AGENDA TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH MEETING WEDNESDAY, 26 JANUARY 1983, 10:00 A.M. ROOM 4E64, LANGLEY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00812R000100210026-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 13, 1983
• Content Type: MISC

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
e /2#1 s
13 January 1983
AGENDA
Two Hundred and Fifty-ninth Meeting
Wednesday, 26 January 1983, 10:00 a.m.
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building
Preliminary Comments (e.g., status of terms of reference on leaks)
ITEM 1 Approval of minutes of 17 November, 3 December and 5 January meetings
ITEM 2 Subcommittee reports
ITEM 3 Presentation by Chairman, Personnel Security Subcommittee on
draft revision of DCID 1/14, and decision by members on it
ITEM 4 Report (member concurrence/comment on attached
ra revision of proposed SECOM response to FBI concerning
this report)
ITEM 5 New Business
ITEM 6 Next Meeting - tentatively scheduled for 10:00 a.m.,
23 February 1983
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CONFIDENTIAL
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L UNI-! ULN I IAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward J. O'Malley
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: TAYLORMAID
1. Thank you for sharing with the Security Committee the report prepared
by the TAYLORMAID working group. It is a welcome step in addressing the
hostile technical penetration threat in the United States.
2. When they become available, the responses of the Army's 902nd
Military Intelligence Group and the Air Force's Office of Special Investiga-
tions to your working group's tasking would be of interest.
3. The technical threat clearly is a matter requiring additional atten-
tion. The SECOM will be considering ways to assist in alleviating the problem
posed by limited security resources, significant vulnerabilities, and a threat
whose dimensions are not easily defined.
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SECRET w4 1:
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Chairman, SECOM
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE 25 January 1983
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
CIA Member, SECOM
2
Copy of my briefing material
for 26 January 1983'SECOMM meeting
2.
.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 6I U UbEDITIONSUS SECRET
1-79
5 C t..' IV
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PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
1. THE DDCI NONCONCURRED IN OUR PAPER ON LEAKS. MR.
MCMAHON TOLD MR. CASEY THAT HE THOUGHT THE COMMUNITY WAS JUST
FLAILING AROUND ON THE SUBJECT AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO UNLESS
THE WHITE HOUSE PROVIDES GUIDANCE. A COPY OF OUR MEMO WITH MR.
MCMAHON'S COMMENTS ON IT IS AT YOUR PLACE. AT THIS POINT, IT
APPEARS THAT WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR ACTION ON THE WILLARD
REPORT AND CONTINUE TO HANDLE LEAKS REFERRED TO US IN THE TRADI-
TIONAL WAY. I BELIEVE THE ONLY WAY TO GET ACTION IS THROUGH THE
PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO CRIMINALIZE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE LEAKS.
2. THE PROGRAM PRESENTATIONS AT THE 3 DECEMBER MEETING
SEEMED TO BE WELL RECEIVED. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO
SCHEDULE OTHERS FOR THOSE SECOM ELEMENTS WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH
TECHNICAL MATTERS. IF MEMBERS AGREE, WE WILL ARRANGE A SPECIAL
MEETING IN A MONTH OR TWO TO HEAR PRESENTATIONS BY THE R & D
SUBCOMMITTEE AND THE SECURITY ADVISORY GROUP USSR. R & D
PROVIDES THE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES FOR USE IN MOSCOW, THUS
MAKING CONSECUTIVE PRESENTATIONS LOGICAL. IT DOES NOT APPEAR
THAT WE NEED PRESENTATIONS BY THE OTHER SUBCOMMITTEES AS THEIR
WORK SEEMS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED TO MEMBERS THROUGH PRESENTATIONS AT
REGULAR MEETINGS.
3. THE IG/CM HAS INDICATED THAT ILL CONDUCT
FURTHER STUDY OF THE NEED FOR NEW NATIONAL POLICY ON TSCM.
4. THE IC STAFF IS STUDYING THE COMPUTER SECURITY PROBLEM
AND.THE D/ICS HAS INDICATED HE IS CONSIDERING APPOINTING A NEW
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INTERAGENCY BODY WITH AN INDEPENDENT CHAIRMAN TO MAKE RECOM-
MENDATIONS. COPIES OF MY PAPER ON COMPUTER SECURITY TO ADMIRAL
BURKHALTER ARE AT YOUR PLACES.
