CHINA: POOR OUTLOOK FOR THE THREE GORGES PROJECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606650002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE /0 / /~cf c~ rl C(
DOC NO
OIR 3
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 October 1986
China: Poor Outlook for the Three Gorges Project
Summary
We believe the Three Gorges hydroelectric project is a far cry from
the "sure thing" China's power ministry has tried to convince United States
and other foreign parties it is. For the project to become a reality, we
believe seven major obstacles must be overcome: the World Bank must
endorse it, low cost financing must be secured, China's economy must
improve, stronger domestic political support must be found, a strategy for
meeting short term energy needs must be agreed to, better management
of limited resources must be realized and a division of labor between
Chinese and foreign firms must be worked out. If the Chinese
Government approves the project, we believe low-cost loans, grants, and
supplier credits from Japan, Canada, and elsewhere will give foreign firms
the edge over the United States in bidding on the project.
This memorandum was prepared byl Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 3 October 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Economic Assessments Branch,
China Division, OEA,
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The Chinese Government has again deferred--this time until late 1987--a final
decision on whether to build the giant Three Gorges project (see inset). In June, the
State Council assigned responsibility for the project to two new offices and authorized
still more feasibility studies, which Canada will carry out and the World Bank will
supervise.' For a number of reasons, we doubt the project will come to fruition even if
it wins State Council approval in 1987.
Three Gorges: A Mammoth Undertaking
For over three decades, proposals to dam the Yangtze River at Three
Gorges have been debated by successive Chinese leaders. If built, the dam
would provide more power capacity than any other in the world--13,000
megawatts (MW), according to the Chinese press, equal to 15 percent of China's
current total power capacity--within a practical distance of China's
power-starved coastal industries. It would also provide flood control and
improved navigation on the Yangtze River, possibly allowing oceangoing vessels
to reach Chongqing. The cost would be steep--with Chinese and foreign
estimates ranging from $10-16 billion, depending on height, power capacity, and
lock capabilities--and construction would take anywhere from 10 to 20 years.
Some Big Ifs
For the Three Gorges to become reality, we believe seven major obstacles must
be negotiated. The fact that the project has been on the drawing broad for over 30
years testifies to the difficulty of that task.
Favorable International Findings
To persuade the State Council that the project is a legitimate use of tight
investment funds, we believe China's review groups will need a strong recommendation
from the World Bank. World Bank approval, however, is not ensured. Past favorable
evaluations of Three Gorges, which were done by the pro-project Ministry of Water
Resources and Electric Power (MWREP), never included the Bank-style cost-benefit
analysis. Also, the technical studies of various aspects of the project done by MWREP
' We believe the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power--the leading
proponent for Three Gorges--has been sidelined by the State Council decision. See
appendix A for a discussion of who is calling the shots on the Three Gorges project.
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have used different assumptions about such factors as dam height, 2 reservoir levels,
and navigation capabilities--making an assessment of the merits impossible. Nor is it
clear that the Bank will recommend a single large dam as the optimum method of
meeting flood control and electric power needs; MWREP itself has been debating this
question for decades.
Low-Cost Financing
we estimate the Chinese will need
$5-8 billion in foreign exchange for the Three Gorges project. China is only interested
in low-cost, concessionary loans--Vice Premier Li Peng, China's energy czar, has told
US Government officials that Three Gorges would not proceed without them. We
believe China cannot secure this amount without unusual cooperation from several
countries and international organizations, and Beijing's best sources of low-cost
financing, the World Bank and Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), may
not be able to provide much help. The World Bank has already indicated to US Embassy
officials in Beijing that it would not finance Three Gorges alone. And, although Japanese
press reports suggest that Tokyo is willing to devote China's next two OECF allocations
(covering the 1990s) exclusively to Three Gorges, we believe China's developing
industries would lobby hard against the proposal because it would cost them a major
source of low-cost project financing for an entire decade.
We think China's best hope is to press potential foreign participants, including the
United States, to contribute to an international finance package that might include a
partial OECF allocation, various eximbank contributions, supplier credits, and possibly
loans from the World Bank. Beijing's success in assembling such a package will depend
on the ability of foreign firms to agree on a division of the Three Gorges pie and to
convince their governments and financial institutions to provide the financing, which we
believe will be difficult.
