NIGER: NEAR TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707360001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 October 1986
Niger: Near Term Prospects
Summary
55-year-old President Senyi
Kountche is in ill-health, and the lack of established
succession procedures raise the prospect of a leadership crisis
that could, at least potentially, serve Libyan efforts to gain
influence over yet another moderate neighbor. Niger is an
important source of uranium for the Mest and has served as a
barrier to Libyan efforts to dominate the Sahel region of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Nigerien officials, however, have long
expressed concern to the US Embassy that their country is
vulnerable to subversion because of Libya's continued
occupation of northern Chad and ties to neighboring Benin and
Burkina. Moreover, they worry that Libya's construction of an
airfield along the northern border will strengthen Qadhafi's
claim to a small triangle of territory across Niger's border
that ad3oins Chad's Aozou Strip.
Kountche's tentative moves to return the country to
civilian rule and revitalize Niger's deteriorating economy--the
result of an extended slump in uranium prices and the effects
of last year's drought--also have clouded prospects for an
orderly succession by arousing discontent within the
military. Senior officers are reluctant to surrender the
perquisites of office, and would probably move to
This memorandum was prepared for Clark A. Murdock, Director of African
National Security Council. It was written
Affairs
,
West Africa Branch, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and
coordinated with the Office of Neareast and Southeast Asia, Office of
European Analysis, and the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
Queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
ALA M 86-20039
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take over the government in the event of Kountche's death.
France, Niamey's major source of aid, mili~~ra ~smealed~by
trade, and investment would probably suppo eg
moderate senior officers. We believe, however, that Paris' own
economic problems will result in diminished aid levels over the
next several years and increase the vulnerability of a less
experienced leader to Libyan overtures.
Pitfalls of One Man Rule
Although we cannot confirm reports that Kountche's health is failing,
they highlight Niger's vulnerability to a sudden crisis provoked by the
death of the President in whom power is concentrated. A source of the US
Embassy reports that Kountche collapsed during a visit to an agricultural
roject
~t is becoming
increasin 1 difficult for the President to carry out his duties
Niger thus shares the vulnerability of many African states to a
political crisis brought on by the death of a highly autocratic leader who
has failed to make credible arrangements for his succession. Kountche nas
kept a tight grip on political power since his takeover by a military coup
in 1974. The US Embassy reports that Kountche continues to rule by
decree, makes all government appointments, and tries to carefully control
the pace of political change. Instead of forming a political party system
as an initial step toward civilian rule, in 1979 Kountche established the
National Development Society, which consists of a hierarchical networK of
councils at the village, regional, department, and national levels. Since
then, the President has taken some tentative steps toward political
liberalization, but his preoccupation with security and opposition from
some of his senior officers to a return to civilian rule have left
untouched the military's osition as the final arbitor of power, according
to US Embassy officials.
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,ti ~~
Domestic Challenges Ahead
In our view, growing disaffection in the Army will impair Kountche's
or a successor's ability to govern effectively over the next few years.
Military confidence in the President is likely to erode if he pursues
austerity but is unable, as seems likely, to spur a quick recovery in the
fundamentally weak economy. Recurrent drought, a large foreign debt, and
the depressed world market for uranium--the country's largest export
earner--probably will continue to drain government resources through the
end of the decade. Moreover, declining living standards could create a
climate conducive to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism among Niger's
predominantly Muslim populace.
Military Restiveness. A takeover attempt in 1983 by one of
Kountche's closest advisers brought into sharp focus the regime's
dependence on the 3,500-man military, which put down the abortive coup. A
review of US Embassy reporting indicates that senior officers, concerned
over Kountche's plans to move toward civilian rule, are taking steps to
forestall erosion of their power. Officials of the Supreme Military
Council (SMC)--Niger's highest ruling body made up of 12 senior military
officers--earlier this year blocked a move by the President to replace
several of its influential members with officers more loyal to him. This
marked the council's first major challenge to Kountche's authority since
its formation in 1974, according to the US Embassy. Moreover, the Embassy
reports that senior officers reacted to the promulgation of a draft
constitution last year by inducing Kountche to emphasize publicly the
military's central role in government. In the Embassy's assessment,
senior officers also have tried to block Kountche's efforts to open the
political system by installing military officers at the highest levels of
the National Development Society.
