CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #30

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0
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RIPPUB
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T
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19
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December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2011
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1
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Publication Date: 
January 1, 1986
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MEMO
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 ROUTING TO: ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 uarrteE H d s 2 ea q 3 4 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE REMARKS: FROM: NAME, AD RE S, AND PHONE V2, DATE Tne XEL- 10 (Security Classification) V 0 Sc-01392/86 CONTROL NO. 0 46 84 COPY .-_._.___._._._.._ 0 Feb1986 233 C A rug ALp _ M. - 20co'7 L COMINT OM Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: 0 0 A NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions TOP SECRET OAF I. ~, le. 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE JANUARY 1986 CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #30 The three newly elected governments in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras have generated high popular expectations and now must grapple with the region's daunting economic problems. Like the incumbent administrations in Panama and Ell Salvador, they face another year of declining per capita incomes with no upturn yet insight. The increase in world coffee prices and reduction in oil prices are unlikely to lead to a noticeable improvement in Central American economic performance this year. In our assessment, economic growth in Costa Rica, Ell Salvador, and Honduras at best will only slightly exceed modest 1985 performances--an average of 2 percent. Meanwhile, economic contraction is likely to continue in Guatemala and Panama. F_ Costa Rica's near term stabilization prospects are mixed. Maintaining IMF support will require further budget cuts and tough new trade initiatives that business interests are sure to oppose. While President-elect Arias has said he will work with the IMF, he will likely move cautiously, and between now and his May inauguration the lame duck administration will have little incentive for pressing austerity. Overall, we predict 3 percent economic growth for San Jose this year, no improvement over 1985. This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains information available as of 3 January 1986. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Newly inaugurated Guatemalan President Cerezo faces unprecedented inflation, slashed living standards, and a depressed economy. Although Cerezo's top economic advisers have recommended decisive economic reforms, including adopting an IMF stabilization program, so far he has temporized, and in fact granted a 50 percent government-wide pay increase and approved a large increase in the money supply. Of all the Central American economies, Guatemala will benefit the least from higher coffee and lower oil prices: much of Guatemala City's coffee was presold before the price increase and it is only a small net importer of oil. Overall, the best the economy is likely to do for 1986 is no growth, compared to a slight decline last year. The lack of attention to corrective economic policies has been most noticeable in Honduras. Although President Azcona pledged to revitalize the economy in his inaugural address, we believe that domestic political opposition will preclude much progress. It is unlikely, for example, that he will be able to temper expansionary fiscal policies or unrealistic exchange rates. Organized labor, which torpedoed the last economic stabilization program in 1984, will intensify pressures for inflationary wage settlements. On balance, we expect sustained high levels of US economic aid to keep economic growth at about 2 percent for the second straight year. We see only marginal economic growth for El Salvador because of the continued turmoil and stepped up insurgent attacks against economic targets. The President's new economic package announced in late January--his first since taking office in June 1984--addresses some budget and trade problems, but is unlikely by itself to restore either domestic or international confidence in the economy. While the program restricts growth in government spending and moderately devalues the colon, it also institutes new price and exchange controls and offers nothing in the way of investment or production incentives. Scheduled new infusions of US aid are likely to boost economic growth only slightly, from about 1 percent in 1985 to maybe 2 percent this year. Panama's near-term outlook is poor in large part because President Delvalle lacks the domestic support required to implement stabilization measures. Although he has recently announced his new economic program, it probably will not meet foreign lenders' requirements and the new loan and debt rescheduling deals with commerical banks, the World Bank, and the IMF remain in jeopardy. Furthermore, the President's proposals for labor reform prompted immediate opposition, according to the Embassy. Delvalle, installed by the Defense Forces and lacking any political base, does not have the muscle to deliver on promised reforms. Investment will further decline and economic growth--which stagnated in 1985--will likely contract this year. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 NICARAGUA The regime hardened its line with new economic policies to deal with both critics and pressing domestic problems. The US Embassy reports that a revision in the agrarian reform law dropped the size limitation on plots eligible for confiscation. Although this change institutionalizes common Sandinista practice, it also reduces the legal obstacles to seizing properties of uncooperative private sector leaders while providing more land for demobilized soldiers and discontented peasants. In addition, the regime has clamped down on vendors selling products above government-set prices in an ineffective attempt to reduce chronic shortages and distribution problems. Facing resistance to controls--including the murder of a price inspector in Managua--the Sandinistas have called on their mass organizations to aid in the campaign against "speculators." The Sandinistas also began 1986 by closing the Catholic Church's radio station, while continuing their harassment of other opponents. The regime blamed the action on Radio Catolica's failure to broadcast President Ortega's New Year's speech. National Directorate member Victor Tirado predicted in October that the station would be closed and said the Church posed a major threat to the regime. Meanwhile, the pro-government media took advantage of Cardinal Obando y Bravo's trip to the United States in January to accuse him of serving Washington's policies and backing the anti-Sandinista insurgents. Managua also announced the discovery of a counterrevolutionary ring and implicated a local priest, an opposition coalition party, and an independent labor union in the conspiracy, according to the US Embassy. The Sandinistas likely will use this plot to justify further detentions and interrogation of potential enemies. In addition, state security suspended publication of a semi-weekly political flyer and arrested its editors. Meanwhile, disputes within the democratic coalition are undermining the effectiveness of the opposition. Internal differences over a strategy for dealing with the Sandinistas caused a serious split this month when the coalition leadership publicly criticized a member party--the Social Christians--for participating in Spanish-sponsored talks with the regime, according to the US Embassy. The Social Christians now refuse to participate in joint activities with the coalition until a public apology is issued. In our view, the dispute is symptomatic of the internal rivalries and weak leadership that have long plagued the coalition. As a result, the organization has been largely inactive in challenging the regime, and the election, planned for March, of more effective coalition leaders appears unlikely. Indeed, the Sandinistas apparently consider the democratic opposition inconsequential--with the exception of private sector leader Enrique Bolanos On the military side, Sandinista forces attacked rebel base camps on the Honduran 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 EL SALVADOR In an effort to maintain the tactical initiative, the armed forces began the new year with their largest offensive operation in several months. "Operation Phoenix"--involving eight battalions and air, naval, and artillery support--is directed at rebel strongholds in the Guazapa volcano area. While initially planned to last about 30 days, that it may continue in a scaled-down version for several more months. In the first three weeks of the operation, the armed forces claimed to have killed 41 rebels, captured 183 guerrilla or guerrilla supporters, and seized sizable caches of arms, medical supplies, and insurgent documents. that the operation probably will disrupt guerrilla resupply and offensive operations for at least several weeks, although it is unlikely to drive the insurgents from the Guazapa region permanently. Guerrilla activity tapered off during the latter half of the month following an extensive sabotage campaign and the first transportation ban of the new year. The US Embassy reported that the nation's electrical power grid was significantly damaged by the guerrillas' sabotage of almost 40 electrical pylons and that the capital and large portions of eastern El Salvador suffered lengthy blackouts. reporting also indicated that the guerrillas appear to be trying to make good on their promise substantially increase their operations in the economically vital western region. that about 100 insurgents destroyed coffee processing facilities and about million worth of coffee during an attack on a town in Sonsonate Department. It is still unclear, however, whether these attacks represent the start of a major sustained campaign in the west or whether the rebels are trying to disrupt the coffee harvest. President Jose Azcona was inaugurated as scheduled on 27 January and agreed to give the opposition National Party control of the Supreme Court as well as several policy positions in the new Congress in return for its legislative cooperation, according to US Embassy reporting. The agreement reportedly promised that the government will pursue a bipartisan foreign policy that includes firm opposition to the Sandinistas and efforts to resolve the border dispute with El Salvador. Despite this agreement, we believe that Azcona--a minority President who controls only 46 of 134 congressional seats--is likely to enjoy only a short political honeymoon. 