CAMEROON: CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR BIYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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i i-f so.
Central Intelligence Agency
DATE $60a Lo (e
DOC NO AL4M r6-ooos
OCR 3
P&PD J
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 February 1986
Cameroon: Challenges Ahead for Biya
Summary
Cameroon has not experienced the political instability
that has engulfed many West and Central African states in
recent years, but the moderate three-year old regime of
President Paul Biya continues to face persistent domestic
strains that could intensify and eventually undermine his
rule. Despite the country's strong economic performance and
relative political calm since gaining independence from France
in 1960, deep-seated rivalries fester among 220 tribes and 24
native language groups, northern Muslims and southern
Christians, and English-speaking West and French-speaking East
Ca meroonians. Young people also increasingly demand political
liberalization that the el i tp nnnns A review of
s an, appears to have the loyalty of the tradi tional l
y
apolitical 17,000-man military, but grumbling periodically
erupts among junior officers unhappy over corruption and the
greater financial benefits of their superiors. We believe that
Libya may attempt to capitalize on these grievances,
particularly in light of Cameroon's expanding relationship with
Israel--Tel Aviv trains Biya's presidential guard--by
increasing support for dissident activities or trying to stir
------ ----- ------- -- - -
This memorandum was requested by Phillip Ringdahl, Director, Office
of Af
i
Aff
i
r
can
a
rs, National Security Council. It was prepared by
Analysis. The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Africa n4-4 .4-- F-- I
ALA M 86-20005
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During his 26 February meeting with President Reagan, Biya
is likely to express concern over what he sees as the growing
Libyan threat to sub-Saharan Africa and particularly to
neighboring Chad. He also may express concern that US plans to
aid UNITA will intensify fighting in Angola and increase
Luanda's dependence on the USSR and Cuba, according to US
Embassy and press reporting. In his search for greater foreign
investment, Biya probably will outline Cameroon's favorable
financial climate by highlighting the liberal investment code,
diversified economy, and fairly well-educated workforce. As
part of his effort to diversify arms suppliers and to improve
Cameroon's military capabilities, Biya may inquire about
purchasing-- sutems as US fighter aircraft and anti-tank
weapons.
Threats to National Unity
In our view, the 53-year old Biya continues to face a delicate task
of balancing the competing demands of disparate ethnic and regional
groups, while controlling the pace and extent of change from two decades
of authoritarian rule to a more open political system favored by the
rapidly growing numbers of youth. Biya's failure to maintain a consensus
as he gradually dismantles the highly personalized political system--
created over 22 years by the country's first president Ahmadou Ahijdo, a
strong-willed Muslim northerner--could result in a dangerous narrowing of
his political base of support. Although the serious problems facing Biya
appear to be manageable, we believe the normally apolitical military will
keep a close watch on the resident's performance and could attempt to
.
t
f-l_---- F__ I
step
n i
he
Regionalism. The anglophones--who constitute some 20 percent of the
population of nearly 10 million--fear their gradual assimilation into the
dominant francophone community, according to US Embassy reporting.
Although they currently lack the leadership and unity to effectively
challenge Biya's rule, we believe the anglophone minority is a potential
timebomb, and should the central government fail to respect their cultural
and linguistic traditions, the two-million strong community may view armed
confrontation as their only alternative. Cameroon is officially
bilingual, but without a perfect mastery of French, it is difficult for
angl ophones to gain admittance--to, the best schools and to enter the civil
anglophone s u en s--s ight y over one-eighth of the 15,000-students
attending the University of Yaounde--are a potentially volatile group.
Student demands include the creation of an English-language university,
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S E C R E T
greater government efforts to promote bilingualism, and a possible return
to a federal state. Although the security services could probably handle
a n outbreak of violence a t a series of schools, we bel i eve i t would be a
significant setback blow to Biya's effort to develop national unity and
Tribalism. Ethnic suspicions permeate the government, military, and
society in general. Dissatisfaction also festers among the one-million
strong Bamileke tribesmen, who dominate-the agricultural and commercial
sectors. the Bamileke--who inhabit the
western highlands--charge Biya with tribal discrimination. Moreover, many
believe the government crackdown in the past two years on corruption has
been directed at their substantial economic interests, according to US
Embassy reports. The Embassy notes, however, that Biya has sought to
allay their concerns by appointing a prominent Bamileke businessman last
year to his inner circles of advisers. Ethnic tensions persist in the
military despite Biya's efforts to maintain a balance among all groups.