At the same time, that junior officers
and enlisted men, many of whom are a is ean~ng, ve fewer
opportunities than senior officers to supplement their income, and are
frustrated over limited advancement opportunities. The better-educated
junior officers are piqued at their superiors, who they believe rely too
and corrupt. ~
laz
d
y
are
heavil on French advisers to do their work, an
_ _ ..................+ .~n~ie;nn to 1^P(~IICP_
drastically military housing su si ies caused widespread grumbling in the
thi ar the
li
er
enlisted ranks because of alread low salaries. Ear
noncommissioned officers to remote interior posts after discovering that
they were meeting secretly to grumble about poor advancement
opportunities.
The Struggling Economy. Niger's dependence on subsistence
agriculture, which employs over 90 percent of its 6 million people, and
the 5-year-old world slump in uranium prices pose almost insurmountable
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obstacles to economic growth. Despite the return of sufficient rainfall
this year, Niger is still recovering from last year's drought that
necessitated massive Western food aid. Food imports were required again
this year, and the US Agency for International Development estimates the
replenishment of livestock--the country's second major export after
uranium--will require up to four years. Even with food assistance,
serious pockets of hunger will exist for the foreseeable future, according
to the Embassy.
Niger's uranium deposits, among world's largest, are its only easily
exploitable source of wealth, but our analysis suggests that world prices
will remain depressed for at least several years, curtailing any new
development efforts. The Embassy reports that uranium exports, accounting
for 25 percent of government revenues in 1985, dropped another 15 percent
in 1986. Uranium production is expected to remain near present levels
through the end of the decade, but the existence of more accessible,
richer deposits in other countries, and large stockpiles by major
consumers reduce the likelihood an upturn in demand for Nigerien uranium
before the mid-1990s.
Niamey also will face heavy debt service obligations for debt
contracted in the early 1980s when Niger mistakenly anticipated continued
high uranium prices. A review of Embassy reporting indicates that Niger's
debt, which totaled about $790 million in 1985 and is calculated to reach
$842 million by 1987, forced it to reschedule debt repayments and adopt
IMF recommended austerity measures. Niger signed its third IMF standby
agreement last December, recently reached an agreement with the World Bank
for a $60 million structural adjustment loan, and has rescheduled its debt
with the Paris and London clubs. Even with comprehensive debt
rescheduling, debt service will consume about 33 percent of government
revenue this year, according to Embassy sources.
Although Kountche's economic austerity program has made some headway,
it has begun to draw public opposition, which we judge probably will
increase if Kountche--or a successor regime--continues to seek ways to
solve Niger's economic problems. Over the last several years, the
government has gradually cut spending levels, adopted agricultural reforms
designed to encourage production, and streamlined some state enterprises,
but has yet to reduce the bloated civil service workforce, according to US
Embassy and press reports. Anew business tax initiated by the government
last January in response to IMF recommendations has already caused several
large private businesses to close and is coming under increasing public
criticism, according to the US Embassy. Labor unions and college
graduates, already restive over high unemployment, fear additional
bankruptcies will sharply increase joblessness and raise prices on basic
commodities, according to the Embassy. Moreover, the public increasingly
believes that the President's family and government ministers embezzle
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._~_
public funds and are deeply involved in the black market trade between
Niger and Nigeria, according to the Embassy.