5. I AM PLEASED TO WELCOME BOB ALLEN AS THE FULL NAVY
MEMBER. MY CONGRATULATIONS TO BOB ON HIS PROMOTION.
6. THE IC STAFF HAS BEEN REORGANIZED. THE ONLY WAY THIS
AFFECTS SECOM IS THAT I NOW REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR, IC
STAFF, RATHER THAN THROUGH THE. OFFICE OF COMMUNITY COORDINATION,
WHICH HAS BEEN ABOLISHED. COPIES OF MY MEMO TO DC/ICS RE SECOM
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION ARE AT YOUR PLACES.
7. YOU WILL FIND AT YOUR PLACES COPIES OF CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEENME AND MR. KLEKNER, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. GAO SEEMS TO BE MUCH MORE ACTIVE IN
SECURITY MATTERS THAN THEY USED TO BE.
8. LAST MONTH I SENT MEMBERS A MEMORANDUM ASKING FOR
NOMINATIONS TO FILL THE TWO STAFF POSITIONS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY
AIR FORCE, ARMY, NAVY, DEFENSE,
ENERGY, FBI AND JUSTICE HAVE RESPONDED NEGATIVELY. CIA HAS
NOMINATED AN OFFICER EXPERIENCED IN COMPUTER AND TECHNICAL
SECURITY. NSA ADVISES THAT THEY WILL NOMINATE TWO OFFICERS.
WE HAVE NOT HEARD FROM STATE, TREASURY, DIA OR OSAF. WHEN I
RECEIVE THE NSA NOMINATIONS, AND ANY OTHERS WHICH MAY BE SUB-
MITTED SOON, I WILL FORWARD THEM TO MEMBERS FOR INFORMATION AND
COMMENT. BECAUSE THE SECOM PROFESSIONAL STAFF NOW CONSISTS OF
DON PASCHAL AND ME, WE NEED TO FILL THESE SLOTS AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.
9. BASED ON EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH MEMBERS, I AGREED TO
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SPEAK TO A MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP. I
DECLINED THEIR INVITATION TO DO SO AT THEIR MEETING IN CALIFORNIA
BECAUSE OF OBJECTIONS BY A SECOM MEMBER. I HAVE AGREED TO SPEAK
TO THEM AT THEIR 15 FEBRUARY MEETING AT AN APPROVED CONTRACTOR
FACILITY IN THE D. C. AREA. MY PRESENTATION WILL BE LIMITED TO
THE SECRET LEVEL, AND WILL FOCUS ON SECOM ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS
AND SELECTED CURRENT ISSUES. I PLAN TO TELL THEM WE WOULD
WELCOME INPUT FROM THEM ON SECURITY MEASURES WHICH AFFECT
INDUSTRY, AND TO REMIND THEM ONCE AGAIN THAT THE ISWG DOES NOT
ENJOY A POSITION AS A PART OF THE SECURITY COMMITTEE. THE
RELATIONSHIP IS OF AN INFORMATIONAL NATURE EXCLUSIVELY.
10. WE MAY BE MOVING FROM THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING LATER
THIS YEAR, PROBABLY TO ROSLYN OR PERHAPS TO THE TYSON'S AREA.
WE'LL KEEP YOU POSTED ON THIS.
11. A MOU HAS BEEN CONCLUDED WITH STATE DEPARTMENT
REGARDING ITS ASSUMPTION OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NEW
MOSCOW EMBASSY SECURITY PROJECT.
12. THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY COMMITTEE HAS PRO-
POSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP OF THE CHAIRMEN OF SCOCE,
SECOM'S TSCS AND AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES WORKING GROUP, AND
POSSIBLY OTHERS TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR MORE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF
TECHNICAL SECURITY RESOURCES. THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO TASKING
FROM THE IG/CM FOR A REVIEW OF TEMPEST STANDARDS.
13. WE HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED BY THE PROTOCOL OFFICE THAT
WOULD LIKE ANY INTERESTED MEMBERS OF THE SECOM 25X1
TO BE INVITED TO HIS AWARD CEREMONY ON FEBRUARY 1 IN HEADQUARTERS
AUDITORIUM AT 11:00. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO ATTEND OR SEND A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM YOUR OFFICE, PLEASE LEAVE NAMES WITH 25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
14 January 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Initiatives to Deal with Leaks
1. Action Requested: Your review and approval of the attached terms
of reference on Community initiatives to deal with the problem of unauthorized
disclosures of classified intelligence information.
