(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000706880001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03: CIA-RDP86T01017R000706880001-1 _
Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 December 1986
The Kumgangsan Dam Controversy 25X1
Summary
Seoul claims that P'yongyang's Kumgangsan Dam--
to be located about 10 kilometers from the DMZ--poses
a serious economic and military threat to the
view, the Kumgangsan Dam project has a primarily
economic goal and is not intended to threaten the
South.
The Political Angle: Seoul's Charges
Pyongyang media announced on 21 October that groundbreaking
ceremonies had been held for the massive Kumgangsan hydroelectric
power station, one of the country's major economic projects, and
that large numbers of North Korean soldiers were participating in
the construction. Since then, Seoul--in a well-planned media
campaign--has charged that the dam would threaten the South's
Information available as of 12 December 1986 was used in its
preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia Division,
OEA,
25X1
25X1
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economy and security, cause shortages of agricultural,
industrial, and drinking water, and considerably reduce the
electric power generation capacity of five South Korean dams.
The government also has claimed that a deliberate or accidental
destruction of the dam would devastate the central part of the
peninsula, inundate Seoul, and result in long-term destruction of
the ecosystem
- Seoul has known since at least 1984 that North Korea
was planning to build a giant dam near the DMZ, but
made no move to solicit US views on the issue or to map
out a coordinated counterstrategy. Either move would
be expected if there were genuine concern about a
security threat.
P'yongyang's Response
Pyongyang responded to Seoul's charges by imposing a news
blackout on its Kumgangsan Dam activities and launching its own
propaganda campaign. It claims that:
-- The Kumgangsan project is only an effort to develop
Kangwon Province's water resources, and that rather
than adversely affecting the South, the dam will help
prevent seasonal flood damage there.
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- The dam will hold only 3.6 billion rather than the 20
billion tons of water claimed by Seoul.
- Water resource exploitation should be settled
bilaterally, not by international mediation, which
would foster the "two Koreas" concept
Economic Importance to the North
We believe P'yongyang's plan to build the Kumgangsan
hydroelectric power plant in Kangwon Province is part of a long-
range goal to expand electric power output rather than a means to
threaten the South. Shortages of all forms of energy have long
plagued the North and have had repercussions throughout the
economy. North Korean reporting suggests the installed capacity
of this plant will be about 800,000 kilowatts. This would make
it the largest hydroelectric plant in the country, adding
significantly to the North's estimated 7 million kilowatts
installed capacity. The Kumgangsan plant would be particularly
important to Kangwon Province, long neglected in the development
of its electric power base.
Reportedly, the system will consist of several dams and
pumping stations that will draw water not only from the Pukhan
River, which flows into the South, but also from the Imjin and
other rivers. Damming the lower reaches of the North Korean
portion of the Pukhan River will back the water up to form a
reservoir that will cover much of Ch'angdo County. This water
will be carried about 50 to 00 kilometers from the site of the
dam?to provide power for generating equipment to be installed
roughly 15 to 25 kilometers south of the port city of Wonsan in
the area of Sinhwa-ri and Munsu-ri
We believe that it will be many years before the project is
finished, especially because the North apparently plans to do
most if not all of the work itself. Completion of the dams
probably will take at least seven years, but the reservoir will
not fill to capacity for several years after that. Building this
power plant is likely to be a formidable undertaking for the
North Koreans, who have only recently begun to manufacture
125,000-kilowatt generators, the size to be installed in the new
T'aech'on hydroelectric plant and probably to be used in the
Kumgangsan plant.
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Kamgangsan Project
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Impact on the South's Economy
We believe the impact on the South Korean economy resulting
from a reduced flow of water caused by the Kumgangsan dam could
be managed by Seoul:
-- Agricultural production. Less than 3 percent of South
Korea s total cultivated land is in the seven counties
bordering the Pukhan and Han Rivers from the DMZ to
Seoul, and only a fraction of that is directly
dependent on waters from those rivers.
-- Hydroelectric power capacity. The five dams along the
affected rivers generate only about 2 percent of South
Korea's electricity; Seoul's ambitious nuclear power
program will reduce hydropower's share.
-- Water for industrial use. The Kumgangsan dam will cut
off less than 10 percent of the Han River watershed
area, according to our estimates. Upstream, some local
industries will encounter difficulties, particularly in
the more heavily populated areas such as Hwach'on and
Ch'unch'on.
Military Implications
We see little merit in Seoul's claims of a military motive
behind North Korea's plans to build the Kumgangsan Dam. A breach
of the dam would destroy some bridges, roads, and crossing points
in the Han River valley and impair the mobility of South Korean
forces. But these lines of communication are the same ones the
North would need for an invasion. The long construction period
for the dam would enable the South to relocate military units and
facilities)
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SUBJECT: The Kumgangsan Dam Controvers,~
Distribution:
Original - Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense
Room 4E830, Dept. of Defense
1 - Director, DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (1E-12)
1 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
1 - NIO/Economics (7E 48)
1-
1-
1 - OGI/FSIC/P 18)
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
1 - OEA/China Division (4G 32)
1 - OEA/SEA Division (4F 24)
1 - D/OEA (4F 18)
1 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
1 - DOI (7E 47)
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
1 Office of Legislative Liaison (76 14)
1 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G 07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G 50)
1 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
1 - ODO
1 - DDO
1 - D D 0
1 - DDO
1
1
C/E
:25418 12 Dec. 86
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