UPDATE OF SECOM HARASSMENTS AND PROVOCATIONS STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 24, 1985
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
1616
SECOM-D-245 ~rnC- 73?j
24 September 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members
Chairman, SECOM Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee
FROM:
SUBJECT: Update of SECOM Harassments and Provocations Study
Attached for review is a draft update of the 1982 SECOM harassments and
provocations study. Thanks are due the CIA, NSA and Navy members for
contributing updated material needed to round out the first draft of this
study done in mid-1984. Addressees are requested to review the attached
draft and to provide their concurrences or comments to the SECOM staff not
later than 11 October 1985. If practicable, members will be asked to concur
in a final version at the 16 October SECOM meeting (the last regular meeting
scheduled for 1985).
Attachment:
As Stated
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R0001000
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTRODUCTION
This study describes harassments and provocations against Americans
assigned to or traveling in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba and China. The
cases cited-illustrate methods used by Communist country intelligence and
security services and are'intended to augment official defensive security
briefings for persons authorized access to classified information who may
travel to those areas. The 24.June 1982 DCI Security Committee publication on
this subject should be reviewed for supplementary information. Items-in this
version are based on reports by US Government departments and agencies on
incidents occurring in the 1982-85 period.
For purposes of this study:
HARASSMENT means any action taken against a person or group to
prevent, inhibit, or delay the achievement of personal or group
objectives (e.g., impeding collection of information by assigned
diplomats).
PROVOCATION means any action taken against a person or group
to induce self-damaging action (e.g., attempts to involve Americans.
in illegal activities).
Attempts by hostile services to recruit Americans to.commit espionage
are outside the purview of this study.
A limited amount of information also is provided on steps travelers can
take or avoid which may help decrease unwelcome consequences if subject to
hijacking or terrorist attack..
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releas~9 09ff21/OiAI-C- BN -00812R000100010003-0
SOVIET UNION
1. Soviet a?urthorities endeavor to keep fairly close tabs on foreigners
visiting the USSR. This is done largely by keeping them in well defined
tracks through organized tour itineraries and other administrative
arrangements designed to discourage the visitor from deviating very far from
the.prescribed program. The ordinary tourist is rarely subjected to
individual physical surveillance or other form of specific security attention
unless he or she does something which the authorities regard as suspicious or
offensive. It is important to realize, however, that the KGB evidently
believes that foreign spies abound among tourist groups and some acts, which
would be regarded as of no consequence in Western countries, may be
interpreted with suspicion by Soviet authorities and cause special attention
to be focused on the individual by the KGB. Types of things which have caused
problems for foreign visitors in the past include:
a. Bringing in literature of a political nature which is
anti-Soviet in tone or which is forbidden in the USSR. Travelers should leave
such material at home, but above all should not try to give it to Soviet
citizens. In addition to political literature, the Soviets object to western
pornography, in which they include such publications as Playboy. There is
lively interest in both types of literature on the part of many Soviet
citizens, but a tourist who carries such material in any quantity or seems
interested in distributing it to Soviet citizens'may find himself the object
of unpleasant attention from the security authorities, as, most certainly,
will the Soviet citizens to whom he gives it.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releasg%&/&&5th d AERB8'7-00812R000100010003-0
b. Black market currency exchange and other illegal financial
transactions. Tourists are frequently approached by Soviets on the streets
offering to exchange rubles for dollars at a very favorable rate and with
offers to buy clothing and other western items. There is a flourishing black
market in such items in the Soviet Union, particularly in those areas
frequented by foreign tourists. Although approaches by Soviet citizens along
those lines are not normally KGB provocations, the KGB does keep close watch
on black marketeers; such transactions are illegal both for the buyer and the
seller. Travelers should reject overtures of this nature. Another popular
type of illegal transaction is the sale of icons to foreigners in other than
state stores. The purchase of icons from individuals is illegal--many are not
genuine and all are subject to confiscation if found in the possession of.a
traveler on leaving the USSR.