2. Background: On 22 December 1982, you asked for an early meeting of
the Security Committee to address initiatives to combat leaks that would be
supported by the Community and to prepare terms of reference to implement
them.
3. Current Status: SECOM met on 5 January 1983 in response to your
tasking. Initiatives supported by all Community agencies represented on the
SECOM are summarized at Tab A. Draft terms of reference to implement the
agreed initiatives are at Tab B.
4. Recommendation: That the DCI approve the attached draft terms of
reference for initiatives to deal with) 7 of intelligence.
Attachments
Regraded Official Use Only When
Separated from Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
.025X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Initiatives to Deal with Leaks
Director, Intelligence Community St;'f
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
18 JAN 1983
2 0 ,;..;; .:.:3
Director of Central Intelligence Date
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Initiatives to Deal with Leaks
Distribution:
Orig - Return C/SECOM w/att
1 - DCI w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - ExDir w/att
1 - ER w/att
1 - D/ICS w/att
1 - ICS Registry w/att
1 - C/UDIS w/att
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-019
24 January 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Information Handling Committee
Chairman, SECOM Computer Security Subcommittee
SUBJECT: Computer Security
Attached for your information is a copy of a paper I sent the Director of
the Intelligence Community Staff concerning policy structures to support
computer security.
STAT
STAT
Attachment
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CONFIDENTIAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-017
21 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Computer Security
1. This paper responds to the request for proposals to create a policy
structure to support computer security in the coming period of exponential
growth in the applications of computer technology, the numbers of people who
will have access to the computerized data and/or the hardware and software,
and the components which will access Community-wide networks handling
sensitive intelligence and information on sources and methods.
2. The measures contemplated'include terms of reference for Community
guidance in computer security matters; determination of appropriate Community
roles for the DoD Computer Security Evaluation Center, the National Communi-
cations Security Committee, the DCI Information Handling Committee, the DCI
Security Committee's Computer Security Subcommittee, the Intelligence
Community Staff, and of the NFIB and NFIC agencies; establishment of long-
and short-range goals for computer security; Community policy for computer
security; consideration of means of obtaining the support of the computer
industry for development of more-easily-secured systems; establishing
requirements for U. S. collection of intelligence concerning hostile efforts
and capabilities to penetrate our computer systems and ensuring optimum
utilization of all such intelligence collected; formulating uniform training
for computer security specialists; and a forum and mechanism for the
consideration and solution of computer security issues and problems.
3. Computer security resources, both human and financial, are in short
supply and likely to remain so for the immediate future.. Those with expertise
in computer security are heavily burdened with their own agencies' efforts and
have little time to spare for Community work. The SECOM Computer Security
Subcommittee is a prime example of this problem. Now that computer security
has been "discovered" by the Community, however, it is possible that managers
will be willing to contribute more of their people's time, effort and exper-
tise. Nevertheless, Community agencies would be hard pressed to contribute
security experts to serve on a full-time task for an extended period of time.
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4. It is essential that any group charged with laying the groundwork for
computer security for the Intelligence Community through the nineteen-eighties
embody the broadest possible representation. The military services' desire to
make as much data as possible available to tactical commanders must be consid-
ered along with the Clandestine Services' desire to assure maximum protection
of sources and methods. It is also important that the structure for computer
security policy have close ties with similar groups concerned with the other
essential security disciplines: personnel, physical, technical, and
procedural, as well as COMSEC and emanations security. Finally, the croup
should have a Community-recognized role and charter to act on behalf of the
DCI in formulating policy proposals for his consideration.
5. This paper, therefore, is a proposal to use an existing institution to
deal with a problem properly under its jurisdiction. The charter (attached) of
the Computer Security Subcommittee under DCID 1/11 assigns to it the major part
of the responsibilities discussed above. With computer security's elevation to
greater prominence, it should now be possible to obtain the cooperation needed
to deal with it effectively. As stated earlier, it is unlikely that the
members of the subcommittee can be spared full-time by their organizations, but
they should be able to devote appreciably more time and effort to the
subcommittee.