A Sound Economy
Because the dam provides no direct source of foreign exchange to repay project
loans, the level of China's foreign exchange reserves will be a factor in Beijing's
decision, even if low-cost loans are available. By our calculations, assuming a 30 year
pay-back period, foreign loan repayment costs for the dam would climb gradually, to at
least $500 million a year for 10 or more of those years. Moreover, we think China
would have considerable difficulty financing the costs of Three Gorges not covered by
foreign loans, costs we estimate at 15 to 25 billion yuan ($4-7 billion), more than
China's entire hydropower budget in the last decade. China's capital construction
budget is already stressed by two years of excessive growth, and other industries will
2 See appendix B for comparisons of the Three Gorges project with other-large
hydropower dams worldwide.
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try to delay a decision on Three Gorges to preserve their share of the pie.
A Strong Backer
high-cost project that will not provide any payoff for decades.
Research by two leading US China scholars concludes that large projects such as
Three Gorges must have strong backing from at least one top leader if they are to
become a reality.3 We believe the support of Deng Xiaoping or Zhao Ziyang is critical
for Three Gorges. We suspect the project faces strong opposition from many quarters
in the bureaucracy--including other energy ministries such as coal and oil, and several
provincial governments--who see their shares of the state investment budget, access to
foreign exchange, and power threatened. Vice Premier Li Peng seems a lukewarm
supporter at best, and we do not detect any other strong support in the top leadership,
perhaps because no one sees any personal gain from championing a high-risk,
Urgent Power Needs
we believe that serious power shortages are likely to continue.
Chronic power shortages resulting from rapid industrial growth in the 1980s may
force China to opt for investment in easy-to-build thermal plants and to defer
long-term hydroprojects such as Three Gorges. China is already building more thermal
power capacity than it had planned, and although industrial growth has slowed in 1986,
promised in the budget.
China's record for completing hydropower projects is poor. China actually
commissioned only 400 MW of hydro capacity--two or three generators--in 1985,
compared with 5,100 MW of thermal capacity, though it has had 10,000 MW of hydro
capacity under construction for years. Most of the problem lies in overall management
of the hydropower effort. Projects are frequently and wastefully postponed and later
reactivated. Four of eight major hydroprojects begun in the late 1970s were shelved for
two years or more; two of the four only recently resumed construction." Even while
some projects were on hold, those actively under construction had to compete for
materials and investment funds. Moreover, over the last year, we suspect that dams
designated as key national projects have had problems getting money that had been
See Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Energy Development, by Kenneth Lieberthal and
Michel Oksenberg, a contract study (#50-SATA-4-16230) for the Department of
Commerce.
See appendix C for a list of hydropower plants currently under construction.
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We believe China could handle construction of Three Gorges if it were the only
major hydroproject, but plans call for an ambitious expansion of hydropower even
without Three Gorges. China's official targets for large hydropower projects call for
adding 28,000 MW of new capacity--twice as much as Three Gorges represents--by the
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Table 1 Thousand megawatts
China: Power Capacity in 1985 and Targets for the Future
Total
Capacity
86
110
240
Hydro
26
34
63
Small Hydro
9
12
18
Large and
medium Dams
year 2000 (see table 1). We doubt China can marshall the resources to add that much
capacity in that time period, but given China's severe power shortages and
provincial-level support for other hydroprojects, Beijing is unlikely to scale back its plans
either. In our judgment, MWREP will find itself overextended and behind schedule even
without Three Gorges.
Self-Reliance Versus Foreign Participation
Li Pang has emphasized that the Chinese themselves would build Three Gorges,
and not turn the project over to foreigners. Whether the Chinese truly act as general
contractors for Three Gorges, or assume the role In name only, we believe efforts to
ensure maximum Chinese participation and the usual bureaucratic hassles encountered
by foreign companies will lead to negotiating and construction delays.