c. Photography. The Soviets have rather strict ideas of what they
consider to be military or security installations. Tourists will be advised
in general terms of what they may photograph and what they may not, but it is
always wise when in doubt to check with the "Inturist" guide before taking
pictures. Although not mentioned in official instructions, Soviets are also
very sensitive to people taking photographs of scenes which put the USSR in a
bad light--run-down housing areas, lines at stores, drunks, or shabbily
dressed people on the street, etc. Tourists taking such pictures have
occasionally been the target of harassment by "patriotic" citizens or
auxiliary militia.
d. Personal contacts with political dissidents, Jewish activists,
and other elements considered undesirable by the authorities. Such contacts
should be avoided. Visitors who go out of their way to meet with such people
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releasg 8iW! AER&8'7-00812R000100010003-0
have frequently been subjected to lengthy customs searches and other forms of
harassment upon leaving the Soviet Union. The Soviets have expelled visitors
from the USSR for such meetings.
e. Narcotics. The Soviets are extremely hard on foreigners found
with narcotics in-their possession. Some have received lengthy prison terms.
Under no circumstances should a foreign visitor bring any.form of narcotic
into the Soviet Union. Visitors who are using prescription drugs should carry
them in containers bearing recognizable pharmacists' labels.
2. Foreign visitors should be aware that, although the KGB does not
normally subject tourists to provocations or other forms of harassment, there
are certain categories of individuals whom the KGB routinely singles out for
special scrutiny:
a. Persons who speak Russian, have Russian-sounding names, have
relatives in the USSR, or have traveled repeatedly to the USSR in the past;
b. Persons who work or have worked for the US Government or its
contractors, particularly in positions involving foreign affairs, national
security, or military matters, or are close relations to such persons;
c. Persons who have had extensive contact with Soviet officials in
the past;
d. Persons known publicly to have expressed strong views against-
the Soviet government, or vigorous opposition to US policy on matters bearing
on the USSR;
e. Persons who, during their visit to the Soviet Union, make
special efforts to establish personal contact with Soviet citizens.
3. Individuals meeting any of the above criteria should be especially
circumspect in their behavior. Although there is little for them to fear if
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For ReleasLEN04V6 tALc RiDI*IS'f-00812R000100010003-0
they use good judgment, visitors may be subjected to KGB approaches of one
sort or another designed to test their reactions, determine their
susceptibility to Compromise or inducement to cooperate with the KGB, or
intimidate them and others from attempting actions of concern to the KGB.
4. The following are some general "do's and don'ts" for visitors in the
Soviet Union which, in particular, should be observed by persons falling into
the?categories.mentioned in paragraph 2:
(2) Do not respond to sexual overtures from anyone. There are
prostitutes in virtually all tourist hotels in the USSR as well as males
seeking. out feminine companionship among foreign visitors. This
activity is closely monitored by the KGB and virtually all of the
individuals involved are subject to KGB pressure.
(3) Do not overindulge in alcohol.
(4) Do not engage in black market currency exchanges or other
.illegal transactions described earlier. The financial advantage of
buying rubles.on the black market might appear substantial, but it-is
definitely not worth the risk.
(5) Do not attempt to propagandize or engage in political
arguments. Many Soviets are intensely curious about the US and are
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For ReleasfeOMMORML CtlAERQIFtlj7-00812R000100010003-0
genuinely interested in talking with Americans. Their questions are best
answered in an objective, forthright manner without drawing unfavorable
comparisons with the USSR.
(6) Do not accept packages or letters from Soviet citizens for
mailing or-delivery outside the Soviet Union. Some such requests are
genuine, but many are not. In many instances the contents can be
compromising to the person carrying them, to the Soviet who gave them to
him, or both.
b. "Do's":
(1) Do behave in a natural manner and enjoy your trip.
(2) Do stay with your group or, at least, with some members
thereof.
(3) Do remember that Soviet citizens in general are discouraged
from extensive contact with foreigners and that those Soviets who engage
in such contacts without authorization can expect to be questioned by
the KGB. Maintain a healthy skepticism toward persons who seem to
attach themselves to you. If invited to a Soviet home or to any other
form of private get-together, try to ensure that at least one other
member of your group is with you.