6. The DoD Computer Security Evaluation Center is represented on the
Computer Security Subcommittee. At least one member is also a member of the
NCSC. 'I would suggest that observers from the Information Handling Committee,
the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee and the NCSC be added
to the subcommittee to ensure input from these sectors. To enhance information
sharing, I propose that a SECOM Staff member be afforded observer status on the
IHC, NCSC and the TTIC/Department of Commerce Working Group, during any delib-
erations of these bodies on computer security matters.
7. Recognizing that some full-time staff assistance is needed, I have
taken steps to recruit a computer security specialist to fill one of the vacant
slots on the SECOM Staff. Because of other duties of the position, I do not
believe that one person will be able to provide all of the needed support. I
do believe, however, that the addition of one more computer-security-
knowledgeable individual to the SECOM Staff would provide sufficient support
to,the Computer Security Subcommittee to make headway against the tasks that
now cry out for action. This was the minimum level recommended in the paper
produced by the Policy and Planning Staff.
8. I agree that throwing resources at the problem is not the solution,
especially since significant resources are not available in the near term. But
I am convinced that, with the exercise of leadership from the D/ICS level or
above and the investment of limited resources, progress is possible in most
areas of computer security through the efforts of the Computer Security
Subcommittee and the SECOM Staff.
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9. Your favorable consideration of the above proposal is requested.
Attachments
DCID No. 1/11 Attachment 2
DCID No. 1/16
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SECRET
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-018
24 January 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Law irman
SUBJECT: Staff Planning (U)
REFERENCE: Your 13 January 1983 Note, Same Subject
As we discussed the Intelligence Community Staff 25X1
reorganization, except for the dissolution of the Office of Community
Coordination, will have minimal structural impact upon the Security
-Committee. We have operated in the past in general accordance with the
The SECOM will continue to provide a mechanism for Community-wide
planning, management and coordination of a broad array of security issues.
We will ensure every member an opportunity to be heard on every topic before
the Committee, and the Staff will provide independent positions that best
serve the interests of the DCI and the Community. We will seek the best
qualified people for staff assignments and subcommittee appointments. 25X1
As security problems become increasingly involved with high technology
systems, security costs can be expected to increase, making practicable
solutions even more difficult within the constraints of limited resources.
The involvement of the SECOM membership in the issues addressed may be
expected to continue at a high level, as these issues are varied and com-
prehensive, affecting all segments of the Community at all levels. 25X1
The initiatives raised in the SECOM are viewed by the members on the
basis of their particular priorities and equities. Generally, they all
perceive the same problems. Solutions are often a different matter. Yet
consensus is possible and often effective. The SECOM consensus on personnel
security investigations was instrumental, I believe, in substantially altering
a trend in the DoD toward less stringent investigations. It was effective in
obtaining DDCI action to dissuade the Department of Energy from contractin
out the staff of its all-source intelligence communications center. 25X1
SECOM is structured to address most of the major security issues of
concern to the Community through eight subordinate elements, each representing
all interested Community components. They are:
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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1. Compartmentation Subcommittee - Chaired by Air Force.
Reviews, develops and coordinates security policy and procedures
on the handling and use of sensitive compartmented information
and data relating to intelligence sources and methods. This sub-
committee will review and revise, as needed, Community security
procedures on handling and use of sensitive compartmented infor-
mation (SCI) and source and method data, and update hazardous
area list
s applicable to foreign travel by persons with sensitive
F_ I
2. Computer Security Subcommittee - Chaired by DIA.
Reviews, develops and coordinates Community security policy
for the protection of intelligence processed by or stored in
ADP systems. During 1983 this subcommittee will complete a
revision of the DCI computer security policy paper; will
review, refine and revise, as needed, Community collection
requirements on hostile threats to computers; and will conduct
other related activities as determined by the ongoing IC Staff
review of computer security.
3. Personnel Security Subcommittee - Chaired by NSA.
Reviews, develops and coordinates Community security policy
"and'procedures-for tfie investigation and adjudication of the
eligibility of persons proposed for access to sensitive
intelligence. This subcommittee will complete an ongoing
revision of DCI personnel security policy for access.to SCI;
conduct three seminars for Community personnel security
officers who adjudicate investigative data for SCI access
determinations; and participate in studies and analyses of
polygraph techniques.
