Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 20, 2010
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 25, 1983
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PDF icon CIA-RDP87-00181R000100060013-8.pdf751.69 KB
77 Sanitized Coov Aooroved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 ? .. P% CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 ,; `" ;'cg.istry 2 5 FE B 1983 Dr. Robert M. Warner Archivist of the United States National Archives and Records Service Eighth Street $ Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20408 Dear Dr. Warner: Enclosed are the "Guidelines for Identifying and Handling CIA Information During Declassification Review of Records from the Period 1946-54," as required by Section 3.3(a) of Executive Order 12356 and Section 2001.(c)(3)(i) of Information Security Oversight Office Directive Number 1. The guidelines were coordinated in draft with W. Edwin A. Thompson of your staff. The policy at CIA is that our offices must review information for which we are responsible before it can be declassified and released to the public. In the attached guidelines we have attempted to explain the reasoning behind that policy. In addition, we have described our activities as an intelligence agency as they relate to the creation and protection of classified records, and we have tried to anticipate, at least ink broad sense, where such records might be encountered in the files of other U.S. Government agencies. Finally, we have provided a three-page listing of the various types of intelligence reports and publications that CIA produced during the period with descriptions and comments about where they mar, be held in governmental records. The enclcsed guidelines supersede the "Central Intelligence Agency Systematic Review Guidelines" signed by Director Stansfield Turner which were issued pursuant to Executive Order 12065 and forwarded under a letter of 5 June 1919. Previously issued guidelines covering the records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), material of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and the Foreign Doctmmts Division (FDD) remain in effect but will be reviewed and considered for revision as necessary. UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 CONFIDENTIAL ? I hope that the enclosed guidelines will Inc ~~~~ Iul ill your systematic declassification review program. Should You iri questions concerning these guidelines, please contac Director of Inform:i:ion Services, Directorate of Adminstrat ion, cu, 1Vd 11.1,. :.0505, incrrciy, 1 avey E. l:itzwatcr Deputy Director for Adiitinistra.tion Distribution: Orig - Addressee w/encl and atts 1 - DDA Subject w/encl and atts 1 - DDA Chrono 1 - D/OIS Subject w/encl and atts 1 - D/OIS Chrono Vt - CRD Liaison w/NARS w/encl and atts Chrono (22 February 1983) FIDENTIAL 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 ? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 ? %..vr4r1utN I IAL M GUIDELINES FOR IDk 'IFYING AND HANDLING CIA INFORMATION 1546-54 INTRODUCTION This guideline will serve as the basis for identifying and handling information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by th;; CIA or one of its predecessor organizations, or is information from that period which falls under CIA jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify information. Its purpose is to provide background and general descriptions intended to aid declassificatApn review personnel to identify CIA material that may be found in the reco b of other agencies. When such material is found it must be reviewed for classification by CIA personnel. This is necessary because an intelli agency has special security problems. All components of an intellie agency are either directly involved in clandestine work, provide. `!t to elements that are engaged in clandestine work, or are involved in 9tna clandestinely acquired information into a finished intelligence product., ateye their role, there is an interrela- tionship among these elements vl'ch makes them all sensitive to one degree or another and an exposure in one can lead to an exposure in another. It requires a thorough understanding of these components and their interrela- tionships to assess the degree of sensitivity of information relating to intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U) The inherent sensitivity of intelligence organizations is attested to by the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence organization to make its records public except after a minimum of 30 years and then sources and methods re sti 1 e 1111 important from another aspect BACKGROUND During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a transitional period. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which played the major U.S. intelligence role wing WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945. It was succeeded by the Strafe Se Cos Unit (SSU) which existed for one year. The records of the OSS:and theSSU reflect a wartime context, being staffed with military personnel and puttjng emphasis on "hot war" activities related to the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more civilians while it succeeded in absorbing the SSU by the end of October 1946. The CIG in turn was replaced by the CIA on 18 September 1947. The CIA was created as a civilian organization and remains one today. (U) 25X1 NOTICE S`ITCES CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 ? y4r/^ \1 IV 1.1 \ 11/1L ? The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime, then very quickly into a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities in Korea, 1950-54. Intelligence activities during the period 1946-54 were not of wartime nature but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast. Considerable resources were devoted to special activities aimed at strengthen- ing the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action operation,;. Measures were undertaken to prepare for a "hot war" situation. Refugee and especially defector debriefings were an important source of intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations were not ignored. Throughout. this period the "iron curtain" between the West and East proved very difficult for our relatively young intelligence agencies to penetrate, and it restricted, the flow of even overt information to the West. That forced collection; efforts into many unlikely areas which normally would be considered overt. (U) During this period, CIA and the other U.S. national security agencies were learning to coordinate their intelligence activities and were developing channels among themselves. asrd,wi other U. S. government agencies to get administrative and operational Sport.. Because intelligence agencies must The identification of intelligence related documents and information can be very difficult, and one purpose of this guideline is to assist the records reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U) GENERAL GUIDELINE For the purpose of identifying information relating to CIA we may break down its activities into four major areas: Plans and Policies; Collection; Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a brief general description of each of these areas intended to serve as a framework within which to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U) CONFIDENTIAL 2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 it .rr . .L....... ? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 -w . .. ^ r ^.^ ? ^ 1/ LIM ? Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence community comes rom a National Security Council (NSC). Many intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are initiated by the NSC or by presidential commissions such as the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) or the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and eventually adopting and formulating such guidance and the record of such collective activities may be held by all the participating agencies. The implementation of such plans must be coordinated at all levels and with the many types of units. This broad involvement will be documented and that record will be found somewhere in the files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning papers often do not indicate the source of the specific information used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and it is not possible to identify the specific agency or department responsible for the information, CIA would like to have the opportunity to review that material. Classified planning and policy records relating to.intelligence activities normally will require protection for long periods of time because (1) they officially confirm U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible denial and, (2) might provide details which could compromise intelligence sources and methods. (C) Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by all merit o s o human and technical. This involves the development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can obtain the intelligence information that our government needs. The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to preserve the flow of intelligence information, to prevent disruption in our foreign relations, to protect those persons and organizations who risk themselves on our behalf, to protect our national investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent the targeted persons and countries from becoming aware of our intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take actions to nullify the results obtained or take aggressive countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U) CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 ? Processing and Analysis - Processing is the conversion of technical data into in -formation useful to the intelligence analyst. An example would he the development of film from overhead reconnaissance, and its examination and reporting by photo interpreters. Since most of this conversion falls under the heading of "intelligence methods", the process and technical parameters are always classified, with the most highly classified information CONFIDENTIAL A Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 ? , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 V being about the degree of success of the system and data which, if divulged, would aid in the development of countermeasures to negate collection. (U) Much of the processing of technical data (such as in the field of overhead photography) is a joint effort by CIA and other U.S. government agencies',, particularly elements of the Department of Defense. The research and development of advanced methods of technical collection is often a joint effort, with CIA sharing contracting, appropriations, testing, etc. with other agencies. Consequently, many documents concerning such joint efforts will be found in the files of all participating agencies. The review of classified documents arising from such joint activities must be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C) Analysis is generally known and understood as the collation and processing of raw data from Many different sources to find the solution to some question confronting our policy makers. There are many specific techniques. that will be classified. The weighing and establishing of priorities for collection data and its use in estimating foreign capabilities and intentions is an intellectual process used by all analysts. But the fact that the Agency employs unique intelligence. methodologies, for example, to estimate the costs of foreign defense activities, is classified. So are analytical techniques used in assessing the impact of natural resources, science and technology development, and food and population factors on foreign military, political, and economic responses to the U.S. The substantive intelligence produced by such analysis is often unavailable any other way. (C) As in the case of processing, CIA has often shared analysis duties with other government agencies, with many of the private "think tanks," and with analytical institutions sponsored by various American universities. CIA often has shared in contracts other U.S. government agencies have had with such institutions. Once again, this will result in documents of interest to CIA being found in many files within and outside the intelligence community, and review of these classified records from joint activities must be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C) Production and Dissemination - The basic infonnatioiial end product inte1Tig'ence ser ice is the finished intelligence report. It results from the collation, analysis, and evaluation of information available on a particular subject from all sources both overt and covert. (Attachment B is a list of many of the finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated by CIA during the period 1946-54.) Most finished intelligence reports are classified. Many of them include information from other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This means that classification review must be coordinated with other interested elements before the information can be downgraded or CONFIDENTIAL 5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 ? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100060013-8 declassified. In some cases the titles of in e.1ligence reports may be sensitive .and require careful hand, i ng . Also, t' jetie publications receive very wide distribution t hroug;hou;t the U. S. g, vernment and therefore will be found in c~ ; ;i~lcrrt~,le i,w".l.,cis a,n,.! in a variety of files not only in the rec ~r, s of intelliw.ern".e :tad national security agencies but other U.S. ,ovc-~rrnr~.rrtt. a en+-.ies as well. (U) As noted above, information that CIA is rc s} >tisihie Loy: may r"} ;gar' in doctm,ents which are not clearly discernible as ClA-ori.ginatc~,:,,, or in docin,ent.s origluated by other ag,enc.te;. This ,cakes the idem i F.i ation o," ('IA invnlve;iie;nt very difficult. t