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 STAT Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releas~480@ff2116iALCIk bf-00812R000100010003-0
The Soviets continue attempted provocations against Americans in the
USSR, apparently in attempts to entrap them in activities that can be treated
as crimes against. Soviet law or publicized to support claims that Americans
are corrupt-or immoral.
Case 1 During a two-year tour in the Soviet Union, an American officer and
his. traveling companion - either a male associate or his wife - were routinely
the subjects of attempts by Soviet nationals to engage them in questionable
social relationships involving alcohol or loose women. When the Americans
went to hotel restaurants, Soviet citizens would always be seated at their
tables even if other tables were unoccupied. Depending on the composition of
the American party, there were usually two Soviets consisting of either two
men, a man and a woman, or two women. The officer avoided trouble by
declining the Soviet offers to "socialize" and by limiting himself to polite
conversation.
Case 2 In early 1983, an aircrewman making an official trip to Moscow went to
his assigned hotel. As he entered, one of two attractive women wearing
European-style clothes started throwing him kisses. His room phone rang soon
thereafter and a woman asked, in excellent English, "is Bill there?" He said
"no." The caller then asked if she and her friend could come up for a drink
and spend the night. He replied in the negative and hung up. About an hour
later the woman called again, waking the crewman, and asking the same thing.
The crewman asked if she was one of the women he had seen earlier in the hotel
lobby. She said she was, and stated that she and her friend were coming up.
The crewman went back to sleep and.had no further contact with the "friendly"
women.
10
Approved For Release(*Q'P? 7ALCI,HERgL87-00812R000100010003-0
 STAT Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releast ( Q1R2( ALQUJEIW 8?-00812R000100010003-0
Harassments including physical and verbal abuse, are used by the
Soviets in attempts to. demoralize and intimidate Americans who are perceived
as too independent of official societal discipline or as impediments to Soviet
r
efforts to control rigidly US official presence in the USSR.
Case 7 Soviet citizens, especially working class persons, are a volatile and
unpredictable element for travelers, especially after having been
indoctrinated on the need to protect their workplace and homeland against the
"foreign threat." _In late 1982, two US officers touring the Soviet Union were
forcibly restrained by a group claiming to be workers at a local factory. The
workers searched one officer's pockets and shoulder travel bag, and forcibly
seized the officer's camera. The other officer was physically restrained and
separated from his traveling companion. Both were physically assaulted for
about a minute. By this time, about 20 to 30 persons surrounded the officers
and threatened them with further physical abuse. The officers declared
themselves as US officials at the outset and presented diplomatic
credentials. The "worker" who wrote up the report on the incident was
recognized as one of the surveillants who followed the officers during the
day.
Leningrad is a hostile environment for Americans, especially for those
with official status. Unprovoked assaults against US personnel are blunt
warnings to our officers and signals to Soviet citizens to avoid contact with
Americans.
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For ~Releas&9800RPAGIALCI&PIBNal-00812ROOO 1000 10003-0
Case 8 In the spring of 1984, a US officer was assaulted in Leningrad by
three Soviets as he left a restaurant. Soviet militiamen there made no effort
to stop the attack: A month later, the official newspaper in Leningrad
praised local citizens for apprehending US officials who were allegedly
"spying." The article was reprinted in another Soviet paper, and seemed
designed to-encourage private abuse against American officials.
In August 1984, the US Department of State issued a travel advisory
warning US citizens of the potential danger of arrest and denial of access to
US consular officials if-they visit Leningrad. This advisory was based on a
significant number of cases of "flagrant harassment" of Americans during the
preceding six months. The advisory followed the beating by Soviets of a
Marine guard assigned to the US Consulate General in Leningrad. Seizing him
on the street at night near the consulate, two Soviet militiamen held the
Marine's arms while three Soviet plainclothes men beat him and kicked him.
