A STUDY OF HARASSMENTS AND PROVOCATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00812R000100010023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 24, 1982
• Content Type: STUDY

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Central
Intelligence
A Study of Harassments
and Provocations
Prepared for
The Director of
Central Intelligence
by the
Security Committee
For Official Use Only
SECOM-D-222
24 June 1982
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This study describes harassments and provocations against Ameri-
cans assigned to or traveling in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China.
The cases cited illustrate procedures used by Communist country
intelligence and security services and are intended to support official
defensive security briefings for persons with authorized access to
classified information who are traveling to those areas. Material in this
study was contributed by US Government departments and agencies
and describes incidents occurring in the 1978-81 period.
For purposes this study:
HARASSMENT means any action taken
against a person or group to prevent, inhibit, or
delay the achievement of personal or group objec-
tives (e.g., impeding collection of information by
assigned diplomats).
PROVOCATION means any action taken
against a person or group to induce self-damaging
action (e.g., attempts to involve Americans in illegal
activities).
Attempts by hostile services to recruit Americans to commit
espionage are outside the purview of this study.
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SOVIET UNION
1. Soviet authorities endeavor to keep fairly close
tabs on foreign tourists visiting the USSR. This is
largely done by keeping them in well defined tracks
through organized tour itineraries and other adminis-
trative arrangements designed to discourage the tourist
from deviating very far from the prescribed program.
The ordinary tourist is rarely subjected to individual
physical surveillance or other form of specific security
attention unless he does something which the authori-
ties regard as suspicious or offensive. It is important to
realize, however, that the KGB evidently believes that
foreign spies abound among tourist visitor groups and
some acts, which would be regarded as of no conse-
quence in Western countries, may be interpreted with
suspicion by the authorities and result in the persons
who perform them attracting the special attention of
the KGB. Types of things which have caused problems
for foreign visitors in the past include:
a. Bringing in literature of a political nature
which is anti-Soviet in tone or which is forbidden
in the USSR. Travelers should leave such material
at home, but above all should not try to give it to So-
viet citizens. In addition to political literature, the
Soviets object to western pornography, in which
they include such publications as Playboy, Pent-
house, etc. There is a lively interest in both types of
literature on the part of many Soviet citizens, but a
tourist who carries such material in any quantity or
seems interested in distributing it to Soviet citizens
may find himself the object of unpleasant attention
from the security authorities, as, most certainly, will
the Soviet citizens to whom he gives it.
b. Black market currency exchange and other
illegal financial transactions. Tourists are frequent-
ly approached by Soviets on the streets offering to
exchange rubles for dollars at a very favorable rate
and with offers to buy clothing and other western
items. There is a flourishing black market in such
items in the Soviet Union, particularly in those areas
frequented by foreign tourists. Although approaches
by Soviet citizens along those lines are not normally
KGB provocations, the KGB does keep close watch
on black marketeers; such transactions are illegal
both for the buyer and the seller. Travellers should
reject overtures of this nature. Another popular type
of illegal transaction is the sale of icons to foreigners
in other than state stores. The purchase of icons
from individuals is illegal-many are not genuine
and all are subject to confiscation if found in the
possession of a traveller on leaving the USSR.
c. Photography. The Soviets have rather strict
ideas of what they consider to be military or
security installations. Tourists will be advised in
general terms of what they may photograph and
what they may not, but it is always wise when in
doubt to check with the "Inturist" guide before
taking pictures. Although not mentioned in official
instructions, Soviets are also very sensitive to people
taking photographs of scenes which put the USSR in
a bad light-run-down housing areas, lines at stores,
drunks, or shabbily dressed people on the street, etc.
Tourists taking such pictures have occasionally been
the targets of harassment by "patriotic" citizens or
auxiliary militia.
d. Personal contacts with political dissidents,
Jewish activists, and other elements considered
undesirable by the authorities. Such contacts should
be avoided. Visitors who go out of their way to meet
with such people have frequently been subjected to
lengthy customs searches and other forms of harass-
ment upon leaving the Soviet Union.
e. Narcotics. The Soviets are extremely hard on
foreigners found with narcotics in their possession.
Some have received lengthy prison terms. Under no
circumstances should a foreign visitor bring any
form of narcotic into the Soviet Union. Visitors who
are using prescription drugs should carry them in
containers bearing recognizable pharmacists' labels.
2. Foreign visitors should be aware that, although
the KGB does not normally subject tourists to provoca-
tions or other forms of harassment, there are certain
categories of individuals whom the KGB routinely
singles out for special scrutiny:
a. Persons who speak Russian, have Russian-
sounding names, have relatives in the USSR, or have
travelled repeatedly to the USSR in the past;
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b. Persons who work or have worked for the
US Government or its contractors, particularly in
positions involving foreign affairs, national security,
or military matters;
c. Persons who have had extensive contact with
Soviet officials in the past;
d. Persons known publicly to have expressed
strong views against the Soviet Government, or
vigorous opposition to US policy on matters bearing
on the USSR;
e. Persons who, during their visit to the Soviet
Union, make special efforts to establish personal
contact with Soviet citizens.