The Islamic Factor. Nigerien officials have expressed concern to US
Embassy officers that Nigerian or Libyan-backed firebrands could rally
fundamentalist converts among Niger's Sunni Muslims, who comprise 90
percent of the population. According to press reports, Libya seeks to
undermine the regime by influencing the growing numbers of disgruntled
junior officers, enlisted men, and students attracted to Islamic
fundamentalism. Members of the influential Muslim community in Nigeria
report that one of Nigeria's largest Islamic fundamentalist groups has
plans to establish branches in Niger. Nigerien authorities worry that
these fundamentalist groups will exploit family and religious ties between
the Hausa* majority in Niger--about 50 percent of the population--and the
Hausa community in northern Nigeria to spread radical political and
religious reform across the Nigerian border, according to the US
Embassy.
The Libyan Threat
Recent press
reports indicate that Libya is attempting to unify Nigeriens opposed to
the Kountche regime living in Libya and France under the banner of the
People's Front for the Liberation of Niger (FPLN), with the goal of
overthrowing the government. Kountche fears that many of the 1,100
Nigeriens in Libya--including politically motivated opponents, mercenaries
who have joined the "Islamic Legion" in the Libyan Army, and individuals
seeking employment--will return to subvert his regime, according to the U5
Embassy. Moreover, Kountche believes he is on Qadhafi's hit list, and has
noted to US officials that Qadhafi--who was implicated in a plot to
assassinate Kountche in 1981 and an abortive coup attempt in
1983--continues to try to infiltrate the Nigerien Army and penetrate
student and labor movements through the eight-man Libyan People's Bureau
in Niamey.
* Niger's three major tribes include the Hausa, Djerma, and the Tuareg
representing 50, 25, and 10 percent of the population, respectively. The
Hausa dominate the business community, while the Djerma control the
government and the military. The Tuaregs are a nomadic tribe that roams
the southwestern Sahara Desert.
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Libya also continues to recruit and train northern Nigerien tribesmen
to attack government officials and installations, according to press
reporting. Libya has long influenced the northern Tuareg nomads, who
resent the southern-dominated government's efforts to restrict their
wanderings across the southwestern Sahara Desert. Qadhafi publicly called
on the Tuaregs to revolt against the government in 1980, and Nigerien
officials allege that Libya was behind a plot by Tuaregs in April 1982 to
blow up a uranium plant. Libya was also implicated in the unsuccessful
attack last year by 14 Tuaregs on a remote northern government outpost at
Tchin-Tabaraden (see map), according to the Embassy. In our view, Qadhafi
der
b
'
,
or
s southern
is especially sensitive to the vulnerability of Libya
and he may believe a US military aid project to resurface Niger's Dirkou
Airfield is intended to support US operations against Libya. We sus~ect
field
i
.
r
he mi ht try to encourage a Tuareg guerrilla attack on the a
Nigerien officials believe that periodic Libyan violations of the
northern border are designed to bolster Tripoli's claim to a small section
of disputed territory along Chad's Aozou Strip, according to the
Embassy. The US defense attache reports that a company of 250 Nigerien
soldiers patrols the isolated northeastern region, but ill-e ui ed to
monitor the area that is about half the size of Texas.
.. , _~ _ ~ ice.. 4. ,.....~...,. oar ~~r 7 c
year, an a iger~en patrol saw some 25 Libyan military personnel camped
ap roximately 50 kilometers inside the Ni Brien border last March
just inside its border, which is capable of
accepting heavy transport aircraft. Although bilateral talks were held
with Libyan officials this year to resolve the border issue, they did
little to reassure Niamey the Libyan encroachment would end, according to
the Embassy.
France's Key Role
Despite expanded ties with other Western capitals, Niamey continues
to protect its traditionally strong relations with France. The Embassy
estimates total French bilateral economic assistance for 1986 at about $43
million, twice the amount of the second largest donor, the United
States. During Kountche's state visit to Paris last month, the French
government promised an additional $6 million in budgetary support and an
increase in French uranium purchases, according to the US Embassy in
Paris. France, which manages and owns controlling interests in Niger's
two functioning uranium mines, also helps subsidize the economy by
importing more uranium from Niger than it probably needs, at a cost above
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the world market price, according to the US Embassy. Although the number
of French businessmen in Niger--about 4,000--is declining due to bleak
commercial prospects, France remains Niamey's largest trading partner.