The Marine was taken to a nearby Soviet jail where his assailants jeered at
him. When released the next morning, Soviet authorities claimed that the
Marine had been drunk and disorderly. At about the same period, an American
exchange professor in the USSR visited Leningrad and made an appointment to
meet a well-known specialist in 18th century Russian literature. Upon
entering the apartment building, he was seized by three plainclothes men who
took his passport and visa, shoved him into a paddy wagon and took him to a
police station. The American's request to call the US consulate was not
honored, and he was only released after signing a statement "apologizing for
the inconvenience he had caused local authorities."
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releasg /biW~ I A-ER ''-00812R000100010003-0
Case 9 Three harassment actions in December 1984 illustrate the continuing
nature of Soviet behavior toward Americans in Leningrad. An American diplomat
was grabbed by a Soviet plainclothes man and forcibly evicted.from a
courthouse. An American attache and his wife were forcibly detained by
Soviets who were-later described by a Soviet official as "simply concerned
workers whose suspicion was no doubt raised by the (Americans') proximity to
objects of military significance." Two American citizens were detained by
Leningrad police for three hours after they tried to visit a "refusenik" in
the city. Their request to call the American consulate was initially refused,
but later granted. When released, they were ordered to leave the USSR the
next day.
Case 10 A March 1985 incident in Moscow shows that Leningrad is not the only
place where Americans can expect to. be victims of unprovoked assaults. A
Marine guard was leaving a Moscow hotel bar when two Soviets in plainclothes
accosted him, ignored his protests that he didn't want to talk and planned
only to return to.the Embassy, and dragged him into an adjacent room and beat
him. Breaking free, the Marine was able to get away when a friendly foreign
diplomat appeared on the scene. Soviet officials later claimed that the
Marine had assaulted an elderly hotel attendant and had to be overpowered and
taken into custody.
Taking photographs in the Soviet Union of anything other than officially
approved subjects may well result in unpleasant consequences.
Case 11 In early 1982, a US serviceman assigned in Moscow was visiting an
open air market where Soviet farmers are permitted to sell ten percent of what
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Release Zv0061W~d4RIgP8 '-00812R000100010003-0
they grow. He was photographing the colorful scene when a Soviet woman
approached him and asked that he stop, as his photographs-could "jeopardize
their situation." -(The private market is tolerated to varying degrees as a
means of providing a more adequate diet, but is subject to restriction because
it is inconsistent with Communist dogma.) The serviceman and his family then
began walking back to their car when a Soviet male approached and ordered the
American to follow him. The American told his family to return to their
vehicle, and determined through questions that the Soviet male was a KGB
agent. On the pretext of walking to a local militia station to resolve the
matter, the American succeeded in running to his vehicle, locked the doors and
drove away. While he suffered no repercussions from this incident, the KGB
could easily have used it as an excuse for making things unpleasant.
In a similar vein, offering a militiaman money to overlook a traffic
offense is likely (as it would be in the United States) to bring painful
consequences,. then or later.
Case 12 During the spring of 1984, a US officer sightseeing in Moscow was
asked by a Soviet to sell his radio. The officer refused. He also refused a
latter offer to buy an icon. Still later the officer was stopped by a
militiaman for taking photographs. The militiaman asked for the camera and
film, but left when the officer pretended not to understand. The same day the
officer was stopped by another militiaman for. making an illegal left turn.
The militiaman asked to see the officer's papers and pointed to him saying
"you," while making picture-taking motions. The officer gave the militiaman a
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For ReleasedQOBk'2i6ipiCI F: i'-00812R000100010003-0
three ruble note and was allowed to leave. The officer did not stop to
consider that his monetary payment could open him to a criminal charge of
bribery - during that visit or a later one.
As part.of"an officially atheist regime, Soviet officials are frequently
hostile to activity they. perceive as tending to propagate Christianity.
Case 13 In May 1985, an American citizen visiting Moscow with her tour group
was detained overnight and required to leave the USSR the next day when Soviet
customs officials searching her luggage found booklets containing the text of
the Sermon on the Mount printed in English and Russian. She was accused of
attempting to smuggle-banned literature into the USSR. The booklets were
confiscated.