3. Individuals meeting any of the above criteria
should be especially circumspect in their behavior.
Although there is nothing for them to fear if they use
good judgment, they may be the object of KGB
approaches of one sort or another designed to test their
reactions and/or determine their susceptibility to com-
promise or inducement to cooperate with the KGB.
4. The following are some general "do's and don'ts"
for visitors in the Soviet Union which, in particular,
should be observed by persons falling into the catego-
ries mentioned in paragraph 2:
(2) Do not respond to sexual overtures from
anyone. There are prostitutes in virtually all
tourist hotels in the USSR as well as males seeking
out feminine companionship among foreign visi-
tors. This activity is closely monitored by the
KGB and virtually all of the individuals involved
are subject to KGB pressure.
(3) Do not overindulge in alcohol.
(4) Do not engage in black market currency
exchanges or other illegal transactions described
earlier. The financial advantage of buying rubles
on the black market might appear substantial, but
it is definitely not worth the risk.
(5) Do not attempt to propagandize or engage
in political arguments. Many Soviets are intensely
curious about the US and are genuinely interested
in talking with Americans. Their questions are
best answered in an objective, forthright manner
without drawing unfavorable comparisons with
the USSR.
(6) Do not accept packages or letters from
Soviet citizens for mailing or delivery outside the
Soviet Union. Some such requests are genuine,
but many are not and in many instances the
contents can be compromising to the person
carrying them, to the Soviet who gave them to
him, or both.
(1) Do behave in a natural manner and enjoy
your trip.
(2) Do stay with your group or, at least, with
some members thereof.
(3) Do remember that Soviet citizens in general
are discouraged from extensive contact with for-
eigners and that those who engage in such con-
tacts without authorization of the authorities can
expect to be questioned by the KGB. Maintain a
healthy skepticism toward persons who seem to
attach themselves to you. If invited to a Soviet
home or to any other form of private get-togeth-
er, try to ensure that at least one other member of
your group is with you.
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The Soviets sometimes use incapacitating drugs in
harassment actions. In 1980 an American traveled
from Moscow to Leningrad on official duty. Taking
the overnight "Red Arrow Express" train, he accepted
the normal offering of a glass of hot tea as they left
Moscow. Returning to his private compartment to
read, he soon became light-headed, disoriented and
subsequently extremely tired. Sensing something
wrong, he locked the compartment door and lay
down. He later recalled being unable to stay awake.
Upon awakening the next morning, he found his
compartment door open and felt disoriented, dazed
and unable to walk without using the wall for support.
He also experienced a bad headache and severe mouth
dryness. After being met in Leningrad, he continued
to feel poorly throughout the morning and began to
return to normal only later in the day. Examination of
his belongings disclosed nothing missing, but clearly
indicated rearrangement of his luggage contents. Later
medical analysis of his displayed symptoms strongly
suggested that he had been given a rapid acting
barbituate or diazepam used in combination with
scopolamine.
A similar experience on the same train was reported
by the press in early 1982. This said four Japanese
business representatives were robbed of their passports
and wallets during the trip to Leningrad. Soviet police
responding to the complaint reportedly said they had
arrested two men who had admitted spraying a sleep-
inducing gas under the train compartment door. The
press accounts hinted that industrial espionage may
have been involved, since the Japanese visitors-
nuclear energy experts-may have been carrying tech-
nical papers. The accounts noted skepticism about the
Soviet version, and cited an observation by an un-
named source that "extraordinary police work" must
have been involved for the Soviets to locate and
return, in less than 24 hours after the incident, pass-
ports said to have been thrown off a fast-moving train
in the middle of the night.
Making contact with dissidents in the USSR is likely
to prompt harassment actions. In 1981 an American
and his British wife-both Jewish-toured the Soviet
Union with an "Inturist" group. They experienced no
difficulties in Moscow. In Kiev they left the tour group
and visited a "refusenik" with whom they had corre-
sponded for several years. While on the train the next
day to repeat the visit, they were approached by a
Soviet who asked for the time and then left. Immedi-
ately afterwards, they were seized by two burly men
in uniform, forced off the train and taken into an
unmarked office in a nearby apartment. There, an
English speaking plainclothes man demanded to know
what dealings they had had with the "criminal" who
had asked them the time. He dismissed their protesta-
tions of innocence as lies and claimed that the "crimi-
nal" had written a lengthy deposition against them.
He refused to permit them to call either the American
or the British Embassy. After about three and a half
hours of interrogation, and search and confiscation of
their personal belongings, their interrogator demanded
that they sign a "protocol" in Russian. He would
neither translate the document nor explain the
"charges" against them. The couple refused to sign.
The plainclothes man then warned them to "stay as
close as possible to your hotel; stick to the main streets;
otherwise you will find yourself in trouble." They
were then driven back to their hotel. They were
unsuccessful then and the next day in attempting to
call their respective embassies in Moscow-hotel per-
sonnel said the calls could not be made. When they
told those personnel that they would not continue with
the tour until their calls were put through, they were
asked to meet with an "Inturist" representative. He
told them they were interfering with "state affairs"
and threatened to take them to court. Fearing immi-
nent arrest, the couple rejoined the tour group and
went to the next city. There they were able to contact
the Canadian Embassy from a pay phone. Other than
getting harassing phone calls late into the night, they
experienced no further incidents until they went to the
next city on the tour. There they were taken by hotel
management before another "Inturist" representative
who referred to their "misbehavior" in Kiev and
warned them that if they continued in that course
"Inturist" would not be responsible for their safety.
