UNDERSTANDING ESPIONAGE: SUBJECTS' OWN PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00812R000200060020-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2010/10/07: CIA-RDP87-00812R000200060020-8
Project "Slanmer" Research Proposal
UNDERSTANDING ESPIONAGE: SUBJECTS' OWN PERSPECTIVES
ADD CONTEIITUAL INFLUENCES
BACKGROUND: Previous espionage research regarding which has considered "human
factors," has concentrated on the personal dynamics of those who commit this
crime. Much of this work has been in the form of the single case study, or
involved the similarities found among several cases which were studied
individually. Information for these studies has predominantly been drawn from
case file data, which included historical material, personnel records and the
results of substantive investigations. Actually, this has been the
traditional methodology for examining criminal behavior in general, and this
is but an application of the technique to the crime of espionage.
Recent initiatives developed by members of the FBI Behavioral Science Unit
suggest a practical, innovative methodology. This approach asks the offenders
themselves about their crimes. It has, for instance, provided numerous
insights into the motivations and methods of serial murderers. Direct inquiry
of subjects, however, may not always be successful. Some incarcerated felons
have no desire to cooperate, while others may provide information which is
intentionally misleading. Nonetheless, many do participate. Apparently the
opportunity to aid in research reinforces their self-esteem, assuages guilt,
or both.
Another innovation is suggested by the psychologists who conduct entrance
screening at CIA. Their astute observation is that environmental/
situational factors appear to be distinct influences upon a number of spies
who were otherwise (psychologically) unremarkable when compared to their
peers. These situations are "triggers" which are perceived by subjects to
justify illegal behavior. It would seem that this interaction of personality
factors and life circumstances produces a compelling sense of entitlement
which motivates espionage. Apparently the key to understanding this
motivation lies in subjects' personal perceptions of their experiences. It
would then seem to follow, that the FBI's direct approach would be essential
to unlocking the importance of contextual issues which have catalytic effects.
The most obvious potential shortcoming of the direct interview approach
questions the validity of the information provided by incarcerated felons.
While it may not be possible to resolve the veracity of all data, interviews
of subjects' closest associates at the time of the offense could be telling.
Spouses, lady-friends or men-friends may be able to validate and amplify
subjects' statements. Further, co-workers could reveal information that would
provide insights into, conditions in the work place. For instance, peers in
the work place may be able to describe presumptions about the subject they
entertained during the period that the crimes occurred. This final
observation may identify barriers perceived by employees to reporting possible
security concerns.
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STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES: This study will examine espionage agents by
exploring the many interactive contextual factors which spies themselves
believe to have influenced their motivation. In the past, most espionage
research has viewed subjects externally to form descriptive personality
assessments. Information has not been obtained directly from subjects to
offer their own perspectives. Consequently, this study will focus on spies'
own thoughts, feelings and beliefs regarding their decision to commit
espionage, presumptions regarding detection, and their reactions to the
potential consequences of their acts. Further, this study will refine a
methodology for continuing inquiry into the crime of espionage.
Increase our understanding of subjects who have committed
espionage to enhance future security screening.
2. Detail situational circumstances that may have influenced the
act of espionage.
3. Examine system effects that may have diluted or impeded the
maintenance of security.
4. Develop a procedure to continually collect and analyze
behavioral science aspects of espionage.
METHOD
Cases: Cases to be studied , to the greatest extent possible, need be
representative of typical instances of the crime. This is so that results
will be generalizable to the most frequently encountered circumstances.
Sensational cases, which are noteworthy only because of their notoriety, may
occur only rarely, thereby limiting their potential for prediction. Further,
cases need to be reasonably recent. Very old cases will potentially suffer
from a lack of uniformity to current conditions, not to mention the influences
of time on memory. The sample also should represent community-wide
investigations, so that idiosyncratic differences within agencies do not
distort conclusions. Member agencies of SECOM will nominate cases by
presenting summaries to the project working group, which will select cases for
study. Detailed case reveiew will precede each subject interview.
Subjects: All personnel who are subjects of this study will be spies who
have been caught, tried and convicted; they need to have been fully
adjudicated. Further, these felons must have exhausted all appeals and be
serving their sentences free of any further legal redress. To confirm the
purpose of this study, and to more fully assist in cooperation, each subject
must be authorized immunity from further prosecution for their offense.
Additionally, others who volunteer to participate as observers of the subject
(while in commission of the crime) should be offered both immunity and
anonymity.