Case 14 In the fall of 1984, the Soviet news service Tass accused the
American who had served as Roman Catholic Chaplain to the foreign community in
Moscow of conspiring with a native Christian to build up an illegal
congregation of Soviet believers. (The American. left the USSR in the summer
of 1983. The Soviet Christian, who Tass claimed was involved with the
American, was arrested that year and charged under the Russian criminal code
with "preparing children for confirmation.")
A close family relationship with a US government official can prompt
extra attention by Soviet authorities to visitors to the USSR.
Case 15 The teen-age son of a US government official visited the USSR with a
student tour group. Upon arrival at the airport the other students were
processed quickly but this young man was directed to an adjacent room for
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R0001000'10003-0
 Approved For ReleaspG%OQ /p;tj LQiRW8?-00812R000100010003-0
search of his belongings. While that was being done, he was questioned about
his father's occupation. Later in the tour, he was approached by a "reporter"
asking questions about the placement of military equipment in Europe. The
interview was quickly ended when the young man's responses did not appear to
meet with the "reporter's" approval.
Don't sign Russian language documents you don't understand, or which
contain false statements about you. If pressed to do so, ask firmly and
consistently to see the nearest US Consul.
Case 16 During mid-1984,.a US officer on temporary assignment to Moscow left
his luggage at the international hotel upon arrival. When he returned, he
found it had been opened. He was later approached by a "hotel official" who
asked him to sign a form in Russian. The. official said the form had to be
signed because the previous room occupant stole the linens upon departure.
The US officer refused to sign.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releasf ( OQl02WALQb .ERIDR8T-O0812R000100010003-0
EASTERN EUROPE
In most East European countries, the security services responsible for
monitoring and working against foreigners inside their borders are patterned
after the KGB. Similarly, the techniques, methods and approaches they use
generally follow KGB practice. Such differences as there are reflect
individual country circumstances, such as the Polish government's concern
about Solidarity and relations with the Catholic Church. Immigration patterns
have resulted in many US citizens having relatives in East European
countries. Americans visiting. those countries have been approached with
offers to help relatives obtain exit visas or with threats to the relatives
depending on the Americans' responses to what is demanded of them. While the
passage of time apparently has made the "hostage" approach infrequent, the
following cases illustrate a variety of provocation and harassment methods.
As in the USSR, some entrapment attempts are obvious.
Case 1 Two American officers traveling in Poland stopped for food in a
hotel. Soon after being seated, two Polish men in their late 20s sat down
with them, displayed large amounts of money, bought drinks, talked freely
about Soviet missiles and offered sexual enticements. The Americans thanked
the Poles for their hospitality, ignored their attempt to engage them in
conversation on military subjects and their offer to find out "what a Polish
woman is like," and left the restaurant.
Consistent refusal of unsolicited overtures will help visitors avoid
entrapments and provocations.
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 STAT Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Release&O'6/61 W4dRA RBW87-00812R000100010003-0
American presence at demonstrations lacking government sanction can
result in harassment.
Case 8 In May 1985, two American diplomats were observing a mass and May Day
demonstration at a Polish church. The diplomats kept a discreet distance away
and fully followed diplomatic conventions. They were soon approached by
Polish police and asked for their identification which, when produced, was
confiscated. The policemen ordered them into an unmarked vehicle. When one
of the diplomats protested, he was pushed, struck, kicked and forced into the
vehicle. He and his colleague were taken to the police station-. En route,
the policemen who seized their documents denied that the Americans were
diplomats and said they would be accused of throwing stones at police
vehicles. The diplomats were released after about 20 minutes at the police
station. They were later charged by the Polish government with participating
in an anti-government demonstration and ordered. to leave the country.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For ReleasJ2808W6~~LCR&kY-00812R000100010003-0
Rigorous and petty enforcement of local rules can. be an unpleasant
experience for visitors used to the flexibility of western society.
Case 9 Travelers Staying in private homes in an East European country must
within 24 hours report to a government office with the "house book" for
signature. This book is charged to a specified individual in the
neighborhood. A recent visitor was unable to locate the custodian of the
book, and decided to wait to comply with the rule until the local individual
returned. After 24 hours had passed, the visitor was picked up by the
militia, taken to the local station, and fined approximately $100 for his
infraction.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releasg bffib1flitALddAERW8''-00812R000100010003-0
Assignment to or travel to Cuba can result in unpleasant experiences.
