NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA: THE 1988 SEOUL OLYMPIC GAMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000706930001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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North Korea-South Korea: The 1988 Seoul Olympic Gamest 25X1
Summary
After a major push for cohosting of the 1988
Olympics, North Korea has won only an offer from the
International Olympic Committee of the right to hold
two Olympic competitions and parts of two others.
Some South Korean officials are willing to go
further, but Seoul and IOC President Samaranch
insist that the North must accept the Committee's
offer unconditionally before continuing negotiations
on more events and other important symbolic issues,
including the title of the Games and the handling of
Olympic ceremonies. Moscow and its East European
allies so far have ignored North Korea's call for an
Olympic boycott. China, which sent a team to the
1986 Seoul Asian Games, probably will take part in
the Olympics. Cuba, until now the North's strongest
supporter, has been awarded the 1991 Pan American
Games, which is likely to diminish its incentive to
oppose the Seoul Olympics. Nevertheless, we are
uncertain how many Communist countries will attend
the Games.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian
Analysis. Information available as of 12 December 1986 was used
in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia Division,
OEA,
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Status of the IOC Offer
Samaranch has given North Korea until 17 September 1987,
exactly one year before the Olympic opening ceremony, to accept a
modest share in the Olympics. According to the US Embassy in
Seoul, Samaranch and South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan have
agreed that no further concessions will be considered until the
North agrees in writing to settle for the archery and table tennis
competitions, along with some soccer and cycling events. Moreover,
Samaranch has publicly scrapped plans to hold a fourth round of North-
South sport talks until the North accepts. 25X1
Pyongyang so far has reacted ambiguously, agreeing to the
proposal in private conversations with Samaranch while publicly
demanding more events and a greater share of Olympic 25X1
ceremonies. Pyongyang has called for another round of talks
without preconditions. We believe North Korea's willingness to
spend scarce resources on athletic facilities indicates it is
serious about cohosting the Olympic Games.
the North Koreans are building arenas for badminton, 25X1
swimming, weightlifting, and archery competitions. North Korean
and Western press reports also indicate the North is building at
least one stadium with a capacity for 150,000 spectators for
track and field and Olympic ceremonies. North Korean spokesmen have
invited Olympic officials to inspect their facilities and have pledged
repeatedly to allow O1 m is articipants and spectators free movement
within North Korea. 25X1
Seoul's Strong Position
South Korea's credentials as Olympic host have benefited
from Seoul's successful staging of the Asian Games this fall.
The international praise for the athletic facilities, which are
the venues for the 1988 Olympics, overshadowed the unsolved
bombing at Kimpo Airport a week before the Asiad--which the South
blames on the North. Even the North Korean media, which
conducted an anti-Asian Games blitz during the summer, have
implicitly admitted the Asian Games went well.
Domestic political movements and most student leaders who
oppose President Chun also did not disrupt the Asian Games.
Opposition leaders, in public statements before the Games, put
national pride ahead of partisan politics.
student leaders acknowledged the Games were a
success, an saw no point in pressing the anti-Asian Games
slogans they had expounded in July and August.
South Korean authorities remain concerned that North Korea
will try to disrupt the 1988 Olympics. Some officials have told
US diplomats they would be willing to permit the North to host
one or, two more events in order to ensure a peaceful Olympiad.
Others
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argue the North cannot be appeased. Lho has told US officials
that he does not believe the North intends to cohost the Games,
citing P'yongyang's alleged inability to construct adequate
facilities and likely unwillingness to permit the free movement
of athletes, officials, and tourists that Samaranch demands.
Lho's pessimistic view considers the next two years a dangerous
period, during which the North will have to choose between
"assault and accommodation."
Little International Support for the North
China's decision to send a team to the 1986 Seoul Asian
Games, in our judgment, makes Beijing's Olympic participation
likely, but we are uncertain whether other Communist countries
will attend. Moscow and its East European allies have ignored
North Korea's call for a boycott, and their Olympic officials
continue to discuss openly team preparations. A Hungarian
journalist implied in an interview with a North Korean sport
official that Pyongyang should not count on support from
Socialist states. According to press reports, Samaranch emerged
from a late October meeting with Soviet officials "convin~ ced" the
Soviet Union and its allies will attend the Olympics.
Nonetheless, the Soviets have begun to adjust their
rhetorical position to reflect improving ties with North Korea.
Moscow responded positively last summer to the IOC event-sharing
formula, interpreting it as a sign the IOC was paying attention
to North Korea's demands. More recently, however, Soviet
spokesmen have echoed the North's criticism of Samaranch's
proposal, have stressed they have not yet decided to attend the
Olympics, and have called on the IOC to increase P'yongyang's
share of Olympic events.
A potentially telling blow to North Korea's hopes for
support on the Olympic issue was the award to Havana--heretofore
P'yongyang's staunchest international supporter--of the 1991 Pan
American Games. According to press reports, Cuba won these Games
on condition it participates in the 1988 Olympics. One report
even says that Mar Del Plata, Argentina, has been selected as
Pan-American Games alternate site. President Castro, who has
loudly attacked the IOC and the Seoul award since 1982, when
Indianapolis edged out Havana for the 1987 Pan American Games,
had declared Cuba would boycott the 1988 Olympics if North
Korea's demands were ignored. The 1991 award could appease him
and reduce Cuba's rhetorical support for P'yongyang's position.
Looking Ahead
Samaranch's skillful diplomacy has given all parties at
least until next fall to find a solution to the Olympic
imbroglio. Behavior by both Koreas suggests a compromi3e is
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possible. Even so, we think the North faces a difficult choice
between accepting a decidedly junior role in Seoul's Olympic
triumph or rejecting the Games and perhaps further tarring its
reputation in an attempt to disrupt them. At the same time, Chun
must continue to control a volatile domestic situation if South
Korea is to maintain its negotiating advantage. Olympic
participants might rethink Seoul's merits as Olympic host if
clashes between police and the opposition escalate as the country
moves toward a political transition in early 1988.
We believe the Soviet Union and its allies hope to avoid
another Olympic boycott in 1988 but, with an eye to North Korea's
position, are likely to push for further South Korean and IOC
concessions. Warsaw Pact states are unlikely to finalize their
Olympic decisions until shortly before the Games themselves.
They can choose from at least four options:
Participate fully;
- Boycott the Games in support of North Korea;
- Withdraw from the Seoul Olympics, citing security
problems, while denying they are boycotting the Games
(Moscow's position in 1984); or
- Keep their athletes home, but send officials to Seoul
to attend Olympic organizational meetings (Vietnam's
policy toward the 1986 Asian Games).
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SUBJECT: North Korea-South Korea: The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games
Distribution:
Original - Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense
Room 4E830, Dept. of Defense
1 - Director, DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (7E-12)
1 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
1 - NIO/Economics (7E 48)
1 - C/PPS DO (3D O1)
1 - OGI/FSIC/PI (2G 18)
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
1 - OEA/China Division (4G 32)
1 - OEA/SEA Division (4F 24)
1 - D/OEA (4F 18)
1 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
1 - DDI (7E 47)
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
1 Office of Legislative Liaison (7B 14)
1 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G 07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G 50)
1 - C/PES (7F 24)
1 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
1 - DDO/EA Division (50 00)
1 - DDO/EA 5C 45)
1 - DDO/EA (5C 19)
1 - DDO/EA (5C 19)
1
1
1
DDI/OEA/NEA/K/ 12 Dec. 86
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