PERSONNEL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE CHARTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 19, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
P
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEETfjk%
SUBJECT: (Optional) """ ILI. t i
Personnel Security Subcom ' Ne Charter
y
FROM EXTENSION
'
NO. U
STA
Chief, Policy and Plans o p
DATE
STA
4-E-70 Headquarters
19 April 1982
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
FORWARDED
RECEIVED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
iDa
CIASTA
h
DDI SI
F
as t
e
represent at ve on the
2.
Personnel Security Sub-
~
committee, has seen this,
st?L
of course. You may wish
3.
to review it before we
respond to the C/SECOM.
V
7.
Q
10.
e
'
^rr'G7/d.c.
11.
STA
12.
13.
14.
15.
T
T
T
T
T
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812 R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-142
14 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security~Commi-ttee
airman
SUBJECT: Personnel Security Subcommittee Charter
Forwarded herewith is the newly written charter for the Personnel Security
Subcommittee. It has been reviewed and unanimously approved by the members of
the Personnel Security Subcommittee as their basic operating document. It is
requested that members review this paper and if there are no objections to it,
it will become this Subcommittee=s basic paper. If no response is received
by myself or the Executive Secretary by Y 30 Agri l I982,awe will consider that
you have approved the document.
Attachment
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4 ' 67S
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-157
23 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee
airman
SUBJECT: SECOM Charter
REFERENCE: My Memo to Members, SECOM-D-104, dated 23 March 1982
As promised at the 21 April meeting, this addresses comments received on
the draft revision of the SECOM charter forwarded by reference:
a. One member noted that the substance of the draft may
not merit'classification.
Comment: It is planned that the collection of revised DCIDs will be
classified..- Accordingly, our charter will be classified as part of the
package.
STAT
b. A suggestion was made that the second sentence of section
four be changed to read "Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community"
instead of "Intelligence Community principals."
Comment: The Executive Secretary NFIB/NFIC chose the "Intelligence
'Community principals" terminology to permit continued representation on the
SECOM and other DCI committees from organizations which do not come under "Senior
Officials of the Intelligence Community" as that term is defined in Executive
Order 12333.
c. One member noted that security education and awareness is left
to a working group and recommended'that this group be upgraded to permanent
subcommittee status.
Comment: This does not bear on the wording of the draft charter, which
authorize the chairman to establish subcommittees, etc., as required. Under
that authority, I accept the. recommendation contingent upon SECOM member endorse-
ment and approval of a tasking charter.
OS REGISTRY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
0 i o I
d. It was suggested that the list of implementing guidelines
be reformatted for the sake of clarity; be consolidated at some future
date; and include "Minimum Standards for Security Awareness Programs
in the Intelligence Community."
Comment: Suggestions accepted.
. e. A question was raised about the interpretation of section 2.b(2)
on SECOM functions concerning investigations of unauthorized disclosures
of classified intelligence.
Comment: It is not intended that the SECOM charter contain authority to
mandate what procedures shall be employed to investigate such disclosures.
However, the DCI does have clear authority to protect intelligence and to
obtain information on disclosures necessary to assess the impact on the intel-
ligence process and to support development of corrective security measures.
The Security Committee was originally formed to address leaks and compromises
of intelligence. A 'significant part of the present (18 May 1976) SECOM charter
addresses our role in unauthorized disclosures. Although overall Executive
Branch procedures concerning unauthorized disclosures of classified information
generally are dealt with in the findings and recommendations of the report the
Attorney General sent the President on 31 March 1982, nothing is being considered
now which would in any way reduce the DCI's authorities or responsibilities con-
cerning disclosures of intelligence. Accordingly, I believe we should carry
forward to the new draft the essential elements of our present tasking. If
the White House directs stronger measures to prevent disclosures, we can change
the SECOM charter as needed. In the interim we need to move promptly to agree
on a final draft charter. If SECOM members find the language of section 2.b(2)
of the present draft troublesome, the following adaptation of our present charter,
to be a new section 2.c (in place of 2.b(2) and renumbering sections appropriately),
may be helpful:
"c. On behalf of the DCI, request and coordinate investigations
by Intelligence Community components of unauthorized disclosures or
compromises of classified intelligence; and determine and recommend
corrective security measures needed to reduce the future likelihood of
such disclosures or compromises."
May I have members' thoughts on this approach?
f. Several members advised of an error in section 2.c in stating
the term "Sensitive Compartmented Information."
