(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707310001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 9, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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9 July 1986
PARAGUAY: Scenarios for Sudden, Unexpected Change L-1
Summary
We believe that despite growing opposition activity in Paraguay, President
Stroessner is in control, will be re-elected in 1988, and probably will remain in power
until he dies, when the military and the ruling Colorado Party will choose a successor.
Nevertheless, change in Paraguay could come about suddenly, leading either to a regime
that initiates some democratic reforms or to right-or left-wing authoritarian rule more
repressive than Stroessner's. We believe that Asuncion will move toward democracy if
the traditionalist faction of the Colorado Party, reformist -elements irt-the military, or the
opposition parties depose Stroessner. The President could, however, be ousted by
rightist elements intent on protecting lucrative narcotics and smuggling interests or--in
the longer term--Paraguay could fall prey to leftist subversion after a brief, chaotic
democratic interlude. All these scenarios, in our view, are highly unlikely, but none can
be discounted.
We believe change is on the horizon in Paraguay, but that true reform in is unlikely as
long as President Stroessner remains in power. Since Stroessner faces no serious opposition
and already has announced he will run again in the 1988 presidential elections, we expect he
will be re-elected and will continue to serve as Paraguay's president as long as his health
permits. When Stroessner dies, we believe someone acceptable to both the armed forces and
the ruling Colorado Party, such as 84 year old Colorado President Juan Chiarino, would serve
as transitional president while the military and Colorado factions battle behind the scenes to
determine the "official" candidate to run in a carefully manipulated presidential election. In
our view, the new president would likely be a moderate civilian Colorado Party member--such
as President of the Supreme Court, Luis Maria Argana--who could begin slowly to move
Paraguay away from authoritarian rule.
This memorandum was requested by Robert Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs. It was prepared by South America Division,
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Information as of July 8, 1986 was used in the preparation of this paper.
Questions and comments may be directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALAI
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Central Intelligence Agency
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We cannot completely rule out, however, alternative scenarios for Paraguay's future. A
number of significant developments have altered the country's socio-economic structure over
the past decade. The economic boom of the 1970s--generated by the construction outlays
on the Itaipu hydroelectric project with Brazil--created for the first time a large middle class
in Paraguay with political and economic aspirations not being served by the Stroessner
regime. The near completion of the dam project, however, is already depriving Asuncion of
much income and has left the economy especially vulnerable to low world prices for
commodity exports and to governmental mismanagement. Even Paraguay's normally reticent
business community has begun to speak out against Stroessner's economic policies. Protests
over the last few months, such as the Hospital de Clinicas strike, have presented the regime
with its most serious political challenge in 32 years. Young Paraguayans--over half the
population is under 30--have no memory of the disorder that preceded Stroessner and are
beginning to criticize his anachronistic policies. The still disjointed opposition parties, aided
by the Catholic Church, are becoming more vocal in their calls for a transition to democracy.
Because of the above factors, there is an outside chance that change in Paraguay could
come about in an abrupt, unexpected manner. Such a development would, in our view, push
the country in one of two directions: towards a moderate government that would promote
democratic reforms, or toward a right or leftwing authoritarian regime even more repressive
than Stroessner's.
Scenarios Leading to Democratic Rule
Very little is done in Paraguay without the ruling Colorado Party's assent and this
powerful organization could still instigate a move towards reform. The party is already split
between a group favoring some sort of political opening--the traditionalists--and a faction
seeking Stroessnerism after Stroessner, known as the militants. The traditionalists currently
hold a commanding majority in the governing junta and are already maneuvering for next
year's junta elections. Several prominent Colorado deputies have publicly criticized
Stroessner's policies, causing the President to acknowledge publicly for the first time that a
schism exists within the party. If Stroessner's policies continue to aggravate Paraguay's
economic decline and public discontent over both the government's economic ineptitude and
political rigidity increases sharply, the traditionalist faction--with the tacit support of key
military leaders--could become strong enough to force the President to resign. Stroessner
could cite ill-health as the reason for stepping down, and the fact that he would probably be
succeeded by a mainline Colorado leader who would not directly repudiate the dictatorship
and only gradually initiate reform might even make this a more attractive option for
Stroessner than clinging desperately to power.