Case 1 A Marine guard assigned to the US Interests Section was in a
restaurant at a popular beach when a Cuban began to insult him. The Marine
extricated himself from a shoving match and left the building. On the street
outside, a vehicle drove up and several local "militia" knocked the Marine
down and injected him with an unknown substance which made him loose
consciousness. American officials were later called by Cuban authorities.
When they arrived and protested what had happened, the Cubans claimed the
injection was necessary to control the Marine's violent behavior.
Case 2 Two dual nationality American servicemen traveled to Havana to visit
relatives. While in Cuba, persons claiming to be from the "Immigration
Department" took the passports from one of the servicemen and directed him. to
what appeared to be a private house. There he found the other American being
detained. The next day six Cubans arrived bearing a letter claiming that one
of the servicemen and another person had come to Cuba to "harm the
revolution." Their detention was explained as necessary while an
investigation of the letter's claims was conducted. Both servicemen were
released after 18 hours' detention. They were not questioned about their
military duties, and were-fed and allowed to make personal phone calls.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For ReleascFQIQ0 /QTALC 14@@7-00812R000100010003-0
The Chinese security service, the Public. Security Bureau (PSB), appears
to take a hard-line approach to dealing with unofficial contacts between
Chinese nationals`and foreigners. Chinese who establish actual or presumed
close ties With foreigners are liable to seizure and punishment. While
diplomats and official visitors are likely to have their status respected,
private foreigners studying or working in China may encounter unpleasant
experiences.
Case 1 The wife of a European diplomat was having lunch with a local artist
in one of Beijing's biggest hotels when PSB officers approached the table,
seized the artist and dragged him to a waiting car. The diplomat's wife
attempted to intercede and was shoved aside.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Releas~9606Fd2116+ALCI-FR h1-00812RO00100010003-0
Case 2 A western European diplomat was driving to the International Club with
a Chinese girl for.lunch in 1983 when a PSB vehicle forced them to the curb.
PSB officers opened the door of the diplomat's car, dragged the girl out,
forced her into their vehicle and drove off.
Case 3 In 1984, an American journalist was spending the night in Beijing's
best hotel with a Canadian girl of Chinese extraction when PSB officers broke
through their door and attempted to drag the girl out. In the confusion the
girl was able to produce identification proving her Canadian citizenship,
whereupon she was released.
Case 4 A foreign student was meeting his Chinese girlfriend in a park in 1984
when PSB officers approached, forced her into a waiting vehicle and drove
away. She was released several days later.
Not all, student-local relationships turn out that easily.
Case 5 Another foreign student was arrested and held illegally for several
days in 1983, ostensibly for fraternizing with local men. She was also
accused of espionage, denied access to consular officials for about two days,
and eventually released after she signed a "confession." Her boyfriend was
detained for almost two years before being released.
Journalists are viewed with suspicion in many Communist countries.
Their normal (to us) information gathering activities can be viewed as
bordering on espionage, as the following case illustrates.
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 Approved For Release 2006%02I/07ALCIUASR8P87-00812R000100010003-0
Case 6 PSB officers broke. into the apartment of a western European journalist
in 1983, beat him and ransacked his room looking for evidence of "espionage."
Failing to find any, they arrested him for "smuggling" and held him several
days before expelling him from China.
Reporting a theft to local authorities may.result in being asked some
tricky questions.
Case 7 An American official in China discovered valuable belongings missing
from his hotel residence. After reporting this he was interviewed by the
security service. A security official asked the American to list his local
contacts as possible sources for the theft. The American politely evaded this
attempt to identify his sources by responding that the hotel staff were the
only logical suspects. The interview was then closed.
As is the case in the Soviet Union, photographing military items in
China will result in unpleasantness.
Case 8 During a 1984 tour, an American military officer photographed Chinese
military equipment at two locations. During internal travel from Beijing to
Xian, the officer's locked suitcase was deliberately damaged. The message for
him was clear.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
 STAT Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010003-0