25X1 25X1 225X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 In our judgment, the sudden removal of armed forces Chief Lopez on 1 February harmed the new administration's image by reinforcing the impression that the military remains beyond civilian control. Lopez 25X1 was ousted by a powerful group of colonels after he tried to reassign them to insignificant positions as part of an effort to solidify his control over the military. 25X1 the colonels--known as the "Fifth Promotion" class--intend to make all major military decisions, regardless of who is chosen to complete the remaining 11 months of Lopez's term. The group reportedly backs close cooperation with the US--including support for the Nicaraguan insurgency--but probably will take a tough 25X1 stance in demanding increased attention to Tegucigalpa's economic and security concerns. Although the leading officer in the Fifth 25X1 Promotion, Colonel Riera, supports Azcona, we believe the group's record of political intrigue and corruption could portend difficult times for the new administration. Despite almost daily Sandinista incursions in Honduran territory throughout January, the Honduran Government remained reluctant to retaliate as they did last September. The Honduran military and outgoing government appeared intent on trying to avoid a major military confrontation with Nicaragua on the eve of President Azcona's inauguration, despite Honduran military reports of several Honduran troop and civilian fatalities. Tegucigalpa, for example, discreetly returned a Nicaraguan AN-2 Colt plane in mid-January that had been flown to Honduras by a Nicaraguan Air Force defector last December, President Cerezo--inaugurated on 14 January--faced his first political challenge when the police peacefully expelled several thousand squatters who had occupied government lands on inauguration day, according to the US Embassy. He subsequently established an "emergency council" to investigate housing shortages. The US Embassy reported that the new President's response reassured some private sector critics who feared that the Christian Democratic government would not protect property rights. Cerezo's early cabinet appointments--including a pro-business Finance Minister--appear to reinforce the judgment that he will pursue pragmatic and cautious policies, at least initially. 25X1 25X1 25X1 5X1 US Embassy and that the military appeared 25X1 satisfied with the appointment of Brigadier General ernandez as the new Minister of Defense. many in the military believe the politically 25X1 neutral Hernandez--due to retire from the military in six months--may be asked to stay on in the post as a civilian to allow Cerezo to avoid choosing between more controversial officers. Cerezo further sought to ease military apprehensions about his administration by renewing assurances that he would not try military officers for past human rights abuses. Meanwhile, the new Interior Minister announced that the government would follow through on its promise to abolish the Directorate of Technical Investigations. He did not indicate, however, when or if the controversial secret police would be incorporated into the National Police. 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 The insurgents conducted no major operations during January. there appears to be a general consensus that their interests are best served by adopting a wait and see attitude and reassessing their options after Cerezo more clearly spells out his policies. In an apparent effort to influence US policy, Defense Chief Noriega in mid-January said he might remove President Delvalle, Seemingly riled by US refusal to disburse aid funds until economic reforms are in place, the Defense Chief probably believed that he could loosen some purse strings by bruiting reports of impending changes. If this tactic fails, or if Delvalle remains unable to develop an economic plan, Noriega could orchestrate the President's removal and the installation of a more competent if compliant civilian junta. Meanwhile, Noriega reinforced his control over the military with his reassignments to the General Staff and other key commands. the Intelligence Chief--implicated in plotting against Noriega at the time of the Spadafora murder last September--was transferred to a minor command. His replacement and the new deputy are both staunch Noriega loyalists. The Defense Chief chose a trusted family member to command the key Battalion 2000, which has a large concentration of troops Oscar Arias, candidate of the governing National Liberation Party, will be installed as President in May following his decisive victory over Social Christian Unity opponent Rafael Calderon in elections on 2 February. The ruling party also won a majority of seats in the unicameral legislature, according to press reports. Although the President-elect acknowledges a clear Sandinista threat, he apparently believes Costa Rica can coexist with Nicaragua and sees his election as a mandate for peace, according to the US Embassy. Nevertheless, Arias plans to continue upgrading the security forces, On economic issues, the new President has pledged growth led by the private sector, increased exports, and an attractive investment climate. The US Embassy reports that Arias plans an early visit to Washington to head off foreign assistance cuts, warning that Costa Rica's economy is too fragile to withstand a drop in aid levels. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Following their meeting in Caraballeda, Venezuela on 12 January, the Contadora mediators and the support group proposed nine specific actions to end the impasse created in December when Nicaragua called for a six-month suspension of the talks. The proposals, endorsed by the Central Americans several days later, include an end to support for regional insurgencies and international military maneuvers, the phasing out of 25X1 foreign military bases and advisers, arms reductions, and steps toward national Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 reconciliation. The mediators and support group also offered their good offices to facilitate renewed talks between the US and Nicaragua. In a separate statement the Central Americans agreed to consider forming a regional parliament and to hold a Presidential summit in May. Reports from various US Embassies point to contradictory interpretations of the Contadora declaration. Mexico and Colombia, as well as Nicaragua, apparently see implementation of the nine actions and a resumption of US-Nicaraguan talks as preconditions for further treaty talks. Honduras, on the other hand, envisions talks between the US and Nicaragua and between the Sandinistas and their opposition proceeding simultaneously with renewed negotiations on the draft treaty. The Sandinistas will likely face more pressure to undertake internal reforms although they were able to defuse charges of blocking the negotiations and gained endorsement of their two key objectives in the treaty process--an end to the US military presence in the area and resumption of talks with the US. Meanwhile, differences in opinion over the nine proposed steps probably will divert attention from substantive negotiations on the draft treaty, at least for a while. Managua will use scheduled regional meetings to lobby the new governments in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica for more flexible terms and to press for bilateral accords. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILDUP Cubans train Nicaraguan pilots on MI-8, MI-17, and MI-24 helicopters, and four Soviet pilots conduct training exercises on AN-2 and AN-26 transport aircraft. 25X1 25X1 3 January 4 January 6 January Soviet ship carrying unspecified military-associated cargo arrives in C = photography. Imagery reveals two storage/support areas partially completed and possible bunkered storage site near completion at Esteli radar site. Satellite imagery shows Nicaraguan shi Aracely, general cargo, arrived in Puerto Cabezas from Mariel, Cuba. Nicaraguan ship Nicarao also seen in Puerto carrying some 26 containers on dec 11-12 January Three AN-2 and two MI-2 helicopters observed on overhead imagery at Sandino Airfield were transported from Rama in military convoy of 33 vehicles, accordinc to 13 Janaury components, according to same sources. vehicles seen transporting probable helicopter Two Top Bar mobile communications vans observed near Managua on overhead photograhy probably part of same convoy. Second convoy of 30 Two short take-off and landing aircraft obtained by Interior Ministry from East Germany being assembled at Los Brasiles Airfield by East German technicians, The aircraft reportedly Mid-January will be used for reconnaissance and for transporting officials to sectors of country lacking good airstrips. F MI-8/17's and 12 MI-25's. Soviet technicians assemble up to nine MI-8 and MI-25 helicopters at Sandino Airfield. Current estimates of Sandinista helicopter inventory are 21 225X1 25X1 2525X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 1 January Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior closes down church radio station, "Radio Catolica," due to failure to broadcast President Ortega's New Year's message. 12 January 16 January 22 January negotiations. Contadora Foreign Ministers' meeting in Venezuela issues Caraballeda document which lists nine actions as a basis for peace to promote resumption of Contadora While attending Guatemalan inauguration, Central American Foreign Ministers endorse Caraballeda document and Presidents of Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and President-elect of Honduras issue similar declaration. United Nicaraguan Opposition leaders Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Adolfo Calero announce outline of their proposal for provisional government of national reconciliation in Nicaragua. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY During January, Sandinista allegations of guerrilla human rights violations declined significantly, but another report points to rebel abuses of Honduran locals living near guerrilla base camps. Honduran nationals also suffered abuses from Sandinistas who crossed the border from Nicaragua in search of rebel bases. Meanwhile, Managua continued its crackdown on internal dissidents and made plans to protect its international human rights image in coming months Insurgent Human Rights Record 12 January 15 January claims insurgents persistently engage in crimina activities against Hondurans ranging from petty theft and cattle stealing to rape and armed assault. 23 January 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sandinista Human Rights Record 2 January Sandinista troops bombed a civilian residence, killing two children and wounding the mother and two other children 6 January 25X1 25X1 7 January special military unit assigned tote Interior Ministry does not take prisoners during field operations the guerrillas report that Sandinista troops 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 arrested and tortured locals in southern Zelaya Department for allegedly aiding the rebels. In one incident a child was allegedly wounded by random Sandinista gunfire. 