes" interview by offering a summit meeting with Gorbachev if the Soviets
would use their influence to get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia.
We believe China's goals and overall strategy in Cambodia will remain unchanged
for the foreseeable future. Beijing's initiatives over the past year, however, signal
greater willingness to use diplomatic means, if possible, to achieve those goals.
ven i ip omatic measures prove unproductive in
moving toward a settlement, continued stalemate in Cambodia, particularly at the
relatively low costs involved at present, is likely to remain an attractive option for
Beijing because of the pain it inflicts on Hanoi. An inconclusive outcome in Cambodia
will prevent Hanoi from accomplishing its strategic objectives, keep it diplomatically
isolated, and divert it from its own desperately needed economic measures.
From Beijing's perspective, the Cambodia issue also isolates the Soviets in
Southeast Asia, limiting PAoscow's ability to exploit its foothold in Vietnam. Support to
Vietnam also saddles Moscow with a continuing aid burden that is not likely to diminish
appreciably in the coming years.
Beijing, in sum, appears convinced that pressures on Vietnam (and to a lesser
extent, Moscow) will, over time, contain the expansion of Soviet and Vietnamese power
r-the region as a whole. Considering the lack of urgency on Beijing's part to
1 The Chinese list the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the Soviet military
buildup along the Sino-Soviet border as the other two major impediments to
improved relations with Moscow.
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settle the issue and its inability or unwillingness to take more drastic actions, we believe
China will remain committed, with occasional tactical adjustments, to the policies it has
pursued over the past seven and a half years.
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Appendix A
The Khmer Rouge: Following China's Lead
The DK over the past year or so has adopted several tactical reforms under
pressure from the Chinese to transform the brutal image earned during Pol Pot's
1975-1978 rule. Although efforts at image building are not new within the DK, we
believe more ra matic elements in the rou 's leadership--including Khieu Samphan
and Son Sen see these measures as critical to the
long-term political and military fortunes of their organization. They believe that the
traditional hardline DK approach toward the Vietnamese dccupation of Cambodia and the
non-Communist resistance holds little promise for the future, realizing that the DK's
current military capabilities are insufficient to defeat the Vietnamese. The pragmatists
believe their approach will strengthen the DK's overall strategic position. They probably
argue that a burnished DK image will increase its appeal with the Cambodian populace,
which can be translated into enhanced DK military prowess by improving its support
network and its ability to recruit, while exacerbating growing resentment of the
Vietnamese occupation. The pragmatists probably also believe the moderate united
front approach is the best way to bolster the resistance coalition's international appeal
and, thereby, maximize diplomatic pressure on the Vietnamese while improving the DK's
position for securing a role in a post settlement Cambodia. DK leaders also are well
aware of their pariah status and the widespread fear that a Vietnamese withdrawal
would lead to the restoration of the DK. The pragmatists probably contend that if the
DK can successfully blur the distinction between the three resistance groups or gain
popular acknowledgement of its apparent moderation, it can reduce at least this one
concern of reluctant would-be supporters.
But not all DK leaders champion the united front approach.
identifies the leading dissenters as Pol Pot and Ta Mok, who still en orse the K's
traditional strong-arm tactics and probably fear that recent efforts at moderation will
undermine their strategic position. They probably believe that as long as Chinese
support holds firm, the DK can easily remain the dominant Cambodian military force
while arguing that cooperation with the non-Communists will only strengthen the
non-Communists' hand by helping them gain a foothold in the Cambodian interior to the
detriment of the DK. They probably also believe that Vietnam will never relinquish
control over Cambodia unless it is forced to do so on the battlefield. The hardliners
would contend that offering to negotiate with Heng Samrin and promising him a
leadership role only serves to legitimize the Vietnamese-installed regime and results in
no strategic gains for the DK.
We believe pragmatic elements within the DK will retain the upper hand largely
because they enjoy strong support from the Chinese, who have been pressing hard for
change. Although Pol Pot remains the most capable military commander and the key
architect of the Communist guerrilla effort, the institution by the DK of unprecedented
reforms suggest that Pol Pot's stature has diminished. Because he is viewed as a major
obstacle to an improved image for the DK, internal and external pressure to limit Pol
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Pot's role in the resistance group probably will intensify and, we believe, will prevent
him from regaining his former preeminent position. Nonetheless, the charismatic Pol Pot
and his unwavering supporter, Ta Mok, command the bulk of DK forces, suggesting that
Pol Pot wilt remain an important figure.
In any event, we see no evidence to suggest that the DK is willing to share
power with the other far weaker Khmer elements. Despite different tactical philosophies,
defectors report that Communist guerrilla leaders are resolved to destroy the Heng
Samrin regime and to drive out the Vietnamese; the DK then
intends to continue the struggle against the non
DK officials are promoting cooperation with the non-Communists to demonstrate
resistance unity for the local populace and Heng Samrin's People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK) forces, hoping they will be inspired to join the resistance. Several
Communist guerrilla commanders, however, say they intend to cooperate with
non-Communists only to facilitate DK operations
The DK also has embarked on an effort to improve its image wit t e am o ian
populace and has made civilian proselytization amajor component of guerrilla
operations in the interior. Because local villagers provide intelligence, supplies, and
other assistance, developing contacts with them and additional internal sources of
support are vital elements of DK military strategy.