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Moreover, the Chinese in our view misjudge their capabilities. US officials have
recommended--in large part because of perceived problems in China's hydropower
sector--that Beijing plan on spending at least three-fourths of the cost of Three Gorges
abroad to buy construction equipment, building materials, electrical equipment (including
all 26 generators), and to acquire foreign consultants and management for various
stages of construction. MWREP, however, told US officials it wants to keep foreign
exchange costs down to roughly 40 percent of project costs and to minimize outside
foreign management. It is also considering importing the technology for the plant's
500-MW generators and building them in China. Either tactic is likely to delay
completion, given China's lackluster record in hydropower construction and its ongoing
problems with even trial production of smaller 300-MW hydroturbines.
We also expect bargaining with foreign suppliers on equipment and engineering
contracts to cause considerable delay. Based on our analysis of Chinese negotiating
tactics, we believe the Chinese will play one vendor's quotes against
another's--regardless of the time wasted in negotiation. For example, China began
commercial discussions for the Guangdong nuclear power plant more than three years
ago, but only last month signed a final contract for the reactors.
We believe that no compelling advantage to US firms would evolve from either
private or US Government contributions to the current round of feasibility studies. Past
US contributions of hydroproject studies to China did not even guarantee US firms a
right to bid on those projects, and MWREP has already told US Embassy officials in
Beijing that any contributions for Three Gorges must include no "preconditions," even
the right to bid. MWREP also said Ottawa was told that Canada's contribution of $5
million to the new studies did not preempt any other potential suppliers.
If the project is approved, both financing requirements and Beijing's emphasis on
self-reliance suggest that neither the United States nor any other country will be
permitted to take the lead on Three Gorges. Consequently, US firms can expect
substantial competition for all goods and services the Chinese seek for Three Gorges.
China has purchased both hydropower construction equipment and expertise from the
United States, but given the likely intensity of competition, price and financing
arrangements will play a key role in all negotiations, and here US firms will be at a
distinct disadvantage. If China builds Three Gorges, low-cost loans, grants, and supplier
credits available from Japan, Canada, and elsewhere would give other foreign firms a
competitive edge that may exceed the benefits of a cheaper dollar.
In fact, a little-publicized supplier credit issued by Canada concurrently with the
feasibility study donation may have given Canada a leg up on both the United States
and Japan in supplying the hydropower generators for Three Gorges. Canada's US$252
million in equipment credits allows for technology transfer packages, and if the project
goes ahead the Chinese could use this money to import Canadian 500-MW generator
technology--dashing US and Japanese hopes of selling China 26 generators or the
technology to build them.
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Appendix A
Three Gorges: Who Is Calling the Shots
We believe the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power (MWREP) has
consistently misrepresented both its ability to influence decisionmaking on the Three
Gorges project and the chances the project will gain final State Council approval.
Indeed, the recent creation of two oversight bodies by the State Council signals a
decline in MWREP's influence and unhappiness with the way it had managed the project.
project approval before MWREP would have to choose a specific height.?
The MWREP has marshalled every resource available in trying to convince the
leadership to build Three Gorges.5 Hoping for the dam's inclusion in the Seventh Five
Year Plan (1986-90), MWREP's Minister, Madame Qian Zhengying, unsuccessfully tried in
1984 to sell the dam as an answer to East China's electric power needs, according to
MWREP, who also told US Embassy officials they later placed more emphasis on the
dam's other benefits--navigation and flood control.6 We believe, MWREP remained
deliberately vague about the height of the dam to gain maximum political support at the
provincial level, hoping that a coalition of high and low dam supporters would lead to
planning office should eventually govern Sanxia Province.
We believe MWREP's main strategy, however, has been to try to give the Three
Gorges project enough momentum to preempt strong opposition from arising before the
State Council made a final decision. Last year the Ministry was instrumental in
establishing a planning office to create a new Chinese province for the dam, called
Sanxia. MWREP provided staff for the planning office, and used it as a springboard for a
press blitz on the benefits of the Three ,Gorges dam--even hinting at support from Deng
Xiaoping--to create the impression that its construction was a foregone conclusion.
Articles in Hong Kong's Ta Kung Pao and elsewhere mapped out tentative boundaries for
the province, and MWREP hinted through these articles that its own officials in the
In the process, MWREP proposals have undergone substantial revisions; initially they
sought an even larger dam with 26,000-MW power capacity.
electric power.