4. Research and Development Subcommittee - Chaired by
CIA/ORD. Plans, coordinates an monitors research and
development on matters of security concern to the Community.
During 1983 the R&D Subcommittee will continue R&D projects
to support State Department management of the Moscow security
program; arrange for R&D on an advanced countermeasures
receiver for Community use in technical surveillance counter-
measures inspections; and sponsor R&D on a variety of security
matters (e.g., RF emanation detection and location).
5. Security Advisory Group USSR - Chaired by State.
Plans and coordinates Community support for the State
Department program to safeguard the new U. S. Embassy being
constructed in Moscow. During 1983 the SAG-USSR will arrange
support for the security inspection of Soviet-made and
installed building components and for security measures to
protect sensitive US components being installed in the new
building.
SECRET
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6. Security Awareness Subcommittee - Chaired by FBI. Develops
and coordinates security awareness and education materials for use
by the Community in briefing on the hostile threat and on measures
to avoid compromise. During 1983 the subcommittee will arrange for
the development of security awareness briefings and materials;
catalog for the benefit of the Community security awareness
materials developed by departments and agencies, contractors, and
allied countries; and study means of influencing opinion, within
government and outside, against unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence and those who perpetrate such leaks.
7. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee -
Chaired by CIA STS Coordinates U. S. Government a enses
against hostile technical surveillance and conducts training for all
Community personnel who conduct technical countermeasures
inspections. During 1983 TSCS will update procedural guides for the
Community on how to inspect for technical penetration and what to do
with "finds"; oversee implementation of budgeted improvements to the
Community's sole technical surveillance countermeasures training
facility; sponsor security testing of new computerized telephone
-systems; and improve-screening-procedures for the review of license
requests for the export of countermeasures equipment.
8. Unauthorized Disclosures'Investigations Subcommittee -
-----C-hai-red-by- CIA/OGC Provides a focal point for the Community to
coordinate investigations of unauthorized disclosures of intelli-
gence, and seeks to develop security procedures to preclude the
recurrence of leaks. During 1983 UDIS will evaluate document
control technology and methods for preventing leaks of extremely
sensitive data; develop means to improve the quality, timeliness and
Community coordination of leak investigations; and seek to develop a
plan of action for sharing damage assessments among agencies.
I believe that completion of the planned tasks identified above will
significantly enhance the security of the Community in ways that are
practicable and acceptable to Community components. Unless otherwise
directed, I will proceed according to this plan during 1983, and will use
existing structures to address new initiatives from SECOM members and any
specific tasking received duri
ng the yam.
25X1
25X1
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
Mr. Arthur A. Klekner
Director, Office of Security and Safety
General Accounting Office, Room 4844
.441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20548
Dear Mr. Klekner:
Thank you for your interest in the Security Committee's Adjudicators'
Seminars. As ust have told you, the seminars are conducted for STAT
Intelligence Community adjudicators who evaluate cases involving access to
sensitive compartmented information (SCI). A primary objective is to achieve
a higher degree of homogeneity and constancy in SCI adjudications among the
several agencies of the community.
The seminars have been consistently oversubscribed, and we are anxious
to afford those for whom the course was designed the earliest opportunity to
attend, thereby achieving our primary objective. It is my understanding that
the SCI adjudications for the General Accounting Office are performed within
the Intelligence Community.
I would suggest we arrange for one GAO security officer to attend the
seminar in March to evaluate its potential worth to your organization. It may
turn out that such a specialized program is not what you are seeking. If it
appears to be worthwhile, we will try to arrange attendance by other GAO
personnel as permitted by Intelligence Community requirements. If you will
provide the name of a candidate, I will arrange for enrollment. If you wish
to discuss this proposal, please call me on
STAT
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December 22, 1982
Chairman, DCI Security Committee
Room 5E25
CIA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20505
In November 1980, the U.S. General Accounting Office established an
internal Office of Security & Safety. Although the mission of GAO does not
place it directly in the intelligence community, we are making every effort
to have our internal security procedures and standards no less than that of
those agencies in the Executive Branch of the Goverment.
