LIBERIA: DOE'S GROWING VULNERABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707190001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707190001-6
Central WOW= Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 April 1986
LIBERIA: Doe's Growing Vulnerability
Summary
Since the inauguration of civilian rule last January,
Liberia's political and economic problems have continued to
grow, threatening the stability of President Samuel Doe's
regime. We believe that Doe probably is unwilling and unable
to restore popular legitimacy to his rule and reverse the
worsening economic conditions that have fueled broad based
discontent. Doe faces potential challenges from an organized
political opposition, disgruntled students and workers, and
external ly-based dissidents. More significantly, discontent
has risen in the military over late pay and ethnic
favoritism.. Although popular protest remains muted, and no
individual civilian or military leader has emerged as a
formidable rival for power, continued economic decay almost
certainly will further erode support for Doe, and probably will
spark strikes, protests,
during the next twelve sonths.
This memorandum was requested by Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State. It was prepared by
African and Latin American Analysis. This paper was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division
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% US relations probably will undergo periodic strains as Doe
seeks a scapegoat for maunting domestic pressures, but in our
view US interests probably will not suffer serious damage even
under a successor regime headed by senior military officers or
leading civilian opponents.
President Doe has not used the inauguration of civilian rule on
1 January to address Liberia's wide array of political and economic
maladies. Confidence in Doe's stewardship continues to decline as he
remains mired in the style of governing
characteristic of his five year military regime. far, he appears
unable to develop an effective strategy for dealing with the political
opposition, as his cosmetic attempts to place opposition members in minor
government posts have been supplemented by repressive legal and security
measures, including beatings and arrests of oppositionists in mid-April.
The government also has damaged its credibility by ignoring or
circumventing various guarantees of the civilian constitution. Prominent
political figures such as Jackson Doe and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf were
illegally detained for months without charge after the coup attempt, and
opposition leader Gabriel Kpoleh was arrested last week on allegations of
sedition.
On the economic front, the US Embassy reports that Doe has taken only
marginal actions, far short of what is required to stem financial and
economic decay, and has made servicing the payroll his top priority,
rather than economic reform. The US Embassy reports that Liberia--which
uses the US dollar--is suffering a severe liquidity crisis that could grow
worse because foreign earnings have already been mortgaged at least
through the summer. According to the Embassy, the government also has
ceased servicing both domestic and foreign debt, and as a result, the IMF
has declared Liberia ineligible to use Fund resources, the World Bank has
suspended credit disbursements, and US Brooke Amendment sanctions were
temporarily triggered. The Embassy calculates that byi mid-veiar Liberia's
arrears to external creditors will top $200 million.
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The Embassy reports that despite several desperate financial
maneuvers, salary arrears still have increased, stirring discontent in the
civil service and military and providing a rallying point for the
political opposition. Furthermore, the loss of external credit lines
already has resulted in fuel shortages and dan erously tightened supplies
of politically sensitive rice imports.
We concur with the Embassy's view that Doe's leadership is at
the center of Liberia's economic quagmire, and we believe that he will
remain unwilling to implement painful austerity measures, fearing they
would further undermine domestic stability. We also believe that years of
imprudent economic policies have created problems that probably are
intractable Yegardless of who takes control of economic decisionmaking.
Opposition Party Coalition
Doe's election victory in October 1985--marred by allegations of
widespread fraud--failed to reconcile the opposition parties, which
recently formed a coalition to try to oust him from office. The Embassy
reports that the "Grand Coalition" of the Liberian Action'Party (LAP), the
Liberian Unification Party (LUP), the Unity Party (UP), and the United
People's Party (UPP) reflects growing disenchantment with the regime.
According to the Embassy, the parties have put aside the differences that
prevented a united ticket in the elections last fall, and have
provisionally named as chairman UPP leader Baccus Matthews, should he
return from the United States. Coalition leaders--ruling out any
possibility for a compromise with the regime--plan to initiate a
nationwide strike, and claim to be courting support in the military. 0
Although the coalition may generally represent the attitudes of a
majority of Liberians, to date it has not demonstrated the organization
and leadership to challenge Doe. The coalition did not fulfill ealier
threats to stage public actions against the regime, and the recent jailing
of 37 UPP members probably will deter Matthews from returning for the near
term. We note, however, that the Embassy reports that militants in the
coalition claim to have exercised self-restraint thus far, and have hinted
that violent options still could be pursued.