The DK already is conducting an active interior campaign that we believe will
continue over the next few months. Communist resistance forces are well positioned
for guerrilla operations with the bulk of their troops already in the interior and an
extensive support network at their disposal. They have been active throughout the
provinces, targeting transportation routes, Vietnamese and PRK military positions, and
local government and economic facilities. They also have launched a number of attacks
against major population centers, including Phnom Penh. This high level of activity
exacerbates Vietnamese security problems, weakens the credibility of the Heng Samrin
regime, and underscores the DK's decided military superiority over the two
non-Communist factions.
Over the longer term, however, the DK probably will face tougher going.
Vietnamese forces available for internal security are stretched thin
We judge that Hanoi
also has roughly 20,000 additional troops that can be brought into Cambodia on short
notice, assuring its ability to retain the strategic advantage.
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SUBJECT: China's Cambodia Policy: Steady As She Goes
DISTRIBUTION:
External
White House and National Security Council .,
1 - The Honorable Alton Keel, Deputy Assistant to the
President, White House.
1 - James H. Kelly, Jr., Senior Staff Member, East Asia, EOB,
Rm 302.
1 - Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President, White
House, Rm 298.
1 - David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Honq
Kong E06, Rm 302.
1 - Richard Childress, NSC, Rm 392 Old E06
National~Security Agency
1 - B152, Rm 3W140, NSA, Fort Meade, Md. 20755. 25X1
1 - Lt. Gen. William Odom, DIR NSA, Fort George Meade, Md.
20755
1 - (Branch Chief, B542, NSA, Rm 1A205 25X1
Department of State
1 - The Honorable Gaston Siqur, Assistant Secretary, East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Rm 6205.
1 - Amb. Morton Abramowitz, Director INR, Rm 6531.
1 - David N. Schwartz, Office of Policy Analysis, Rm 7430.
1 - Richard Williams, Director, EAP/C, Rm 4318.
1 - Amb. H. Alan Holmes, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs, Rm 7327.
1 - Doug Paal, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7330.
1 - Mark A. Sigler, INR/PMA, Rm 6524A.
1 - The Honorable Vernon A. Walters, l1S Ambassador to the UN,
USUN, Department of State.
1 - James Liley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Rm 6202.
1 - Robert W. Drexler, Director, EAP/RA, Rm 4210.
1 - Thomas Fingar, Chief, INR/EAP/CH, Rm 8840.
1 - Louis G. Sarris, Acting Director, INR/EAP, Rm 8840.
1 - Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7311.
1 - Dorothy Avery, INR/EAP, Rm 8647 New State.
1 - Paula Causey, Chief, INR/EAP/SA, Rm 8647 New State
1 - Robert bean, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
? Politico-Military Affairs, Rm 7325, Department-of State
1 - Fred Greene, Acting Director, INR/EAP, Rm 8840, Department
of State.
1 - Shephard Lowman, Director EAP/VLC, EA/VLK, Rm 6808,
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Department of State.
1 - John C. Monjo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Rm 6205, Department of State
1 - John A. Wiant, Deputy Director/Office of Intelligence,
Liaison, (INR/IL), Rm 6635, Department of State -.~
Department of Defense .-
1 - Colonel David R. Brown, Executive Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Rm 3A948.
1 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of
Defense, International Security Affairs, Rm 4E808,
Pentagon.
1 - Rear Admiral Baker Deputy Assistant Secretary for East
Asia, ISA, Rm 4E~17, Pentagon.
1 - Major General Schuyler Bissell, Air Force Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, DAMI-FII, Rm 2A474, Pentagon.
1 - Lieutenant Colonel Eden Woon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, China Plans and Policy, FESA J-5, Rm 2E973
Pentagon.
1 - Lieutenant Colonel Gary Weis, ISA, Rm 4C849 Pentagon.
1 - John J. Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer, East Asia and
- arne i n e igence ser to the Under Secretary,
International Security Policy, Rm 4E838, Pentagon.
1 - Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the
Under Secretary for Policy, Rm 3A948, Pentagon.
1 - Lieutenant General John M. Mollering, USA, Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rm 2E872, Pentagon.
1 - Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman, Director of Naval
Intelligence. Rm 5C572. Pentagon.
- ar ac son, as Sian ~ aci is Affairs, OSD/ISA,
Rm 4C839, Pentagon.
1 - Lt. Col. Richard A. Rice, J5 FESA, Rm 2E973, Pentagon.
1 - LTC George Tannehill II, USA, Defense Security Assistance
Agency, Rm 4B-659 Pentagon
1 - Lt. Col. William Wise USAF OSD/t SA Rm 4C839 P nt gon.
Department of Energy
1 - Douglas Faulkner, DOE/DP-421, GA-257, Forrestal Bldq.
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