In studies carried out by the US Interior's Bureau of Reclamation in 1981 under the
US-China Hydroelectric Protocol, US experts told MWREP that in cost-benefit terms
the dam probably made more sense as a flood control project than as a source of
greater flood control capabilities.
Most of those outside of MWREP willing to consider the dam favored a lower dam to
keep down costs, including peasant relocation costs. According to Lieberthal and
Oksenberg, Chongqing favors a higher dam that will allow oceangoing vessels to
reach the city; the provinces downstream presumably also favor a higher dam with
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Criticism Forces Postponement...
We believe MWREP's political maneuvering was ineffective and possibly
counterproductive. In March of this year, outspoken opposition to Three Gorges
surfaced at the sixth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). A
well-received speech by economist Qian Jiaju--reported in both the Beijing and Hong
Kong press--blasted the leadership's usual willingness to "give the nod" to large
projects without comprehensive technical evaluations. Following Qian's speech, an
earlier CPPCC review critical of Three Gorges was detailed In Ta Kung Pao. Then, .in an
April press conference, Vice-Premier Li Peng downplayed plans for a new province and
belittled the planning office. In June, the leadership dissolved the provincial planning
office and postponed a final decision on Three Gorges until late 1987.
And a New Approach
In the meantime, the State Council has set up two new planning bodies for the
project. According to Chinese press reports, both are directly answerable to the State
Council, and neither includes any MWREP representation. The new groups represent a
leadership effort to make a more informed and less political decision on the merits of
the Three Gorges project.
The Three Gorges Project Coordination Group will oversee a new round of
internal bureaucratic review. It includes members of the State Council, the National
People's Conference (NPC) Standing Committee, the CPPCC National Committee, and the
Central Advisory Commission, namely Li Peng, Wang Renzhong, Chang Zihua, and Bo
Yibo.
More powerful is the Three Gorges Project Examination Committee, which will
evaluate new foreign and domestic feasibility studies, and make the preliminary
recommendation next year on whether the State Council should approve the dam.
Chinese press reports list LI Peng as chairman of this committee with two State
Councillors as vice chairmen: Song Ping, head of the State Planning Commission (SPC),
and Song Jian, head of the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC).
Li Peng was personally opposed to the project in
the early 1980s, and In talks with US officials over the last two years he has been a
lukewarm supporter at best. In an era of budget cutbacks and foreign exchange
restrictions, he Is already committed to another big-ticket item, China's commercial
nuclear program, which has Itself been cut back In recent months. Despite his influence
and his position as "energy czar," we think LI will recommend Three Gorges receive
State Council approval only If concessionary funding is available and the feasibility
studies make the project appear quite sound. Even then, he may not prove a strong
supporter of the project.
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Appendix B
How Big Is Three Gorges?
Although Three Gorges is not a high dam---the low design option of 160 meters
would make it shorter than the 172-meter dam being built by the Chinese at
Longyangxia--it is relatively long and--for a concrete-and-earth dam--massive; in
volume terms Three Gorges ranks among the world's largest, many of which are lower,
earth or rockfill dams.
World's Highest Dams (Height above lowest foundation)
1
Rogun*
Country
USSR
Height in meters
335
2
Nurek
USSR
300
3
Grand Dixence
Switzerland
285
4
Inguri
USSR
272
5
Boruca*
Costa Rica
267
16
Oroville
US
230
19
Hoover
US
221
---
Three Gorges
China
165-180?
63
Longyangxia*
China
172
66
Grand Coulee
United States
168
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World's Largest Volume Dams
Rank
Name
Country
Volume (million
cubic meters)
1
Chapeton*
Argentina
296,200
2
New Cornelia Tailings
US
209,500
3
Tarbela
Pakistan
148,500
---
Three Gorges
China
108,000
4
Fort Peck
US
96,050
---
Grand Coulee
US
8,093
---
Hoover
US
3,364
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World's Largest Capacity Hydroplants
Three Gorges
Country
China
Current
Capacity
(MW)
13,00b
Itaipu
Brazil/Paraguay
4,900
12,600
Guri*
Venezuela
2,800
10,000
Tucurui*
Brazil
3,760
8,000
Grand Coulee
US
6,494
6,494
Sayano-Shusensk
USSR
6,400
6,400
Gezhouba
China
1,215
2,715
Hoover Dam
US
1,345
1,345
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World's Largest Capacity Reservoirs
Rank
Name
Country
Reservoir capacity
(billion cubic meters)
1
Owen Falls*
Uganda
2,700
2
Bratsk
USSR
169
3
Aswan (High)
Egypt
169
4
Kariba
Zimbabwe
160
5
Akosombo
Ghana
148
24
Tucurui
Brazil
43
---
Three Gorges
China
37
25
Vilyui
USSR
36
---
Hoover
US
35
---
Grand Coulee
US
12
*Most of this reservoir was previously a lake.