Data Collection: All subjects will be interviewed to obtain detailed
historical data regarding their maturational development. This history will
explore the nature of relationships, the engendering of loyalty and effects of
critical incidents. Psychological testing will be conducted to obtain
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objective measures of current functioning, to include personality traits and
dispositions. These assessments will also permit comparisons to earlier
psychometric findings (where available) to provide an index of change from
entrance security screening. Interviews will be videotape recorded to enhance
review and permit refinement of procedure.
Procedure: This research will be conducted in three phases. Phase one
will consist of a pilot study to develop technique, both in content and
style. Phase two will comprise a series of four subject interviews. This
phase will be a preliminary evaluation of progress based on an arbitrarily
small number of cases. It will permit further procedural refinement while
allowing for initial analyses as a check for the utility of the data. The
third phase will consist of continuing interviews so that a data base can be
established, procedure can be modified for greater relevance, and cases
themselves can have more thorough conclusions. In summary, the procedures are
intended to be self refining, and in time, permit a course of action to more
fully resolve each case examined (e.g., to provide further insights to include
possibly revising assessments of information compromised). Eventually, all
adjudicated cases could be considered for behavioral science review, providing
an on-going source of research and investigation. Figure 1 depicts the
procedural overview.
Projected Deadlines
4 Months 7 Months
Phase I Pilot study
(1 case)
Phase II
Preliminary study
(4 cases)
On-Going Study
(Reporting at 6
month intervals)
FIGURE 1. PROCEDURAL OYEEYIEW
Figure 1 also presents suggested deadlines for accomplishing goals. While
these deadlines are onty approximate, they are offered to shape expectations
for reporting. Initiation of Phase I will, of course, require a number of
supportive actions.
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~EQUIREMEVTS FOR INITIATING RESEARCH
Personnel: It is proposed that personnel to support this study be
formally appointed as either research team members (Mho will actually conduct
the interviews) or to the project working group. Team members should be
consistent throughout Phases I and II. By the time Phase III is initiated,
procedures should be sufficiently standardized that individual roles could be
conducted by others. The team should be small in size to facilitate
interaction, aid standardization and intensify the learning experience. It
ought to consist of two behavioral scientists, and two security
investigators. One of the behavioral scientists will be the project leader;
one of the security experts will function administratively as a point of
contact and expeditor for the many "behind the scenes" actions and
coordinations. Additionally, there should be clerical support, preferably
from the same office as the security agent Who acts as functional
administrator. Importantly, in addition to being multidisciplinary, the team
and working group should have multiagency representation.
Consultants to the teas will comprise a working group. Resources will
include additional behavioral scientists, security, legal, and data automation
personnel. Consultants will attend an initial planning session to develop
structured interview content and format, design preliminary data analysis
procedures, and select an initial case for study. Results of this first
working group sooting will be refined by the team and tasted in the subsequent
pilot study (Phase I of the project). The working group will then again meet
to review salient videotaped portions of interviews, discuss findings and
restructure the procedure as appropriate. Phase II would then follow, with
an additional working group meeting to be held to select additional cases.
The working groups may also be convened prior to reporting Phase II findings.
Phase III presumes sufficient refinement of procedure to preclude the need for
routine scheduling for working group assistance.
Coordination: In addition to making team and working group selection,
there will be requirements for a variety of essential arrangements. These
will include scheduling and arranging meetings, nominating cases for study,
obtaining grants of immunity (and authorization for anonymity of subjects's
associates), contacting prospective subjects to determine their voluntariness,
and arranging for interviews of subjects and their former associates.
Equipment; Psychological testing materials and videotaping equipment are
the only items required. Access to word processing and minicomputers for data
analysis is also necessary.
Funds: The primary expenditure is anticipated to arise from travel
expenses required for meetings and interviews. Additional costs may be
incurred if members of the team or working group are contractual employees.
Further, consideration ought to be given to compensating subjects' former
associates for their time if they are not in governmental employment. Due to
the variability of these factors, an estimate of expenses is difficult.
nonetheless, Phase I would be expected to cost approximately ten thousand
dollars and Phase II, twenty-five thousand dollars. More precise estimates
per interview for Phase III should be established by completion of Phase II.
The first year of this study is therefore estimated to cost approximately 35
thousand dollars.
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COSCLUSI0I$: The proposed study is intended to be a community-wide effort to
re-examine selected espionage cases from multiple sources and disciplines. It
is unprecedented in scope and is designed to provide technology for continuing
insights into improving our national security. In the spirit of this
cooperative effort, review by the SBCOM committee is hoped to offer
recommendations by which this proposal can be enhanced further. This study is
a reflection of the resourcefulness of the committee, and initiatives it has
taken by stimulating interest through two behavioral science symposia.
SUBMITTED BY: Neil S. Kibler, Major, USAF, BSC
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Approved For Release 2010/10/07: CIA-RDP87-00812R000200060020-8