Bamileke tribesmen complain that military assignments and romoti r
officers and enlisted men from Biya's Boulou home region.
threatening to military command capabilities
Biya must take into
,
consideration these sensitivities when considering personnel changes.
Religious Splits. Although religious friction is not immediately
threatening to regime stability, we believe the Christian-Muslim division
will continue to grow deeper. According to US Embassy reporting, the
northern-based Muslims--which make up some 30 percent of the population--
have long feared domination by the Christians. The Embassy also reports
Biya is increasingly worried that small groups of Islamic fundamentalists
that have appeared recently in the far north may imitate Nigeria's
Maitatsine sect, which touched off rioting in several Nigerian cities
since 1980, resulting in over 10,000 deaths. These fundamentalists of
northern Cameroon reportedly are recruiting among the region's poorly
d
t
d
d
e
uca
e
an
unemployed youth, according to Embassy reporting.
The Mili tar Biya's most direct challenge was a coup attempt in
Aprils by eliments of the elite 700-man Presidential Guard--originally
formed and handpicked by former President Ahijdo to ensure his security.
The US Embassy reports that the attempt was triggered by Biya's decision
to transfer most members of the Guard--made up predominately of
northerners--out of Yaounde. The military remained loyal to Biya,
however, and the insurrection--in which some 1,000 people died--was
crushed in two days, according to Embassy reporting. Biya has since
recreated the Presidential Guard, which the US Embassy estimates now
numbers 2,000-men, the majority of which are from Biya's home region. F_
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Biya now appears to have the loyalty of his senior officers, and the
-
oug
o
of
n
h t
r
a I n
- - -
decisionmaking, according to US Embassy and - -
In
related to Biya by tribal origin-and marriage--helps ensure loyalty to the
President. The Embassy observes that Biya has been responsive to the
ili '
t
m
arys desire for new equipment and faster promotions.
Nevertheless, evidence indicates that frustration may be building
below the surface, particularly among more nationalistic junior officers
and enlisted men who believe the government has not moved against corrunt
superiors.
Moreover, junior officers
may grow. impatient with Biya's intention to stem corruption among senior
last February a group of lieutenants gnu captains met with Bi
la to
y
express their unhappiness and complained that senior officers receive too
many privileges. According to the Embassy, Biya has sought to pacify
t
di
i
~ r
ssat
sfaction by furnishing them with inexpensive cars.
Pressures for Political Liberalization. The end of Ahijdo's highly
autocratic rule st rre long dormant popular expectations among
Cameroonians for political liberalization, according to press reports and
US Embassy reporting. Although Biya has sought to respond by increasing
popular participation in the politics of the Cameroon People's Democratic
Movement--the country's sole political party, he refuses to introduce a
multi-party system for fear of aggravating tribal or regional rivalries.
Moreover, Biya must contend with a restive younger generation--nearly half
the population is under 20--which seeks a greater political voice, as well
as with an outspoken media which is increasingly critical of government
censorship. According to the Embassy, 30 members of the banned Union of
Cameroonian Peoples (UPC), which is a left-of-center party and which was
reponsible for the protracted insurgency from 1959 to 1970, have been
d
t
arres
e
since December for circulating anti-government tracts.