10 January The proregime press reports two Sandinista soldiers received long prison terms for the October murder of an evangelical minister in Esteli. The progovernment evangelical organi he sentences as proof of the regime's concern for human rights 16 January The Honduran military reports that Sandinista troops operating inside Honduras robbed a civilian family, Proregime press reports that security officials suspend publication of Prisma, a news publication, for violating press censorship laws Speaking at a news conference during his recent visit to Guatemala, President Ortega denies his government systematically violates human rights, but admits that violations still occur, saying that 20 military men had been tried for such abuses 19 January The US Embassy reports that regime harassment of the recently established Catholic Church human rights office has blocked investigations of complaint 20 January Sandinista troops operating in Honduras killed a civilian and took her two sons back into Nicaragua. 21 January A US defense attache source in southern Zelaya Department reports that Sandinista troops arrested nearly 300 locals on suspicion of aiding rebels in the area. 22 January 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 on the Atlantic coast reports the regime enticed a large group of Indians to return to Nicaragua from camps in Honduras with promises that they could occupy their traditional lands. Instead, the Sandinistas confined them to a camp to force them to work in the local gold mines 25 January 27 January 28 January According to press reports, four civilians were killed and several others wounded, including an American Indian activist traveling with Miskito Indian rebels along Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, when Sandinista troops fired rockets into a village 30 January 31 January Insurgents patrolling in the salient reported that between 18 and 21 January, Sandinista troops raped one Honduran national and murdered six others, 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 4 January 8 January 14 January 15 January NICARAGUAN TRIPS/VISITS JANUARY 1986 Vice President Ramirez departs for Guatemala to attend Third Central American Games. F_~ Czech Culture Minister Klusak arrives in Managua for five day visit. n Duarte. President Ortega and Foreign Minister D'Escoto visit Guatemala for inauguration of President Cerezo during which Ortega also meets with Presidents Betancur and coalition. Spanish Foreign Minister Ordonez visits Managua and meets with President Ortega, National Directorate member Nunez, and members of the opposition 22 January 25X1 23 January- Nicaraguan trade delegation headed by Minister 8 February of Foreign Cooperation Ruiz to travel to eastern Europe and Soviet Union. 27 January Vice President Ramirez to Honduras for inauguration of President-elect Azcona. F1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING FEBRUARY 4-11 February 6-7 February 6-11 February 10 February 10-12 February Socialist International delegation to visit Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador scheduled to meet to discuss strategy for Contadora peace negotiations. F Former President Jimmy Carter to visit Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. F7 Contadora Foreign Ministers representing mediators and support group to meet with Secretary of State Shultz. invited. Sandinista National Liberation Front to hold conference of Latin American political leaders to which representatives of almost all parties holding elected office have been 14-15 February Contadora Plenipotentiary meeting scheduled in Panama. 21 February Outline of Nicaraguan draft constitution scheduled to be presented to National Assembly. 0 Fifty-second anniversary of Sandino's death. 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Vin Sebeco M ul Oulu. No,nbr. 1do Celmi I Coloni. ueve Guinea RIO N JUAN \ ban Carlos `f_~ndL COSTA RICAp Nicaragua International boundary -?- Departamento boundary * National capital o Departamento capital Railroad Road Departamentos are named only where they differ from their administrative capitals. 0 25 50 Kilometers 25 50 Miles Caribbean ,, *13 Wds Welliff Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #28 Distribution Copy # 1 - Vice Admiral John Poindexter - Mr. William Walker - Mr. Donald Gregg - Ambassador Shlaudeman - HPSCI - SSCI - Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USA - Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez - Mr. Ray Burghardt - Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF - LTG John H. Moellering, USA - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz - Ambassador Elliott Abrams - Doug Mulholland - Dr. Darnell Whitt - DCI - 7060 - DDCI - 706011 - Executive Secretary - 7D60 - SA/DCI/IA - 7E12 - IADO - 1 E4846 - NIO/LA - 7E62 - NIC/AG - 2G40 - Comptroller - 7C21 - C/DDI/PES - 7F24 - Executive Registry-- - DDI - 7E44 - DDO - 7E26 Director, Legislative Liaison - 7043 Legislative Liaison - 7B04 32 - PDB Staff - 7F30 33 & 34 - D/ALA - 3F45 35 - C/DDO/LA - 3C3203 36 - DDO/LA,- 3D5309 37 - C/DDO/LAD- 3C3203 38 - C/DDO/LA,1 - 3B44 39 - C/LAA 40 & 41 - ALA/PS - 3F38 42 - ALA Research Director - 3F44 43 - 46 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07 47 - DDI/CPAS/ISS 7G40 48 - CPAS/CDPB/CC - GH25 49 - DC/RIG/SOYA - 5E25 50 - - C/LE/OCR - 1 H39 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0 51 52 53 - C/MCD 54 - DC/MCD 55 - C/CAN 56 - C/MX 57 - C/CAR 58 - C/CU 59 - C/CAS 81 - MCD Files 82 - CAN Files 83 - CAS Files - PPS/PO/RPB - 3D02 DDI/ALA/MC/CAS/ I (1 November 1985) 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000707060001-0