More abrupt and far-reaching change could, in our view, come from the military.
middle grade and junior officers are becomina
disillusioned with the government and more critical of Stroessner's policies.
junior officers in particular are concerned about the reputation of the military as
an institution and resent the blatantly corrupt practices prevalent in the high command.
These reformis Iements in the military could become fed-up with the corruption of their
high command and move against the government.
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This scenario would be more probable if popular dissent--due to economic hardship and the
regime's political heavy handedness--increased dramatically over the next year. A reformist
military government would probably make a cleaner and quicker break with the past than a
Colorado traditionalist regime, clearing the way for relatively free elections by purging both
the armed forces and the Colorado Party.
Finally, Paraguayans may look to the country's currently small and fractured opposition
parties for an alternative to Stroessner. The opposition--spearheaded by the relatively
dynamic Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA)--is trying to channel the so far largely
inchoate public discontent over worsening economic conditions into anti-regime activities.
Moreover, the Catholic Church has joined opposition efforts by sponsoring a "national
dialogue" designed to pressure the government into initiating a transition to democracy. So
far, the opposition parties have held a number of protest rallies, which have been violently
repressed by the police, and have backed several strikes with clear anti-Stroessner overtones.
The President's harsh crackdown on demonstrators and actions such as the beating of PLRA
leader Laino at Asuncion's airport have focused international attention on human rights
violations in Paraguay and helped to further discredit and isolate Stroessner's regime.
If the opposition becomes bolder and more successful, Stroessner will probably crack
down even harder, possibly creating a Chilean-like cycle of demonstrations, repressions, and
polarization. In Paraguay, however, the absence of a strong left would likely prevent
Stroessner from convincingly using the Communist threat to hold on to power; in a
tumultuous political situation, the opposition--especially if it produced a charismatic figure to
unite the parties and inspire the public--could quickly gather substantial popular support.
Joined by dissident elements within the military and Colorado Party, the opposition then
might be able to combine public pressure and behind-the-scenes politicking to convince or
force Stroessner to resign. Because of the key role of the opposition parties and popular
mobilization in this scenario, the resulting provisional government would probably move more
rapidly toward democratic rule than would a government controlled by Colorado
traditionalists. A slightly different scenario might involve the opposition's generating so much
pressure on the Stroessner regime through strikes and demonstrations that he either lost the
ability or felt it was politically too dangerous to manipulate the 1988 presidential election.
This might give a unified opposition slate an outside chance of winning power either at the
ballot box or in the wake of chaos following a failed attempt by Stroessner to rig the voting.
Scenarios Leading to a More Authoritarian Left or Rightwing Regime
Change in Paraguay could, in our view, also produce a regime even more repressive and
oblivious to international human rights concerns than the Stroessner dictatorship. We believe
the most probable scenario would begin with a precipitous decline in Stroessner's personal
power and a rise in opposition protest activity similar to that outlined in the previous
examples. In this case, howeve high military officers and militant 25X1
Colorado leaders, fearing that Stroessner mig ontrol of the situation, could themselves
dispose of him and establish a far-right regime 25X1
reminiscent of the Garcia Meza government of the early 1980's in Bolivia. 25X1
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The most remote scenario, in our view, would be a sharp swing to the left. The
Paraguayan left is so minute and fractionalized that we doubt it could play a significant role in
either forcing Stroessner from power or in forming the first post-Stroessner government. The
reestablishment of civil and political liberties by an elected or provisional government,
however, might provide an opening for radical elements. Communists and other leftists could
re-enter the country, reorganize their forces, and begin to infiltrate both the military and the
political parties. If the new Paraguayan government proved politically inept, the left might
begin to gain popular support and maneuver itself into a position from which it could seize
the levers of power. Nevertheless, such a leftist coup or popular uprising would, in our view,
require a breakdown of political and economic institutions, as well as almost impossibly
dextrous political maneuvering by the left. We consider this scenario to be the least
likely--and also the most long-term of those discussed.
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Original - Requestor
1 - D/DCI-DDCI
1 - DDI
1 - O/DDI
1 - NIO/LA
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PES
1 - DDI/CPAS
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - ALA/SAD
1 - ALA/SAD/SC
ALA/SAD/SC/I I (9Jul86)
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