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Appendix C
Large Dams Now Under Construction in China
Capacity
Expected
City
(in megawatts)
Begun
Completion
Lubuge
600
1982
1990
Tianshengqiao
1,150
1985
NA
Yantan
1,100
1984-5
1993
Tongjiezi
600
1985
1993
Dongjiang
500
1978
NA
Ankang
800
1978
1986
Shuikou
1,400
1986
1988-95
Shaxikou
300
1984
1988
Baishan
900
1976
1986
Longyangxia
1,280
1976
1989
Manwan
1,500
1986
1991
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SUBJECT: China: Poor Outlook for the Three Gorges Project.
Distribution:
National Security Council
1 - David Laux, Senior Staff Member for China, Taiwan and Hong
Kong, Room 302, Old Executive Office Bldg., NSC
Department of State
1 - Joan Plaisted, Office of Chinese Affairs, Room 4318
1 - Bob Goldberg, Office of Chinese Affairs, Room 4318
1 - Larry Roeder, Office of East-West Trade, Room 3815
1 - Doug Paal, S/P, Room 7330
1 - Tom Fingar, Chief, China Division, INR/EAP, Room 8840
1 - Chris Clarke, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Room 8840
1 - Tom Martin, Deputy Director, EB/EPC - Room 3329
1 - Dan Stein, Trade Development Program, State Annex SA-16,
Room 301, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20523
Department of Treasury
2 - Jonathan Hill, Office of East-West Policy, Room 4426
Department of Commerce
1 - Christine Lucyk, Office of PRC and Hong Kong, Room 2317
1 - Jeffrey Lee, Office of PRC and Hong Kong, Room 2317
1 - Myna Stoltz, Country Policy Analyst, Office of East Asia and
the Pacific, Room 3820
3 - Betsy Hudson, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Room 6854
Department of Energy - Forrestal Bldg.
5 - Lana Ekimoff, Office of International Affairs, Room 7G090
1 - T.K. Lau, Room 7A029
1 - Douglas Faulkner, Room GA257, Forrestal Building
Office of the US Trade Representative
2 - William Abnett, Director of China Affairs, 600 17th Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C., Room 300
United States Export-Import Bank
1 - Raymond J. Albright, Vice President, Asia Division, Room 1129
2 - Howard Turk, Room 1112
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Overseas Private Investment Corporation
1 - Craig Nalen, President
Defense Intelligence Agency
1-
1-
1-
National Security Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
C/OEA/CH, Room 4G32
C/OEA/CH/IS, Room 4G32
C/OEA/CH/EA, Room 4G32
C/OEA/CH/TT, Room 4G32
C/OEA/CH/LA, Room 4G32
D/OEA, Room 4F18
DDI, Room 7E44
- Senior Review Panel, Room 5G00
PDB Staff, Room 7F30
NIO/EA, Room 7E62
C/PES, Room 7F24
C/DO/PPS, Room 3D01
- FBIS/NEAAD/China Branch, Room 306, Key
FBIS/S&TC, 311 Key Bldg
NEAD/CSTP, 304 Key Bldg
- EA/CO Room 5D54
- OGI/SRD/EM, Room 3G31
- C/EA/RR, Room 5E 18
- LDA/AN/CHINA, Room 1H18
LDA/AN/CHINA, Room 1H18
- CPAS/ILS, Room 7G50
- CPAS/IMC/CB, Room 7G07
- Congressional Liaison, Room 7B02
Author
Chrono
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