In 1979, the FBI, at the request, of the Comptroller General, did a review
of the overall security program in GAO. In March of this year, the new
Comptroller General requested that the FBI re-review the security of GAO to
determine if the previous recommendations had been established and/or followed
and to make any further recommendations, as appropriate. One of the new rec-
ommendations the FBI will be making to the Comptroller General, is that the
members of the Personnel Security Branch of the Office of Security & Safety
attend the intelligence community adjudication conference.
I spoke with of your staff, and he informed me there are a
total of four conferences in 1983. This is to request two slots for the first
conference,-one for myself and one for the main adjudicator of my staff.
Additionally, I would like to request two slots at any of the other three
conferences.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me or Linda Skelly
of my staff on 275-4700. I would appreciate your prompt attention to this
matter.
Sincerely yours,
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548
Arthur A. Klekner
Director
STAT
STAT
STAT
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-404
15 December 1982
Mr. Arthur Klekner
Director, Office of Security and Safety
General Accounting Office, Room 4844
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20548
Dear Mr. Klekner:
Mr. Brown's letter of 30 November 1982, requesting assistance of the DCI
in trainino GAO Der nn l in technic? ntermeasures, has been, referred to STAT
me. The operates under the sponsorship of
the DCI Security Committee (SECOM).
At this time, plans are underway to provide technical surveillance
countermeasures training to the US Capitol Police, under sponsorship of the
FBI. In order to maintain FBI cognizance of Legislative Branch TSCM training,
I have forwarded Mr. Brown's letter to Mr. Lloyd E. Dean, Systems Program
Manager of the FBI. I have asked Mr. Dean to contact you regarding GAO's
request.
I regret the delay in responding, but Mr. Brown's letter did not reach me
until 9 December. If I can be of assistance to GAO, please do not hesitate to
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GAO
United States General Accounting Office General Services and Controller
1:'ashington, DC 20548
V 3 0 I S 8 2
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
ATTN: SECOM
The General Accounting Office is comprised of a Headquarters, fourteen
Regional Offices in the U.S. and three overseas offices. The mission of
GAO frequently necessitate acquisition, storage, discussion and dissemina-
tion of classified/sensitive information obtained from both government and
private organizations.
The wide access to classified/sensitive information which GAO
auditors/evaluators are often afforded renders this organization extremely
sensitive to potential targeting by hostile elements.
In 1980, the General Accounting Office established an Office of Security
and Safety whose primary mission is to safeguard information and personnel
within the agency. One project currently being implemented is the establish-
ment of an effective countermeasure program. The Office of Security has
procured several devices designed for use in this program to detect and
locate RF transmission devices ("bugs"), and telephone analysis equipment.
Instruction in the use of this equipment was provided by the vendors from
whom the equipment was purchased.
In order to create and implement a highly effective countermeasure
program for the GAO, highly specialized and intensive training is necessary.
The nature of the training we are interested in is not limited to proper
use of countermeasures equipment, but also in the development of a total
program. Such a program would include, but not be limited to, recognition
of the threat, proper physical search technique, identification of clandes-
tine listening devices and telephone taps, establishment of preventive
measures against such possible attacks and any other information and train-
ing that would serve us in establishing a credible countermeasures program.
While we, as an agency, do have some limited expertise in-house to
establish such a program, we do not feel that our current level of knowledge
is adequate to the task. However, it has come to our attention that train-
ing in this field is available only through the intelligence community
through agencies such as yours.
In view of the above, it is requested that this office be authorized
to send representatives to your training center to obtain the necessary
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instructions regarding establishment of a total countermeasures program for
the GAO. We have previously discussed this matter with personnel at your
training site and have been advised to request this training through your
Headquarters. Any assistance you can give us in this matter would be greatly
appreciated.
Please direct your response to this inquiry to the Director, Office of
Security and Safety, General Accounting Office, 441 G Street, N.W., Room
4844, Washington, D.C. 20548, phone [phone].
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STAT
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In reply refer to:
1-14473/82
2 2 SEP 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STI LWELL ,
L'
SUBJECT: Survey of Special Background Investigation (SBI)
15 Year Period of Coverage-INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
On 15 June 1982, the Army, Navy, Air Force and DIS were
tasked to conduct a two month survey (1 Jul 82-31 Aug 82)
to determine how far back the SBI must go in order to
uncover adverse information serious enough to warrant
denial of access. This survey was prompted by two factors:
(1) the Select Panel recommendation for DoD adoption of a
single scope background investigation at the level mandated
by DCID 1/14 and (2) the impact that such an investigative
effort would have on DIS considering the required 1S year
period of coverage for an SBI.