The new coalition, however, probably places Doe's political opponents
in a better position to capitalize on any spontaneous unrest generated by
economic policy missteps. Last March students staged their most violent
demonstrations in almost two years in support of, a teachers' strike over
unpaid wages, and the Embassy reports that worker discontent is being
exacerbated by continued delays in pay, fears of rice shortages, and daily
power blackouts. We believe that the potential for popular protests will
increase steadily over the next twelve nonths as economic problems mount,
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government.
and that the opposition parties probably would participate in and claim
some credit for such actions. In the event that the coalition plays some
role in Doe's overthrow, we believe that Matthews, Johnson-Sirleaf, and
Jackson Doe could be called upon to take lead roles in a successor
Military Grunbling
Doe's sur intaining support in the
military, but pay arrears, tribal tensions,
internal jealousies, and ineffective leadership have shattered army morale
and discipline. In our judgment, the pay issue could prove most volatile
as military support for Doe has rested largely on his reputation for
protecting their corporate interests. discontent
among both enlisted men and officers over salary arrears, an A
E hich was instrumental in defeating Quiwonkpa--
admitted to similar problems in his unit.
reprisals by Doe's fellow
Krahn sol diers following the Quiwonkpa coup attempt have exacerbated the
Army's tribal divisions, and Doe has reacted by recruiting up to 700 young
Krahns without notifying other military leaders.
tensions in the EMG. Moreover, internal
rumors of a secret Krahn recruitment drive will worsen tribal
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divisions have surfaced in the military over rumors that particular units
are receiving favored treatment.
will try to
distance themselves from Doe if political pressures continue to rise. The
popular apd respected Army. Chief-of-Staff Dubar often has stated his wish
retire. and increasingly delegates responsibilities ubord- nates
Moreover,
who apparently has a
noderating influence on Doe, would leave his post this spring.
security officials recently arrested on suspicion of anti-governmen
activities a member of the elite Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, which acts
as Doe's bodyguard, and they are monitoring other members. Furthermore,
disgruntled soldiers probably are increasingly susceptible to recruitment
by anti-government elements, as both the
opposition coalition and dissidents already have made contacts with the
military. At a minimum. the military's willingness and ability to support
Doe in the event of a serious challenge to his rule robably will
deteriorate over the next twleve months.
Outlook
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We believe that the events of the first three months of civilian rule
in Liberia reaffirm two key judgments made in the September 1985 SNIE:
-- The near certainty that Liberia's political climate will not
stabilize nor economic conditions improve through early 1987.
-- The likelihood that Doe will continue to respond in an erratic
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fashion to political and economic issues as they arise,
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and remain incapable of implementing a longer term governing
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strategy.
Even if Doe suddenly decides to enact comprehensive political and economic
reforms, we do not believe he could sumnon the necessary cooperation from
the political opposition, business sector, and bureaucracy.
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Although the political opposition appears unable to mount a challenge
to the regime and Liberian dissidents probably pose little threat,
spontaneous protests spurred by economic problems could increase the
militancy of Doe's enemies. If popular demonstrations gathered momentum,
we believe Doe would have few means to diffuse tensions, and probably
would order a government crackdown. A violent overreaction: by security
forces could trigger uncontrollable street violence and destroy the unity
of the military as some soldiers joined the protests. We believe that
under these circumstances prominent civilian oppositionists could forge an
alliance with senior officers seeking to protect the military's corporate
interests. Such a regime undoubtedly would encounter serious problems in
maintaining a viable civilian/military power balance, as well as
attempting economic reforms amidst popular expectations for immediate
improvements. We note, however, that a diverse group of civilians"-
including Matthews and Johnson-Sirleaf--held important government
positions in the early years of Doe's rule, and believe that a workable,
moderate coalition could emerge if he were ousted.
We believe, however, that the greater threat to Doe remains an
outright military takeover,
Although senior officers probably would maintain
Liberia's pro-Western policies, it is doubtful they would prove adept at
tackling Liberia's problems without the participation of talented
civilians. Moreover, a purely military regime probably would not enjoy
much popular support though Doe's removal could ease tensions for
several nonths.
Implications for the US
Monrovia's relations: with the United States are likely to undergo
strains as domestic pressures mount. Doe probably will periodically
complain about US interference in local politics, grumble about perceived
shortfalls in US assistance, threaten to turn to US adversaries for
support, and probe other Western nations for more external . aid. We
believe, however, that Doe ultimately will try to maintain Liberia's
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"special relationship" with the US as long as he is in office. In our
judgment, although a post-Doe government probably would be somewhat less
accommodating toward the US, most prominent civilian politicians and
senior military officers who might take control are generally pro-
Western. Nevertheless, Doe's fall
might seriously jeopardize bilateral relations and reduce
US influence: such a group could make unrealistic demands for US
assistance or seek alternative sources of aid, while pursuing a more
nationalistic, nonaligned foreign policy.
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SUBJECT: Liberia: Doe's Growing Vulnerability
Distribution:
Original -- Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, Department of State
1 -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of State
'1 -- Princeton Lyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of State
1 -- Ambassador Howard K. Walker, Director, Office of West
African
Affairs, Department of State
1 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State
International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ALA/AF/W/
1 -- Constance Freeman, Liberia Desk Officer, Office of West
African Affairs, Department of State
1 -- DDI
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- NIC
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- PDB Staff
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/ALA
1 -- ALA Research Director
2 -- ALA/PS (one source copy; one clean)
4 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
4 -- ALA/W
4 -- ALA/W (files)
(28 April 1986)
S E C R E T
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