NICARAGUA-HONDURAS: IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT BORDER FIGHTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707540002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Wa%hin,lon. D C 20505
Nicaragua-Honduras: Implications of Recent Border Fighting
12 December 1986
Summary
Honduran airstrikes and troop movements apparently have induced Managua to
withdraw most of its forces from the Las Vegas salient and temporarily halt its military
campaign against the anti-Sandinista insurgent bases there. We believe, however, that
the public attention that has been drawn to the rebel presence in Honduras and
Tegucigalpa's related reluctance to continue providing sanctuary may yet lead to
relocation of the bases. If the camps are not moved and Honduran forces withdraw, we
believe the Sandinistas almost certainly will return in force to the salient. In the
meantime, Managua will use publicity from the latest round of fighting and evidence of
Honduran airstrikes on Nicaraguan territory to strengthen its calls for international
observers to patrol the border. In our view, the Honduran military response during the
past week does not signal any long-term willingness to fight on behalf of the
Nicaraguan rebels. Honduras, however, is certain to use the current situation to press
for additional military and economic assistance from the US--such as more favorable
payment terms or an earlier delivery date for more advanced jet fighters.
This memorandum was prepared by the Nicaragua and Central America Branches, Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. It contains information available as of 11 December 1986. Questions and
comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA
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The Recent Fighting
The latest and largest Sandinista military operation against insurgents in the Las Vegas
salient is now drawing to a close. In what we believe was an attempt to outflank rebel
troops blocking their advance toward the camps, Nicaraguan forces attacked and overran
Honduran Army positions in the western half of the salient last week. The Hondurans
responded on 6 and 7 December by launching retaliatory airstrikes both in the salient and in
northern Nicaragua, and by dispatching reinforcements and artillery to the border with US
helicopter assistance. These actions appeared to take Managua by surprise,
In our judgment, the ultimate objective of Managua's campaign was to force the rebels
out of the salient--rather than merely seek to block infiltration, as in previous years. From
their positions inside the salient, regime troops gathered intelligence on the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN) and used artillery fire, commando raids, and ambushes to inflict
casualties and interdict the overland supply route. In early November, for example, the
Sandinistas destroyed a truck carrying helicopter fuel on the only road to the main guerrilla
camp at Yamales.
We believe the Sandinista cross-border operation also was intended to embarrass the
Azcona administration by increasing public attention to Honduran support for the rebels.
Sandinistas pressed forward in the salient because they believed turmoil with
Honduran military would prevent Tegucigalpa from responding forcefully.
Over the past
several years, Managua persistently has attempted to entice Tegucigalpa into a bilateral
border settlement, and the publicity generated by the recent fighting is certain to heighten
public uneasiness in Honduras.
In reaction to the fighting, Honduras has moved some 1,000 troops to staging areas
west of the salient. The Hondurans have limited lift and logistical capability, however, as
evidenced by their request that the US help ferry roughly 40 percent of the troops to Danli,
about 50 miles from the fighting. Tegucigalpa has been reluctant to engage the Sandinistas
with ground forces and probably hoped that the airstrikes would prompt a Nicaraguan
withdrawal.
Managua's Next Steps
The Sandinistas' decision to withdraw most of their forces suggests Managua remains
deterred by the threat of a wider war with possible US intervention. Nevertheless, we believe
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regime troops are likely to continue patrolling the salient and--if the camps remain in place
and the Honduran Army withdraws --almost certainly will return in force. In the meantime,
Managua probably will use the troops concentrated in the border area to impede rebel
infiltration and collect intelligence on insurgent movements and logistic activities.
At some point, possibly after more of the rebels have entered Nicaragua, regime forces
may try to launch a large-scale assault on the rebel headquarters, training center, and other
facilities remaining in the salient. Destroying the camps would require the movement of
Nicaraguan artillery and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers across the border to bring them
into effective range. The terrain on the eastern side of the salient would make such a move
difficult, however, and any use of the better road network on the western side would involve
clashes with the Honduran Army.
Nicaragua will use public attention to last week's fighting to press its case before the
United Nations and other diplomatic forums for international supervision of the Honduran
border. Managua already has asked the UN Secretary General to send an inspection team to
the areas hit by the Honduran airstrikes last weekend.
They also are likely to trumpet their claim that the US instigated
the whole incident to draw attention away from the ongoing Congressional investigations of
insurgent funding.
Rebel Plans
The rebels likely will stick to their strate
of avoiding. decisive engagements and not
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fighting to defend Honduran territory.
judgment, the political pressure on the rebels to reduce their presence in the salient and
move some of their installations to more remote areas to the east undoubtedly will increase
in the next few weeks as a result of the recent fighting. The Hondurans are pressing the
insurgents to move their forces into Nicaragua as quickly as possible, according to the US
Embassy. Also, as more of their troops infiltrate Nicaragua, the insurgents' ability to defend
their bases from a future Sandinista incursion will be lessened.
Moving the rebel headquarters and other facilities from the salient probably would
disrupt insurgent infiltration and resupply for a few weeks, particularly if carried out before
most of the 9,000 combatants still in Honduras begin infiltrating into Nicaragua. Even if the
main bases are moved, some logistics operations and several thousand non-combatants and
family members probably would remain in the Yamales area.