The Economy
Cameroon remains one of A"frica's economic bright spots. According to
official statistics, the economy grew around 6 percent last year and with
a per capita GNP of some $800, it is one of the continent's most developed
countries. Yaounde historically has emphasized the agricultural sector
and exports of cocoa, coffee, and cotton have continued to buoy the
economy. As a result of fertile soil, good weather, and government
incentives to farmers, Cameroon is now essentially self-sufficient in
food. Cameroon's debt service ratio has remained relatively low in recent
years--only 12 percent of export earnings. The government budget is
balanced and funded entirely by internal resources. According to the
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Embassy, Biya has appointed highly regarded technocrats to the Finance,
Commerce and Industry, Planning and Agricultural ministries. Cameroon has
a liberal foreign investment code and in the past two years Yaounde has
activitely sought greater US, Canadian, Japanese, and British
t
_
.
m
n
Cameroon has exported oil since 1978--some 180,000 barrels per day--
but production probably will peak by the end of the decade and drop
considerably in the 1990s, according to US Embassy reporting. The oil
sector amounts for 12 percent of the gross national product and provides
one-fourth of government revenues, petroleum industry analysts report.
According to press reports, oil exploration by Western companies has all
but stopped because of the government's high tax rates and a slump in
world prices. Cameroon has vast reserves of untapped natural gas which
may partially compensate for the expected decline in oil production, if
world demand f
r
o
gas strengthens.
Cameroon, however, does face socioeconomic challenges that may
eventually erode some of Biya's political support. Foreign observers
report that the increasingly well-educated youth are reluctant to return
to farming after several years of study in the cities. Over time this
could erode agricultural export potential. Moreover, the unemployment and
underemployment facing these new job seekers in urban areas may lead to
unrest. The population of 9.7 million is growing at 2.7 percent a year,
while the urban rate is increasing by 8 percent annually. State-run
companies--which are losing money--will continue to be a drain on the
economy. Corruption, an inadequate infrastructure, and an inefficient
bureaucrac
ma
l
h
y
y a
so
amper sustained economic growth.
Potential for Libyan and Soviet Meddling
Cameroon has not been a target for active Libyan or Soviet subversion
over the last decade, but the US Embassy reports that Biya increasingly
regards Libya as a growing threat to the country's stability. Although
the president deeply distrusts Qadhafi's intentions, Biya has tried to
maintain polite relations with Libya--primarily to avoid giving Tripoli a
pretext for meddling in Cameroon's affairs, according to the US Embassy.
Nevertheless
the Embas
,
sy reports that Libya may be training a small
number of Cameroonian dissidents.
The Embassy
p e s Bureau in Yaounde has sought unsuccessfullvssohe
far to recruit
tud
s
ents for the fundamentalist cause.
Biya also worries that Cameroon's warming relationship with Israel,
which maintains a small interests section in Yaounde and trains elements
of Biya's new Presidential Guard, may make it an inviting target for
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1984 accounted for less than one percent of Cameroon's commerce.
Cameroon has kept the Soviet Union and other East Bloc countries at
arms length. Yaounde has no military or economic agreements with the
USSR, and the US Embassy reports that trade with communist countries in
e f
resurgence U I fundamentalism in the far north.
Libyan destabilization efforts, the US Embassy reports. Should Biya
decide to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv--possibly this
year--Cameroon's Muslims, could interpret this as the predominantly
Christian government's insensitivity to their interests. According to the
Embassy, Biya is increasingly worried that Qadhafi may attempt to exploit
th
Ties with Paris have improved somewhat since 1984, when Cameroonian
authorities suspected French support for coup attempt by the Presidential
Guard. Although Biya visited Paris last year and was warmly received by
President Mitterrand, US Embassy reporting indicates that suspicions of
French intentions remain--especially among mid-and low-level government
employees who suspect Paris still supports former President Ahidjo, who
maintained close ties with France and who now lives there. Government
officials see France's influence in Africa as on the decline, according to
the Embassy, and Biya doubts Paris is willing to defend Chad against
further Libyan aggression. As a result of these concerns, Yaounde has
begun to seek new trading partners and to diversify sources of its
posse y t rough European communist parties.