The next day they went with the tour group to
Leningrad, where they reported the incidents to the
US Consulate, and, subsequently, left the USSR with-
out further harassment.
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Case 6
A staged provocation that went awry is illustrated
by the experience of two US military officers touring
the Soviet Union. They noted surveillance of them
during local sightseeing trips, and frequent approaches
by Soviets seeking-illegally-to purchase jeans or
exchange rubles for dollars. Prior to their departure,
one officer noted his luggage had been searched and a
small packet of photographic slides of what appeared
to be Soviet public buildings and tourist sites inserted
in his bag. At the airport for the departing flight a very
similar bag belonging to a third officer on the tour was
thoroughly searched and its owner harassed at some
length. It seemed likely that the slides had been
planted to set the stage for official discovery and
accusation of attempted smuggling of "classified"
material out of the country.
Case 7
Tourists in the USSR can be the targets of harass-
ments/provocations apparently resulting from their
innocent interest in places considered sensitive by the
Soviets. The wife of a US officer assigned in Europe
took a Wives' Club tour to the Soviet Union. While in
Moscow she asked about visiting Kaliningrad because
of her interest in the philosopher Immanuel Kant.
(Kant was born and lived there when it was Koenigs-
berg.) The tour guide told her there were some places
which could not be visited. Later, while walking along
a Moscow street with another wife on the tour, a man
stepped from a hotel doorway, focused his camera on
them, took their picture at fairly close range, and then
disappeared. The next day the woman involved in this
incident went to a Moscow bank to exchange money.
While waiting in line a "cleaning lady" appeared from
behind potted plants and attempted to get the wife to
make an unauthorized exchange of funds. The wife
refused and encountered no other incidents.
Personal documentation which differs from what
Soviet officials expect can prompt unwelcome atten-
tion. The Thai wife of a US enlisted man in Europe
traveled with her daughter to Thailand via Moscow,
taking an Aeroflot flight because it offered a cheaper
rate. Officials at the Moscow airport demanded an
explanation of why she was traveling on a Thai
passport while her daughter held an American one.
She was questioned about her husband's identity and
occupation. While she and her daughter were permit-
ted to transit Moscow to Bangkok, their luggage was
"lost" at the Moscow airport and didn't reach them in
Thailand until 20 days later. On their return trip the
flight to Moscow was late and they missed their
connecting flight to Frankfurt. They were taken to a
Moscow hotel for the night, but were unable to eat
dinner because they were not permitted to exchange
currency. The next day airport officials told them
they'd have to spend another day in Moscow waiting
for a flight out. But, after talking at length with airline
officials, they were allowed to leave for Germany.
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EASTERN EUROPE
In most East European countries, the components
responsible for monitoring and working against for-
eigners inside their borders are patterned after the
KGB. Similarly, the techniques, methods and ap-
proaches they use generally follow KGB practices.
Such differences as there are tend to reflect circum-
stances which vary between Eastern Europe and the
USSR. For example, immigration patterns have result-
ed in many US citizens having relatives still living in
Eastern European countries. That offers opportunity
to approach visiting Americans with offers to help
relatives obtain exit visas or to threaten them with
adverse action, depending on the Americans' responses
to what is demanded of them.
afterwards, his company transferred him to another
Western European country, and he no longer makes
business trips to Hungary.
Five wives of high-ranking US military officers
were on a tour in East Berlin when they were
approached in a cafe by a German woman speaking
excellent English who sought to get them to exchange
East German marks for West German ones. The
request was directed in a persistent manner toward the
wife of a general officer. The ladies refused the
request. This incident happened soon after the defec-
tion of an East German employee of the US Embassy
in East Berlin.
In mid-1980, a Hungarian-born, American sales
manager for a large US company on a business trip to
Budapest was called to the Ministry of Interior and
interrogated about his background and frequent trips
to Hungary. About a month later he returned to
Budapest on business and was again called in for
interrogation by the same security officers. They asked
him to cooperate with them, and threatened to deny
him further entry visas and threatened the safety of
his relatives still in Hungary if he did not cooperate.
The businessman refused and left Hungary immedi-
ately for his residence in Western Europe where he
told the US Ambassador about his experience. Shortly
An American serviceman married to a German
national traveled with his wife to East Germany for
the wedding of one of her cousins. During their stay a
person claiming to be a press reporter interviewed
them for about 45 minutes on such matters as the
American's vacation and sports interests and similar
general interest matters. Toward the end of the inter-
view the "reporter" asked the American if he wanted
to exchange currency. The wife, becoming suspicious,
interrupted to state that they were not interested. The
subject was dropped in favor of a closing discourse by
the "reporter" praising conditions in East Germany.
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