The short-term effects of the recent fighting on rebel capabilities are unclear.
Ithe rebels probably will try to use the breather gained from the Sandinista
withdrawal to distribute supplies to units and speed infiltration to increase operations inside
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Nicaragua.
The Honduran Perspective
In our view, the Honduran military response during the past week does not signal a
long-term increased willingness to fight on behalf of the Nicaraguan rebels. As in the past,
Tegucigalpa probably will respond to future Sandinista incursions only if Hondurans are
attacked or there is strong domestic pressure to respond to violations of Honduran
sovereignty. Even then, the Honduran response likely will be limited to artillery fire,
airstrikes, and movement of reinforcements--all calibrated to give the Sandinistas ample
opportunity to pull back and undertaken only after Tegucigalpa has obtained reassurances of
US backing, including a commitment to implement security agreements if the situation
worsens.
Honduran requests for additional military and economic assistance are likely to grow
as a result of the recent fighting. Tegucigalpa already has requested ordnance to replace
that expended in the airstrikes as well as $7 million to compensate civilians displaced by the
fighting. The effective performance of the Honduran Air Force last weekend, and the
perception that it continues to be a deterrent on the Sandinistas, will reinforce Tegucigalpa's
determination to seek more advanced fighter aircraft--with better payment terms, earlier
delivery dates, or both--to retain air superiority in the region.
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On the diplomatic front, the Hondurans are currently asking the US to reaffirm its
commitment to mutual defense under the Rio Treaty.
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a major clash between
Honduran and Sandinista forces probably would lead them to demand that the US commit
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some troops--helicopter pilots, at a minimum--to combat areas.
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Nicaraguan, Rebel, and Honduran Force Distribution, 9 December 1986
UNC) 'FD ^:
~:rategir Cc-manri
26-man Honduran -ter `:)r M 1, f iry
j artillery battalion a, '1 'ruction
bndduran 200-man Honduran ;,.~: ~A9.coo rF be?s in i nsd
9ttalion Infantry battalion Y niales valley
~Caln
Las Truss FDN defensive line
?AK? l?t _ 1,000 trc'p4y
41?-lnan n ran
h antry battalion S 4 December 1986;
1,500 troops
( Estimated 4,100 Sandinista
troops in reserve near border
* Nicaragua
NA?AWA
saves,
El Sdrdar
Sandinista battalion
command post
Sandinista artillery unit
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Nicaraguan, Rebel, and Honduran Force Distribution, 9 December 1986
Ojo do
ANa
/-60=man Hondura
infantry brigade
412-man Honduran
infantry battalion
Sandinista forward line,
4 December 1986,
Estimated 4,100 Sandinista
troops in reserve near border
I Sandinista battalion
command post
24-'man Honduran
r Artillery battalion
UNO/FDN
Strategic Command
200-man J~londuran 200-man Honduran m:
infantrv%attalion y I - infantry battalion
Center for Military
M Instruction
L? ~ 1 Ban*
y 9,000 rebels in
^ Yamales Valley
us irolos I FDN defensive line
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Copy 1 - Dr. Alton G. Keel, Jr., NSC
2 - The Honorable Elliot Abrams/William Walker/
Philip Habib, State
3 - Mr. Donald Gregg, The White House
4 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, State
5 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, DoD
6 - Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
7 - Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez, DOD
8 - Mr. Raymond Burghardt, NSC
9 - Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA
10 - LTG John H. Moellering, USA
11 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz, INR
12 - Mr. Doug Mulholland, Treasury
13 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, DOD
14 - CAJIT, I D917, Pentagon (Ken Rosen)
15 - SOUTHCOM
16 - DCI - 7D60
17 - DDCI - 7D6011
18 - Ambassador Peter Dailey, 7E12
19 - Executive Secretary - 7060
20 - SA/DCI/IA - 7E12
21 - Executive Registry - 7E12
22-DDI-7E44
23-DDO-7E26
24 - PINS/SOG/GB - 1 E4846
25 - NIO/LA - 7E62
26 - NIC/AG - 7E47
27 - Comptroller - 7C21
28 - C/DDI/PES - 7F24
30 - Director, Legislative Liaison - 7D43
31 - Legislative Liaison - 7B04
33 - PDB Staff - 7F30
34 & 35 - D/ALA - 3F45
36 - C/DDO/LA - 3C3203
37 - DDO/LA
38 - C/DDO/l.A/I
39 - C/DDO/
40 - C/LA~
41 & 42 - ALA/PS - 4F21
43 - ALA Research Director - 3F44
44 - 48 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07
49 - DDI/CPAS/ISS - 7G40
50 - CPAS/CDPB/CC - GH25
51 - DC/RIG/SOVA - 5E25
C/LA/LDA - 1 H39
- PPS/PO/RPB - 3002
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55
56 - NSA
57 - Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser, JCS
58 - RADM Anthony A. Less, JCS
59 - C/ALA/MCD
60 - DC/ALA/MCD
61 - C/ALA/MX
62 - C/ALA/CAR
63 - C/ALA/CU
64 - C/ALA/NIC
65 - C/ALA/CA
66 -
67 -F
68 - MCD Files
69 - CA Files
70 - NIC Branch Files
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