Comment: Correction made.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
14 APR 1982
I i:iORANNDUxi FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Coi mittee
FROM :
CIA tienher, DCI Security Co awittee
SU3Ja-CT: Draft SECOii Charter
i EI ER.LiIGE: NeraoranduY from Chairiaan/LOCI SECOH, dated
23 March 1932, same subject (SECOU-D-1O4)
Please be advised of the concurrence of the Central
Intelligence Agency in the draft SECOU charter foruarded by
reference.
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - D/Sec
C - OS Reg
1 - PPG Chrono
OS/P&M/ cbt (12 April 82)
Revise cbt (13 April 82)
05 a 0787-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
ST
Draft SECOM Charter
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO. ST
d
Policy an
Plans Group
4E-70, Hdqs.
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/PPG
2.
3. DD/PIM
. ApeC
12 1982
4.
5. DD/SEC
12'11982
6.
D/SEC
12 "9e
.
14 A+9sa
8
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
AT
AT
FORM 61 A USE PREVIOUS
_79 1 EDITIONS
,-79m
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
.In io
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee f ~ e 2 `S
SECOM-D-104
23 March 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members,DCI Security Committee
SUBJECT: SECOM Charter
1. As part of the ongoing effort to revise the Director of Central
Intelligence Directives (DCIDs), Admiral Inman has approved an approach which
looks to stating broad policy in new DCIDs and publishing implementing guidance,
such as is found in many current DCIDs (e.g., DCIDs 1/14, 1/16 and 1/19), in
attachments. The NFIB Executive Secretary and I cooperated in drafting a pro-
posed revision of the SECOM charter (DCID 1/11) which reflects this approach.
Admiral Inman has approved this revision for circulation to SECOM members.
2. The draft revision is attached. Members are requested to coordinate
it within their departments and agencies and to provide me their concurrences
or comments by 16 April 1982.
Attachment
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED When
Separated from Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Revised SECOM Charter
EXTENSION
NO
FROM:
.
Ch i e
DATE
202
8 April 1982 c
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
Chief/PPG
49 4?
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM ~~ 0 USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
STAT
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
8 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy and Plans Group
Chief of Operations (PTAS)
1. Pursuant to your request for comments re Subject by
9 April, attached is a review/comment from the Chief, Information
Systems Security Group. Additionally, we would like to point out
that we are certainly in agreement with the intention and goals
of SECOM, however, continue to feel that strong emphasis must be
provided to upgrade security standards and criteria in the
Community. The job of security daily seems to become more difficult
in a permissive society with all its "leaks" and watered-down
philosophies and attitudes. A job of SECOM, as we see it, is
to disallow even the thought that standards and criteria are
to be at the lowest common denominator level.
2. A minor point is pointed out that on page 2, paragraph
2(c), the expression "special compartmented information" is
probably in error. If this statement refers to SCI, it should
e compartmented information."
REGRADE UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FR N CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
rnim r~n a i " II
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT :
Chief of Operations
Physical, Technical and Area Security
Information Systems Security Group, OS
Comments on Revised SECOM Charter
REFERENCE: Routing and Record Sheet dated 24 March 1982
w/attachment
2. We have no problem with the approach as stated in reference
which will separate broad policy from implementation guidance in the
form of an Intelligence Community regulation provided that the
effective date of the regulatory issuance conforms with the date of
policy promulgation. If broad policy is published, for example, on
the subject of computer security and there is a gap of time before
the regulation to go with this policy is agreed to and published,
agencies (and contractors) would be doing their "own thing" and
chaos would ensue. There would be a breakdown in uniformity which
we have been striving to achieve over these many years. Lack of
such uniformity especially in the contractor world could and most
probably would lead to increased dollar costs in processing
community data (with different contractor requirements for instance
and lack of Memoranda of Agreement(s) among member agencies).
3. The bright side in this proposed charter is that technology
changes which oftentimes generate new computer security
vulnerabilities (e.g., fixed storage devices, remote diagnostics,
etc.) can be handled as revisions to the regulation(s) with the
broad policy document kept intact without the necessity of
constantly changing it. In short, the policy section would be
somewhat fixed, with changes made when needed in the regulation
instead of the whole document. Our concern is there always be
a regulation to go with stated br
oad policy.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4
ROUTING = Aida AtE
o%, I
i-7?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250006-4