The Embassy reports that Niger imported $91 million in goods from France
and exported $176 million in 1984, the last year for which reliable data
are available.
Niger continues to look to Paris to guarantee its security, despite
the absence of a formal mutual defense treaty. France's annual military
assistance to Niger includes about $3 million in military credits and
another $15 million to support 160 French military advisers in the
country. The Embassy reports that French advisers are attached to various
units throughout the Nigerien military. The French delivery of five
d
h
ance
armored personnel carriers and five Landrovers last spring en
Nigerien confidence in French willingness to protec the
region rom i n expansion was bolstered last February after Paris sent
a 1,300-man military contingent to Chad to re el a Libyan-backed Chadian
rebel offensive, according to the US Embassy.
Despite these close ties, however, we believe France's own
diminishing economic resources are likely to constrain assistance levels
at a time when Niger's needs and those of other francophone states are
soaring. Although Paris still provides more aid than any other donor, its
aid levels to Africa, which have vacillated markedly since 1980, reveal an
overall downward trend of 3 percent. The US Embassy in Paris reports that
France is urging African governments to encourage private economic
investments, and is considering the creation of aFrench-African co-
investment fund to finance investments in former colonies such as Niger,
to help offset aid cutbacks.
US Ties
Niamey has strengthened relations with the United States over the
last two years, probably in an effort to diversify sources of Western
support. Kountche highly values US aid and believes that US emergency
food assistance--100,000 tons totaling $40 million--was crucial to
maintaining the stability of his government during the 1984-85 drought and
famine, according to the Embassy. Embassy sources report Niger will
receive about $16 million in US development aid in 1986 and is allocated
another $5 million in economic support funds.
US military assistance has increased in the past several years and
last year totaled over $5 million, including the rehabilitation of Dirkou
Airfield to help Niger defend its borders from Libyan aggression. US aid
also equipped a parachute company, built military barracks, and provided
small arms, according to the US Embassy. The Embassy also reports that 2U
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Nigerien military personnel came to the US for training in 1985. We
believe Kountche politely declined a recent US offer to conduct joint
military exercises, however, to avoid offending his primary donor, France,
and possibly provoking stepped-up subversion by Libya, according to US
Embassy sources.
Prospects for Succession
The absence of a designated successor and of a formalized procedure
for selecting and installing one (and political institutions capable of
managing a smooth transfer of power) raise the real possibility of a
leadership crisis in Niger in the event of Kountche's death. In our view,
the Supreme Military Council, by virtue of its command of military force,
is the only institution that could intercede in a succession crisis to
choose anew leader, and it probably would select someone from within its
own ranks. Although a leadership vacuum would likely spark infighting and
jockeying for position among SMC members, we believe they would try to
close ranks behind one of their members to protect their vested interests
in the system.
In our view, Lt. Col. Moumoni Djermakoye Adamou is the most likely
member of the SMC to emerge as a successor. He is highly regarded within
the military establishment and among the general population, and according
to Embassy reports, he is the only SMC member to have an independent
powerbase--stemming from his influence as the son of the "king" of the
Djerma ethnic group and the popularity he enjoys as a local prefect.
Djermakoye is also an experienced and competent administrator, credited
with efficient management of drought relief last year and during the great
drought of the early 1970s.
If the SMC could not agree on a new leader and a prolonged period of
uncertainty ensued, some faction within the group might be tempted to
seize power by force. Under these circumstances, Col. Ali Saibou, Armed
Forces Chief of Staff, would be a likely candidate to launch such a
coup. He is popular among the rank and file, according to the US Embassy,
and helped engineer the coup that brought Kountche to power in 1974.