Relations with France
activities. The Embassy reports that Cameroon does not seek closer ties
with Moscow, and that Yaounde has repeatedly rejected Soviet requests for
a consulate in the port city of Douala. There are no identified Soviet
front groups in Cameroon and the illegal opposition party--the United
People's Congress--though originally Marxist, has modified its ideology,
the US Embassy reports. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that
the Soviet Union maintains contacts with Cameroonian oppositionists,
'bl h
Nevertheless, France will remain the focal point of Cameroon's
foreign policy in the near term as a result of their historically close
economic and military ties. Paris is Yaounde's largest trading partner,
taking 35 percent of its exports and providing 48 percent of its imports
last year. The US Embassy reports that some 17,000 French citizens reside
in Cameroon and that the French presence is pervasive through the
country's administration, economy, educational, and defense structures.
r . - . ....... ., v...a. " w ul l I I I U I I Q
year in military ~ and 75 French military advisors serve in the 25X1
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Ties with the United States
Cameroon pursues a moderate, pro-Western foreign policy and has
generally supported US positions in international forums, according to US
Embassy reporting. Biya, however, has expressed concern that US plans to
aid UNITA will intensify fighting in Angola and increase Luanda's
dependence on the Soviet bloc. The Embassy reports that Biya seeks closer
ties with Washington in part to supplement French influence and has
expressed interest in acquiring US fighter aircraft, such as the F-5, as
well as equipment for the Presidential Guard. The US Embassy also reports
that trade and business ties between Washington and Yaounde are good. In
1983--the last year for which figures are available--US exports to
Cameroon were valued at $92 million and imports at more than $500
million. The US Embassy notes the American business community in Cameroon
has expanded rapidly in the past 10 years--some 100 US firms maintain a
presence or representation and US private investment totals some $790
million. The US presence is dominated by oil companies and engineering
and construction firms. Cameroon-reportedly is seeking greater US
inv
t
t
es
men
, particularly to shore up some of the faltering state
enterprises, which it hopes to privatize with foreign capital
Outl ook
Although Biya's position appears secure for the short term, we
believe this second generation leader will face serious problems that
could start to weaken his position over the next two years. He will
probably have to contend with conflicting pressure from within his own
party, as the older generation, accustomed to his predecessor's
authoritarianism, attempts to block the efforts of a younger generation to
gain greater freedom of expression and a more democratic selection of
leaders. Moreover, Biya is likely to face persistent and possibly growing
regional and ethnic pressures, particularly if Libya decides to stir
unrest among northern Muslisms or dissident groups.
Although Biya appears to command the military's loyalty, we believe
senior officers may increasingly demand a decisionmaking role if he fails to
stem tribal dissent and violence erupts. While unlikely in the next one to
two years, we cannot discount the possibility that some of the younger, more
nationalistic officers, frustrated over slow advancement and tribal
grievances, could attempt a coup. Should they come to power, there is always
the risk that junior officers probably could steer Cameroon on a more non-
aligned course, which could include confrontations with the West and warming
relations with Libya. Should a pro-Soviet or pro-Libyan government come to
power, the neighboring moderate states of Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and
Central African Republic could be subjected to further destabilization.
Moreover, a pro-Libyan regime probably would allow Chadian dissidents to
operate out of Cameroonian territory to further strain the limited resources
of Presid
t H
b
'
en
a
re
s neighboring pro-Western regime.
C F r u P T
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SUBJECT: Challenges Ahead for Biya
Original -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director African Affairs, NSC
1-- Ambassador K. Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of State
1-- Frank Wisner, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1-- Ambassador Howard K. Walker, Director, Office of West
African Affairs, Department of State
1-- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
1-- Byron Jackson, Intelligence Liaison, Department of
Commerce
4-- Anthomy Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State
1-- Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
1-- Margaret Greenwood, Acting Defense Intelligence Officer,
for Africa Defense Intelligence Agency
1-- Edward L. Killham, Director, Central African Affairs,
Department of State
1-- T. Dennis Reece, Cameroon Desk Officer, Office of Central
African Affairs, Department of State
1-- DDI
1-- N I O for Africa
1-- NIC
1-- DDO/Africa
1-- PDB Staff
1-- ILS
1-- C/DDI/PES
1-- D/ALA
1-- ALA Research Director
2-- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean)
4-- CPAS/IMD/CB
4-- ALA/AF
4-- ALA/C
4-- ALAN file
ALA/AF/W/
(3 F
bruary 1986)
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