It has long been our position that a ten year investigative
scope would be more than adequate coverage to reveal signif-
icant factors in a person's background that might affect
their eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented in-
formation (SCI). In fact, the survey revealed that of the
7,335 total cases reviewed during the period, 213 were con-
sidered for an adverse action; of these only 2 cases were
based on information developed exclusively in the over 10
.year period. It also appears that in those instances the
adverse information was of such a nature that it would have
been uncovered in the course of a 10 year scope investigation
or less.
As a result of this and other previous studies, and due to
our concern over the impact that a single 1S year scope
background investigation would have on DIS, a recommendation
was made to the Personnel Security Subcommittee (PerSSub) of
the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) to change DCID 1/14 coverage
from 1S to 10 years. On 14 September 1982, the OSD proposal
on this point was defeated by a vote of 7 to 5. However, I
intend to pursue this action further directly with the SLCOM 1!`~.'
nrinrinn1 c and trill Vjmnn vnii ;ncnrtne~.1 nP m., .,---- 1
Maynt Fd -CT- Ande r Lon
Dir c or
Security Pla and Pfograms
j 9 /2L
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Summary of DoD Survey of SBI Period of Coverage
1.
Adverse information appearing in only one year group
category:
(1)
0 - 5 years:
166
(2)
6 - 10 years:
12
(3)
11 - 15 years:
1
(4)
16+ - years:
1
2.
Adverse information appearing in more than one year group
category:
(1)
0
- 5 years:
31
_(2)
6
- 10 years:
29
(3)
11
- 15 years:'
6
(4)
16+
- years:
3
Total:
69
3. Total of boththe above categories:
(1)
0 - 5 years:
197
(2)
6 - 10 years:
41
(3)
11 - 15 years:
7
(4)
16+ - years:
4
Total:
249*
* This number totals more than 213 due to the fact that a
number of cases reported adverse information in as many
as three or four categories.
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STAT
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D RAF T
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-012
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward J. O'Malley
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: TAYLORMAID (U)
1. Thank you for sharing with the Security Committee the report prepared
by the TAYLORMAID working group. It is a welcome step in addressing the
hostile technical penetration threat in the United States.
2. When they become available, the responses of the Army's 902nd
Military Intelligence Group and the Air Force's Office of Special Investiga-
tions to your working group's tasking would be of interest.
3. The technical threat clearly is a matter requiring additional atten-
tion. The SECOM will be considering ways to assist in alleviating the problem
posed by limited security resources, significant vulnerabilities, and a threat
whose dimensions are not easily defined. 25X1
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
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14 JAN 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee
DCI Security Committee
LIA em er
Rotational Assignment Nomination
1. I am pleased to nominate
Security Officer, for the position of Deputy for Technical
Security, SECOM. is an experienced senior security
officer with broad knowledge of physical, technical and infor-
mation security matters. He is a self-starter. He communicates
effectively both orally and in writing. His many years in
computer security make him, by Agency standards, an exceptional
candidate for this position.
2. A brief biographic sketch of is attached.
He is very enthusiastic regarding his can i acy. It would be
appreciated if you would advise this Office is the
successful candidate for this position so that the necessary
arrangements for his rotational assignment can be made. ls-.
Attachment
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
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25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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: united states vepartment of State
Assistant SecretaD- of State
for Administration
::Ogistr;?
Washington, D. C. 20520
SECRET January 21, 1983
Dear Harry:
I regret the delay in responding to your letter of
January 17, but I have been travelling and have just
returned to the office.
I appreciate your drafting the proposed Memorandum of
Understanding. I concur in your approach, and have signed
the original. Enclosed is a copy for your records.
The Department looks forward to continued cooperation
and support from the Agency and the DCI Security Committee
in order to insure the continuity and successful
completion of this important project.
Sincerely,
Thomas M. Tracy
Enclosure:
As stated...
The Honorable
Harry E. Fitzwater,
Deputy Director for Administration,
Central Intelligence Agency.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
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