Despite his good standing with the military, he is regarded as inept by
many Nigeriens after failing to effectively distribute food aid in recent
years.
In our judgment, Western relations with Niger would suffer the least
damage, at least over the near term, if Kountche were replaced by a senior
officer, such as Djermakoye or Saibou. Efforts to civilianize the
government probably would be put on hold, but both men probably would
continue Kountche's pro-Western policies. We believe such a senior
officer would not want to alter France's guardian role and would continue
to look to Paris as a principal source of military and economic support.
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For its part, however, Paris would be unlikely to intervene directly in
the succession process unless vital French interests or the security of
its nationals were threatened. France would likely use its considerable
influence to ensure some measure of effectiveness by anew, friendly
government.
In our view, Niger's seemingly insurmountable economic problems pose
a key challenge to any leader and portend increasing military factionalism
and public unrest over the longer term. Despite additional belt-
tightening measures, the economy will remain fragile and vulnerable to
drought. Barring an unlikely upturn in the world uranium market, the
country probably will remain dependent on Western donors, particularly
France, to help stave off further deterioration in living conditions. In
the event of a dramatic weakening of the economy by another drought, a new
leader almost certainly would find it more difficult than Kountche to
manage the impact of austerity and protect the interests of his political
backers. While Kountche has proved adept at coopting the opposition and
diffusing contentious political issues, a successor--and especially
someone like Saibou with limited popular support--might be forced to
resort to repression, and in doing so undermine popular confidence in his
rule.
We believe it is possible, though less likely, that opportunistic
junior officers or enlisted men favoring radical policies--possibly
modeling themselves after populist leaders in neighboring Ghana and
Burkina--could muster enough support to launch a successful coup. These
men, however, could exploit a prolonged stalemate in the SMC to rally
rank-and-file support with promises to redress what they see as corruption
and neglect of enlisted personnel by senior officers. We believe a regime
led by lower ranking personnel probably would seek to distance itself from
ort
su
f
ll
.
pp
or
y,
the West and possibly look to Libya, at least initia
A pro-Libyan regime in Niamey, in our judgment, would provide Qadhafi
with a considerable propaganda victory. Qadhafi, who in the past has
sought a quadripartite defense arrangement with friendly regimes in
Burkina, Benin, and Ghana could try to forge a similar agreement with a
new regime in Niger. At a minimum, a pro-Libyan regime in Niamey would
serve further to intimidate moderate regimes in the region. Qadhafi might
well try to use a friendly Niger as a base for subversion against northern
Nigeria, and step up pressure on the Chadian government. In exchange for
Libyan economic and security assistance, Tripoli might pressure the regime
to cede the disputed border territory or make Libya the primary customer
of Nigerien uranium.
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ALGERIA
LIBYA
IRKOU
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
TC}1IN-TRBRRROEN
. TRHOUfl
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
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SUBJECT: Niger: Near Term Prospects
Distribution:
Original -- Clark A. Murdock, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1 -- Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs
1 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa, INrt
Department of State
1 -- Ambassador Howard K. Walker, Director, West African Affairs,
Department of State
1 -- Mark L., Edelman, Assistant Administrator for Africa,
Agency for International Development
1 -- James L.Woods, Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for African
Affairs, International Security Affairs, DOD
1 -- Vincent D. Kern, Acting Director, Africa Region, ISA, Department
of Defense
1 -- Walter Barrows, Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa,
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 -- DDI
1 -- 0/DDI
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- Chief, Africa Division, DDO
1 -- PDB Staff
1 -- Chief, PES
1 -- DDI/CPAs/ILS
1 -- D/ALA
5 -- CPAs/IMC/CB
2 -- ALA/PS (one clean copy; one sourced copy)
1 -- ALA Research Director
4 -- Africa Division, ALA
1 -- Africa Division (Analyst Production File)
2 -- West Africa Branch, ALA/AF (Branch Files)
4 --
AF/W
ALA/AF/W~ (1 October 1986)
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